Business Organizations Law Commons^™

All In The Family As A Single Shareholder Of An S Corporation, Douglas A. Kahn, Jeffrey H. Kahn, Terrence G. Perris

Articles

Subject to a few exceptions, a corporation that has elected to be taxed under subchapter S of chapter 1 of subtitle A of title 26 of the United States tax code is not taxed on its net income. Instead, the income, deductions, credits, and other tax items of an S corporation pass through to its shareholders on a pro rata basis. To qualify for subchapter S treatment, an electing corporation must satisfy the requirements that are set forth in section 1361, one of which is that the corporation can have no more than 100 shareholders. One aspect of that requirement …

The Economic Impact Of Backdating Of Executive Stock Options, M. P. Narayanan, Cindi A. Schipani, H. Nejat Seyhun

Michigan Law Review

This Article discusses the economic impact of legal, tax, disclosure, and incentive issues arising from the revelation of dating games with regard to executive option grant dates. It provides an estimate of the value loss incurred by shareholders of firms implicated in backdating and compares it to the potential gain that executives might have obtained through backdating. Using a sample of firms that have already been implicated in backdating, we find that the revelation of backdating results in an average loss to shareholders of about 7%. This translates to about $400 million per firm. By contrast, we estimate that the …

Criminalization Of Corporate Law: The Impact On Shareholders And Other Constituents, David K. Millon

Scholarly Articles

None available.

Dividend Policy Inside The Multinational Firm, Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley, James R. Hines Jr.

Articles

This paper examines the determinants of profit repatriation policies for US multinational firms. Dividend repatriations are surprisingly persistent and resemble dividend payments to external shareholders. Tax considerations influence dividend repatriations, but not decisively, as differentially-taxed entities feature similar policies and some firms incur avoidable tax penalties. Parent companies requiring cash to fund domestic investments, or to pay dividends to common shareholders, draw on the resources of their foreign affiliates through repatriations. Incompletely controlled affiliates are more likely than others to make regular dividend payments and to trigger avoidable tax costs through repatriations. The results indicate that traditional corporate finance concerns …

The Yukos Money Laundering Case: A Never-Ending Story, Dmitry Gololobov

Michigan Journal of International Law

The Yukos case has unveiled the possible dangers of money laundering legislation in the hands of governments with transitional economies and weak democratic traditions. Even if the anti-money laundering laws of the country comply with international pronouncements to the letter, there are still a number of ways the laws could be used for the sole purpose of persecuting political opponents. In the Yukos case, the money laundering charges were interrelated with the charges of corporate tax evasion, which, taken separately, in Russia, represent a rather weak tool for suppressing the political opponents, but taken together they are perfect for the …

Insider Trading Laws And Stock Markets Around The World: An Empirical Contribution To The Theoretical Law And Economics Debate, Laura Nyantung Beny

Articles

The primary goal of this Article is to bring empirical evidence to bear on the heretofore largely theoretical law and economics debate about insider trading. The Article first summarizes various agency, market, and contractual (or "Coasian") theories of insider trading propounded over the course of this longstanding debate. The Article then proposes three testable hypotheses regarding the relationship between insider trading laws and several measures of stock market performance. Exploiting the natural variation of international data, the Article finds that more stringent insider trading laws are generally associated with more dispersed equity ownership, greater stock price accuracy and greater stock …

Director Compliance With Elusive Fiduciary Duties In A Climate Of Corporate Governance Reform, Nadelle Grossman

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Megasubsidiaries And Asset Sales Under Section 271: Which Shareholders Must Approve Subsidiary Asset Sales, Yaman Shukairy

Michigan Law Review

Corporate law statutes determine the nature of the relationship between shareholders, the principal owners of the corporation, and the board of directors, those w ho run and operate the corporation. Under the Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL"), many of the powers are delegated to the board of directors. More specifically, under section 141, "the business and affairs of every corporation . . . [are] managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . ." The Delaware courts have interpreted this provision by deferring to decisions by directors and their designated management under the business judgment …

Dual Class Shares In Canada: An Historical Analysis, Stephanie Ben-Ishai, Poonam Puri

Dalhousie Law Journal

Dual class shares have been used by Canadian corporations to access public capital markets for the past sixty years. The debates surrounding the regulation of dual class shares have been reenergized. The authors of this article argue that only by looking to the legitimating role of nationalist policy, legislation and discourse in the historical development of dual class share structures can we derive context to the current debates surrounding the regulation of dual class shares and obtain a fuller understanding of the contemporary issues theypresent. Based on an analysis of the use of dual class shares as a financing technique …

The Dividend Problem, Daniel J.H. Greenwood

ExpressO

Everyone knows that shareholders receive dividends because they are entitled to the residual returns of a public corporation. Everyone is wrong.

