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Articles 151 - 180 of 1067

Full-Text Articles in Contracts

Is U.S. Ceo Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay, Randall S. Thompson May 2005

Is U.S. Ceo Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay, Randall S. Thompson

Michigan Law Review

In Pay Without Performance, Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried develop and summarize the leading critiques of current executive compensation practices in the United States. This book, and their highly influential earlier article, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, with David Walker offer a negative, if mainstream, assessment of the state of U.S. executive compensation: U.S. executive compensation practices are failing in a widespread manner, and much systemic reform is needed. The purpose of our Review is to summarize the book and to offer some counterarguments to try to balance what is becoming …

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Unity And Pluralism In Contract Law, Nathan Oman May 2005

Unity And Pluralism In Contract Law, Nathan Oman

Michigan Law Review

It is a cliché of contemporary legal scholarship that, in the last few decades, the study of law has witnessed a vast proliferation of competing theoretical approaches. The old faith in the careful honing of doctrinal concepts and the essential usefulness of legal analysis has given way to a cacophony of competing theoretical sects. Economists, moral philosophers, sociologists, historians, and others have stepped forward to offer the insights of this or that discipline as a new and superior path to legal enlightenment. Perhaps nowhere has this cliché been truer than in the realm of contracts scholarship, where, for a generation, …

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"We Insist! Freedom Now": Does Contract Doctrine Have Anything Consitutional To Say?, Hila Keren Jan 2005

"We Insist! Freedom Now": Does Contract Doctrine Have Anything Consitutional To Say?, Hila Keren

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

This Article first exposes the detachment between contract doctrine and the scattered antidiscrimination norms and analyzes the harmful consequences of this detachment. It then creates an original meeting point between the two bodies of law, one of which is intentionally located within contract doctrine. This point is found by dismantling the dominant concept of "freedom OF contact", and especially by defining and establishing the freedom to make a contract.

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An Ex-Ante View Of The Battle Of The Forms: Inducing Parties To Draft Reasonable Terms, Omri Ben-Shahar Oct 2004

An Ex-Ante View Of The Battle Of The Forms: Inducing Parties To Draft Reasonable Terms, Omri Ben-Shahar

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009

This paper focuses on one type of ex-ante effect of the battle of the forms: the incentive to draft reasonable boilerplate terms. It argues that the experience with the battle-of-the-forms rule under the CISG reinforces what we already know, that existing legal solutions do not provide any incentive for the parties to draft reasonable forms. The paper suggests that the goal of inducing parties to draft reasonable terms can be significantly promoted by a third rule, a variant of the “best-shot” rule proposed by Victor Goldberg. Under the version labeled the “reasonable-shot” rule, the court would resolve the battle of …

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Why Don't Doctors & Lawyers (Strangers In The Night) Get Their Act Together?, Frances H. Miller May 2004

Why Don't Doctors & Lawyers (Strangers In The Night) Get Their Act Together?, Frances H. Miller

Michigan Law Review

Health care in America is an expensive, complicated, inefficient, tangled mess - everybody says so. Patients decry its complexity, health care executives bemoan its lack of coherence, physicians plead for universal coverage to simplify their lives so they can just get on with taking care of patients, and everyone complains about health care costs. The best health care in the world is theoretically available here, but we deliver and pay for it in some of the world's worst ways. Occam's razor ("Among competing hypotheses, favor the simplest one") is of little help here. There are no simple hypotheses - everything …

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The Responsible Thing To Do About "Responsible Party" Provisions In Nursing Home Agreements: A Proposal For Change On Three Fronts, Katherine C. Pearson Apr 2004

The Responsible Thing To Do About "Responsible Party" Provisions In Nursing Home Agreements: A Proposal For Change On Three Fronts, Katherine C. Pearson

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Nursing homes routinely seek the signature of a family member on nursing home agreements, calling the signer a "responsible party" or sponsor for the resident. Federal Medicare and Medicaid law provides that participating facilities must "not require a third party guarantee of payment to the facility as a condition of admission ...to, or continued stay, in the facility. "Nonetheless, if federal benefits prove to be unavailable, courts are holding responsible parties contractually liable for thousands of dollars for the care of their elders. This Article proposes private and public responses to the increasing likelihood that nursing homes will seek collection …

