Business Organizations Law Commons^™

Securities Fraud, Officer And Director Bars, And The "Unfitness" Inquiry After Sarbanes-Oxley, Jon Carlson

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Mtic (Carousel) Fraud: Twelve Ways Forward; Two Ways "Preferred" - Has The Technology-Based Administrative Solution Been Rejected?, Richard Thompson Ainsworth

Faculty Scholarship

In a May 31, 2006 Communication to the Council, the European Parliament, and the European Economic and Social Committee, the European Commission indicated a need to develop a co-ordinated strategy to improve the fight against fiscal fraud [COM(2006) 254 final]. Although the Communication considers fiscal fraud broadly (VAT, excise duties and direct taxes) the most pressing need seems to be for a VAT strategy that will effectively deal with MTIC (Missing Trader Intra-Community) or carousel fraud. To this end the Commission hosted a conference: Fiscal Fraud - Tackling VAT Fraud: Possible Ways Forward. The March 29, 2007 conference was constructed …

Sentencing High-Loss Corporate Insider Frauds After Booker, Frank O. Bowman Iii

Faculty Publications

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have for some years prescribed substantial sentences for high-level corporate officials convicted of large frauds. Guidelines sentences for offenders of this type moved higher in 2001 with the passage of the Economic Crime Package amendments to the Guidelines, and higher still in the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Today, any corporate insider convicted of even a moderately high-loss fraud is facing a guideline range measured in decades, or perhaps even mandatory life imprisonment. Successful sentencing advocacy on behalf of such defendants requires convincing the court to impose a sentence outside (in many cases, far …

Corporate America Fights Back: The Battle Over Waiver Of The Attorney-Client Privilege, Michael L. Seigel

UF Law Faculty Publications

This Article addresses a topic that is the subject of an on-going and heated contest between the business lobby and its lawyers, on the one side, and the U.S. Department of Justice on the other. The fight is over federal prosecutors' escalating practice of requesting that corporations accused of criminal wrongdoing waive their attorney-client privilege as part of their cooperation with the government. The Department of Justice views privilege waiver as a legitimate and critical tool in its post-Enron battle against white collar crime. The business lobby views it as encroaching on corporations' fundamental right to protect confidential attorney-client communications. …

Attorneys As Debt Relief Agencies: Constitutional Considerations, Marisa Terranova

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Stoneridge Investment Partners V. Scientific-Atlanta: The Political Economy Of Securities Class Action Reform, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

I begin in Part II by explaining the wrong turn that the Court took in Basic. The Basic Court misunderstood the function of the reliance element and its relation to the question of damages. As a result, the securities class action regime established in Basic threatens draconian sanctions with limited deterrent benefit. Part III then summarizes the cases leading up to Stoneridge and analyzes the Court's reasoning in that case. In Stoneridge, like the decisions interpreting the reliance requirement of Rule 10b-5 that came before it, the Court emphasized policy implications. Sometimes policy implications are invoked to broaden the reach …

Getting The Word Out About Fraud: A Theoretical Analysis Of Whistleblowing And Insider Trading, Jonathan Macey

Michigan Law Review

The purpose of this Article is to show that corporate whistleblowing is not analytically or functionally distinguishable from insider trading when such trading is based on "whistleblower information," that is, the information a whistleblower might disclose to the authorities. In certain contexts, both insider trading and whistleblowing, if incentivized, would reduce the incidence of corporate pathologies such as fraud and corruption. In light of this analysis, it is peculiar that whistleblowing is encouraged and protected, while insider trading on whistleblower information is not only discouraged but criminalized. Often, insider trading will be far more effective than whistleblowing at bringing fraud …

Still "Ain't No Glory In Pain": How The Telecommunications Act Of 1996 And Other 1990s Deregulation Facilitated The Market Crash Of 2002, André Douglas Pond Cummings

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

A Business Ethics Perspective On Sarbanes-Oxley And The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, David Hess

Michigan Law Review

This Article assesses the ability of Sarbanes-Oxley and other recent changes in the law and stock exchange listing requirements to reduce the incidence of fraud and to increase the reporting of financial misconduct. It begins by examining the individual decision-makers within a corporation and analyzing their intentions and behaviors under the Theory of Planned Behavior. It then examines the ability of the organization to influence the employees' intentions and behaviors through codes of ethics and compliance programs, and finds growing support for the usefulness of integrity based compliance programs. Finally, the Article considers how the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation and Organizational Sentencing …

Of Fine Lines, Blunt Instruments And Half-Truths: Business Acquisition Agreements And The Right To Lie, Jeffrey M. Lipshaw

