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Corporate law

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Full-Text Articles in Business Organizations Law

Exalting The Corporate Form Over Environmental Protection The Corporate Shell Game And The Enforcement Of Water Management Law In Florida, Mary Jane Angelo, Charles Lobdell, Tara Boonstra Oct 2001

Exalting The Corporate Form Over Environmental Protection The Corporate Shell Game And The Enforcement Of Water Management Law In Florida, Mary Jane Angelo, Charles Lobdell, Tara Boonstra

UF Law Faculty Publications

Current laws in Florida afford substantial protection to the “people behind the corporations” (corporate principals) and generally do not allow environmental permitting agencies such as the water management districts to consider such people in their permitting or enforcement efforts. This article poses the question “Do existing corporate law principles of limited liability defeat the important public policy of water resource protection in Florida?” First, in Parts II and III, this article introduces the problem and provides an overview of Florida water management district permitting and enforcement authorities and processes. Next, in Part IV, this article explores the existing legal authorities …


Voting (Insincerely) In Corporate Law, Zohar Goshen Jan 2001

Voting (Insincerely) In Corporate Law, Zohar Goshen

Faculty Scholarship

Voting lies at the center of collective decision-making in corporate law. While scholars have identified various problems with the voting mechanism, insincere voting — in the forms of strategic voting and conflict of interests voting — is perhaps the most fundamental. This article shows that insincere voting distorts the voting mechanism at its core, undermining its ability to determine transaction efficiency. As further demonstrated, strategic and conflict of interests problems frequently coincide with one another: voting strategically often means being in conflict, and many fact patterns present aspects of both problems. Finally, this article claims that although the two problems …


Unocal Revisited: No Tiger In The Tank, Mark J. Loewenstein Jan 2001

Unocal Revisited: No Tiger In The Tank, Mark J. Loewenstein

Publications

No abstract provided.


To Know A Veil, Douglas C. Michael Oct 2000

To Know A Veil, Douglas C. Michael

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Lawyers, judges, law students, and law professors have a love-hate relationship with the doctrine of “piercing the corporate veil”—the idea that shareholders might sometimes be personally liable for the debts of the corporation. It is the subject covered more than all others in courses on corporation law. It is widely litigated, being the subject of thousands of opinions. Yet, for all this attention, it is routinely vilified by the experts. Most commentators recognize that it is jurisprudence without substance.

This Article is an attempt to form a basis for rigorous analysis of virtually every veil-piercing case and to rid the …


Should State Corporate Law Define Successor Liability - The Demise Of Cercla's Federal Common Law, Bradford Mank Jan 2000

Should State Corporate Law Define Successor Liability - The Demise Of Cercla's Federal Common Law, Bradford Mank

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

During the 1980s and early 1990s, a series of decisions broadly interpreting the liability provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCIA) appeared destined to transform corporate law practice. CERCIA does not directly address successor liability, but the statute's complex and contradictory legislative history arguably implies that Congress wanted federal courts to apply broad liability principles to achieve the statute's fundamental remedial goal of making polluters and their successors pay for cleaning up hazardous substances.

Notably, a number of courts rejected state corporate law principles that usually limit the liability of successor corporations and instead …


Corporate Governance In The Former Soviet Union: The Failure Of The Self-Enforcing Model, J. Robert Brown Jr., Kostyantyn Shkurupiy Jan 2000

Corporate Governance In The Former Soviet Union: The Failure Of The Self-Enforcing Model, J. Robert Brown Jr., Kostyantyn Shkurupiy

Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship

With the fall of the Soviet Union, a number of newly independent countries emerged, many of them attempting to put in place market based institutions and legal regimes. A number of corporate scholars from the United States participated in the development of these legal regimes. In the area of corporate law, problems arose from poor draftsmanship, lack of adequate expertise and institutions, poorly functioning courts, the problem of hold over directors from the Soviet period, and corruption. As a result of these and other factors, traditional corporate statutes of the type used in most developed countries did not work effectively. …


The Direction Of Corporate Law: The Scholars' Perspective, John C. Coffee Jr., Richard A. Booth Marbury Research Professor Of Law, R. Franklin Balotti, David C. Mcbride, Edward P. Welch Jan 2000

The Direction Of Corporate Law: The Scholars' Perspective, John C. Coffee Jr., Richard A. Booth Marbury Research Professor Of Law, R. Franklin Balotti, David C. Mcbride, Edward P. Welch

Faculty Scholarship

Transcript of a panel on a scholar's approach to corporation law.