Using the familiar economic model of the firm, I show that shareholders have no special claim on corporate economic returns. No one has an entitlement to rents in a capitalist system. Shareholders, the purely fungible providers of a purely fungible commodity and a sunk cost, are particularly unlikely to be able to command a share of economic profits or, indeed, any return at all.

Shareholders do win much of the corporate surplus. But this is not by market right …

Disloyalty Without Limits: “Independent” Directors And The Elimination Of The Duty Of Loyalty, J. Robert Brown Jr., Shkurupiy

Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship

In discussing independent directors, most of the focus has been on the definitions employed by the stock exchanges. It is the Delaware definition, however, that is the more important one. Delaware provides that, in non-controlling shareholder cases, conflict of interest transactions approved by a board consisting of a majority of "independent" directors will receive the presumption of the business judgment rule. The result is to eliminate any judicial consideration of fairness in reviewing the transaction.

China's Acquisitions Abroad - Global Ambitions, Domestic Effects, Nicholas C. Howson

Articles

In the past year or so, the world has observed with seeming trepidation what appears to be a new phenomenon-China's "stepping out" into the world economy. The move, labeled the "Going Out Strategy" by Chinese policy makers, sees China acting in the world not just as a trader of commodities and raw materials, or the provider of inexpensively-produced consumer goods for every corner of the globe, but as a driven and sophisticated acquirer of foreign assets and the equity interests in the legal entities that control such assets. The New Yorker magazine, ever topical and appropriately humorous, highlighted this attention …

Prevention Of Double Deductions Of A Single Loss: Solutions In Search Of A Problem, Douglas A. Kahn, Jeffrey H. Kahn

Articles

In the current tax system, a corporation is treated as a separate taxable entity. This tax system is sometimes referred to as an entity tax or a double tax system. Since a corporation is a separate and distinct entity from its owners, the shareholders, the default rule is that transfers between them are treated as realization events. Without a specific Internal Revenue Code (Code) provision providing otherwise, such transactions will also require the parties to recognize the realized gain or loss. Congress has enacted several nonrecognition corporate provisions when forcing the recognition of income could prevent changes to the form …

Panel Discussion: Bigger Carrots And Bigger Sticks: Issues And Developments In Corporate Sentencing, Jill E. Fisch, Hon. John S. Martin, Richard C. Breeden, Timothy Coleman, Stephen M. Cutler, Celeste Koeleveld, Richard H. Walker

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

The Political Dynamics Of Corporate Legislation: Lessons From Israel, Yael T. Ben-Zion

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Corporate And Business Law, Allen C. Goolsby, Louanna O. Heuhsen

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Are Shareholders Entitled To The Residual? , Daniel J.H. Greenwood

ExpressO

Everyone knows that shareholders are entitled to the residual returns of a public corporation. Everyone is wrong.

Using the familiar economic model of the firm, I show that shareholders have no special claim on a corporation’s economic returns. No one has an entitlement to economic rents in a capitalist system. Shareholders, the purely fungible providers of a purely fungible commodity, are particularly unlikely to be able to command a share of economic profits. Indeed, since the contribution of shareholders to the firm is a sunk cost, in a competitive market shareholders are unlikely to earn any return at all. Accordingly, …

Comment: The Case For Real Shareholder Democracy, George W. Dent

Faculty Publications

Comment on presentations at The Georege A. Leet Business Law Symposium: Corporate Governance: Directors v. Shapreholders, Cleveland, Ohio, 2005.

The Cyclical Transformations Of The Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective On Corporate Social Responsibility, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah

Articles

This article describes the transformations underwent by the corporate form from its Roman origins to the present. It shows that every time there was a shift in the role of the corporation, three theories of the corporation (the aggregate, artificial, and real entity theories) were brought forward in cyclical fashion. Every time, however, the real entity theory prevailed, and it was the dominant theory during periods ofstability in the relationship between the corporation, the shareholders, and the state. The article describes this evolution in detail, and then attempts to derive normative consequences for the legitimacy of corporate social responsibility (CSR). …

Corporate Fiduciary Duties In Kentucky, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.

Kentucky Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Let The Money Do The Governing: The Case For Reuniting Ownership And Control, Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

Part I of the Article outlines the problems with the current method of board selection and functioning. Management or management-sympathetic board members often select the board nominees, who share social ties with other board members. Boards tend to avoid "rocking the boat" by questioning management's recommendations, and because of the way the proxy process is structured, shareholders cannot effectively use their votes to oust unsatisfactory board members.