ExpressO

In this article, I expand upon a happy coincidence (for scholars) in reconciling the overlap between contract and fraud. Both the recent book by Ian Ayres and Gregory Klass and the Delaware Court of Chancery in Abry Partners Acquisition V, L.P. v. F& W Acquisition, LLC addressed the issue of promissory fraud – the making of a contract as to which the promisor had no intention of performing. Each treatment, however, in focusing on fraudulent affirmative representations, falls short of (a) recognizing the fundamental aspect of deceptive promising in a complex deal, namely the half-truth, (b) articulating an appropriate doctrinal …

Conscripting Attorneys To Battle Corporate Fraud Without Shields Or Armor? Reconsidering Retaliatory Discharge In Light Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Kim T. Vu

Michigan Law Review

This Note advocates that federal courts should allow attorneys to bring retaliatory discharge claims under SOX. Traditional rationales prohibiting the claims of retaliatory discharge by attorneys do not apply in the context of Sarbanes-Oxley. This Note contends that the Department of Labor and the federal courts should interpret the whistleblower provisions of § 806 as protecting attorneys who report under § 307. Assuring reporting attorneys that they have protection from retaliation will encourage them to whistleblow and thereby advance SOX's policy goal of ferreting out corporate fraud. Part I explores the legal landscape of retaliatory discharge suits by attorneys. This …

Reassessing Damages In Securities Fraud Class Actions, Elizabeth C. Burch

ExpressO

No coherent doctrinal statement exists for calculating open-market damages for securities fraud class actions. Instead, courts have tried in vain to fashion common-law deceit and misrepresentation remedies to fit open-market fraud. The result is a relatively ineffective system with a hallmark feature: unpredictable damage awards. This poses a significant fraud deterrence problem from both a practical and a theoretical standpoint.

In 2005, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to clarify open-market damage principles and to facilitate earlier dismissal of cases without compensable economic losses. Instead, in Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, it further confused the damage issue by (1) perpetuating the …

Breach Of Fiduciary Duty As Securities Fraud: Sec V. Chancellor Corp., Carl W. Mills

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Teaching Enron, Milton C. Regan

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

What follows is a discussion of several transactions that the Examiner analyzed for the Enron bankruptcy court. These represent only a portion of the many transactions that the Examiner analyzed, but constitute a large number of the transactions with respect to which he focused on the conduct of attorneys. In most of these cases, the Examiner found that Enron's lawyers potentially could be liable to the company under various causes of action. In some instances, the Examiner did not find potential liability. These transactions are included in my discussion, however, because they can be used to explore certain ethical issues …

Pour Encourager Les Autres? The Curious History And Distressing Implications Of The Criminal Provisions Of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act And The Sentencing Guidelines Amendments That Followed, Frank O. Bowman Iii

Faculty Publications

This Article presents a legislative history of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the subsequent amendments to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. It explains the surprising interaction between the civil and criminal provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley. The Article also provides a dramatic and detailed account of the interplay of political interests and agendas that ultimately led to large sentence increases for serious corporate criminals and blanket sentence increases for virtually all federal fraud defendants. The tale illuminates the substance of the new legislation and sentencing rules, but is more broadly instructive regarding the distribution of power over criminal sentencing between the three branches and …

Note: Get The Balance Right: Finding An Equilibrium Between Charitable Solicitation, Fraud, And The First Amendment In Illinois Ex Rel. Madigan V. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 538 U.S. 600 (2003), Christopher R. Sullivan

William Mitchell Law Review

This Note first examines the history of the relevant law in the areas of fraud, charitable solicitation, and prior restraints. Specifically, it examines the three leading cases on regulation of charitable fundraising speech: Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley. Next, the Note discusses the history and holding of Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc. Next, this Note will explore the holding in Telemarketing Associates in light of Schaumburg and its progeny. This analysis includes a survey of recent and pending fraud litigation against charities and their fundraisers, and a review of the Federal Trade Commission's “Operation Phoney Philanthropy.” Finally, the …

Corporate Governance Issues, Peter Peterson, John Foster, Jeffrey M. Colon, William Treanor

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Keynote Address, Susan S. Bies, Alan Rechtschaffen

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Proposals For Insider Trading Regulation After The Fall Of The House Of Enron, James P. Jalil

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Multinational Enforcement Of U.S. Securities Laws: The Need For The Clear And Restrained Scope Of Extraterritorial Subject-Matter Jurisdiction., Kun Young Chang