Delaware As Demon: Twenty-Five Years After Professor Cary's Polemic, Mark J. Loewenstein Jan 2000

Delaware As Demon: Twenty-Five Years After Professor Cary's Polemic, Mark J. Loewenstein

Publications

No abstract provided.


Corporate Finance, Corporate Law And Finance Theory, Peter H. Huang, Michael S. Knoll Jan 2000

Corporate Finance, Corporate Law And Finance Theory, Peter H. Huang, Michael S. Knoll

Publications

No abstract provided.


Teaching Corporate Law From An Option Perspective, Peter H. Huang Jan 2000

Teaching Corporate Law From An Option Perspective, Peter H. Huang

Publications

No abstract provided.


The Conundrum Of Executive Compensation, Mark J. Loewenstein Jan 2000

The Conundrum Of Executive Compensation, Mark J. Loewenstein

Publications

Much of the scholarship on executive compensation that appears in law reviews assumes that large U.S. corporations overpay their chief executive officers ("CEOs"). This assumption is understandable, as many of these compensation packages are indeed stunning. The question of whether CEOs are overpaid, however, is complicated. Some scholars in other disciplines, principally in economics and management science, have studied the issue but, as this Article demonstrates, this literature does not confirm the assumption. Indeed, some studies suggest that CEO pay is competitive. Moreover, efforts to reduce the level of executive compensation may have the unintended consequence of achieving the opposite …


Cross-Border Bank Branching Under The Nafta: Public Choice And The Law Of Corporate Groups, Eric J. Gouvin Jan 1999

Cross-Border Bank Branching Under The Nafta: Public Choice And The Law Of Corporate Groups, Eric J. Gouvin

Faculty Scholarship

This Article examines a question left unresolved after the negotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA): whether the banks of the member countries should be permitted to engage in the business of banking in the other member countries simply by branching across national borders. Under present law, the United States permits branching subject to extensive restrictions, while Canada and Mexico permit access to their banking markets only by acquisition or establishment of institutions chartered in their countries. While the NAFTA does not provide for unfettered branching across national borders, article 1403(3) of the NAFTA left the issue of …


An Evolutionary Theory Of Corporate Law And Corporate Bankruptcy, David A. Skeel, Jr. Oct 1998

An Evolutionary Theory Of Corporate Law And Corporate Bankruptcy, David A. Skeel, Jr.

Vanderbilt Law Review

In this Article, Professor Skeel argues that the important recent literature exploring historical and political influences on American corporate law has neglected a crucial component of corporate governance: corporate bankruptcy. Only by appreciating the complementary relationship between corporate law and corporate bankruptcy can we understand how corporate governance operates in any given nation.

To show this, the Article contrasts American corporate governance with that of Japan and Germany. America's market-driven corporate governance can only function effectively if the bankruptcy framework includes a manager-driven reorganization option. The relational shareholding that characterizes Japanese and German corporate governance, by contrast, requires a much …


Turning Servile Opportunities To Gold: A Strategic Analysis Of The Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, Eric L. Talley Jan 1998

Turning Servile Opportunities To Gold: A Strategic Analysis Of The Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

Perhaps no single motif permeates corporate law and governance literature like the problem of agency costs. Though modest in concept, the canonical principal-agent framework yields fundamental insights into virtually every economic relationship involving the firm. These insights, in turn, not only animate prevailing positive accounts of the modern corporation, but they also provide a normative basis for regulating the oft-lamented gulf between ownership and control.

Despite their pervasiveness, problems of agency costs are rarely more vexing than when an agent is also a potential competitor. A notable example of such a scenario occurs when a corporate manager acquires information about …


The Folklore Of Investor Capitalism, John C. Coffee Jr. Jan 1997

The Folklore Of Investor Capitalism, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Ideally, Thurman Arnold should review this book. In his The Folklore of American Capitalism, Arnold dissected the ideology and rationalizations by which the business community of an earlier day defended its legitimacy and perquisites. Michael Useem, a sociologist at the Wharton School, also has an interest in the ideology of the business community: how corporate managers view the new institutional investors, how they justify resistance, and the tensions and inconsistencies between their critiques of money managers and their own behavior. This is an underutilized perspective (which law and economics inherently tends to overlook), and Useem is at his best …


