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Articles 61 - 90 of 223
Full-Text Articles in Business Organizations Law
Executive Compensation In Controlled Companies, Kobi Kastiel
Executive Compensation In Controlled Companies, Kobi Kastiel
Indiana Law Journal
Conventional wisdom among corporate law theorists holds that the presence of a controlling shareholder should alleviate the problem of managerial opportunism because such a controller has both the power and incentives to curb excessive executive pay. This Article challenges that common understanding by proposing a different view based on an agency problem paradigm. Controlling shareholders, this Article suggests, may in fact overpay managers in order to maximize controllers’ consumption of private benefits, due to their close social and business ties with professional managers or for other reasons, such as being captured by professional managers. This tendency to overpay managers is …
Voter Primacy, Sarah C. Haan
Voter Primacy, Sarah C. Haan
Fordham Law Review
This Article argues that Citizens United v. FEC expanded the audience for campaign finance disclosure to include a group that had never before been held relevant to campaign finance disclosure—corporate shareholders—and explores the constitutional, policy, and political consequences of this change. In part IV of Citizens United, the U.S. Supreme Court departed from more than thirty years of campaign finance disclosure analysis to treat corporate shareholders as a target audience for corporate electoral spending disclosure, holding that the governmental interest advanced by campaign finance disclosure laws includes an interest in helping corporate shareholders “determine whether their corporation’s political speech advances …
Tax And Corporate Governance: The Influence Of Tax On Managerial Agency Costs, David M. Schizer
Tax And Corporate Governance: The Influence Of Tax On Managerial Agency Costs, David M. Schizer
Faculty Scholarship
This chapter examines the influence of tax on managerial agency costs, with particular emphasis on public companies in the United States. Focusing on “C-corporations,” this chapter first considers why tax is an imperfect vehicle for mitigating managerial agency costs. It then discusses how tax influences the compensation of managers, both in ways policy makers intended, and in ways they did not. The chapter also considers how tax affects management decisions about capital structure, hedging, and acquisitions. In addition, this chapter explores the tax system’s influence on the ability and incentives of shareholders to monitor management. This chapter then concludes with …
Enforceability Of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses For Shareholder-Corporation Disputes, Garry D. Hartlieb
Enforceability Of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses For Shareholder-Corporation Disputes, Garry D. Hartlieb
Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review
Investor litigation is an increasingly vexatious field of law. Nearly every time a significant change of control or corporate ownership occurs, plaintiffs’ attorneys file standardized complaints to set in motion class action suits. Ultimately, the settlements shareholders receive fail to achieve the practical effects that parties on both sides desire. Shareholders may receive pennies on the dollar of what they allege was lost by corporate wrongdoing, and, in some cases, shareholders may not receive monetary recovery as the settlement requires only that the corporation to make changes to its governing documents. These suits distract directors and management from the core …
Unanimous Shareholder Agreements, Nicolas William Juzda
Unanimous Shareholder Agreements, Nicolas William Juzda
PhD Dissertations
The unanimous shareholder agreement is a feature of most Canadian corporate statutes that allows the shareholders to, by creating an agreement meeting the necessary criteria, restrict the powers of the directors to manage the business and affairs of the corporation. One possible justification for this is the "nexus of contracts" theory that all corporations are notionally reducible to voluntary agreements. Three key areas of ambiguity surrounding unanimous shareholder agreements are examined in this dissertation, with specific reference to existing judgments. The requirements for their formation are reviewed, including the exact meaning and strictness of the unanimity criterion and the necessity …
A Blended Approach To Reducing The Costs Of Shareholder Litigation, Valian A. Afshar
A Blended Approach To Reducing The Costs Of Shareholder Litigation, Valian A. Afshar
Michigan Law Review
Multiforum litigation and federal securities law class actions impose heavy costs on corporations and their shareholders without producing proportionate benefits. Both are largely the result of the agency problem between shareholders and their attorneys, driven more by the attorneys’ interests in generating fees than by the interests of their clients. In response to each of these problems, commentators have recommended a number of solutions. Chief among them are forum selection and mandatory arbitration provisions in a corporation’s charter or bylaws. This Note recommends that corporations unilaterally adopt both forum selection and mandatory arbitration bylaws to address shareholder lawsuits under state …
Shareholder Liability In Nova Scotia Unlimited Companies, Mohamed F. Khimji
Shareholder Liability In Nova Scotia Unlimited Companies, Mohamed F. Khimji
