Business Organizations Law Commons^™

Wrong-Termism, Right-Termism, And The Liability Structure Of Investor Time Horizons, Andrew Verstein

Seattle University Law Review

Do investor time horizons lead to inefficient business conduct in the real economy? An extensive finance literature analyzes whether particular practices (e.g., high frequency trading and stock buybacks) lead firms to operate with inefficiently myopic investment horizons, and an extensive legal literature considers the appropriateness of policy interventions. This Article joins those debates by charting the space of possibilities: what might be the causes of problematic time horizons? What solutions are available? One implication of this analysis is that there may be unexplored market-based solutions located on the liability side of investors’ balance sheets. This Article also argues that we …

Specificity And Time Horizons, Frank Partnoy

Seattle University Law Review

This Essay argues that the short-termism debate would benefit from greater clarity and specificity regarding time horizons. I make four points. First, optimal time horizons vary in discernible ways. Second, the potential mismatch between actual and optimal time horizons should generate a range of responses. Third, investors and managers can discern and disclose estimates of actual and optimal time horizons (e.g., using categories such as preconscious, fast conscious, slow conscious, and discounting). Fourth, market participants, policy makers, and scholars should use such estimates to be more precise about time horizons. For example, critics of hedge fund activism could recognize that …

The Myth Of The Ideal Investor, Elisabeth De Fontenay

Seattle University Law Review

Critiques of specific investor behavior often assume an ideal investor against which all others should be compared. This ideal investor figures prominently in the heated debates over the impact of investor time horizons on firm value. In much of the commentary, the ideal is a longterm investor that actively monitors management, but the specifics are typically left vague. That is no coincidence. The various characteristics that we might wish for in such an investor cannot peacefully coexist in practice. If the ideal investor remains illusory, which of the real-world investor types should we champion instead? The answer, I argue, is …

Long-Term Executive Compensation As A Remedy For Corporate Short-Termism, Caroline Flammer

Seattle University Law Review

It is often argued that corporations are too focused on the short term (i.e., they are “short-termist”). For example, during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, candidate Hillary Clinton urged companies to escape the tyranny of short-termism. Similarly, in the recent policy debate in the United Kingdom on the need to reform corporate governance and executive compensation, Bank of England’s Chief Economist Andy Haldane stated that “[e]xecutive pay is a matter of profound and legitimate public interest. Pay practices can encourage short-term behaviour in ways which harm both firms and the economy.” In this context, a recent article by Flammer and …

Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance, And Firm Value, K.J. Martijn Cremers, Simone M. Sepe

Seattle University Law Review

In the corporate governance debate, the short-term versus longterm contention has grown into perhaps today’s most controversial topic. In this debate, descriptions of institutional investors tend to present a dichotomic nature. These investors are alternatively portrayed as homogenously short-termist or as consistent “forces for good,” focused on targeting underperforming companies. This Article moves beyond this dichotomy. It shows empirically that aggregate institutional investor behavior presents nuances that depend on a variety of factors, including individual firm characteristics, institutional ownership levels, and institutional propensity toward activism.

Flash Traders (Milliseconds) To Indexed Institutions (Centuries): The Challenges Of An Agency Theory Approach To Governance In The Era Of Diverse Investor Time Horizons, Harold Weston, Conrad Ciccotello

Seattle University Law Review

One aspect of the problem in trying to align a corporate investment horizon (the time period for return on investment) to that of its shareholders is the enormous range of investor time horizons, which can range from milliseconds to centuries. A second aspect of the problem is whether ownership of shares equates to ownership of the corporation. A third aspect of the problem is that, despite the theories and advocacy of shareholders being owners, based on the agency model of corporate finance first developed in the 1970s, the theory is contrary to corporate law. These three aspects will be developed …

Corwin V. Kkr Financial Holdings Llc—An After-Action Report, Joseph R. Slights Iii, Matthew Diller

Scholarly Articles

Vice Chancellor Slights presented this speech as the Eighteenth Annual Albert A. Destefano Lecture On Corporate, Securities, and Financial Law at the Fordham Corporate Law Center on April 9, 2018. Includes an introduction by Matthew Diller, Dean of the Fordham University School of Law.

