Commercial Law Commons^™

Citizen Capitalism: How A Universal Fund Can Provide Influence And Income To All (2019), Lynn A. Stout, Sergio Gramitto, Tamara Belinfanti

Books

Corporations have a huge influence on the life of every citizen--this book offers a visionary but practical plan to give every citizen a say in how corporations are run while also gaining some supplemental income. It lays out a clear approach that uses the mechanisms of the private market to hold corporations accountable to the public.

This would happen through the creation of what the authors call the Universal Fund, a kind of national, democratic, mega mutual fund. Every American over eighteen would be entitled to a share and would participate in directing its share voting choices. Corporations and wealthy …

Board Independence As A Panacea To Tunnelling? An Empirical Study Of Related Party Transactions In Hong Kong And Singapore, Christopher C. H. Chen, Wai Yee Wan, Wei Zhang

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

In this article, we examine a general question: is the legal transplantation of corporate governance rule effective in curtailing agency costs? Entering into the 21st century, we have seen reforms of corporate governance standards in the Far East since the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, including in Hong Kong and Singapore. These reforms built on the Anglo-American model of corporate governance in the UK and US supported by broad academic literature of connecting better corporate governance with firm value and identifying the association of tunneling or wrongdoings with poor corporate governance practices. The idea is also to provide more checks-and-balances …

The Shifting Tides Of Merger Litigation, Randall Thomas, Matthew D. Cain, Jill Fisch, Steven D. Solomon

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In 2015, Delaware made several important changes to its laws concerning merger litigation. These changes, which were made in response to a perception that levels of merger litigation were too high and that a substantial proportion of merger cases were not providing value, raised the bar, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to win a lawsuit challenging a merger and more difficult for plaintiffs’ counsel to collect a fee award. We study what has happened in the courts in response to these changes. We find that the initial effect of the changes has been to decrease the volume of merger …

From Corporate Law To Corporate Governance, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

In the 1960s and 1970s, corporate law and finance scholars gave up on their traditional approaches. Corporate law had become “towering skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together and containing nothing but wind.” In finance, the theory of the firm was recognized as an “empty box.” This essay tracks how corporate law was reborn as corporate governance through three examples of how we have usefully complicated the inquiry into corporate behavior. Part I frames the first complication, defining governance broadly as the company’s operating system, a braided framework of legal and non-legal elements. Part II adds a second complication by …

The Cambridge Handbook Of Social Enterprise Law, Lloyd Histoshi Mayer

Books

Book Chapters

Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Creating a Tax Space for Social Enterprise, in The Cambridge Handbook of Social Enterprise Law 157 (Benjamin Means & Joseph W. Yockey eds., 2018)

While still relatively few in number compared to traditional nonprofit and for-profit organizations, the rise of social enterprises represents a possible disruption of not only existing models of doing business but also areas of law that in many respects have seen little fundamental change for decades. One such area is domestic tax law, where social enterprises currently find themselves subject to the rules of for-profit activities and entities. Here, both scholars …

Criminally Bad Management, Samuel W. Buell

Faculty Scholarship

Because of their leverage over employees, corporate managers are prime targets for incentives to control corporate crime, even when managers do not themselves commit crimes. Moreover, the collective actions of corporate management — producing what is sometimes referred to as corporate culture — can be the cause of corporate crime, not just a locus of the failure to control it. Because civil liability and private compensation arrangements have limited effects on management behavior — and because the problem is, after all, crime — criminal law is often expected to intervene. This handbook chapter offers a functional explanation for corporate criminal …

Delaware's Retreat: Exploring Developing Fissures And Tectonic Shifts In Delaware Corporate Law, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Crisis In Corporate Governance: 2002 Style, Robert W. Hamilton

Maine Law Review

The period from November 1, 2001 to October 1, 2002 has been an astonishing period for corporate governance in many respects. It began with the completely unexpected collapse of Enron Corporation on November 1, 2001, followed almost immediately thereafter by widely publicized downward profit restatements and bankruptcy filings by a significant number of telecommunication companies. Since November 1, 2001, there have been numerous public reports of fraud, misconduct, and scandals by directors of other well-known corporations such as Lucent Technologies, Kmart, Merck & Co., and Rite Aid Corporation. There also have been disclosures of many instances in which corporate officers …

Social Capital Of Directors And Corporate Governance: A Social Network Analysis, Zihan Niu, Christopher C. H. Chen

