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Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

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Full-Text Articles in Commercial Law

Delaware Law As Lingua Franca: Theory And Evidence, Brian Broughman, Jesse A. Fried, Darian Ibrahim Nov 2014

Delaware Law As Lingua Franca: Theory And Evidence, Brian Broughman, Jesse A. Fried, Darian Ibrahim

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Why would a firm incorporate in Delaware rather than in its home state? Prior explanations have focused on the inherent features of Delaware corporate law, as well as the positive network externalities created by so many other firms domiciling in Delaware. We offer an additional explanation: a firm may choose Delaware simply because its law is nationally known and thus can serve as a “lingua franca” for in-state and out-of-state investors. Analyzing the incorporation decisions of 1,850 VC-backed startups, we find evidence consistent with this lingua-franca explanation. Indeed, the lingua-franca effect appears to be more important than other factors that …

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Shareholder Voting In An Age Of Intermediary Capitalism, Paul H. Edelman, Randall S. Thomas, Robert B. Thompson Sep 2014

Shareholder Voting In An Age Of Intermediary Capitalism, Paul H. Edelman, Randall S. Thomas, Robert B. Thompson

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Shareholder voting is a key part of contemporary American corporate governance. As numerous contemporary battles between corporate management and shareholders illustrate, voting has never been more important. Yet, traditional theory about shareholder voting, rooted in concepts of residual ownership and a principal/agent relationship, does not reflect recent fundamental changes as to who shareholders are and their incentives to vote (or not vote). In the first section of the article, we address this deficiency directly by developing a new theory of corporate voting that offers three strong and complementary reasons for shareholder voting. In the middle section, we apply our theory …

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What Should We Do About Multijurisdictional Litigation In M&A Deals?, Randall Thomas Nov 2013

What Should We Do About Multijurisdictional Litigation In M&A Deals?, Randall Thomas

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Many M&A transactions attract shareholder litigation challenging the fairness of the economic terms of the deal for the target shareholders. Since the end of the financial crisis, however, there has been a documented increase in the number of jurisdictions in which each individual transaction is attacked. Why has this upsurge in multi-jurisdictional litigation occurred? How significant are its real costs and benefits? And what should we do about it, if anything? This Article first summarizes what we know about these questions and then offers its own viewpoint on how best to respond to multi-jurisdictional litigation. On the one side, the …

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Carrots & Sticks: How Vcs Induce Entrepreneurial Teams To Sell Startups, Brian Broughman, Jesse A. Fried Sep 2013

Carrots & Sticks: How Vcs Induce Entrepreneurial Teams To Sell Startups, Brian Broughman, Jesse A. Fried

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Venture capitalists (VCs) usually exit their investments in a startup via a trade sale. But the entrepreneurial team – the startup’s founder, other executives, and common shareholders – may resist a trade sale. Such resistance is likely to be particularly intense when the sale price is low relative to VCs’ liquidation preferences. Using a hand-collected dataset of Silicon Valley firms, we investigate how VCs overcome such resistance. We find, in our sample, that VCs give bribes (carrots) to the entrepreneurial team in 45% of trade sales; in these sales, carrots total an average of 9% of deal value. The overt …

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The First Year Of "Say On Pay" Under Dodd-Frank: An Empirical Analysis And Look Forward, Randall Thomas, James F. Cotter, Alan R. Palmiter Apr 2013

The First Year Of "Say On Pay" Under Dodd-Frank: An Empirical Analysis And Look Forward, Randall Thomas, James F. Cotter, Alan R. Palmiter

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Using voting data from the first year of say-on-pay votes under Dodd- Frank, we look at the patterns of shareholder voting in advisory votes on exec- utive pay. Consistent with the more limited say-on-pay voting before Dodd- Frank, we find that shareholders in the first year under Dodd-Frank generally gave broad support to management pay packages. But not all pay packages received strong shareholder support. At some companies, management suf- fered the embarrassment of failed say-on-pay votes-that is, less than fifty per- cent of their company's shareholders voted in favor of the proposal. In particular, we find that poorly performing …

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Should New Zealand Adopt Say On Pay?, Randall Thomas, Susan Watson Jan 2013