Part II analyzes the SEC's recent proposals for reform, which center on granting shareholders more opportunities to nominate candidates to the board. These proposals attempt to give shareholders a greater voice in the …

Should Issuers Be On The Hook For Laddering? An Empirical Analysis Of The Ipo Market Manipulation Litigation, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi

Articles

On December 6, 2000, the Wall Street Journal ran a front-page story exposing abuses in the market for initial public offerings (IPOs). The story revealed "tie-in" agreements between investment banks and initial investors seeking to participate in "hot" offerings. Under those agreements, initial investors would commit to buy additional shares of the offering company's stock in secondary market trading in return for allocations of shares in the IPO. As the Wall Street Journal related, those "[c]ommitments to buy in the after-market lock in demand for additional stock at levels above the IPO price. As such, they provide the rocket fuel …

Tender Offers By Controlling Shareholders: The Specter Of Coercion And Fair Price, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

Taking your company private has never been so appealing. The collapse of the tech bubble has left many companies whose stock prices bordered on the stratospheric now trading at small fractions of their historical highs. The spate of accounting scandals that followed the bursting of the bubble has taken some of the shine off the aura of being a public company-the glare of the spotlight from stock analysts and the business press looks much less inviting, notwithstanding the monitoring benefits that the spotlight purports to confer. Moreover, the regulatory backlash against those accounting scandals has made the costs of being …

Debt Investments In Competitors Under The Federal Antitrust Laws, Hanno F. Kaiser

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Beyond The Business Judgment Rule: Protecting Bidder Firm Shareholders From Value-Reducing Acquisitions, Ryan Houseal

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

During the takeover transactions of the 1980s, bidder firms paid target firm shareholders average premiums of approximately 50% for their shares. Did the sizable premiums paid to target firm shareholders during the 1980s reflect post-takeover improvement in the target's performance? Or were the premiums a result of the mismanagement of the bidder firms' assets?

The answer will help determine whether additional legal mechanisms should be established to protect bidder firm shareholders from the threat of management's consummation of value reducing acquisitions. Accordingly, this Note examines various studies which attempt to identify the source of the premiums paid to target firm …

Should Congress Repeal Securities Class Action Reform?, Adam C. Pritchard

Other Publications

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was designed to curtail class action lawsuits by the plaintiffs’ bar. In particular, the high-technology industry, accountants, and investment bankers thought that they had been unjustly victimized by class action lawsuits based on little more than declines in a company’s stock price. Prior to 1995, the plaintiffs’ bar had free rein to use the discovery process to troll for evidence to support its claims. Moreover, the high costs of litigation were a powerful weapon with which to coerce companies to settle claims. The plaintiffs’ bar and its allies in Congress have called …

Competition, Corporate Responsibility, And The China Question, Jospeh Vining

Other Publications

"Corporate responsibility" is not a peripheral matter. It is at the core of all decision-making on behalf of business corporations under American law. This paper examines the effort to add an exemption for "business" in corporate form to the exemptions from ordinary responsibility that are seen in other areas of activity - e.g., for the military, for lawyers in adversarial litigation, or for investigators in scientific research. It looks at a number of well known cases and points to the often neglected relevance of both the criminal law applicable to corporations as such, and the evolving professional responsibility of corporate …

Bad And Not-So-Bad Arguments For Shareholder Primacy, Lynn A. Stout

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

In 1932, the Harvard Law Review published a debate between two preeminent corporate scholars on the subject of the proper purpose of the public corporation. On one side stood the renowned Adolph A. Berle, coauthor of the classic The Modern Corporation and Private Property. Berle argued for what is now called "shareholder primacy"—the view that the corporation exists only to make money for its shareholders. According to Berle, "all powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a corporation, or to any group within the corporation. . . [are] at all times exercisable only for the ratable …

A Control-Based Approach To Shareholder Liability For Corporate Torts, Nina A. Mendelson

Articles

Some commentators defend limited shareholder liability for torts and statutory violations as efficient, even though it encourages corporations to overinvest in and to externalize the costs of risky activity. Others propose pro rata unlimited shareholder liability for corporate torts. Both approaches, however, fail to account fully for qualitative differences among shareholders. Controlling shareholders, in particular, may have lower information costs, greater influence over managerial decisionmaking, and greater ability to benefit from corporate activity. This Article develops a control-based approach to shareholder liability. It first explores several differences among shareholders. For example, a controlling shareholder can more easily curb managerial risk …

Stakeholder Protection In Germany And Japan, Mark J. Loewenstein

Publications

This Essay considers the stakeholder debate in the context of the German and Japanese legal systems. Although, nominally, corporations in those countries must operate in the interests of shareholders, in fact nonshareholder constituencies have considerable influence on corporate decision makers. Of equal importance, weak securities markets and ineffective or nonexistent legal protections for shareholders are also important factors in strengthening the position of nonshareholder constituencies and freeing directors to consider their interests. Thus, the stakeholder debate is more of an issue in the United States and Britain, where more shareholder-centic models flourish.