Dalhousie Law Journal
Unlimited Companies incorporated under the Nova Scotia Companies Act (NSULCs) have, in recent decades, become recognized as tax efficient forms of business organizations. NSULCs differ from conventional business corporations in that their shareholders are exposed to liability for corporate obligations under the enabling legislation. This paper attempts to provide an analysis of the precise nature of unlimited liability faced by shareholders in such entities in response to recent bankruptcy litigation in the U.S. that raised the issue of the relationship between a shareholder's liability for a debt of the firm under the enabling legislation and under a contractual guarantee provided …
Is The Independent Director Model Broken?, Roberta S. Karmel
Is The Independent Director Model Broken?, Roberta S. Karmel
Seattle University Law Review
At common law, an interested director was barred from participating in corporate decisions in which he had an interest, and therefore “dis-interested” directors became desirable. This concept of the disinterested director developed into the model of an “independent director” and was advocated by the Securities and Exchange Commission and court decisions as a general ideal in a variety of situations. This Article explores doubts regarding the model of an “independent director” and suggests that director expertise may be more important that director independence. The Article then discusses shareholder primacy and sets forth alternatives to the shareholder primacy theory of the …
The Third Way, Kent Greenfield
The Third Way, Kent Greenfield
Seattle University Law Review
Shareholder supremacists argue that corporate management should be constrained by additional shareholder power to nominate directors, approve executive pay, or receive financial disclosures. Meanwhile, managerial and directorial apologists suggest that the way forward is to protect managerial prerogative. But, there is a third way: Managerial obligation could be increased without the obligation running solely to the holders of equity. This Article situates the current moment of intellectual churning in corporate law in a larger historical narrative and explains why we find ourselves in this moment. This Article then suggests what a third way might require in terms of conceptualization, process, …
Insider Trading And Other Securities Frauds In The United States: Lessons For Chile, Dante Figueroa
Insider Trading And Other Securities Frauds In The United States: Lessons For Chile, Dante Figueroa
Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review
This Article is a comparative analysis of insider trading law in the United States and Chile. The study summarily reviews the historical, political, and legal foundations of insider trading regulation in both jurisdictions, identifying areas of convergence, as well as areas in which the Chilean securities market could benefit vis- ` a-vis the more advanced experience of the considerably larger American securities market. The Article also highlights the axiological closeness between both jurisdictions concerning the protection of inside corporate information and the fiduciary role of those who intervene in securities markets in their various capacities (as investors, shareholders, corporate officers, …
Legally "Strong" Shareholders Of Japan, Gen Goto
Legally "Strong" Shareholders Of Japan, Gen Goto
Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review
Foreign investors often criticize Japanese corporations for not paying enough attention to the interests of their shareholders. It might surprise these critics, then, to learn that shareholders’ legal rights under the Japanese Companies Act are actually quite strong. Indeed, many of the rights that shareholders’ rights advocates often support, including shareholders’ power to alter a corporate charter without board consent, shareholders’ power to control dividend payments, majority voting for board elections, shareholders’ power to replace the board of directors, and shareholder access to a corporate ballot—all of which are strongly debated elsewhere— are already effective in Japan. Moreover, derivative suits …
Corporate Taxation And Corporate Social Responsibility, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
Corporate Taxation And Corporate Social Responsibility, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
Articles
This Article will address the question of whether publicly traded U.S. corporations owe a duty to their shareholders to minimize their corporate tax burden through any legal means, or if instead, strategic behaviors like aggressive tax-motivated transactions are inconsistent with corporate social responsibility (“CSR”). I believe the latter holds true, regardless of one’s view of the corporation. Under the “artificial entity” view, such behavior undermines the constitutive relationship between the corporation and the state. Under the “real view,” such behavior runs contrary to the normal obligation of citizens to comply with the law (even absent effective enforcement). And under the …
'Quack Corporate Governance' As Traditional Chinese Medicine – The Securities Regulation Cannibalization Of China's Corporate Law And A State Regulator's Battle Against Party State Political Economic Power, Nicholas C. Howson
Articles