Should New Zealand Adopt Say On Pay?, Randall Thomas, Susan Watson

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

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Corporate Personhood And The Corporate Persona, Margaret M. Blair Jan 2013

Corporate Personhood And The Corporate Persona, Margaret M. Blair

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Citizens United v. FEC that restrictions on corporate political speech were unconstitutional because of the First Amendment rights granted corporations as a result of their status as "persons" under the law. Following this decision, debate has been rekindled among legal scholars about the meaning of "corporate personhood." This debate is not new. Over the past two centuries, scholars have considered what corporate personhood means and entails. This debate has resulted in numerous theories about corporate personhood that have come into and out of favor over the years, including the "artificial person" theory, …

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Shareholder Litigation In Mergers And Acquisitions, Randall S. Thomas, C. N.V. Krishnan, Ronald W. Masulis Dec 2012

Shareholder Litigation In Mergers And Acquisitions, Randall S. Thomas, C. N.V. Krishnan, Ronald W. Masulis

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Using hand-collected data, we examine the targeting of shareholder class action lawsuits in merger & acquisition (M & A) transactions, and the associations of these lawsuits with offer completion rates and takeover premia. We find that M & A offers subject to shareholder lawsuits are completed at a significantly lower rate than offers not subject to litigation, after controlling for selection bias, different judicial standards, major offer characteristics, M & A financial and legal advisor reputations as well as industry and year fixed effects. M & A offers subject to shareholder lawsuits have significantly higher takeover premia in completed deals, …

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Do Vcs Use Inside Rounds To Dilute Founders? Some Evidence From Silicon Valley, Brian Broughman, Jesse Fried Dec 2012

Do Vcs Use Inside Rounds To Dilute Founders? Some Evidence From Silicon Valley, Brian Broughman, Jesse Fried

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In the bank-borrower setting, a firm's existing lender may exploit its positional advantage to extract rents from the firm in subsequent financings. Analogously, a startup's existing venture capital investors (VCs) may dilute the founder through a follow-on financing from these same VCs (an “inside” round) at an artificially low valuation. Using a hand-collected dataset of Silicon Valley startup firms, we find little evidence that VCs use inside rounds to dilute founders. Instead, our findings suggest that inside rounds are generally used as “backstop financing” for startups that cannot attract new money, and these rounds are conducted at relatively high valuations …

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A Former Treasury Adviser On How To Really Fix Wall Street, Morgan Ricks Jan 2011

A Former Treasury Adviser On How To Really Fix Wall Street, Morgan Ricks

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Any serious program for Wall Street reform should start with two words: “term out.” “Terming out” is a financial term of art, but its meaning is easily grasped. It simply means funding your business with long-term financing instead of short-term IOUs. To a far greater extent than is commonly understood, our financial sector funds its operations with extremely short-term borrowings. These IOUs must be paid back in a day, a week, or a month. By contrast, termed-out financial firms shun borrowings that come due in less than a year. A terming-out requirement would be costly for Wall Street, but the …

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Outsourcing, Modularity, And The Theory Of The Firm, Erin O'Connor, Gregg Kirchhoefer, Margaret M. Blair Jan 2011

Outsourcing, Modularity, And The Theory Of The Firm, Erin O'Connor, Gregg Kirchhoefer, Margaret M. Blair

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Firms have increasingly moved productive activities from within to outside the firm through outsourcing arrangements. According to some estimates, the value of outsourcing contracts has been nearly 100 billion dollars per year since 2004. Firm outsourcing happens for a number of reasons, including to save labor costs, capture the benefits of regulatory arbitrage, and take advantage of economies of scale in the provision of firm needs. We review a number of outsourcing contracts for evidence that contract techniques are used to help modularize the relationship between the firm and its service provider. Consistent with what modularity theory might predict, some …

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The Role Of Independent Directors In Startup Firms, Brian J. Broughman Sep 2010

The Role Of Independent Directors In Startup Firms, Brian J. Broughman

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This Article develops a new theory to explain the widespread use of independent directors in the governance of startup firms. Privately held startups often assign a tie-breaking board seat to a third-party independent director. This practice cannot be explained by the existing corporate governance literature, which relies on diffuse ownership and passive investment-features unique to the publicly traded firm. To develop an alternative theory, I model a financing contract between an entrepreneur and a venture capital investor. I show that allocating a tie- breaking vote to an unbiased third party can prevent opportunistic behavior that would occur if the firm …

