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Fiduciary duty

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Articles 91 - 100 of 100

Full-Text Articles in Business Organizations Law

Conclusion, Christopher C. Whitson, Thomas A. D'Ambrosio, Patricia A. Daniel, Kathryn N. Fine, Robert P. Mckinney, Marcia M. Mcmurray, Bennet L. Ross Apr 1987

Conclusion, Christopher C. Whitson, Thomas A. D'Ambrosio, Patricia A. Daniel, Kathryn N. Fine, Robert P. Mckinney, Marcia M. Mcmurray, Bennet L. Ross

Vanderbilt Law Review

Despite recent responses designed to combat the increased liability exposure of directors and officers, the personal risks for corporate insiders remain significant. With corporations operating in an ever-complex regulatory maze, there has been an increased focus on corporate accountability. The difficulty in resolving director and officer liability issues, however, arises in balancing the need to punish misguided fiduciaries with the need to protect aggressive managers who take good faith risks to produce increased corporate profits. While long-range solutions to this balancing problem are essential, directors and officers should pursue short-term tactics to reduce their risk of personal liability.

Because it …


Leveraged Buyout, Management Buyout, And Going Private Corporate Control Transactions: Insider Trading Or Efficient Market Economics?, Patrick S. Dunleavy Jan 1986

Leveraged Buyout, Management Buyout, And Going Private Corporate Control Transactions: Insider Trading Or Efficient Market Economics?, Patrick S. Dunleavy

Fordham Urban Law Journal

According to one commentator, a particularly troublesome form of insider trading abuse has developed in the past decade without full public discussion of its ethics or its legality. This abuse has spurred significant commentary. Corporate control transactions of this type, known as "insider leveraged buyouts," management buyouts, and going private, have totaled billions of dollars. On their face, these deals, regardless of their specifics, raise the most basic questions of whether security holders are getting the legal and ethical protection they require and, by law, deserve. It is a fundamental precept of the theory of going private that different groups …


Piercing The Corporate Veil—The Undercapitalization Factor, Harvey Gelb Dec 1982

Piercing The Corporate Veil—The Undercapitalization Factor, Harvey Gelb

Chicago-Kent Law Review

No abstract provided.


Corporate Indemnification Of Directors And Officers: Time For A Reappraisal, K.G. Jan Pillai, Craig Tractenberg Oct 1981

Corporate Indemnification Of Directors And Officers: Time For A Reappraisal, K.G. Jan Pillai, Craig Tractenberg

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Article evaluates the benefits and burdens of shifting litigation risk from management to the enterprise. The Article begins by considering the nature of the legal risks confronting the corporate executive, and the principles of common law that developed to counter those risks. The Article proceeds to assess the two statutory responses to threats of personal liability against the corporate executive: indemnification statutes, and director and officer insurance. Finally, after comparing the effective absolute immunity available to corporate executives with the qualified immunity enjoyed by high-level government officials, the Article concludes that indemnification practices have overinsulated the corporate officer from …


Corporations - Securities: Regulation - Parent Corporation As Insider Realizing Shortswing Profit, Allan L. Bioff Feb 1957

Corporations - Securities: Regulation - Parent Corporation As Insider Realizing Shortswing Profit, Allan L. Bioff

Michigan Law Review

Parent corporation, owning a majority of the outstanding voting securities of its subsidiary, sold 120,000 shares of the subsidiary's common stock. A substantial shortswing profit was realized on 4115 shares which had been purchased on the open market five months earlier. The sale, whereby the parent was to divest itself of control of its subsidiary, was made pursuant to an agreement between both companies and approved by a majority of the voting stock of each. Section 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that officers, directors and beneficial owners of more than ten percent of any class …


Corporations - The Fudiciary Duty Of Directors In The Issuance Of Stock Subject To Preemptive Rights, Howard M. Downs Feb 1955

Corporations - The Fudiciary Duty Of Directors In The Issuance Of Stock Subject To Preemptive Rights, Howard M. Downs

Michigan Law Review

In Gord v. Iowana Farms Milk Co. , a stockholder protested the issue to the defendant of certain shares of stock in a closely held corporation. At the time of the sale, the plaintiff was a director and secretary-treasurer of the corporation with access to the corporate books and knowledge of the corporate assets. At the meeting at which the stock was issued, the plaintiff signed a statement saying "at the present time I do not elect to purchase any stock. . . ." The stock, sold for $15 a share, had a value variously estimated at $50 to $103.22. …


Corporations - "Personal Interst" Of Directors In Corporate Transactions, Richard R. Dailey Jan 1955

Corporations - "Personal Interst" Of Directors In Corporate Transactions, Richard R. Dailey

Michigan Law Review

Serious dissension had developed between two factions of the seven member board of directors of defendant corporation. Group A, consisting of four members, represented a working majority of the outstanding stock recently acquired by a group of investors. Group B, consisting of three members, had constituted the active management of the corporation for a number of years. The resignation of group B was probable if group A continued to dominate the board. It was proposed that stock of the defendant be exchanged for stock in another corporation. Under the overall plan, group A was to resign and two …


Corporations-Right Of Directors To Enforce At Face Value Claims Against The Corporation Purchased At A Discount During Insolvency, Robert H. Frick S.Ed. Jun 1950

Corporations-Right Of Directors To Enforce At Face Value Claims Against The Corporation Purchased At A Discount During Insolvency, Robert H. Frick S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

From 1942 to the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings the assets of the debtor corporation were insufficient to pay its liabilities, and, with the exception of 1945, it operated at a deficit. In 1946 the assets of the corporation were sold, and the debtor filed a petition under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act Prior to the filing of the petition, but during the period of insolvency, the respondents, the sister, mother, and a personal friend of a director, acquired debenture bonds of the corporation, primarily from over-the-counter dealers, at 3% to 14% of face value, the aggregate cost being $10,000. …


Corporations - Legal Aspects Of Corporation Bonuses, H. Marshall Peter Dec 1942

Corporations - Legal Aspects Of Corporation Bonuses, H. Marshall Peter

Michigan Law Review

It would clearly be inaccurate to say that the percentage method of compensation represents a modern idea. Its rationale is so simple that there must have been instances of its utilization in early history. Be that as it may, it is a device which attained little prominence in this country before the beginning of the present century and which has grown since then with amazing rapidity. Along with the growth of bonus plans in some form or another, perplexing problems have arisen economic, social and perhaps even moral as well as legal. The emphasis of this comment will be upon …


Corporations - Officers And Directors - Duty To Investigate Purchasers Of Controlling Interest, Michigan Law Review Feb 1941

Corporations - Officers And Directors - Duty To Investigate Purchasers Of Controlling Interest, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

Plaintiff corporation, an investment trust specializing in shares of small life insurance companies, brought an action against its former officers and directors, referred to as "the management group," who in 1937 owned twenty-seven per cent of the outstanding stock of the corporation. This group sold all their stock at an inflated price to another group, referred to as "the Boston group," who on the resignation of the management group immediately elected themselves to the control of the corporation. By this control the Boston group obtained access to the portfolio and proceeded systematically to rob the corporation of all its securities. …