Business Organizations Law Commons^™

A Board’S Duty To Monitor, Eric J. Pan

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Carpe Crisis: Capitalizing On The Breakdown Of Capitalism To Consider The Creation Of Social Businesses, Celia R. Tayloe

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Congress, Corporate Boards, And Oversight: A Public Law/Private Law Comparison, Paul S. Miller

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Corporate And Business Law, Laurence V. Parker

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Shareholders In The Jury Box: A Populist Check Against Corporate Mismanagement, Ann M. Scarlett

All Faculty Scholarship

The recent subprime mortgage disaster exposed corporate officers and directors who mismanaged their corporations, failed to exercise proper oversight, and acted in their self-interest. Two previous waves of corporate scandals in this decade revealed similar misconduct. After the initial scandals, Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission attempted to prevent the next crisis in corporate governance through legislative and regulatory actions such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Those attempts failed. Shareholder derivative litigation has also failed because judges accord corporate executives great deference and thus rarely impose liability for breaches of fiduciary duties.

To prevent the next crisis in …

Introduction: Unsettling Questions, Disquieting Stories, Mae Kuykendall, David A. Westbrook

Journal Articles

The Business Law and Narrative Symposium, held at Michigan State University on September 10-11, 2009, brought together nationally known legal scholars, and scholars from other disciplines, to discuss whether and how the institution of the corporation was embedded in social narratives, public stories. This introductory essay reviews the responses of these scholars to the thesis of Kuykendall's article, No Imagination: The Marginal Role of Narrative in Corporate Law. The authors conclude with a hope that corporate law might offer a more literary sensibility by which to make our lives in global capitalism more comprehensible.

Returning Rico To Racketeers: Corporations Cannot Constitute An Associated-In-Fact Enterprise Under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4), Caroline N. Mitchell, Jordan Cunningham, Mark R. Lentz

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Evaluating The Mission: A Critical Review Of The History And Evolution Of The Sec Enforcement Program, Paul S. Atkins, Bradley J. Bondi

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Workers, Information, And Corporate Combinations: The Case For Non-Binding Employee Referenda In Transformative Transactions, Matthew T. Bodie

All Faculty Scholarship

Employees present a curious puzzle for corporate law. The success of a corporation depends on its employees, from the chief executive officer down to the front-line production or service worker. But for the most part, corporate law relegates employees to the sidelines. Perhaps nowhere is this difference as dramatic as in the realm of mergers, acquisitions, and other transformative transactions. Such transactions are usually negotiated at the highest levels of management, approved by the board, and ultimately approved by the shareholders. In contrast, employees at most may be able to bargain about the effects of the merger through union representatives; …

Managers’ Fiduciary Duties In Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos In Delaware (And Elsewhere), Rutheford B. Campbell Jr., Christopher W. Frost

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

The inherent conflict between creditors and shareholders has long occupied courts and commentators interested in corporate governance. Creditors holding fixed claims to the corporation's assets generally prefer corporate decision making that minimizes the risk of firm failure. Shareholders, in contrast, have a greater appetite for risk, because, as residual owners, they reap the rewards of firm success while sharing the risk of loss with creditors.

Traditionally, this conflict is mediated by a governance structure that imposes a fiduciary duty on the corporation's managers-its officers and directors-to maximize the value of the shareholders' interests in the firm. In this traditional view, …

Panelist Biographies, Introduction By Dana Gold, Editor's Note, Dana L. Gold

Seattle University Law Review

This conference brought together nationally recognized scholars, attorneys, policymakers and activists from across the country who represent a depth of knowledge and range of viewpoints necessary to explore the intersection of corporate and First Amendment law. This discussion was sometimes heated, frequently politically surprising, and always robust. In this symposium issue, the Seattle University Law Review has captured the presentations and exchanges at this unique, multidisciplinary conference.

Corporations And Political Speech: Should Speech Equal Money?, David Skover, Lisa Danetz, Martin Redish, Scott Thomas

Seattle University Law Review

Welcome now to the panel on corporations and political speech. We will explore the First Amendment jurisprudence of campaign finance regulation and some of the more controversial issues raised by corporate involvement in the marketplace of political ideas and elections.