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The Role Of Independent Directors In Startup Firms, Brian Broughman Jan 2010

The Role Of Independent Directors In Startup Firms, Brian Broughman

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This Article develops a new theory to explain the widespread use of independent directors in the governance of startup firms. Privately held startups often assign a tie-breaking board seat to a third-party independent director. This practice cannot be explained by the existing corporate governance literature, which relies on diffuse ownership and passive investment-features unique to the publicly traded firm. To develop an alternative theory, I model a financing contract between an entrepreneur and a venture capital investor. I show that allocating a tie- breaking vote to an unbiased third party can prevent opportunistic behavior that would occur if the firm …

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Citizens United & Corporate & Human Crime, Christopher Slobogin Jan 2010

Citizens United & Corporate & Human Crime, Christopher Slobogin

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Citizens United v. Election Commission held that, like human citizens, corporations can exercise their right to free speech by spending as much money as they like trying to influence elections. This article does not attack or defend that decision, but rather explores its implications for criminal liability, corporate and otherwise. Most prominently, Citizens United reinforces the long-accepted but still highly controversial proposition that, despite their inanimate nature, corporations can be criminally prosecuted for harm they cause. Less obviously, Citizens United provides fodder for those who would soften current corporate liability and punishment rules. Less obviously still, the decision could bolster …

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Common Challenges Facing Shareholder Suits In Europe And The United States, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox Aug 2009

Common Challenges Facing Shareholder Suits In Europe And The United States, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Episodic and even sometimes systematic misbehavior by businessmen and corporate entities is ubiquitous. While Enron and WorldCom were the battle cries for corporate reform in the U.S. so it was with Ahold and Parmalat across Europe. No country is free of concern that company officers will misbehave thereby injuring investors, consumers and destroying shareholder value. Thus, this symposium issue collects the recent experiences across Europe in strengthening shareholder suits. Most recent legislative efforts in Europe, and hence the comments in the symposium, are focused on the derivative suit. Just as the American experience with class actions, reviewed separately in this …

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Does Private Equity Create Wealth? The Effects Of Private Equity And Derivatives On Corporate Governance, Randall Thomas, Ronald W. Masulis Jan 2009

Does Private Equity Create Wealth? The Effects Of Private Equity And Derivatives On Corporate Governance, Randall Thomas, Ronald W. Masulis

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Private equity has reaped large rewards in recent years. We claim that one major reason for this success is due to the corporate governance advantages of private equity over the public corporation. We argue that the development of substantial derivative contracts and trading has significantly weakened the governance of public corporations and has created a need for financially sophisticated directors and much closer supervision of management. The private equity model delivers these benefits and allows corporations to be better governed, creating wealth gains for investors.

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The Evolving Role Of Institutional Investors In Corporate Governance And Corporate Litigation, Randall Thomas Mar 2008

The Evolving Role Of Institutional Investors In Corporate Governance And Corporate Litigation, Randall Thomas

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Each of the articles in this Symposium sheds new light on the ever-changing role of institutional investors in U.S. corporate governance and corporate litigation. They cover a broad range of topics, including institutional investor activism on executive compensation, proxy access initiatives at the SEC, state and federal litigation, and the current levels of activism by public pension funds. The data and the theoretical contributions of these articles provide important foundation for the ongoing discussion about the role of institutional investors.

