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Articles 1 - 14 of 14
Full-Text Articles in Common Law
Should Judicial Opinions Be Read Like Statutes?, Margaret H. Lemos
Should Judicial Opinions Be Read Like Statutes?, Margaret H. Lemos
Northwestern University Law Review
Should judicial opinions be interpreted with an eye to their purpose, context, or the intent of their authors, or should interpreters focus on the ordinary meaning of the text? Opinions present the same sorts of interpretive puzzles as other legal texts, and yet they have been omitted from the debates over interpretive methodology that dominate the fields of constitutional and statutory interpretation. The omission is no accident: the Supreme Court has stated repeatedly—and with increasing frequency in recent years—that judicial opinions are not to be read like statutes. Yet neither courts nor commentators have explained why the principles that ground …
The Ex Parte Young Cause Of Action: A Riddle, Wrapped In A Mystery, Inside An Enigma, Andrew S. Oldham, Adam I. Steene, John W. Tienken
The Ex Parte Young Cause Of Action: A Riddle, Wrapped In A Mystery, Inside An Enigma, Andrew S. Oldham, Adam I. Steene, John W. Tienken
Northwestern University Law Review
Ex parte Young ushered in a new era of the American judicial system. Most famously, the decision allowed plaintiffs, in certain circumstances, to sue state officials without having to worry about sovereign immunity. Young’s other holding, though perhaps lesser known, is no less important: individuals, the Supreme Court held, have an equitable cause of action to sue government officials for injunctive relief.
Even today, that second holding remains something of a riddle. Did this cause of action always exist in American law? Or was it an invention of the Young Court? And, at any rate, does the Ex parte …
Negligent Hiring: Recidivism And Employment With A Criminal Record, Benjamin Pyle
Negligent Hiring: Recidivism And Employment With A Criminal Record, Benjamin Pyle
Northwestern University Law Review
This Article tackles a difficult legal and policy challenge— reducing the impact of criminal records on job applicants’ chances in a manner that does not spur more discrimination—by looking at how another area of law, tort liability, impacts employers’ decision-making. It uses theoretical and empirical methods to study the most common reason employers report being reluctant to hire workers with a criminal record: legal liability generated by the tort of negligent hiring. While the purpose of the tort is ostensibly to protect and make whole those harmed when an employee misbehaves in a foreseeable manner, I show that, in practice, …
The Establishment That Time Forgot: The Historical Understanding Of Religious Offenses And Their Unconstitutionality In Modern Law, Benjamin J. Citow
The Establishment That Time Forgot: The Historical Understanding Of Religious Offenses And Their Unconstitutionality In Modern Law, Benjamin J. Citow
Northwestern University Law Review
This Note argues that religious offenses, meaning laws which penalize conduct for religious purposes, should be barred by the Establishment Clause of the Constitution, as the Clause was interpreted in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District. This is because Kennedy interpreted the Establishment Clause to prohibit each of the several types of laws which early Americans associated with religious establishment—the historical practice wherein early states would adopt a religion as the state religion and pass various types of laws for its support. And religious offenses, this Note argues, were amongst the types of laws which early Americans so associated with …
Nonparty Protective Relief In The Early Republic: Judicial Power To Annul Letters Patent, James E. Pfander, Mary E. Zakowski
Nonparty Protective Relief In The Early Republic: Judicial Power To Annul Letters Patent, James E. Pfander, Mary E. Zakowski
Northwestern University Law Review
Much of the debate over the constitutionality of universal or nonparty protective relief in the federal court system has focused on lessons drawn from historical practice. But with its emphasis on injunctive relief, the literature has largely ignored forms of adjudication that arose outside the courts of equity and led to judgments and decrees affecting the rights of nonparties. As a result, the story of nonparty protective relief has not yet been fully told.
This Article offers a more complete story, highlighting proceedings in which federal courts issued judgments that settled a matter once and for all. Some familiar examples …
Take In Case Of Emergency: Reconciling Necessity Takings With The Original Meaning Of The Takings Clause, Tony Smith
Take In Case Of Emergency: Reconciling Necessity Takings With The Original Meaning Of The Takings Clause, Tony Smith
Northwestern University Law Review
Does the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause permit the state to destroy property without compensation whenever it declares an emergency? The long-standing doctrine of necessity empowers the state to do exactly that.