Guardians Of The Galaxy: How Shareholder Lawyers Won Big For Their Clients And Vindicated The Integrity Of Our Economy, Daniel J. Morrissey

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

Securities class actions are the most economically significant form of litigation. Highly skilled lawyers expend huge sums and relentless efforts in these matters but because of the costs involved and the potential for enormous liability very few of them ever make it to trial. This Article is the story of one that did, a mammoth fraud where a jury returned a $1.5 billion verdict that, with interest, increased to almost $2.5 billion by the time the case reached the appellate court.

There the Court upheld the shareholders’ theory that their damages could be measured by the excessive amounts they had …

Caremark's Hidden Promise, Ezra Wasserman Mitchell

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

In re Caremark, decided in 1996, established for the first time a director’s duty to monitor under Delaware law. A significant amount of jurisprudence and commentary has developed. Almost all of this literature parses the language of the case and those following, and disregards the underlying claims for damages. As a result of this linguistic focus, many have concluded that the duty to monitor largely is toothless and, importantly, deals only with claims of failure to monitor legal risk. A duty to monitor business risk has been disavowed.

Following the money reveals a different story. Classifying the cases according to …

A Necessary Social Evil: The Indispensability Of The Shareholder Value Corporation, Marc T. Moore

Seattle University Law Review

This symposium article critically evaluates the developing Post-Shareholder-Value (PSV) paradigm in corporate governance scholarship and practice with particular reference to Professor Colin Mayer’s influential theory of the corporation as a unique, long-term “commitment device.” The article’s positive claim is that, while evolving PSV institutional mechanisms such as benefit corporations and dual-class share structures are generally encouraging from a social perspective, there is cause for skepticism about their capacity to become anything more than a niche or peripheral feature of the U.S. public corporations landscape. This is because such measures, despite their apparent reformist potential, are still ultimately quasi-contractual and thus …

Benefit Corporations And Public Markets: First Experiments And Next Steps, Brett H. Mcdonnell

Seattle University Law Review

Part I begins by considering the leading benefits and costs for a benefit corporation that chooses to go public. It starts there both to begin gaining an understanding of the challenges public companies will face and also to consider whether going public is likely to actually be an attractive option at all for some set of social enterprises. Some of the benefits and costs of going public are the same for benefit corporations as for ordinary corporations—access to new sources of capital and new accountability mechanisms are benefits, but legal compliance and pressures from shareholders to show quick results are …

Redefining Corporate Purpose: An International Perspective, Afra Afsharipour

Seattle University Law Review

This comparative analysis of India’s move toward redefining corporate purpose proceeds as follow. Part I presents an overview of global debates over corporate purpose, drawing principally from the move toward the ESV model in the U.K. and benefit corporations in the U.S. This section briefly recounts the debates in both jurisdictions about whether the changes they have experienced will engender more socially responsible corporations. Part II then provides a condensed history of corporate law reforms in India and an overview of the legislative changes undertaken in the past decade. In Part II, this Article takes a broad approach toward analyzing …

Finding The Pearl In The Oyster: Supercharging Ipos Through Tax Receivable Agreements, Christopher B. Grady

Northwestern University Law Review

A new, “supercharged” form of IPO has slowly developed over the last twenty years. This new form of IPO takes advantage of several seemingly unrelated provisions of the tax code to multiply pre-IPO owners’ proceeds from a public offering without reducing the amount public investors are willing to pay for the stock. Supercharged IPOs use a tax receivable agreement to transfer tax assets created by the IPO back to the pre-IPO ownership, “monetizing” the tax assets. As these structures have become more efficient, commentators have expressed concerns that these agreements deceive shareholders who either ignore or do not understand the …

The Battle Over Corporate Bylaws, Ariel Beverly

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

No abstract provided.

Responsible Resource Development And Prevention Of Sex Trafficking: Safeguarding Native Women And Children On The Fort Berthold Reservation, Kathleen Finn, Erica Gajda, Thomas Perin, Carla Fredericks

Publications

In 2010, large deposits of oil and natural gas were found in the Bakken shale formation, much of which is encompassed by the Fort Berthold Indian reservation, home to the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Nation (“MHA Nation” or “Three Affiliated Tribes” or “the Tribe”). However, rapid oil and gas development has brought an unprecedented rise of violent crime on and near the Fort Berthold reservation. Specifically, the influx of well-paid male oil and gas workers, living in temporary housing often referred to as “man camps,” has coincided with a disturbing increase in sex trafficking of Native women. The social risks …

Shareholders Do Not Have Standing To Bring An Individual Action Against Third Parties Who Have Damaged The Corporation: Adair V. Wozniak, Frank Carrino

Akron Law Review

Apart from the context of a derivative action, can a shareholder in a corporation sue individually for wrongful acts committed against the corporation by third parties?