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Rationalizing The Taxation Of Reorganizations And Other Corporate Acquisitions, Herwig J. Schlunk Jul 2007

Rationalizing The Taxation Of Reorganizations And Other Corporate Acquisitions, Herwig J. Schlunk

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This article examines the taxation of human shareholders in the case of mergers and acquisitions. Currently, the relevant law is extraordinarily complex, utterly inconsistent, and in many instances arguably unfair. There are really only two plausible ways to cure these ills. The first would involve moving to a tax system with more fulsome gain recognition, most likely in the form of mark-to-market taxation. This option is not in my opinion feasible (either technically or what is perhaps more important, politically). Accordingly, the second potential cure, moving to a tax system with less gain recognition, merits attention. In this article, I …

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A Minimalist Approach To Corporate Income Taxation, Herwig J. Schlunk Apr 2006

A Minimalist Approach To Corporate Income Taxation, Herwig J. Schlunk

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

An ever-shrinking hallmark of our federal income tax system is the apparent double taxation of some, but not all, business income. That is, some business income ultimately flows to the human shareholders of C corporations. These corporations pay corporate income tax on the taxable income they generate. Then, as and when such corporations distribute their after-corporate-income-tax income to their human shareholders (or equivalently, as and when their human shareholders sell their shares in such corporations), the human shareholders pay individual income tax on the amounts so distributed (or equivalently, on their capital gains).

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Symposium: International Legal Dimensions Of Art And Cultural Property, Jeffrey Schoenblum Oct 2005

Symposium: International Legal Dimensions Of Art And Cultural Property, Jeffrey Schoenblum

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The market for art and cultural property is international. Demand is intense and not particularly local in terms of consumer preference. Supply responds to this intense international demand. Like most anything else, art finds its way to whomever is prepared to pay for it. Regulation affects how it arrives at its ultimate destination, but generally does not prevent it from getting there. Apart from this international market, legal and policy aspects of art and cultural property have a distinctly international flavor due to historical circumstance. Since many works over time have been removed from their source by way of conquest, …

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What Is Corporate Law's Place In Promoting Societal Welfare?: An Essay In Honor Of Professor William Klein, Randall Thomas Jan 2005

What Is Corporate Law's Place In Promoting Societal Welfare?: An Essay In Honor Of Professor William Klein, Randall Thomas

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This is a short essay on what should be the fundamental criterion used to evaluate corporate law. I argue that the overall goal of good corporate law should be to assist private parties to create wealth for themselves and the economy in a manner that does not inflict uncompensated negative externalities upon third parties. Private businesses that produce goods and services should be encouraged by the state because creating greater wealth is generally beneficial to society. Corporate law can act as a helpful precondition for faster economic growth by protecting the parties' expectations, encouraging savings and investment, reducing transaction costs, …

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The Globalization (Americanization?) Of Executive Pay, Randall Thomas, Brian R. Cheffins Oct 2004

The Globalization (Americanization?) Of Executive Pay, Randall Thomas, Brian R. Cheffins

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In the United States, the remuneration packages of top executives are characterized by a strong emphasis on pay-for-performance and by a highly lucrative "upside." There is much discussion of the possibility that executive pay practices will globalize in accordance with this pattern. This Article assesses whether such convergence is likely to occur. After surveying briefly the key components of managerial remuneration and after examining the essential elements of the "U.S. pay paradigm," the Article considers market-oriented dynamics that could constitute a "global compensation imperative." These include wider dispersion of share ownership, more cross-border hiring of executives, growing international merger and …

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The Increasing Role Of Empirical Research In Corporate Law Scholarship, Randall Thomas Jun 2004

The Increasing Role Of Empirical Research In Corporate Law Scholarship, Randall Thomas

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This is a review of Professor Mark Roe's book, The Political Determinants of Corporate Governance. It seeks to accomplish two goals. First, in Part I, it summarizes the theoretical arguments made in Political Determinants and critiques the empirical support marshaled by Professor Roe in support of them. Then, in Part II, it develops an alternative model that could be used to test jointly Professor Roe's and LLSV's theory about the determinants of corporate governance. Finally, it offers a few concluding remarks about the future of empirical legal scholarship.

