Business Organizations Law Commons^™

Nonvoting Shares And Efficient Corporate Governance, Dorothy S. Lund

Faculty Scholarship

A growing number of technology companies, including Google, Zillow, and Snap, have issued stock that does not allow investors to vote on corporate decisions. But there is fundamental disagreement among scholars and investors about whether nonvoting stock is beneficial or harmful. Critics argue that nonvoting shares perpetually insulate corporate insiders from influence and oversight, and therefore increase agency costs. By contrast, proponents contend that nonvoting shares may provide benefits that exceed these agency costs, such as enabling corporate insiders to pursue their long-term vision for the company without interference from outside shareholders.

This Article offers a novel perspective on this …

The Compliance Process, Veronica Root Martinez

Journal Articles

Even as regulators and prosecutors proclaim the importance of effective compliance programs, failures persist. Organizations fail to ensure that they and their agents comply with legal and regulatory requirements, industry practices, and their own internal policies and norms. From the companies that provide our news, to the financial institutions that serve as our bankers, to the corporations that make our cars, compliance programs fail to prevent misconduct each and every day. The causes of these compliance failures are multifaceted and include general enforcement deficiencies, difficulties associated with overseeing compliance programs within complex organizations, and failures to establish a culture of …

Investing In Corporate Procedure, Jessica M. Erickson

Law Faculty Publications

Corporate litigation is in crisis. At the state level, shareholder lawsuits challenging mergers and other corporate decisions are ubiquitous but rarely end with meaningful relief for shareholders. At the federal level, securities class actions are rife with ethical challenges and low-value settlements. Over the last several decades, multiple groups — including judges, legislatures, and corporate boards — have tried to solve this problem, but all have come up short. This Article argues that the solution lies in rewriting the procedural rules that govern corporate lawsuits. New standing requirements would lead to better screening of these claims. Discovery limits and heightened …

Legal Literature Review Of Social Entrepreneurship And Impact Investing (2007-2017): Doing Good By Doing Business, Deborah Burand, Anne M. Tucker

Scholarly Works

Although the ambition to do good by doing business is not new, the burgeoning realization of this ambition is. As the fields of social entrepreneurship and impact investing advance in size, scope and complexity, questions about the roles of corporations and capital markets in society intensify. What is legal scholarship contributing to this discussion? This Article reviews the scholarly contributions of 260 articles written by over 150 authors about the fields of social enterprise, social finance, and impact investing. The Article maps the contri- butions of legal scholarship over the last decade-from 2007 (when the term "impact investing" was first …

A New Standard For Governance: Reflections On Worker Representation In The United States, Julian Constain

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

The contemporary state of corporate law in the United States is one that is skewed toward the archaic principle of shareholder primacy. This narrow conception of corporate purpose has resulted in governance mechanisms that tend to overlook the many stakeholders that are affected by, and, in turn, affect the bottom line of modern corporations. In the wake of the recently proposed Accountable Capitalism Act, this Note investigates the viability of adopting a system of mandated worker board representation—codetermination—in the United States. The Note employs a comparative analysis of the German and Swedish experiences with codetermination, and then evaluates the policy, …

Explaining Choice-Of-Entity Decisions By Silicon Valley Start-Ups, Gregg Polsky

Scholarly Works

Perhaps the most fundamental role of a business tax advisor is to recommend the optimal entity choice for nascent business enterprises. Nevertheless, even in 2018, the choice-of-entity analysis remains highly muddled. Most tax practitioners across the United States consistently recommend flow-through entities, such as LLCs and S corporations, to their clients. In contrast, a discrete group of highly sophisticated tax professionals, those who advise start-ups in Silicon Valley and other hotbeds of start-up activity, prefer C corporations.

Prior commentary has described and tried to explain this paradox without finding an adequate explanation. These commentators have noted a host of superficially …

Do Conflicts Of Interest Require Outside Boards? Yes. Bsps? Maybe., Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

From the Symposium: Outsourcing the Board: How Board Service Providers Can Improve Corporate Governance

Boards of directors are curious creatures. The law generally requires corporations to have them—indeed, they are the focus of the corporate law we teach in Business Associations in U.S. law schools. The corporation is managed by directors or under their direction; directors hire and fire officers; directors are necessary for fundamental transactions.