The general rule of corporate law states that a shareholder cannot attain standing for such a suit. This rule is grounded on the theory that all shareholders should incur loss from third party wrongdoing in proportion to the amount of shares he or she holds, and likewise should proportionately benefit when the corporate entity wins an action. In addition, courts are fearful that if this rule were not in force, then there would be …

Statutory Limits On A Corporation's Right To Make Distributions To Shareholders: The Law Of Distribution In The 1984 Revised Model Business Corporation Act, Philip Mcgough

Akron Law Review

The purpose of this paper is to review the law of distribution in the 1984 Model Business Corporation Act. As we shall see, the 1950 MBCA's basic stance was that distributions should be made from earnings and that any distribution from contributed capital should require notification and approval of shareholders. The 1984 MBCA rejects the original stance and provides for minimal restrictions on distributions. What follows is in two parts: the first is a general survey of the law of distribution, the second compares the 1950 and 1984 versions of the MBCA in how they regulate distributions to shareholders.

Alternative Relief Available To Dissenting Shareholders Of A Cash-Out Merger, Edwin Davila

Akron Law Review

This article relates to the standing and right of a minority shareholder, who has dissented from a cash-out merger and commenced an appraisal proceeding, to pursue a separate individual claim of fraud in the merger through an action for rescissory damages against the participants for breaches of fiduciary duties to the shareholder. This issue arises from a cash-out merger of the minority shareholder. The situation encompasses two suits: a first filed statutory appraisal proceeding (the "Appraisal Action"); and a later filed shareholder's individual suit for damages for alleged fraud, conspiracy, self-dealing and waste of corporate assets (the "Fraud Action").

Unlimited Liability In The Modern Context: An Examination Of Shareholder Liability In Nova Scotia Unlimited Liability Companies, Sarah P. Bradley

Dalhousie Law Journal

For over 30 years, unlimited liability companies have been ubiquitous in USCanadian M&A transactions. Typically interposed between a US parent company and a Canadian operating company, these entities quietly function to make such structures more tax efficient. They are facilitated by Nova Scotia's venerable Companies Act, which has allowed for the incorporation of corporations with unlimited liability for over a hundred years. Unlimited liability of shareholders is the singular defining characteristic of the ULC, but the precise nature of ULC shareholder liability was apparently regarded as something of a technicality and rarely, if ever, closely examined in the professional or …

Balance And Team Production, Kelli A. Alces

Seattle University Law Review

For decades, those holding the shareholder primacy view that the purpose of a corporation is to earn a profit for its shareholders have been debating with those who believe that corporations exist to serve broader societal interests. Adolph Berle and Merrick Dodd began the conversation over eighty years ago, and it continues today, with voices at various places along a spectrum of possible corporate purposes participating. Unfortunately, over time, the various sides of the debate have begun to talk past each other rather than engage with each other and have lost sight of whatever common ground they may be able …

The Boundaries Of "Team" Production Of Corporate Governance, Anthony J. Casey, M. Todd Henderson

Seattle University Law Review

We examine the cooperative production of corporate governance. We explain that this production does not occur exclusively within a “team” or “firm.” Rather, several aspects of corporate governance are quintessentially market products. Like Blair and Stout, we view the shareholder as but one of many stakeholders in a corporation. Where we depart from their analysis is in our view of the boundaries of a firm. We suggest that they overweight the intrafirm production of control. Focusing on the primacy of a board of directors, Blair and Stout posit a hierarchical team that governs the economic enterprise. We observe, however, that …

Testing The Normative Desirability Of The Mediating Hierarch, Zachary J. Gubler

Seattle University Law Review

In their influential article, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, Professors Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout explained how corporate law might be viewed as an attempt at solving what is known as the team production problem. At its core, this problem has to do with the opportunistic behavior that arises when multiple economic actors make investments—whether of labor, capital, or otherwise—in a business venture where these investments are said to be “firm specific” because they cannot be easily withdrawn and redeployed in other projects. The problem is how to construct a governance regime that will create incentives for the …