The Shaping Force Of Corporate Law In The New Economic Order, Jeffrey N. Gordon Jan 1997

The Shaping Force Of Corporate Law In The New Economic Order, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

My topic for this Allen Chair lecture is the shaping force of corporate governance in the new economic order. It is easy to think of corporate law as an arcane field with mysterious terms and peculiar rules, ultimately of interest only to those who are prepared to bill at least 2000 hours a year to unravel its complexities. This is the view that there is a pointless mystery about shareholders, directors, common stocks, debentures, and the bizarre creature my class encountered recently, a convertible exchangeable cumulative preferred stock; and that ultimately corporate law and practice consists of the expert manipulation …


Controlling Strategic Voting: Property Rule Or Liability Rule, Zohar Goshen Jan 1997

Controlling Strategic Voting: Property Rule Or Liability Rule, Zohar Goshen

Faculty Scholarship

Strategic voting – situations where voters place their votes according to their assessment of how other voters will behave rather than according to their actual preference – results in distorted decisionmaking. Strategic voting can cause the company to lose desired transactions and can also be used to coerce voters into accepting alternatives they would have otherwise rejected. An analysis of the various types of strategic voting situations which arise in corporate law demonstrates the author's argument that strategic voting is inherent in the voting mechanism, regardless of the type of group involved or of the decision being made. Maintaining a …


Fired Employees And/Or Frozen-Out Shareholders (An Essay), Deborah A. Schmedemann Jan 1996

Fired Employees And/Or Frozen-Out Shareholders (An Essay), Deborah A. Schmedemann

Faculty Scholarship

The thesis of this essay can be stated as follows: Shareholder-employees should be able to recover for loss of employment, within the cause of action provided by corporate law, where the termination violates public law, breaches the agreement among the shareholders, or is unsupported by legitimate business purposes. In Part II, this essay presents the employment model, including the paradigm of employment that the law builds on, the starting premise of employment law, the roles of private and public law, and the remedies afforded for violations of an employee's rights. In Part III, this essay develops the corporate model, discussing …


A Positive Analysis Of The Common Law Of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr. Jan 1996

A Positive Analysis Of The Common Law Of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

The purpose of this Article is to offer a positive analysis of the common law of corporate managers' fiduciary duties. The Article attempts to explain the present shape of these corporate fiduciary duties by reference to Pareto criteria.

A particular state of affairs ("state B") is considered to be Pareto superior to another state of affairs ("state A") if at least one person in state B is better off than he or she is in state A and no one in state B is worse off than he or she is in state A. Since in a move from state …


Reflections On Executive Compensation And A Modest Proposal For (Further) Reform, Mark J. Loewenstein Jan 1996

Reflections On Executive Compensation And A Modest Proposal For (Further) Reform, Mark J. Loewenstein

Publications

No abstract provided.


Two Cheers For Specialization, Jeffrey W. Stempel Jan 1995

Two Cheers For Specialization, Jeffrey W. Stempel

Scholarly Works

Professor Dreyfuss adopts what might be termed the more conservative and deferential view of the efficacy of Delaware corporate law in her paper and her presentation. This approach generally views the market as making a statement with which one should not lightly quarrel. Because Delaware continues to attract incorporations, this view posits that the state's attraction is the superiority of its corporate law compared to other states, which lack a semi-specialized Chancery Court. Consequently, in a race to the top of corporate standards, legal rules and adjudications, Delaware's success in the market suggests that Delaware's legal product is good.

Other …


Presumptions And Burdens Of Proof As Tools For Legal Stability And Change, Tamar Frankel Jul 1994

Presumptions And Burdens Of Proof As Tools For Legal Stability And Change, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

Presumptions and burdens of proof are used, among other purposes, to maintain legal stability and at the same time effect change. By imposing the burden of proof on the party asserting a certain outcome, courts can calibrate burdens of proof and substantive rules until experience points to rule retention or amendment. As agents of change, presumptions and burdens of proof are far more flexible and less brittle than rules.1

This Article tells the story of presumptions and burdens of proof in litigation between corporate shareholders and managements. This litigation is replete with volatile presumptions and innovative burdens of proof, …


Thoughts Evoked By "Accounting And The New Corporate Law", Ted J. Fiflis Jan 1993

Thoughts Evoked By "Accounting And The New Corporate Law", Ted J. Fiflis

Publications

No abstract provided.