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Credible Coercion, Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar Mar 2004

Credible Coercion, Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009

The ideal of individual liberty and autonomy requires that society provide relief against coercion. In the law, this requirement is often translated into rules that operate “post-coercion” to undo the legal consequences of acts and promises extracted under duress. This Article argues that these ex-post anti-duress measures, rather than helping the coerced party, might in fact hurt her. When coercion is credible—when a credible threat to inflict an even worse outcome underlies the surrender of the coerced party—ex post relief will only induce the strong party to execute the threatened outcome, to the detriment of the coerced party. Anti-duress relief …

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"Agreeing To Disagree": Filling Gaps In Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, Omri Ben-Shahar Jan 2004

"Agreeing To Disagree": Filling Gaps In Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, Omri Ben-Shahar

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009

This Article develops a new standard for gap filling in incomplete contracts. It focuses on an important class of situations in which parties leave their agreement deliberately incomplete, with the intent to further negotiate and resolve the remaining issues. In these situations, neither the traditional no-enforcement result nor the usual gap filling approaches accord with the parties’ partial consent. Instead, the Article develops the concept of pro-defendant gap-fillers, under which each party is granted an option to enforce the transaction supplemented with terms most favorable (within reason) to the other party. A deliberately incomplete contract with pro-defendant gap fillers transforms …

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Contracting Under Amended 2-207 (Freedom From Contract Symposium), James J. White Jan 2004

Contracting Under Amended 2-207 (Freedom From Contract Symposium), James J. White

Articles

Amended Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code1 (the Code) states new contract rules. I call these "contract rules" to avoid the labels of contract formation and contract interpretation. These new rules cure many of the problems presented by current Section 2-2072 and remind courts that the purpose of Section 2-207 is to interpret a contract that has been made, not to see if a contract exists. One is tempted to label current Section 2-207 as a contract formation provision-and to some extent that would be right-but most of this Section's work has been in contract interpretation, not in contract …

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Threatening An Irrational Breach Of Contract, Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar Jan 2004

Threatening An Irrational Breach Of Contract, Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar

Articles

When circumstances surrounding the contract change, a party might consider breach a more attractive option than performance. Threatening breach, this party may induce the other party to modify the original agreement. The contract law doctrine of modification determines whether and when these modifications are enforceable. To promote social welfare as well as the interests of the threatened party, the law should enforce modifications if and only if the modification demand is backed by a credible threat to breach. This paper argues that credibility is not a function of pecuniary interests alone. A decision to breach can be motivated also by …

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The Law Of Duress And The Economics Of Credible Threats, Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar Jan 2004

The Law Of Duress And The Economics Of Credible Threats, Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar

Articles

This paper argues that enforcement of an agreement, reached under a threat to refrain from dealing, should be conditioned solely on the threat's credibility. When a credible threat exists, enforcement promotes social welfare and the threatened party's interests. If agreements backed by credible threats were not enforceable, the threatening party would not extort them and would instead refrain from deaing-to the threatened party's detriment. The doctrine of duress, which invalidates such agreements, hurts the coerced party. By denying enforcement when a credible threat exists, the duress doctrine precludes the threatened party from making the commitment necessary to reach agreement. Paradoxically, …

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Mutual Assent Versus Gradual Ascent: The Debate Over The Right To Retract, Omri Ben-Shahar Jan 2004

Mutual Assent Versus Gradual Ascent: The Debate Over The Right To Retract, Omri Ben-Shahar

Articles

I ended Contracts Without Consent: Exploring a New Basis for Contract Liability with a reminder that the analysis was "lacking in rigor and in nuance" and that "[i]t remains for future work to explore the extent to which the approach developed. . . has the horsepower to resolve pragmatically the problems that have proven difficult for current doctrine and to examine whether these solutions advance the various social objectives associated with contract formation." Such "future work" arrived sooner than I expected. I have now had the privilege to read the three commentaries that the University of Pennsylvania Law Review solicited, …

