Contracts Commons^™

The Puzzle Of Pdvsa Bond Prices, Anna Gelpern, Paolo Colla, Mitu Gulati

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Market reports in the summer of 2016 suggest that Venezuela is on the brink of default on upwards of $65 billion in debt. That debt comprises of bonds issued directly by the sovereign and those issued by the state-owned oil company PDVSA. Based on the bond contracts and other legal factors, it is not clear which of these two categories of bonds would fare better in the event of a restructuring. However, market observers are convinced — and we agree — that legal and contractual differences would likely impact the payouts on the bonds if Venezuela defaults. Using a comparison …

Sovereign Debt: Now What?, Anna Gelpern

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The sovereign debt restructuring regime looks like it is coming apart. Changing patterns of capital flows, old creditors’ weakening commitment to past practices, and other stakeholders’ inability to take over, or coalesce behind a viable alternative, have challenged the regime from the moment it took shape in the mid-1990s. By 2016, its survival cannot be taken for granted. Crises in Argentina, Greece, and Ukraine since 2010 exposed the regime’s perennial failures and new shortcomings. Until an alternative emerges, there may be messier, more protracted restructurings, more demands on public resources, and more pressure on national courts to intervene in disputes …

What If Fiduciary Obligations Are Like Contractual Ones?, Gregory Klass

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This essay, to appear in Contract, Status, and Fiduciary Law (Miller & Gold, 2016), explores three ways fiduciary obligations might be like contractual ones: in the methods lawmakers use or should use to determine the content of the obligation; in the private voluntary acts that generate the obligation; and in the fact that the obligation is a default that parties have the power to alter. The thesis is that to the extent that these similarities exist, they are not especially revealing. Theorists who emphasize the similarities commonly treat contract law as a private power-conferring rule, then analogize the law of …

Count The Limbs: Designing Robust Aggregation Clauses In Sovereign Bonds, Anna Gelpern, Ben Heller, Brad Setser

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

On August 29, 2014, the International Capital Market Association (ICMA) published new recommended terms for sovereign bond contracts governed by English law. One of the new terms would allow a super majority of creditors to approve a debtor’s restructuring proposal in one vote across multiple bond series. The vote could bind all bond holders, even if a series voted unanimously against restructuring, so long as enough holders in the other series voted for it. An apparently technical change, awkwardly named “single-limb aggregated collective action clauses (CACs)” promised to eliminate free-riders for the first time in the history of sovereign bond …

From Hierarchies To Markets: Fedex Drivers And The Work Contract As Institutional Marker, Julia Tomassetti

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Judges are often called upon today to determine whether certain workers are “employees” or “independent contractors.” The distinction is important, because only employees have rights under most statutes regulating work, including wage and hour, anti-discrimination, and collective bargaining law. Too often judges exclude workers from statutory protection who resemble what legal scholars have described as typical, industrial employees — long-term, full-time workers with set wages and routinized responsibilities within a large firm. To explain how courts reach these counterintuitive results, the article examines recent federal decisions finding that FedEx delivery drivers are independent contractors rather than employees. It argues that …

Gatsby And Tort, Robin West

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The Great Gatsby is filled with potential tort claims, from drunken or reckless driving to assault and battery. In a pivotal passage Nick Carraway, the narrator of The Great Gatsby, judges Daisy and Tom as “careless people,” who “destroy creatures and leave others to clean up the mess.” The carelessness, negligence, and recklessness portrayed by Fitzgerald’s characters shows an absence of due care, long regarded as the foundation for tort law. Although there are torts, tortfeasors, and tortious behavior aplenty in The Great Gatsby, the novel is void of even a mention of tort law. Why?

The first part of …

Contracts Symposium Issue: Featured Speaker: The Right To Contract As A Civil Right, Robin West

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The "right to contract," whether originating in the Constitution, common law, or natural law, has been long and widely felt to be in tension with our civil rights, broadly conceived. The individual himself, we generally believe, and only the individual, should decide the scope and terms of his affirmative, voluntary, and other-regarding undertakings. When he does so through contract, the individual and only the individual should determine the terms under which he will perform those duties. The civil rights laws of the nineteenth, twentieth, and early twenty-first centuries, and the various rights they create interfere with these natural freedoms.

So, …

Common Capital: A Thought Experiment In Cross-Border Resolution, Anna Gelpern

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Cross-border bank resolution efforts focus on burden-sharing between bank owners, private creditors and the public. There is little talk of burden-sharing among governments, despite the rich history of governments trying to stick one another with the cost of financial conglomerate failures. There is an unspoken fear that acknowledging the need to allocate losses among governments would undermine post-crisis pledges of No More Bailouts. This symposium essay argues for making government stakes in private financial firms more transparent, and for using the contingent public share as a key to loss allocation among governments in cross-border banking crises.