Individual And Collective Sovereignty In The Corporate Enterprise (Reviewing Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fishel, The Economic Structure Of Corporate Law (1991) And Robert N. Bellah Et Al., The Good Society (1991), Lyman P. Q. Johnson Dec 1992

Individual And Collective Sovereignty In The Corporate Enterprise (Reviewing Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fishel, The Economic Structure Of Corporate Law (1991) And Robert N. Bellah Et Al., The Good Society (1991), Lyman P. Q. Johnson

Scholarly Articles

Not available.


The Corporate Officer's Independent Duty As A Tonic For The Anemic Law Of Executive Compensation, Douglas C. Michael Jul 1992

The Corporate Officer's Independent Duty As A Tonic For The Anemic Law Of Executive Compensation, Douglas C. Michael

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

History repeats itself in the law as in other arenas. In the law of executive compensation, such a repetition may be imminent. Ever since the advent of the large industrial corporation in the United States, there has been periodic outrage at payments made to its top executives. This repetition suggests that the law has failed to keep pace with the observed problems. Part I of this Article describes the current and historic uproar over executive compensation in large corporations in the United States. Part II provides the economic background of the process of negotiating executive compensation. Part III analyzes the …


Responsibility Of Investment Bankers To Shareholders, Ted J. Fiflis Jan 1992

Responsibility Of Investment Bankers To Shareholders, Ted J. Fiflis

Publications

No abstract provided.


Corporations, Markets, And Courts, Jeffrey N. Gordon Jan 1991

Corporations, Markets, And Courts, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

The times they are a changin'. Vanguard firms of the 1980s takeover boom have announced associate layoffs and salary freezes because business is down. Bankruptcy and corporate reorganization are the hot new specialties as reflected in law school class size and law firm entrepreneurialism. Acquisition activity has fallen dramatically from the halcyon days of the 1980s. The gargantuan headline-grabbing hostile bid is now rare. In particular, the "boot-strap, bust-up" highly leveraged transaction that so engaged the passions of corporate managers and raiders now seems part of the history of corporate finance rather than its future.

Many forces have played a …


Why Not Good Faith?-The Foibles Of Fairness In Closely Held Corporations, Daniel S. Kleinberger Jan 1990

Why Not Good Faith?-The Foibles Of Fairness In Closely Held Corporations, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

This essay describes the contours of the shareholder’s duty to be fair and explores some of the problems caused by the law’s imprecision in defining the duty of fairness. Because this duty is best understood as a rejection of old norms, part one of this essay describes the traditional doctrines of intra-corporate responsibility. Part two describes the special characteristics of a close corporation and outlines how those characteristics pushed close corporation law to new concepts of fairness and shareholder duties. Part three attempts to delineate those duties of fairness and also to highlight some of the dangers that arise when …


Indeterminacy: The Final Ingredient In An Interest Group Analysis Of Corporate Law, Douglas M. Branson Jan 1990

Indeterminacy: The Final Ingredient In An Interest Group Analysis Of Corporate Law, Douglas M. Branson

Vanderbilt Law Review

Legal realists emphasized the contradictory norms of law. Contradictory norms permitted judges to reach conclusions about what basic equities and broadly accepted social interests required in particular cases. Judges then used whatever norm of law suited them to reason in support of their a priori conclusions about what these equities or broad social interests required.

Critical Legal Studies (CLS) has inherited and enhanced the legacy of questioning the value of legal rules. CLS thinkers maintain that law is indeterminate, drawing heavily upon linguists who have explored the indeterminacy of language.' CLS scholars go beyond realists, however,both in positing contradictory norms …


Coming Of Age In A Corporate Law Firm: The Economics Of Associate Career Patterns, Ronald J. Gilson, Robert H. Mnookin Jan 1989

Coming Of Age In A Corporate Law Firm: The Economics Of Associate Career Patterns, Ronald J. Gilson, Robert H. Mnookin

Faculty Scholarship

The traditional American corporate law firm, long an oasis of organizational stability, in recent years has been the subject of dramatic change. The manner in which firms divide profits, perhaps the most revealing aspect of law firm organization because it displays the balance the firm has selected between risk-sharing and incentives, has changed in a critical way. From a long standing reliance on seniority that emphasizes risk-sharing, profit division is shifting to a system based on the productivity of individual partners that emphasizes incentives. With what seems to be only a short time lag from the change in how profits …