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'Agreeing To Disagree': Filling Gaps In Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, Omri Ben-Shahar Jan 2004

'Agreeing To Disagree': Filling Gaps In Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, Omri Ben-Shahar

Articles

Incomplete contracts have always been viewed as raising the following challenge for contract law: does the incompleteness-or, "indefiniteness," as it is usually called-rise to such a level that renders the agreement legally unenforceable? When the indefiniteness concerns important terms, it is presumed that the parties have not reached an agreement to which they intend to be bound. This "fundamental policy" is the upshot of the view that "contracts should be made by the parties, not by the courts."' When, in contrast, the indefiniteness concerns less important terms, courts supplement the agreement with gap fillers and enforce the supplemented contract.

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Forward [To Freedom From Contract Symposium], Omri Ben-Shahar Jan 2004

Forward [To Freedom From Contract Symposium], Omri Ben-Shahar

Articles

This Symposium explores freedom from contract. When I was preparing to travel from my home in Ann Arbor to the University of Wisconsin where this Symposium was to be held, my 9-year-old son asked where I was headed. I explained that a bunch of people and I were going to meet and talk about freedom from contract, but the boy seemed unsure what this exchange was going to be about. I tried to translate: "It is about making promises that you don't really have to keep." This sounded surprising to him. He raised an inquisitive brow, and I knew he …

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Contracts Without Consent: Exploring A New Basis For Contractual Liability, Omri Ben-Shahar Jan 2004

Contracts Without Consent: Exploring A New Basis For Contractual Liability, Omri Ben-Shahar

Articles

This Essay explores an alternative to one of the pillars of contract law, that obligations arise only when there is "mutual assent "--when the parties reach consensus over the terms of the transaction. It explores a principle of "no-retraction," under which each party is obligated to terms it manifested and can retract only with some liability. In contrast to the all-or-nothing nature of the mutual assent regime, where preliminary forms of consent are either full-blown contracts or create no obligation, under the no-retraction regime, obligations emerge gradually, as the positions of the negotiating parties draw closer. Further, the no-retraction liability …

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Measuring Recovery For Non-Contractual Investment, Omri Ben-Shahar, Robert A. Mikos Sep 2003

Measuring Recovery For Non-Contractual Investment, Omri Ben-Shahar, Robert A. Mikos

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009

Parties who make investments that generate externalities may sometimes recover from the beneficiaries, even in the absence of contract. Previous scholarship has shown that granting recovery, based on either the cost of the investment or the benefit it confers, can provide optimal incentives to invest. However, this article demonstrates that the law often awards recovery that is neither purely cost-based, nor purely benefit-based, and instead equals either the greater-of or lesser-of the two measures. These hybrid approaches to recovery distort incentives to invest. The article demonstrates the prevalence of these practices, and explores informational and related reasons why they emerge. …

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Venture Capital On The Downside: Preferred Stock And Corporate Control, William W. Bratton Mar 2002

Venture Capital On The Downside: Preferred Stock And Corporate Control, William W. Bratton

Michigan Law Review

When stock indices drop precipitously, when the startup companies fizzle out, and when it stops raining money on places like Wall Street and Silicon Valley, attention turns to downside contracting. Law and business lawyers, sitting in the back seat as mere facilitators on the upside, move up to the front and sometimes even take the wheel. The job is the same on both the upside and downside: to maximize the value of going concern assets. But what comes easily on the upside can be dirty work on the down, where assets need to be separated from dysfunctional teams of business …

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Default Rules In Sales And The Myth Of Contracting Out, James J. White Jan 2002

Default Rules In Sales And The Myth Of Contracting Out, James J. White

Articles

In this article, I trace the dispute in the courts and before the ALI and NCCUSL over the proper contract formation and interpretation default rules. In Part II, I consider the Gateway litigation. In Part III, I deal with UCITA and the revision to Article 2. In Part IV, I consider the merits of the competing default rules.