Efficient Breach, Gregory Klass

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The theory of efficient breach is the best known, and the most controversial, product of nearly half a century of economic analysis of contract law. In its simplest form, which is the one that dominates the legal imagination, the theory argues that expectation damages are good because they allow, even encourage, a party to breach when performance becomes inefficient, thereby increasing social welfare. Many noneconomists assume the theory is well supported by principles of neoclassical economics. Thus critics commonly focus on the theory’s moral failings, or on problems with the neoclassical approach more generally. But today no economic thinker defends …

Introduction To Philosophical Foundations Of Contract Law, Gregory Klass

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This Introduction to Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law (Gregory Klass, George Letsas & Prince Saprai eds., Oxford University Press, forthcoming) describes the field of contract theory and locates the essays in the volume within that field. The volume includes chapters from Aditi Bagchi, Randy Barnett, Lisa Bernstein, Mindy Chen-Wishart, Charles Fried, Avery Katz, Dori Kimel, Gregory Klass, George Letsas and Prince Saprai, Daniel Markovits, Liam Murphy, David Owens, J.E. Penner, Margaret Jane Radin, Joseph Raz, Stephen Smith, and Charlie Webb.

The Rise And Fall Of Unconscionability As The 'Law Of The Poor', Anne Fleming

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

What happened to unconscionability? Here’s one version of the story: The doctrine of unconscionability experienced a brief resurgence in the mid-1960s at the hands of naive, left-liberal, activist judges, who used it to rewrite private consumer contracts according to their own sense of justice. These folks meant well, no doubt, much like present-day consumer protection crusaders who seek to ensure the “fairness” of financial products and services. But courts’ refusal to enforce terms they deemed "unconscionable” served only to increase the cost of doing business with low-income households. Judges ended up hurting the very people they were trying to help. …

Interpretation And Construction In Altering Rules, Gregory Klass

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This essay is a response to Ian Ayres's, "Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules," 121 Yale L.J. 2032 (2012). Ayres identifies an important question: How does the law decide when parties have opted-out of a contractual default? Unfortunately, his article tells only half of the story about such altering rules. Ayres cares about rules designed to instruct parties on how to get the terms that they want. By focusing on such rules he ignores altering rules designed instead to interpret the nonlegal meaning of the parties' acts or agreement. This limited vision is characteristic of economic approaches to …

Promise Etc., Gregory Klass

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This Article examines the moral obligations contractual agreements generate. It distinguishes a narrow sense of "promise," central to autonomy theories, according to which to promise is to communicate an intention to undertake an obligation by the very communication of that intention. Not every agreement involves promises in this sense. Yet nonpromissory agreements too commonly generate moral obligations. And even when a party promises to perform, her promise need not be the only reason for her moral obligation to do so. Other possible reasons include reliance, an invitation to trust, implicit or explicit, principles of reciprocity, and the harm that nonperformance …

To Perform Or Pay Damages, Gregory Klass

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In The Myth of Efficient Breach: New Defenses of the Expectation Interest, Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz argue that contractual promises between sophisticated parties are best interpreted as disjunctive promises to perform or pay damages. They further argue that this dual performance hypothesis answers moral critics of the expectation remedy. This comment makes three claims about Markovits and Schwartz's argument. First, although the dual performance hypothesis is supported by Markovits and Schwartz's instrumentalist model, they do not have a good argument that it is empirically correct -- that it is the best interpretation of what sophisticated parties actually intend. …

Does The Constitution Protect Economic Liberty?, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The author defends the proposition that the Court in Lochner v. New York was right to protect the liberty of contract under the Fourteenth Amendment. He does not defend its use of the Due Process Clause to reach its result. As he explains, the Court should have been applying the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Nor does he contend that the Court was correct in its conclusion that the maximum‐hours law under consideration was an unconstitutional restriction on the liberty of contract. Although the statute may well have been unconstitutional, the author does not take the time to evaluate that claim. …

Implied Certification Under The False Claims Act, Gregory Klass, Michael Holt

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The False Claims Act prohibits fraud by government contractors, including a contractor's false certification of compliance with the contract, statutes or regulations. In the early 1990s, some courts began holding that the act of requesting payment from the government implicitly represents such compliance for the purposes the FCA. Circuits are today split on the implied certification doctrine. This Article provides a theory of implied certification, suggests how the circuit split should be resolved and describes how contracting agencies should write contracts in light of the existing rule. There are good reasons for the implied certification rule: it is an information-forcing …

Contract Is Not Promise; Contract Is Consent, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In the 1980s, Charles Fried was right to focus on what was missing from both the “death of contract” and “law and economics” approaches to contract law: the internal morality of contract. But he focused on the wrong morality. Rather than embodying the morality of promise-keeping, the enforcement of contracts can best be explained and justified as a product of the parties’ consent to be legally bound. In this essay, I observe that, in Contract as Promise, Fried himself admits that the “promise principle” cannot explain or justify two features that are at the core of contract law: the objective …

Intent To Contract, Gregory Klass

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

There is a remarkable difference between black-letter contract laws of the United States and England. In England, the existence of a contract is supposedly conditioned on the parties' intent to be legally bound, while section 21 of the Second Restatement of Contracts states that "[n]either real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a contract." There are also differences within U.S. law on the issue. While section 21 describes courts' approach to most contracts, the parties' intent to contact can be a condition of validity of preliminary agreements, domestic agreements and social …

On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Second Circuit, Stolt-Neilsen S.A., V. Animalfeed International, No. 08-1198 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2009), Cornelia T. Pillard

U.S. Supreme Court Briefs

No abstract provided.