Team Production And Securities Laws, Urska Velikonja

Seattle University Law Review

In the seminal paper that this symposium celebrates, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout made two related points. First, that Delaware law does not require shareholder primacy in public corporations. Rather, the broad deference afforded to the decisions of predominantly independent corporate boards of directors is consistent with a contrary theory, that of team production, or, as they call it, “the mediating hierarch” theory. The fundamental role of the board of directors is to mediate between the interests of various stakeholders that contribute to the corporation’s output. As a result, Delaware courts have repeatedly …

The Agency Cost Paradigm: The Good, The Bad, And The Ugly, Claire A. Hill, Brett H. Mcdonnell

Seattle University Law Review

In the “managerialist” world that preceded our present shareholder value world, some corporate managers could, and did, help themselves when they should have been doing their jobs. The modern agency cost paradigm has focused attention on this problem, in part by conceptualizing the duty of corporate managers as maximizing shareholder value. This paradigm has had a variety of effects: some good, some bad, and some ugly. The agency cost paradigm has had a good effect by focusing on the problem of managerial enrichment and providing a simple, clear benchmark—shareholder value-- that may quickly indicate when managers are performing badly. However, …

A Theory Of The Just Corporation, Ronit Donyets-Kedar

Seattle University Law Review

In their seminal article A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout hold that the modern corporation is best understood in terms of team production. Challenging the principal–agent model, Blair and Stout offer an analysis that considers the various stakeholders of the corporation as members of a team. Accordingly, they suggest, the purpose of corporate law is to provide a response to the problems created by collective production processes, in particular those pertaining to the distribution of profits stemming from the cooperation. According to Blair and Stout, the solution to this problem is to be found …

The Corporation As Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity, Intergenerational Efficiency, And The Corporate Form, Lynn A. Stout

Seattle University Law Review

This Symposium Article argues that the board-controlled corporation can be understood as a legal innovation that historically has functioned as a means of transferring wealth forward and sometimes backward through time, for the benefit of present and future generations. In this fashion the board-controlled corporation promotes both intergenerational equity and intergenerational efficiency. Logic and evidence each suggest, however, that the modern embrace of “shareholder value” as the only corporate objective and “shareholder democracy” as the ideal of corporate governance is damaging the corporate form’s ability to serve this economically and ethically important function.

Shareholder Wealth Maximization As Means To An End, Robert P. Bartlett, Iii

Seattle University Law Review

In several recent cases, the Delaware Chancery Court has emphasized that where a conflict of interest exists between holders of a company’s common stock and holders of its preferred stock, the standard of conduct for directors requires that they strive to maximize the value of the corporation for the benefit of its common stockholders rather than for its preferred stockholders. This article interrogates this view of directors’ fiduciary duties from the perspective of incomplete contracting theory. Building on the seminal work of Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart, incomplete contracting theory examines the critical role of corporate control rights for addressing …

Unilateral Forum Selection Clauses In Corporate Bylaws: A Synopsis Of The Debate, Bryce Cullinane

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

No abstract provided.

A Canadian Model Of Corporate Governance, Carol Liao

Dalhousie Law Journal

What is Canada s actual legal model to govern its corporations? Recent landmark judicial decisions indicate Canada is shifting away from an Anglo-American definition of shareholder primacy Yet the Canadian securities commissions have become increasingly influential in the governance sphere, and by nature are shareholder-focused. Shareholders' rights have increased well beyond what was ever contemplated by Canadian corporate laws, and the issue of greater shareholder vs. board control has now become the topic of live debate. These conflicting theoretical positions have enriched the dialogue on the current environment of Canadian corporate governance. This qualitative study brings together some of Canada's …

Anglo-American Directors' Legal Duties And Csr: Prohibited, Permitted Or Prescribed?, Benedict Sheehy, Donald Feaver

Dalhousie Law Journal

The interaction between corporate social responsibility (CSR) obligations and directors' legal duties is underexamined. This article addresses that void by examining directors' duties in case law and legislation across the major commonwealth countries and the U.S.A. It provides an analysis of leading cases and examines how they deal with directors' duties, the doctrine of shareholder primacy, corporate legal theory and CSR. The article reviews fiduciary relations and duties and analyzes the directors'duties toexercise power in the best interests of the company as a whole and for proper purposes. The article concludes that CSR is well within the accepted range of …