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A Footnote For Jack Dawson, James J. White, David A. Peters Jan 2002

A Footnote For Jack Dawson, James J. White, David A. Peters

Articles

Jack Dawson, known to many at Michigan as Black Jack, taught at the Law School from 1927 to 1958. Much of his work was published in the Michigan Law Review, where he served as a student editor during the 1923-24 academic year. We revisit his work and provide a footnote to his elegant writing on mistake and supervening events. In Part I, we talk a little about Jack the man. In Part II, we recite the nature and significance of his scholarly work. Part III deals briefly with the cases decided in the last twenty years by American courts on …

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Should The Law Ignore Commercial Norms? A Comment On The Bernstein Conjuncture And Its Relevance For Contract Law Theory And Reform, Jason Scott Johnston Jun 2001

Should The Law Ignore Commercial Norms? A Comment On The Bernstein Conjuncture And Its Relevance For Contract Law Theory And Reform, Jason Scott Johnston

Michigan Law Review

Professor Bernstein's study of the interaction between private law and norms in the cotton industry is the latest installment in her ongoing investigation into the relationship between law and norms in trades ranging from the diamond market to grain and feed markets. Her incredibly detailed and thorough exploration of private lawmaking and commercial norms - and their interaction - stands as one of the most significant contributions to contract and commercial law scholarship made in the last half-century. The cotton industry study upon which I focus in this Comment not only reports fascinating findings about dispute resolution practices, but also …

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Private Commercial Law In The Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, And Institutions, Lisa Bernstein Jun 2001

Private Commercial Law In The Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, And Institutions, Lisa Bernstein

Michigan Law Review

The cotton industry has almost entirely opted out of the public legal system, replacing it with one of the oldest and most complex systems of private commercial law. Most contracts for the purchase andsale of domestic cotton, between merchants or between merchants andmills, are neither consummated under the Uniform Commercial Code("Code") nor interpreted and enforced in court when disputes arise. Rather, most such contracts are concluded under one of several privately drafted sets of contract default rules and are subject to arbitration in one of several merchant tribunals. Similarly, most international sales of cotton are governed neither by state-supplied legal …

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Performance Risk, Form Contracts And Ucita, Leo L. Clarke Jan 2001

Performance Risk, Form Contracts And Ucita, Leo L. Clarke

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

No scholarly commentator has suggested that the form contract rules provide a satisfactory answer to the commercial problem of performance risk. So, one might think that the dawn of the "information economy" would be a propitious time to implement a new doctrinal approach. Apparently not: the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (the "Conference") has promulgated a comprehensive commercial statute that fails to remedy or even modify the law of form contracts in purely commercial transactions. The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act ("UCITA")--drafted to provide the background law for many of the most significant transactions in the information …

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Good Faith And The Cooperative Antagonist (Symposium On Revised Article 1 And Proposed Revised Article 2 Of The Uniform Commercial Code), James J. White Jan 2001

Good Faith And The Cooperative Antagonist (Symposium On Revised Article 1 And Proposed Revised Article 2 Of The Uniform Commercial Code), James J. White

Articles

One of Karl Llewellyn's most noted achievements in the Uniform Commercial Code was to impose the duty of good faith on every obligation under the Uniform Commercial Code.1 Some (I am one) have privately thought that imposition of this unmeasurable, undefinable duty was Llewellyn's cruelest trick, but no court, nor any academic writer, has ever been so bold or so gauche as to suggest that good faith should not attend the obligations of parties under the UCC. Notwithstanding this silent indorsement of the duty of good faith, the courts2 and commentators3 have had difficulty in determining what is and what …

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Precontractual Reliance, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Omri Ben-Shahar Jan 2001

Precontractual Reliance, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Omri Ben-Shahar

Articles

During contractual negotiations, parties often make reliance expenditures that would increase the surplus should a contract be made. This paper analyzes decisions to invest in precontractual reliance under alternative legal regimes. Investments in reliance will be socially suboptimal in the absence of any precontractual liability-and will be socially excessive under strict liability for all reliance expenditures. Given the results for these polar cases, we focus on exploring how "intermediate"-liability rules could be best designed to induce efficient reliance decisions. One of our results indicates that the case for liability is shown to be stronger when a party retracts from terms …