But the reason why corporations have directors is not entirely clear. In the prototypical privately held corporation, the family firm, the same individuals serve both as directors and officers. The CEO (better known as …

Insulation By Separation: When Dual-Class Stock Met Corporate Spin-Offs, Young Ran Kim, Geeyoung Min

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

The recent rise of shareholder engagement has revamped companies’ corporate governance structures so as to empower shareholder rights and to constrain managerial opportunism. The general trend notwithstanding, this Article uncovers corporate spin-off transactions — which divide a single company into two or more companies — as a unique mechanism that insulates the management from shareholder intervention. In a spin-off, the company’s managers can fundamentally change the governance arrangements of the new spun-off company without being subject to monitoring mechanisms, such as shareholder approval or market check. Furthermore, most spin-off transactions enjoy tax benefits. The potential agency problems associated with the …

Who Is The Client? Rethinking Professional Responsibility For Benefit Corporations, Joseph Pileri

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

A growing social enterprise movement has led companies to increasingly opt into the benefit corporation form, and those companies are hiring lawyers. Benefit corporations challenge the notion that corporate law’s primary focus is on furthering shareholder interests. While many have written about the benefit corporation with respect to corporate fiduciary law, this Article is the first to explore the form’s ethical implications for lawyers. Ethical obligations necessarily reflect substantive law governing client organizations; changes to the corporate form presented by benefit corporation legislation should reverberate in legal ethics. The legal profession, however, has not addressed how to lawyer to a …

The Corporate Purpose Of Social License, Hillary A. Sale

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This Article deploys the sociological theory of social license, or the acceptance of a business or organization by the relevant communities and stakeholders, in the context of the board of directors and corporate governance. Corporations are generally treated as “private” actors and thus are regulated by “private” corporate law. This construct allows for considerable latitude. Corporate actors are not, however, solely “private.” They are the beneficiaries of economic and political power, and the decisions they make have impacts that extend well beyond the boundaries of the entities they represent.

Using Wells Fargo and Uber as case studies, this Article explores …

The Diminishing Duty Of Loyalty, Julian Velasco

Journal Articles

Fiduciary duties comprise an integral part of corporate law. It is generally understood that directors owe the corporation and its shareholders two fiduciary duties: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. Although both duties are firmly established in corporate law, they are not treated equally. It is generally understood that the duty of loyalty is enforced far more rigorously than the duty of care. The justification for this dichotomy is twofold. First, differential treatment is appropriate because of the relative urgencies of the underlying subject matter: loyalty issues pose greater risks than do care issues. Second, the deference …

Uncharted Waters? Legal Ethics And The Benefit Corporation, Joseph Pileri

St. Mary's Journal on Legal Malpractice & Ethics

Corporate law norms are reflected in lawyers’ ethical duties. The enactment of benefit corporation legislation across the country signals a legislative acknowledgment that corporate law can serve as a public, rather than a merely private, ordering mechanism. Benefit corporations expressly adopt a public benefit as a legal purpose of the enterprise. While many have written about this important development with respect to corporate fiduciary law, this essay is the first to explore the professional and ethical responsibility of lawyers representing benefit corporations. In the last century, as scholars and courts drove an understanding of corporate law that elevated the interests …

Regulating Fintech, William Magnuson

Faculty Scholarship

The financial crisis of 2008 has led to dramatic changes in the way that finance is regulated: the Dodd-Frank Act imposed broad and systemic regulation on the industry on a level not seen since the New Deal. But the financial regulatory reforms enacted since the crisis have been premised on an outdated idea of what financial services look like and how they are provided. Regulation has failed to take into account the rise of financial technology (or “fintech”) firms and the fundamental changes they have ushered in on a variety of fronts, from the way that banking works, to the …

The Public Cost Of Private Equity, William Magnuson

Faculty Scholarship

This Article presents a theory of the corporate governance costs of private equity. In doing so, it challenges the common view that private equity’s governance structure has resolved, or at least significantly mitigated, one of the fundamental tensions in corporate law, that is, the conflict between management and ownership. The Article argues that this widespread perception about the corporate governance benefits of private equity overlooks the many ways in which the private equity model, far from eliminating agency costs, in fact exacerbates them. These governance costs include compensation structures that incentivize excessive risk-taking, governance rights that provide investors with few …