Protecting The Polity: Strategies For Reform, Dana Gold, Solange Bitol-Hansen, Charlie Cray, Bruce Freed

Seattle University Law Review

This session is Protecting the Polity: Strategies for Reform, and we frame this as additional strategies that are actually percolating in a concrete way out in the real world, not just in the world of academic theory, to promote citizen participation in a democracy that countenances corporate influence in the political process.

Keynote Speech, Mark Crispin Miller

Seattle University Law Review

Corporations tend to work against immediate contact. They tend to discourage familial bonds and popular interaction. They are allergic to democracy. Because corporations are usually in the business of selling deviations of various kinds, they tend to want a world in which each one of us is completely walled off in a portable, wonderful land of communication technology. Corporations want a world where everything is done for us. A world where everything is presented to us through a corporate medium, so that what once looked like satire is now commonly represented as an admirable ideal. To that end, I am …

Curbing Shareholder Voting Groups With A New Philosophy For Washington's Business Corporation Act, Tilman Larson

Seattle University Law Review

This Comment explores Washington's changing philosophy of shareholder voting and how the current developments to Washington's corporate law have impacted shareholder voting group rights. In light of Washington's corporate law history, the underlying reasons for the amendments, and case law, this Comment argues that the recent amendments have altered, rather than preserved, what has been historically the true philosophy underlying Washington corporate law: minority shareholder rights. Part II of this Comment tracks the evolution of voting group rights through past Washington law and until the present Washington Business Corporation Act. Part III discusses the underlying reasons for the amendments, addresses …

Corporate Personhood And The Rights Of Corporate Speech, Adam Winkler

Seattle University Law Review

My objective here is to provide a little historical background on business corporations and their place in First Amendment law. In the course of that overview, I will also make a few observations that I believe can be helpful in thinking about corporate speech rights. First, I will argue that one aspect of the constitutional status of corporations-the notion of corporate personhood-has not played the central role in shaping corporate speech rights that some believe. Corporations have free speech rights, but they are more limited than those held by individuals. Second, I will argue that there is not a single …

The Corporatization Of Communication, Eric Chiappinelli, Adam Candeub, Jeffrey Chester, Lawrence Soley

Seattle University Law Review

Our next panel discusses the corporatization of communication.

What Hedge Funds Can Teach Corporate America: A Roadmap For Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, Robert C. Illig

American University Law Review

Hedge funds and other private equity funds are aggressive monitors of corporate America. Their investment strategies are designed to squeeze agency costs and other inefficiencies out of under performing companies. Mutual funds and public pension funds, by contrast, have remained relentlessly passive despite their many resources. Rather than seek to improve the performance of their portfolio companies, they generally prefer to exit any investments that turn sour. Why the difference? In this Article, I compare the business environments and regulatory regimes affecting different types of institutional investors. I conclude that the primary reason that most institutional investors do not better …

Corporations And Commercial Speech, Ron Collins, Mark Lopez, Tamara Piety, David Vladeck

Seattle University Law Review

Today's discussion will be about a rather famous case-actually, a non-case, Nike v. Kasky.

Should Corporations Have First Amendment Rights?, Kent Greenfield, Daniel Greenwood, Erik Jaffe

Seattle University Law Review

As Professor Winkler correctly stated, current doctrine emphasizes the rights of listeners rather than the identity of corporate speakers. My argument is, in effect, that this emphasis misses the key point. But I will not deal with listeners directly. I am simply going to assume, rather than argue, that if corporate advertising were ineffective in influencing voters or legislators, normal market processes would eliminate it. I'm going to take it for granted that when corporations speak, it makes a difference in the actual results.