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Law And Regret, Eric A. Posner May 2000

Law And Regret, Eric A. Posner

Michigan Law Review

Professor Farnsworth's1 topic is what he calls the "law of regretted decisions," those laws "that apply when you change your mind and reverse a decision" (p. ix). One finds such laws across many doctrinal divisions. Contract law influences the decision to change one's mind about keeping a promise. Tort law influences the decision to change one's mind after starting to rescue another person. The law of wills influences the decision to change one's mind about the distribution of one's assets among heirs. Farnsworth believes there are general principles that underlie the law of regretted decisions. Although there are some "anomalies," …

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Mandatory Arbitration: Bane Or Boon?, Theodore St. Antoine Jan 2000

Mandatory Arbitration: Bane Or Boon?, Theodore St. Antoine

Other Publications

Buy a new car that turns out to be a lemon and you may find you can't sue. Fine print in the sales contract often restricts you to arbitration. That means presenting your case before a private person instead of a judge and jury. And the arbitrator may be someone drawn from a panel compiled by the car seller.

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Autistic Contracts (Symposium), James J. White Jan 2000

Autistic Contracts (Symposium), James J. White

Articles

In this paper I address the question whether the law should affirm the offeror's inference and should bind the offeree to the terms proposed by the offeror even in circumstances where the offeree may not intend to accept those terms and where an objective observer might not draw the inference of agreement from the offeree's act. Modem practice and current proposals concerning contract formation in Revised Article 2 and in the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (nee Article 2B) press these issues on us more forcefully than old practices and different law did. 1 But contractual autism is not new; …

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The Secrecy Interest In Contract Law, Omri Ben-Shahar, Lisa Bernstein Jan 2000

The Secrecy Interest In Contract Law, Omri Ben-Shahar, Lisa Bernstein

Articles

A long and distinguished line of law-and-economics articles has established that in many circumstances fully compensatory expectation damages are a desirable remedy for breach of contract because they induce both efficient performance and efficient breach. The expectation measure, which seeks to put the breached-against party in the position she would have been in had the contract been performed, has, therefore, rightly been chosen as the dominant contract default rule. It does a far better job of regulating breach-or-perform incentives than its leading competitors-the restitution measure, the reliance measure, and specific performance. This Essay does not directly take issue with the …

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Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order, John Mcmillan, Christopher Woodruff Jan 2000

Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order, John Mcmillan, Christopher Woodruff

Michigan Law Review

Businesspeople need contractual assurance. Most transactions are less straightforward than a cash sale of an easily identifiable item. Buyers need assurance of the quality of what they are purchasing, and sellers need assurance that bills will be paid. The legal system may not always be available to provide contractual assurance - and when the law is dysfunctional, private order might arise in its place. Many developing and transition economies have dysfunctional legal systems, either because the laws do not exist or because the machinery for enforcing them is inadequate. In such countries, bilateral relationships, communal norms, trade associations, or market …

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Enforcing Contracts In Dysfunctional Legal Systems: The Close Relationship Between Public And Private Orders: A Repy To Mcmillan And Woodruff, Ariel Porat Jan 2000

Enforcing Contracts In Dysfunctional Legal Systems: The Close Relationship Between Public And Private Orders: A Repy To Mcmillan And Woodruff, Ariel Porat

Michigan Law Review

When the public order is dysfunctional, a private order for enforcing contracts will develop. In the absence of courts, transactors will seek ways to secure performance without recourse to legal sanctions. Social and economic sanctions imposed on the party in breach, whether by the aggrieved party or by the economic and social community in which both parties operate, replace legal sanctions. These sanctions sometimes arise within a private order functioning spontaneously, as when ongoing contractual relationships prevail between the parties, or when a close-knit economic or social community exists in which information concerning breaches of contract flows freely. In other …

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