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Ethics, Law Firms, And Legal Education, Milton C. Regan

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

A rash of recent corporate scandals has once again put professional ethics in the spotlight. It's hard to pick up the Wall Street Journal each day and not read that authorities have launched a new investigation or that additional indictments are imminent. Stories of financial fraud and outright looting have galvanized the public and shaken the economy. What ethical lessons can we draw from these events? Two explanations seem especially prominent. The first is a story of individuals without an adequate moral compass. Some people's greed and ambition were unchecked by any internal ethical constraints. For such deviants, no amount …

When Clients Do Bad Things: The Lawyer's Response To Corporate Wrongdoing, Craig M. Bradley

Articles by Maurer Faculty

The high profile meltdowns of Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia, Global Crossing and other well-known companies have focused attention on the responsibilities of corporate gatekeepers, including attorneys, to deter or expose fraudulent conduct by their clients and associated persons. Attorneys have been the subject of investigation and criticism by Congress' and federal regulators for failing to adequately respond to their clients' fraudulent (and, possibly, criminal) conduct. The lawyer who learns that his or her client or persons acting on its behalf are engaged in a course of fraudulent or criminal conduct which threatens economic losses to non-client third parties faces both …

Self-Regulation And Securities Markets, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

Enron, Arthur Andersen, Tyco, ImClone, WorldCom, Adelphia - as American investors reel from accounting scandals and self-dealing by corporate insiders, the question of trust in the securities markets has taken on a new urgency. Securities markets cannot operate without trust. Markets known for fraud, insider trading, and manipulation risk a downward spiral as investors depart in search of safer investments. Today, many investors are rethinking the wisdom of entrusting their financial futures to the stock market. Absent trust in the integrity of the securities markets, individuals will hoard their money under the proverbial mattress.

Did The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, Michael A. Perino

Faculty Publications

In 1995 Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (the PSLRA or the Act) to address abuses in securities fraud class actions. In the wake of Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, and other high profile securities frauds, critics suggest that the law made it too easy to escape liability for securities fraud and thus created a climate in which frauds are more likely to occur. Others claim that the Act has largely failed because it did little to deter plaintiffs' lawyers from filing nonmeritorious cases. This article employs a database of the 1449 class actions filed from 1996 through 2001 to …

Should Congress Repeal Securities Class Action Reform?, Adam C. Pritchard

Other Publications

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was designed to curtail class action lawsuits by the plaintiffs’ bar. In particular, the high-technology industry, accountants, and investment bankers thought that they had been unjustly victimized by class action lawsuits based on little more than declines in a company’s stock price. Prior to 1995, the plaintiffs’ bar had free rein to use the discovery process to troll for evidence to support its claims. Moreover, the high costs of litigation were a powerful weapon with which to coerce companies to settle claims. The plaintiffs’ bar and its allies in Congress have called …

On The Liability Of Corporate Directors To Holders Of Securities For Illegal Corporate Acts: Can The Tension Between The "Net-Loss" And "No-Duty-To-Disclose" Rules Be Resolved, Geoffrey Rapp

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Antitrust Enfocement And High-Technology Markets, William J. Baer, David A. Balto

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

Although the antitrust laws apply to all industries, the application must be tempered in each case by the myriad ways in which competition can be modified by structural, behavioral, technological, regulatory, and other characteristics. The Commission applies the antitrust laws with sensitivity to the special characteristics of high-tech industries and of intellectual property, but also with the recognition that--as in other industries--competition plays an important role in spurring innovation and in spreading the benefits of that innovation to consumers. This focus is not new. This balanced approach has roots that go back at least to the 1977 Antitrust Guide to …

Thinking To Be Paid Versus Being Paid To Think, Merritt B. Fox

Faculty Scholarship

In the first chapter of The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel make an arresting statement:

... [P]eople who are backing their beliefs with cash are correct; they have every reason to avoid mistakes, while critics (be they academics or regulators) are rewarded for novel rather than accurate beliefs. Market professionals who estimate these things wrongly suffer directly; academics and regulators who estimate wrongly do not pay a similar penalty. Persons who wager with their own money may be wrong, but they are less likely to be wrong than are academics and regulators, who are wagering …

Is This The End Of Civil Rico?, Randolph N. Jonakait

Other Publications

No abstract provided.

Banks And Banking - Bank May Finance The Involuntary Takeover Of One Of Its Borrowers And May, In Making Its Loan Decision, Rely On Confidential Information Received From The Takeover Target, John C. Sullivan

Villanova Law Review (1956 - )

No abstract provided.