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

This Article examines how a director’s social capital might affect his or her behavior, the board’s performance, and corporate governance, as well as the potential normative implications of the director’s social network. We argue that the quality of board performance could be improved where the social network closure within the board is high and there are many non-redundant contacts beyond the board. Network closure can improve trust and collaboration within a board, while external contacts may benefit a company with more diverse sources of information. Moreover, different network positioning leads to the inequality of social capital for directors. With more …

The Role Of Social Enterprise And Hybrid Organizations, Ofer Eldar

Faculty Scholarship

Recent years have brought remarkable growth in hybrid organizations that combine profit-seeking and social missions. Despite popular enthusiasm for such organizations, legal reforms to facilitate their formation and growth—particularly, legal forms for hybrid firms—have largely been ineffective. This shortcoming stems in large part from the lack of a theory that identifies the structural and functional elements that make some types of hybrid organizations more effective than others. In pursuit of such a theory, this Article focuses on a large class of hybrid organizations that has been effective in addressing development problems, such as increasing access to capital and improving employment …

“Captured Boards”: The Rise Of “Super Directors” And The Case For A Board Suite, Kobi Kastiel, Yaron Nili

Faculty Scholarship

Boards of public corporations in the United States are becoming increasingly independent, due to an effort to ensure that shareholders' interests in the company are protected. Yet, little attention has been given to the way that board members obtain and digest the information necessary for their independent decision-making. In this Article, we highlight how "independent" boards remain extremely dependent on management for the information they need to accomplish their role -- we classify as the "informational capture" of the board. We further describe how activist hedge funds identified this capture and are using what is commonly termed as "super directors" …

Regulatory Competition And The Market For Corporate Law, Ofer Eldar, Lorenzo Magnolfi

Faculty Scholarship

This article develops an empirical model of firms’ choice of corporate laws under inertia. Delaware dominates the incorporation market, though recently Nevada, a state whose laws are highly protective of managers, has acquired a sizable market share. Using a novel database of incorporation decisions from 1995- 2013, we show that most firms dislike protectionist laws, such as anti-takeover statutes and liability protections for officers, and that Nevada’s rise is due to the preferences of small firms.Our estimates indicate that despite inertia, Delaware would lose significant market share and revenues if it adopted protectionist laws. Our findings support the hypothesis that …

Controlling Systemic Risk Through Corporate Governance, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Most of the regulatory measures to control excessive risk taking by systemically important firms are designed to reduce moral hazard and to align the interests of managers and investors. These measures may be flawed because they are based on questionable assumptions. Excessive corporate risk taking is, at its core, a corporate governance problem. Shareholder primacy requires managers to view the consequences of their firm’s risk taking only from the standpoint of the firm and its shareholders, ignoring harm to the public. In governing, managers of systemically important firms should also consider public harm. This proposal engages the long-standing debate whether …

Out Of Sight Out Of Mind: The Case For Improving Director Independence Disclosure, Yaron Nili

Faculty Scholarship

Director independence is a cornerstone of modern corporate law. Independent directors are entrusted with objectively and impartially monitoring management and ensuring that the interests of shareholders are well served. But translating the notion of independence into practice is far from a simple task, and while regulators and stock exchanges have tackled this elusive standard in different ways, for the most part their attempts have come up short. Currently, boards designate themselves as independent, and as this Article demonstrates empirically, they provide little information to investors regarding the considerations that supported their designation.

Regulating director independence is at heart a means …

Corporate Officers As Agents, Deborah A. Demott

Faculty Scholarship

Although officers are crucial to corporate operations, scholarly and theoretical accounts tend to slight officers and amalgamate them with directors into a single category, "managers." This essay anchors officers within the common law of agency-as does black-letter law-which crisply differentiates officers from directors. Understanding that agency is central of the legal account of officers' positions and responsibilities is crucial to seeing why, like directors, officers are fiduciaries, but distinctively so, not as instances of generic "corporate fiduciaries." Officers, like directors, owe duties of loyalty, but also particularized duties of care, competence, and diligence. Additionally, officers' duties of performance encompass two …

The Responsibility Gap In Corporate Crime, Samuel W. Buell

Faculty Scholarship

In many cases of criminality within large corporations, senior management does not commit the operative offense — or conspire or assist in it — but nonetheless bears serious responsibility for the crime. That responsibility can derive from, among other things, management’s role in cultivating corporate culture, in failing to police effectively within the firm, and in accepting lavish compensation for taking the firm’s reins. Criminal law does not include any doctrinal means for transposing that form of responsibility into punishment. Arguments for expanding doctrine — including broadening of the presently narrow “responsible corporate officer” doctrine — so as to authorize …