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Director's Duties In A Post-Enron World: Why Language Matters, Margaret M. Blair Jan 2003

Director's Duties In A Post-Enron World: Why Language Matters, Margaret M. Blair

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This essay observes that, in the face of corporate scandals of the last few years, a number of prominent advocates for shareholder primacy have retreated to the position that directors and officers should attempt to maximize long run share value performance, rather than short term value. But the mantra of share value maximization has no distinctive meaning and policy implications if it is not interpreted to mean maximization of short term value. This is because the actions required to maximize share value in the long run are indistinguishable in practice from actions taken in pursuit of other more broadly-stated goals …

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Locking In Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved For Business Organizers In The Nineteenth Century, Margaret M. Blair Jan 2003

Locking In Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved For Business Organizers In The Nineteenth Century, Margaret M. Blair

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This Article argues that corporate status became popular in the nineteenth century as a way to organize production because of the unique manner in which incorporation permitted organizers to lock in financial capital. Unlike participants in a partnership, shareholders in an incorporated enterprise could not extract capital from the firm without explicit approval of a board of directors charged with representing the interests of the incorporated entity, even when that interest might sometimes conflict with the interests of individual shareholders. While this ability to lock in capital has occasionally led to abuses, the ability to commit capital generally helped promote …

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Litigating Challenges To Executive Pay: An Exercise In Futility?, Randall Thomas, Kenneth J. Martin Apr 2001

Litigating Challenges To Executive Pay: An Exercise In Futility?, Randall Thomas, Kenneth J. Martin

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This paper is an empirical analysis of plaintiffs' success rates in executive compensation litigation. Using data from publicly available files, this study examines a sample of 124 cases where shareholders have challenged executive compensation levels and practices at public and closely held corporations. This data set shows that shareholders are successful in at least some stage of this litigation in a significant percentage of these cases. Our most robust result is that plaintiffs win a greater percentage of the time in compensation cases against closely held companies than against publicly held companies. This result is consistent for every stage of …

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Should Shareholders Have A Greater Say Over Executive Pay??, Randall S. Thomas, Brian R. Cheffins Jan 2001

Should Shareholders Have A Greater Say Over Executive Pay??, Randall S. Thomas, Brian R. Cheffins

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Executive pay arrangements in Britain's publicly quoted companies have been subjected to much criticism in recent years. Proposals that shareholders should have a greater direct say over managerial remuneration have been a by-product of the concerns expressed. Debate on this point, however, has been largely speculative. This is because there is little evidence available in the United Kingdom indicating how shareholders would exercise any new powers they might be given. This paper addresses the evidentiary gap by drawing upon the experience in the United States, where empirical work indicates that shareholder voting only operates as a potential check when pay …

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Director Accountability And The Mediating Role Of The Corporate Board, Margaret M. Blair Jan 2001

Director Accountability And The Mediating Role Of The Corporate Board, Margaret M. Blair

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

One of the most pressing questions facing both corporate scholars and business people today is how corporate directors can be made accountable. Before addressing this issue, however, it seems important to consider two antecedent questions: To whom should directors be accountable? And for what? Contemporary corporate scholarship often starts from a "shareholder primacy" perspective that holds that directors of public corporations ought to be accountable only to the shareholders, and ought to be accountable only for maximizing the value of the shareholders' shares. This perspective rests on the conventional contractarian assumption that the shareholders are the sole residual claimants and …

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The Zen Of Corporate Capital Structure Neutrality, Herwig J. Schlunk Nov 2000

The Zen Of Corporate Capital Structure Neutrality, Herwig J. Schlunk

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Given the current tax rate structure - where the marginal tax rate of some persons exceeds the corporate tax rate and the marginal tax rate of others is exceeded by it - corporations are generally well advised to employ both debt and equity in their capital structures. The former will be held by low tax rate taxpayers and will serve to lower the effective aggregate tax rate6 on the corporation's taxable income. The latter will be held by high tax rate taxpayers and will serve to keep low the effective aggregate tax rate on the corporation's unrecognized economic income (such …

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Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping By Insolvent Corporations, Randall Thomas, Robert K. Rasmussen Jul 2000

Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping By Insolvent Corporations, Randall Thomas, Robert K. Rasmussen

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Most commentators decry forum shopping. This general hostility extends to forum shopping by firms filing for bankruptcy. Indeed, Congress is considering legislation designed to reduce forum shopping by companies filing for bankruptcy. This article makes two contributions to this debate. First, we show that the current debate is driven almost exclusively by attorneys trying to protect fees rather than by any principled objection to forum shopping. Second, on the merits, we argue that the hostility to forum shopping is misplaced. The near universal condemnation of forum shopping rests on the premise that, at the time the plaintiff selects a forum, …

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