From the start of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) “corporatization ” project in the late 1980s, a Chinese corporate governance regime subject to increasingly enabling legal norms has been determined by mandatory regulations imposed by the PRC securities regulator, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Indeed, the Chinese corporate law system has been cannibalized by all - encompassing securities regulation directed at corporate governance, at least for companies with listed stock. This Article traces the path of that sustained intervention and makes a case — wholly contrary to the “quack corporate governance” critique much aired in the United States …
Quotas And The Transatlantic Divergence Of Corporate Governance, Véronique Magnier, Darren Rosenblum
Quotas And The Transatlantic Divergence Of Corporate Governance, Véronique Magnier, Darren Rosenblum
Faculty Publications
The French adoption of a corporate board quota for women reflects Europe’s increasingly stakeholder-oriented approach to corporate governance, one that stands in marked contrast with that of the United States. This Article discusses how the corporate board quota will shift French and European corporate governance. The change accentuates an already established stakeholder corporate culture widespread in Europe, most notably evidenced by the presence of worker representation on boards. In contrast, the United States’ corporate governance structure increasingly places the shareholder at its center. The proliferation of quotas for women on corporate boards in the national and transnational European contexts is …
On The Rise Of Shareholder Primacy, Signs Of Its Fall, And The Return Of Managerialism (In The Closet), Lynn A. Stout
On The Rise Of Shareholder Primacy, Signs Of Its Fall, And The Return Of Managerialism (In The Closet), Lynn A. Stout
Seattle University Law Review
In their 1932 opus "The Modern Corporation and Public Property," Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means famously documented the evolution of a new economic entity—the public corporation. What made the public corporation “public,” of course, was that it had thousands or even hundreds of thousands of shareholders, none of whom owned more than a small fraction of outstanding shares. As a result, the public firm’s shareholders had little individual incentive to pay close attention to what was going on inside the firm, or even to vote. Dispersed shareholders were rationally apathetic. If they voted at all, they usually voted to approve …
The Future Of Shareholder Democracy In The Shadow Of The Financial Crisis, Alan Dignam
The Future Of Shareholder Democracy In The Shadow Of The Financial Crisis, Alan Dignam
Seattle University Law Review
This Article argues that the U.K. regulatory response to the financial crisis, in the form of “stewardship” and shareholder engagement, is an error built on a misunderstanding of the key active role shareholders played in the enormous corporate governance failure represented by the banking crisis. Shareholders’ passivity, rather than activity, has characterized the reform perception of the shareholder role in corporate governance. This characterization led to the conclusion that if only they were more active they would be more responsible “stewards” of the corporation. If, as this Article argues, shareholder activity was part of the problem in the banks, then …
Limits Of Disclosure, Steven M. Davidoff, Claire A. Hill
Limits Of Disclosure, Steven M. Davidoff, Claire A. Hill
Seattle University Law Review
One big focus of attention, criticism, and proposals for reform in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis has been securities disclosure. Many commentators have emphasized the complexity of the securities being sold, arguing that no one could understand the disclosure. Some observers have noted that disclosures were sometimes false or incomplete. What follows these issues, to some commentators, is that, whatever other lessons we may learn from the crisis, we need to improve disclosure. How should it be improved? Commentators often lament the frailties of human understanding, notably including those of everyday retail investors—people who do not understand or …
Shareholders And Social Welfare, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter
Shareholders And Social Welfare, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter
Seattle University Law Review
This Article addresses the questions of whether and how shareholders matter for social welfare, finding that different and contrasting answers have prevailed during different periods of recent history. Observers in the mid-twentieth century believed that the socioeconomic characteristics of real-world shareholders were highly pertinent to social welfare inquiries. But those observers went on to conclude that there followed no justification for catering to shareholder interest, for shareholders occupied elite social strata. The answer changed during the twentieth century’s closing decades, when observers came to accord the shareholder interest a key structural role in the enhancement of economic efficiency even as …
Corporation Code Sections 309 And 1203: California Redefines Directors' Duties Towards Shareholders, Ernest F. Batenga, Mark Willis
Corporation Code Sections 309 And 1203: California Redefines Directors' Duties Towards Shareholders, Ernest F. Batenga, Mark Willis
Pepperdine Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Supreme Court And The Shareholder Litigant: Basic, Inc. V. Levinson In Context, Jayne W. Barnard
The Supreme Court And The Shareholder Litigant: Basic, Inc. V. Levinson In Context, Jayne W. Barnard
Pepperdine Law Review
No abstract provided.