A Conditional Intent To Perform, Gregory Klass

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The doctrine of promissory fraud holds that a contractual promise implicitly represents an intent to perform. A promisor’s conditional intent to perform poses a problem for that doctrine. It is clear that some undisclosed conditions on the promisor’s intent should result in liability for promissory fraud. Yet no promisor intends to perform come what may, so there is a sense in which all promisors conditionally intend to perform.

Building on Michael Bratman’s planning theory of intentions, this article provides a theoretical account of the distinction between “foreground” and “background” conditions on intentions in general and then explains why foreground conditions …

Commentary, Anna Gelpern

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Enforceable promises discourage lying, cheating, and stealing. Contracts that embody such promises shape institutions, distribute power, and organize markets. The Smith-King critique of elite empirical contracts scholarship reveals a field preoccupied with the first set of functions and barely interested in the second. I am loath to second-guess this view without empirical evidence of my own. Instead, I draw from it two sets of implications-one for the substantive study of contracts, the other for the relationship between contract theory and contract empiricism.

Brief For Professors James D. Cox Et Al. As Amici Curiae In Support Of Petitioners, Stoneridge Investment Partners V. Scientific-Atlanta, No. 06-43 (U.S. June 11, 2007), Donald C. Langevoort

U.S. Supreme Court Briefs

No abstract provided.

Three Pictures Of Contract: Duty, Power And Compound Rule, Gregory Klass

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

A fundamental divide among theories of contract law is between those that picture contract as a power and those that picture it as a duty. On the power-conferring picture, contracting is a sort of legislative act, in which persons determine what law will apply to their transaction. On the duty-imposing picture, contract law puts duties on persons entering into agreements for consideration whether they want them or not. Until now, very little attention has been paid to the problem of how to tell whether a given rule is power conferring or duty imposing -- a question that should lie at …

Beyond Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers And Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, J. Maria Glover

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

We live in an age of convenience. From financial transactions to electronic correspondence, we frequently deal with large corporations that provide services in our daily lives. One of the prices we pay for the convenience of these transactions, however, is that our commercial relationships increasingly are based on standard form contracts written by large corporations. While these standard form contracts are necessary to an economically efficient society, the growing use of mandatory arbitration provisions and clauses that prohibit class actions in these contracts raises the spectre of corporate abuse.

New Rules For Promissory Fraud, Gregory Klass, Ian Ayres

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This article summarizes the authors’ recommended reforms to the law of promissory fraud. These recommendations are presented as a Draft Prestatement of the Law of Insincere Promising. The basic propositions of the Prestatement are taken, with some modification, from the authors’ book, Insincere Promises: The Law of Misrepresented Intent (2005). This article adds extensive comments, in the style of the Restatements, and a prose introduction identifying three reforms we deem most important. First, courts should drop their insistence that every promise represents an intent to perform, and treat that representation instead as a default. Second, courts faced with claims of …

Common-Law Disclosure Duties And The Sin Of Omission: Testing The Meta-Theories, Kathryn Zeiler, Kimberly D. Krawiec

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This Article represents the first attempt to study empirically the factors that cause courts to impose disclosure duties on bargaining parties in some circumstances, but not in others. We analyze data coded from 466 decisions spanning a wide array of jurisdictions and covering over two hundred years. The results are mixed. In some instances our data support the conventional wisdom relating to common-law disclosure duties. For example, we find that courts are more likely to require the disclosure of latent, as opposed to patent, defects and are more likely to require disclosure when the parties are in a fiduciary or …

Promissory Fraud Without Breach, Gregory Klass, Ian Ayres

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This Article, in keeping with the theme of this Symposium, explores the possibility of promissory fraud liability where there is no breach of contract. It is well known that mere breach of contract is not sufficient to make out a claim of promissory fraud. This rule makes eminent sense, for a promisor who initially intended to perform may have later changed her mind. Here we pose the converse question: is it possible to have promissory fraud liability without a breach?

Brief For Respondents, Green Tree Financial Corp. V. Bazzle, No. 02-634 (U.S. Mar. 27, 2003), ., Cornelia T. Pillard

U.S. Supreme Court Briefs

No abstract provided.

Consenting To Form Contracts, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this essay, I will identify one theoretical source of the common antipathy towards form contracts and why it is misguided. I contend that the hostility towards form contracts stems in important part from an implicit adoption of a promise-based conception of contractual obligation. I shall maintain that, when one adopts (a) a consent theory of contract based not on promise but on the manifested intention to be legally bound and (b) a properly objective interpretation of this consent, form contracts can be seen as entirely legitimate-though some form terms may properly be subject to judicial scrutiny that would be …

Foreword: Is Reliance Still Dead?, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

One thing I found out when I was a prosecutor is that you should never tell a police officer he cannot do something, for that just serves as an open invitation for him to do it. In recent years, I have learned a similar lesson about legal scholarship which I should probably keep to myself but won't. If you proclaim the existence of a scholarly "consensus," this is an open invitation for academics to try to demolish such a claim.