The Diminishing Duty Of Loyalty, Julian Velasco

Washington and Lee Law Review

Fiduciary duties comprise an integral part of corporate law. It is generally understood that directors owe the corporation and its shareholders two fiduciary duties: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. Although both duties are firmly established in corporate law, they are not treated equally. It is generally understood that the duty of loyalty is enforced far more rigorously than the duty of care. The justification for this dichotomy is twofold. First, differential treatment is appropriate because of the relative urgencies of the underlying subject matter: loyalty issues pose greater risks than do care issues. Second, the deference …

Polishing Up Wisconsin's Fiduciary Duties In Llc Law To Attract New Suitors, Collin D. Brunk

Marquette Law Review

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The (Un)Changing Derivative Suit, Jessica M. Erickson

Law Faculty Publications

The past 25 years brought great upheaval in shareholder litigation. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”) upended securities class actions. As a result of this legislation, institutional investors now play a far more prominent role in these cases (Choi, et al. 2005), but also face procedural hurdles nearly unprecedented in our legal system (Erickson 2016). More recently, the number of merger class actions skyrocketed, as shareholders began to challenge nearly every significant merger or acquisition, often in multiple jurisdictions across the country (Sinha 2016). To curb these suits, courts announced increased scrutiny of settlements and invited companies …

Sexual Harassment And Corporate Law, Daniel Hemel, Dorothy S. Lund

Faculty Scholarship

The #MeToo movement has shaken corporate America in recent months, leading to the departures of several high-profile executives as well as sharp stock price declines at a number of firms. Investors have taken notice and taken action: Shareholders at more than a half dozen publicly traded companies have filed lawsuits since the start of 2017 alleging that corporate fiduciaries breached state law duties or violated federal securities laws in connection with sexual harassment scandals. Additional suits are likely in the coming months.

This Article examines the role of corporate and securities law in regulating and remedying workplace sexual misconduct. We …

Does Shareholder Voting Matter? Evidence From The Takeover Market, Paul Mason, Usha Rodrigues, Mike Stegemoller, Steven Utke

Scholarly Works

Voting rights are a basic shareholder-protection mechanism. Outside of the core voting requirements state law imposes (election of directors and votes on fundamental changes), federal law grants shareholders additional voting rights. But these rights introduce concomitant costs into corporate governance. Each grant of a voting right thus invites the question: is the benefit achieved worth the cost the vote imposes?

The question is not merely a theoretical one. Recently the SEC, concerned about Nasdaq’s potential weakening of shareholder voting protections, has lamented that little evidence exists on the value of the shareholder vote. This Article provides that evidence. It examines …

Evolving Norms Of Corporate Social Responsibility: Lessons Learned From The European Union Directive On Non-Financial Reporting, Constance Z. Wagner

All Faculty Scholarship

This article examines an important development in the field of corporate social responsibility, namely theadoption of a 2014 European Union Directive (“2014 EU Directive”) mandating non-financial reporting by certain large companies. Such disclosure has traditionally been provided by businesses on a voluntary basis, but the 2014 EU Directive reflects an emerging global trends toward mandatory reporting. Such trend emerged in response to the perceived low quantity and poor quality of information disclosed voluntarily onsocial and environmental topics of importance to corporate stakeholders. The author analyzes the history and development of policy and legislation on this issue both at the European …

Corporate Law Federalism In Historical Context: Comparing Canada And The United States, Camden Hutchison

All Faculty Publications

Although American and Canadian corporate law share many similarities, they are also marked by important institutional differences. Among the most notable are the differing roles of federal versus state/provincial policymaking in the two countries: While American corporate law has been deeply influenced by jurisdictional competition among the states, Canadian law has instead been shaped by federal legislative activity, as seen today in the standardizing influence of the Canada Business Corporations Act. These different institutional histories have led to distinct evolutionary paths, with important substantive consequences for contemporary corporate law. Despite considerable academic attention to the subject of corporate law federalism, …

The Long And The Short: Portfolio Turnover Ratios & Mutual Fund Investment Time Horizons, Anne M. Tucker

Scholarly Works

Mutual fund portfolio turnover ratios (PTR) are at the center of the short-termism debate, which criticizes corporate maneuvers taken to prop up near-term earnings at the expense of long-term, value focused investments and policies. Scholars and policymakers often rely on portfolio turnover ratios to argue that mutual fund short-termism, as measured by the PTR, is increasing and infecting operating company time horizons. This article answers two main questions central to discerning mutual funds' role in the short-termism debate. The first is, how long, on average do U.S. registered mutual funds hold onto their assets? The second is, how good of …