Courts dating back to common law England have permitted governments to claim a privilege of necessity to avoid paying for private property they destroy in times of crisis. The privilege rests on the principle that the public good sometimes outweighs the harm the individual suffers. Today’s courts and academics stretch this principle to its limits, arguing necessity should be used as a vehicle for combating all manner of social …
The Renaissance Of Private Law, Yotam Kaplan, Adi Libson, Gideon Parchomovsky
The Renaissance Of Private Law, Yotam Kaplan, Adi Libson, Gideon Parchomovsky
Northwestern University Law Review
Crisis is the new normal. Between global warming, the opioid pandemic, bursts of gun violence, and political instability fueled by fake news, it is hard to remember a time when we were not facing a major catastrophe. Still more troubling, there is a growing sense that our political and regulatory institutions are faltering in their ability to offer effective responses to the incoming crises. The rapid pace at which new problems emerge—together with growing political polarization—stymies regulatory and legislative action, resulting in an inability to address contemporary challenges.
Against this gloomy background, we posit an unlikely hero: private law. Recent …
Preclusive Jurisdictional Dismissals, Kevin Song
Preclusive Jurisdictional Dismissals, Kevin Song
Northwestern University Law Review
Every litigant deserves their day in court. At the same time, litigants cannot endlessly go to court on the same matter. A complex body of preclusion law balances these fundamental tenets by examining when adjudication of a matter precludes subsequent relitigation. This body of law has evolved over time to preserve the day-in-court ideal in a way that is sensitive to the threats that relitigation present to judicial efficiency, fair adjudication, and repose. Modern preclusion law has settled on a pragmatic approach: where a court has issued a final judgment on the merits but erroneously assumed jurisdiction, relitigation may still …
Obstructing Precedent, Bill Watson
Obstructing Precedent, Bill Watson
Northwestern University Law Review
Critics of the Supreme Court sometimes accuse the Justices of disrespecting or being unfaithful to precedent—of undermining certain precedents while leaving them formally in place. Yet it remains unclear what exactly these criticisms mean or why they point to anything objectionable. This Article proposes that critics are often drawing attention to a particular practice: obstructing precedent. A better grasp of what obstructing precedent is and when it is legitimate is important to understanding the Roberts Court’s treatment of precedent in a range of cases.
A court obstructs precedent when it refuses to cooperate with its prior self in building a …
Deepfake Privacy: Attitudes And Regulation, Matthew B. Kugler, Carly Pace
Deepfake Privacy: Attitudes And Regulation, Matthew B. Kugler, Carly Pace
Northwestern University Law Review
Using only a series of images of a person’s face and publicly available software, it is now possible to insert the person’s likeness into a video and show them saying or doing almost anything. This “deepfake” technology has permitted an explosion of political satire and, especially, fake pornography. Several states have already passed laws regulating deepfakes, and more are poised to do so. This Article presents three novel empirical studies that assess public attitudes toward this new technology. In our main study, a representative sample of the U.S. adult population perceived nonconsensually created pornographic deepfake videos as extremely harmful and …
The Democratic First Amendment, Ashutosh Bhagwat
The Democratic First Amendment, Ashutosh Bhagwat
Northwestern University Law Review
Over the past several decades, the Supreme Court and most First Amendment scholars have taken the position that the primary reason why the First Amendment protects freedom of speech is to advance democratic self-governance. In this Article, I will argue that this position, while surely correct insofar as it goes, is also radically incomplete. The fundamental problem is that the Court and, until recently, scholars have focused exclusively on the Religion Clauses and the Free Speech Clause. The rest of the First Amendment—the Press, Assembly, and Petition Clauses—might as well not exist. The topic of this Article is the five …
Multifactoral Free Speech, Alexander Tsesis
Multifactoral Free Speech, Alexander Tsesis
Northwestern University Law Review
This Article presents a multifactoral approach to free speech analysis. Difficult cases present a variety of challenges that require judges to weigh concerns for the protection of robust dialogue, especially about public issues, against concerns that sound in common law (such as reputation), statutory law (such as repose against harassment), and in constitutional law (such as copyright). Even when speech is implicated, the Court should aim to resolve other relevant individual and social issues arising from litigation. Focusing only on free speech categories is likely to discount substantial, and sometimes compelling, social concerns warranting reflection, analysis, and application. Examining the …
The Scrivener’S Error, Ryan D. Doerfler
The Scrivener’S Error, Ryan D. Doerfler
Northwestern University Law Review
It is widely accepted that courts may correct legislative drafting mistakes, i.e., so-called scrivener’s errors, if and only if such mistakes are “absolutely clear.” The rationale is that if a court were to recognize a less clear error, it might be “rewriting” the statute rather than correcting a technical mistake.
This Article argues that the standard is much too strict. The current rationale ignores that courts can “rewrite,” i.e., misinterpret, a statute both by recognizing an error and by failing to do so. Accordingly, because the current doctrine is designed to protect against one type of mistake (false positives) but …
The New Old Legal Realism, Tracey E. George, Mitu Gulati, Ann C. Mcginley
The New Old Legal Realism, Tracey E. George, Mitu Gulati, Ann C. Mcginley
Northwestern University Law Review
No abstract provided.