Favoritism And Corporate Law: The Confused Corporate Opportunity Doctrine In The Hyundai Motor Case, Hwa-Jin Kim, Seung Hwan Lee, Stephen M. Woodcock
Favoritism And Corporate Law: The Confused Corporate Opportunity Doctrine In The Hyundai Motor Case, Hwa-Jin Kim, Seung Hwan Lee, Stephen M. Woodcock
Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review
Core legal principles of U.S. corporate law are often met with perplexity in foreign jurisdictions. This is especially true for legal principles that are controversial even in the U.S. This Article takes the corporate opportunity doctrine and examines how it has been exported to the civil law regime in Korea. Korean conglomerates such as Samsung Group and Hyundai Motor Group have become major players in the global market, but corporate law and practice in Korea have had a difficult time keeping up with developments in the business sector. The Hyundai Motor Case demonstrates an ambitious, but ill-fated, attempt at the …
Private Regulation Of Insider Trading In The Shadow Of Lax Public Enforcement: Evidence From Canadian Firms, Laura Nyantung Beny, Anita Anand
Private Regulation Of Insider Trading In The Shadow Of Lax Public Enforcement: Evidence From Canadian Firms, Laura Nyantung Beny, Anita Anand
Articles
Like firms in the United States, many Canadian firms voluntarily restrict trading by corporate insiders beyond the requirements of insider trading laws (i.e., super-compliance). Thus, we aim to understand the determinants of firms’ private insider trading policies (ITPs), which are quasi-contractual devices. Based on the assumption that firms that face greater costs from insider trading (or greater benefits from restricting insider trading) ought to be more inclined than other firms to adopt more stringent ITPs, we develop several testable hypotheses. We test our hypotheses using data from a sample of firms included in the Toronto Stock Exchange/Standard and Poor’s (TSX/S&P) …
Carrots And Sticks: How Vcs Induce Entrepreneurial Teams To Sell Startups, Brian J. Broughman, Jesse M. Fried
Carrots And Sticks: How Vcs Induce Entrepreneurial Teams To Sell Startups, Brian J. Broughman, Jesse M. Fried
Articles by Maurer Faculty
Venture capitalists (VCs) usually exit their investments in a startup via a trade sale. But the entrepreneurial team – the startup’s founder, other executives, and common shareholders – may resist a trade sale. Such resistance is likely to be particularly intense when the sale price is low relative to VCs’ liquidation preferences. Using a hand-collected dataset of Silicon Valley firms, we investigate how VCs overcome such resistance. We find, in our sample, that VCs give bribes (carrots) to the entrepreneurial team in 45% of trade sales; in these sales, carrots total an average of 9% of deal value. The overt …
The Limited Liability Company As A Security, Mark I. Steinberg, Karen L. Conway
The Limited Liability Company As A Security, Mark I. Steinberg, Karen L. Conway
Pepperdine Law Review
No abstract provided.
Are Limited Liability Company Interests Securities?, Mark A. Sargent
Are Limited Liability Company Interests Securities?, Mark A. Sargent
Pepperdine Law Review
No abstract provided.
Shareholder Demands For Higher Corporate Earnings Have Their Price: How Courts Allow Employers To Fire Older Employees For Their Achievements, Kester Spindler
Shareholder Demands For Higher Corporate Earnings Have Their Price: How Courts Allow Employers To Fire Older Employees For Their Achievements, Kester Spindler
Pepperdine Law Review
No abstract provided.
Eliminating The Executive Overcompensation Problem: How The Sec And Congress Have Failed And Why The Shareholders Can Prevail, Blake H. Crawford
Eliminating The Executive Overcompensation Problem: How The Sec And Congress Have Failed And Why The Shareholders Can Prevail, Blake H. Crawford
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
No abstract provided.
The Politicization Of Corporate Governance: Bureaucratic Discretion, The Sec, And Shareholder Ratification Of Auditors, J. Robert Brown Jr.
The Politicization Of Corporate Governance: Bureaucratic Discretion, The Sec, And Shareholder Ratification Of Auditors, J. Robert Brown Jr.
Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship
The role of the Securities and Exchange Commission in the corporate governance process has shifted dramatically in recent years. The Commission has increasingly supplanted state law in determining substantive standards of corporate governance. The replacement of states with the Commission will have significant consequences.
The Facebook Ipo's Face-Off With Dual Class Stock Structure, Anna S. Han
The Facebook Ipo's Face-Off With Dual Class Stock Structure, Anna S. Han
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform Caveat
The Facebook initial public offering (“Facebook IPO”) is premised on a dual class stock structure, which the media criticizes as a circumvention of regulations designed to protect shareholders. I argue that Facebook’s use of dual class stock not only is likely to benefit its shareholders, but also follows in the footsteps of seasoned, influential companies like Google.
A Very Quiet Revolution: A Primer On Securities Crowdfunding And Title Iii Of The Jobs Act, Thaya Brook Knight, Huiwen Leo, Adrian A. Ohmer
A Very Quiet Revolution: A Primer On Securities Crowdfunding And Title Iii Of The Jobs Act, Thaya Brook Knight, Huiwen Leo, Adrian A. Ohmer
Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review
This essay introduces the complex regulatory regime that governs the public sale of all securities, no matter how small the offeror. It is intended as a rudimentary roadmap for the start-up or its counsel and will, hopefully, help to illuminate the traps for the unwary while providing an overview of the regulatory universe in which securities crowdfunding will operate.