Corporate Governance, Capital Markets, And Securities Law, Adam C. Pritchard

Book Chapters

This chapter explores the dividing line between corporate governance and securities law from both historical and institutional perspectives. Section 2 examines the origins of the dividing line between securities law and corporate governance in the United States, as well as the efforts of the SEC to push against that boundary. That history sets the stage for section 3, which broadens the inquiry by examining the institutional connections between capital markets and corporate governance. Are there practical limits to the connection between securities law and corporate governance? The US again illustrates the point, as Congress has increasingly crossed the traditional boundary …

The Evolution Of Entrepreneurial Finance: A New Typology, J. Brad Bernthal

Publications

There has been an explosion in new types of startup finance instruments. Whereas twenty years ago preferred stock dominated the field, startup companies and investors now use at least eight different instruments—six of which have only become widely used in the last decade. Legal scholars have yet to reflect upon the proliferation of instrument types in the aggregate. Notably missing is a way to organize instruments into a common framework that highlights their similarities and differences.

This Article makes four contributions. First, it catalogues the variety of startup investment forms. I describe novel instruments, such as revenue-based financing, which remain …

Tournament Of Managers: Lessons From The Academic Leadership Market, Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

Why do firms usually make, not buy, their chief executive officers (CEOs)? Public corporations hire their CEOs from within the firm 78% of the time. They do so although earlier studies have found no clear evidence that internal hires perform better than external ones. So why do firms prefer them? Few scholars have focused on this simple question.

The reason why firms favor internal candidates matters not only in its own right, but also for an overlooked reason: it informs the controversial question of executive compensation. Currently board-compensation committees look to peer benchmarks to set executive pay. But, taking cues …

Will Swing Pricing Save Sedentary Shareholders?, Anne M. Tucker, Holly Van Den Toorn

Scholarly Works

This Article explains and explores new Securities Exchange Commission rules authorizing optional swing pricing for mutual funds. Swing pricing is an anti-dilution tool intended to protect sedentary investors who enter, and stay, in a fund. Workers setting aside money for retirement are often sedentary investors. Mutual funds are the mainstay vehicle for retirement investors, yet as sedentary shareholders they can experience significant asset dilution over their savings lifetime. Swing pricing—a mutual fund pricing mechanism that allocates transaction costs to the triggering shareholders—could save sedentary shareholders, collectively, billions of dollars. The mutual fund industry's operational complexities and competing regulatory obligations may …

20/20 Vision In The Long & Short-Termism Debate, Anne M. Tucker

Scholarly Works

What is an optimal investment time horizon—for institutions, individual shareholders and corporations? This question can evoke emotional, ideological, and theoretical responses. The answers usually deeply entrenched debates over the fundamental roles of markets versus regulation and between the appropriate loci of corporate power: the board of directors versus the shareholders. Too long-term and it is myopia; too near-term and is it short-termism. Neither label is inconsequential, so the debates are not tepid, academic, or marginal.

Corporate Governance Reform In Post-Crisis Financial Firms: Two Fundamental Tensions, Christopher Bruner

Scholarly Works

The manner in which financial firms are governed directly impacts the stability and sustainability of both the financial sector and the "real" economy, as the financial crisis and associated regulatory reform efforts have tragically demonstrated. However, two fundamental tensions continue to complicate efforts to reform corporate governance in post-crisis financial firms. The first relates to reliance on increased equity capital as a buffer against shocks and a means of limiting leverage. The tension here arises from the fact that no corporate constituency desires risk more than equity does, and that risk preference only tends to be stronger in banks, and …

Distributed Ledgers, Traceable Shares, And The Division Of Power In Corporate Law, Christopher M. Bruner

Scholarly Works

Review of Traceable Shares and Corporate Law, 113 Nw. U. L. Rev. __ by George S. Geis (forthcoming 2018)

Center-Left Politics And Corporate Governance: What Is The 'Progressive' Agenda?, Christopher Bruner

Scholarly Works

For as long as corporations have existed, debates have persisted among scholars, judges, and policymakers regarding how best to describe their form and function as a positive matter, and how best to organize relations among their various stakeholders as a normative matter. This is hardly surprising given the economic and political stakes involved with control over vast and growing "corporate" resources, and it has become commonplace to speak of various approaches to corporate law in decidedly political terms. In particular, on the fundamental normative issue of the aims to which corporate decision-making ought to be directed, shareholder-centric conceptions of the …