China's "Corporatization Without Privatization" And The Late Nineteenth Century Roots Of A Stubborn Path Dependency, Nicholas C. Howson

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

This Article analyzes the contemporary program of "corporatization without privatization" in the People's Republic of China (PRC) directed at China's traditional state-owned enterprises (SOEs) through a consideration of long ago precursor enterprise establishments--starting from the last Chinese imperial dynasty's creation of "government-promoted/supervised, merchant-financed/operated" (guandu shangban) firms in the latter part of the nineteenth century. While analysts are tempted to see the PRC corporations with listings on international exchanges that dominate the global economy and capital markets as expressions of "convergence," this Article argues that such firms in fact show deeply embedded aspects of path dependency unique to the Chinese context …

Commitment And Entrenchment In Corporate Governance, K.J. Martijn Cremers, Saura Masconale, Simone M. Sepe

Northwestern University Law Review

Over the past twenty years, a growing number of empirical studies have provided evidence that governance arrangements protecting incumbents from removal promote managerial entrenchment, reducing firm value. As a result of these studies, “good” corporate governance is widely understood today as being about stronger shareholder rights.

This Article rebuts this view, presenting new empirical evidence that challenges the results of prior studies and developing a novel theoretical account of what really matters in corporate governance. Employing a unique dataset that spans from 1978 to 2008, we document that protective arrangements that require shareholder approval—such as staggered boards and supermajority requirements …

Solving The Puzzle Of Corporate Governance Of State-Owned Enterprises: The Path Of Temasek Model In Singapore And Lessons For China, Christopher C. H. Chen

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

The purpose of this Article is to examine the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the Asian context by empirically surveying the influence of Temasek Holdings, Singapore’s sovereign wealth fund, on its portfolio of government-linked companies in Singapore. Overall, the Temasek model seems to be a promising one. This Article shows that the top listed government-linked companies in which Temasek has a stake have greater board independence than the other top listed companies in Singapore. This illustrates that a high quality of corporate governance could be aligned with public interests associated with SOEs. While this research offers hope for …

Modern-Day Monitorships, Veronica Root

Faculty Scholarship

When a sexual abuse scandal rocked Penn State, when Apple was found to have engaged in anticompetitive behavior, and when servicers like Bank of America improperly foreclosed upon hundreds of thousands of homeowners, each organization entered into a "Modern-Day Monitorship”. Modern-day monitorships are utilized in an array of contexts to assist in widely varying re­mediation efforts. This is because they provide outsiders with a unique source of information about the efficacy of the tarnished organization's efforts to resolve misconduct. Yet, despite their use in high profile and serious matters of organi­zational wrongdoing, they are not an outgrowth of careful study …

In Search Of The Absent Shareholders: A New Solution To Retail Investors' Apathy, Kobi Kastiel, Yaron Nili

Faculty Scholarship

Corporate law scholars have taken investors' rational apathy for granted for many years, considering it a necessary evil once ownership is no longer closely held. But how significant is retail investors' apathy and what is its impact? This Article is the first to provide comprehensive data on the true magnitude of retail investors' apathy and its negative impact on corporate governance. Building on behavioral economics tools, this Article then presents a novel solution that could substantially mitigate, if not fully eliminate, this long-standing problem of investors' rational apathy, with minimal regulatory burden. The solution is based on the premise that …

The "New Insiders": Rethinking Independent Directors' Tenure, Yaron Nili

Faculty Scholarship

Director independence is a cornerstone of modern corporate governance. Regulators, scholars, companies and shareholders have all placed a strong emphasis on director independence as a means to ensure that investors’ interests in their companies are well served. But what makes a director independent? While regulators and stock exchanges have tackled this elusive standard in different ways, the end goal is always the same – ensuring that the director is able to exercise truly independent judgment and further the best interests of shareholders. Surprisingly, these regulatory bodies have failed to consider the impact board tenure might have on director independence. This …

Open Sesame: The Myth Of Alibaba's Extreme Corporate Governance And Control, Yu-Hsin Lin, Thomas Mehaffy

Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law

In September 2014, Alibaba Group Holding Limited (Alibaba) successfully launched a $25 billion initial public offering (IPO), the largest IPO ever, on New York Stock Exchange. Alibaba’s IPO success witnessed a wave among Chinese Internet companies to raise capital in U.S capital markets. A significant number of these companies have employed a novel, but poorly understood corporate ownership and control mechanism—the variable interest entity (VIE) structure and/or the disproportional control structure. The VIE structure was created in response to the Chinese restriction on foreign investments; however, it carries the risk of being declared illegal under Chinese law. The disproportional control …

Officer Accountability, Megan Wischmeier Shaner

Faculty Articles

The officer is at the center of modern corporate governance. Wielding immense power and influence, officers’ conduct and decision-making can determine the success or failure of their companies and impact the economy more broadly. Fiduciary duties under state law serve as a vital check on officer power. This article is the third piece in a study of the role of fiduciary duties in regulating officer behavior. It examines an underlying premise in prior scholarship – that officers are rarely being held accountable for their conduct in the traditional fiduciary duty litigation context of state court. This article reviews opinions of …

Balance And Team Production, Kelli A. Alces

Seattle University Law Review

For decades, those holding the shareholder primacy view that the purpose of a corporation is to earn a profit for its shareholders have been debating with those who believe that corporations exist to serve broader societal interests. Adolph Berle and Merrick Dodd began the conversation over eighty years ago, and it continues today, with voices at various places along a spectrum of possible corporate purposes participating. Unfortunately, over time, the various sides of the debate have begun to talk past each other rather than engage with each other and have lost sight of whatever common ground they may be able …

The Long Road To Reformulating The Understanding Of Directors' Duties: Legalizing Team Production Theory?, Thomas Clarke

Seattle University Law Review

In this Article, the historical evolution of corporate governance is considered, highlighting the different eras of governance, the dominant theoretical and practical paradigms, and the reformulation of paradigms and counter paradigms. Two alternative and sharply contrasting theorizations, one collective and collaborative (the work of Berle and Means), the other individualistic and contractual (agency theory and shareholder value) are focused upon. The explanatory potential of Blair and Stout’s team production theory is elaborated, along with its conception of the complexity of business enterprise, with a mediating hierarch (the board of directors) securing a balance between the interests of different stakeholders. The …

Tax And Corporate Governance: The Influence Of Tax On Managerial Agency Costs, David M. Schizer

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter examines the influence of tax on managerial agency costs, with particular emphasis on public companies in the United States. Focusing on “C-corporations,” this chapter first considers why tax is an imperfect vehicle for mitigating managerial agency costs. It then discusses how tax influences the compensation of managers, both in ways policy makers intended, and in ways they did not. The chapter also considers how tax affects management decisions about capital structure, hedging, and acquisitions. In addition, this chapter explores the tax system’s influence on the ability and incentives of shareholders to monitor management. This chapter then concludes with …

Majority Control And Minority Protection, Zohar Goshen, Assaf Hamdani

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter examines legal issues concerning majority control and minority protection in firms with concentrated ownership governance structures, with particular emphasis on the tradeoff between the goals of protecting minority shareholders and allowing controllers to pursue their vision and how corporate law should balance these conflicting goals. Focusing primarily on Delaware corporate law, it suggests that holding a control block allows majority shareholders to pursue their idiosyncratic vision in the manner they see fit, even against minority investors’ objections. Idiosyncratic vision refers to the subjective value that entrepreneurs attach to their business idea or vision, and this chapter considers its …

Say On Pay Around The World, Randall Thomas, Christoph Van Der Elst

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Shareholders have long complained that top executives are overpaid by corporate directors irrespective of their performance. Largely powerless to stop these practices, in 2002, they prevailed upon the U.K. Parliament to adopt legislation requiring public companies to permit their shareholders to have a mandatory, non-binding vote on the compensation of their top executives (Say on Pay). Since that time, there has been a wave of such legislation enacted in countries around the world, including the U.S., Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden, while Switzerland, Germany and France appear to be moving rapidly in the same direction. In this article, we …

Convergence And Persistence In Corporate Law And Governance, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter discusses the question of “convergence or persistence” in corporate law and governance. It first considers efforts to measure convergence directly by focusing on the evolution of law-on-the-books governance provisions before analyzing capital market evidence on convergence, with particular emphasis on capital market indicators such as the decline in “cross-listings” onto US stock exchanges by firms from jurisdictions with weaker investor protection and the increase in initial public offerings (IPOs) on emerging market stock markets. The chapter proceeds by reviewing evidence of divergence, especially “divergence within convergence,” and the failure of the European Union to produce more convergent corporate …