Reconciling Shareholder Limited Liability With Vicarious Copyright Liability: Holding Parent Corporations Liable For The Copyright Infringement Of Subsidiaries, Joshua M. Siegel

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Implications Of The Third Circuit's Armstrong Decision On Creative Corporate Restructuring: Will Strict Construction Of The Absolute Priority Rule Make Chapter 11 Consensus Less Likely?, Harvey R. Miller, Ronit J. Berkovich

American University Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Corporation As God, Douglas Litowitz

ExpressO

No abstract provided.

The Closely Held Business Through The Entity-Aggregate Prism, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

When the law conceptualizes the legal form that houses a closely held business, does it matter whether the law envisages that form as an entity separate from, rather than an aggregate of, the several owners of the business? At one time, this question was at the conceptual core of the law of general partnerships, but the Revised Uniform Partnership Act supposedly put the issue to rest. Moreover, the closely held corporation is emphatically an entity, as is the predominant form of unincorporated organization - the limited liability company. Today, the entity-aggregate question might seem a mere relic of a discarded …

The Corporation As Insider Trader, Mark J. Loewenstein, William K.S. Wang

Publications

With regard to issuer purchases, some of the traditional policy rationales against insider trading do not apply or apply with less force. Nevertheless, courts, commentators, and the SEC have all stated or assumed that a public corporation violates rule 10b-5 by buying its own shares in the market based on material, nonpublic information. In rule 10b-5 cases involving face-to-face transactions, several circuit courts have ruled that the company may not purchase its own stock based on material information not known to the seller. No good reason exists not to apply these precedents to stock market trades by issuers, especially because …

Charging Orders And The New Uniform Limited Partnership Act: Dispelling The Rumors Of Disaster, Daniel S. Kleinberger, Carter G. Bishop, Thomas Geu

Faculty Scholarship

Last year, an article published in this magazine focused on the charging order as "the Exclusive Remedy Against a Partnership Interest" and announced the "[s]hocking [r]evelation" that ULPA (2001)--the new Uniform Limited Partnership Act--undermines the "exclusive remedy" limitation on charging orders. The authors asserted categorically that, "from an asset protection perspective, the 2001 Act is considerably less protective of a partner's partnership interest than the 1976 Act." Elizabeth M. Schurig & Amy P. Jetel, A Charging Order Is the Exclusive Remedy Against a Partnership Interest: Fact or Fiction?, Prob. & Prop. 57, 58 (Nov./Dec. 2003).

As this article will show, …

The Impact Of Modern Finance Theory In Acquisition Cases, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

In February of 1983, the Supreme Court of Delaware decided Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. The case holds that, in determining the present value of a corporation involved in an acquisition, courts are free to use “any techniques or methods [of valuation] which are generally considered acceptable in the financial community…”

The rule in Delaware prior to Weinberger required courts to determine the present value of a corporation by use of the Delaware block method of valuation exclusively. The Delaware block method, however, is a poor way to determine the present value of a corporation. As a result, even before the …

New Developments In Oklahoma Business Entity Law, Gary W. Derrick, Irving L. Faught

Oklahoma Law Review

No abstract provided.

Form And Function In Business Organizations, Richard A. Booth Marbury Research Professor Of Law

Faculty Scholarship

In this piece, I argue that the recent proliferation of forms of business organizations in addition to the traditional partnership and corporation may have arisen from the implicit recognition that various organizations may serve needs of business people in different types of businesses, and that traditional theory of the firm explanations are too narrowly focused on market failure explanations for firm formation. I identify at least five different factors that may motivate people to form a business organization and discuss how these different factors may militate in favor of one business form rather than another. I conclude that the collections …

To Know A Veil, Douglas C. Michael

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Lawyers, judges, law students, and law professors have a love-hate relationship with the doctrine of “piercing the corporate veil”—the idea that shareholders might sometimes be personally liable for the debts of the corporation. It is the subject covered more than all others in courses on corporation law. It is widely litigated, being the subject of thousands of opinions. Yet, for all this attention, it is routinely vilified by the experts. Most commentators recognize that it is jurisprudence without substance.

This Article is an attempt to form a basis for rigorous analysis of virtually every veil-piercing case and to rid the …