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Articles 1 - 30 of 646
Full-Text Articles in Business Organizations Law
Unruly Boards: Abrogating The Separate Duty Of Obedience In Nonprofit Organizations, Andrew Faul And Dr. Muthusami Kumaran
Unruly Boards: Abrogating The Separate Duty Of Obedience In Nonprofit Organizations, Andrew Faul And Dr. Muthusami Kumaran
Barry Law Review
This Article examines whether the duty of obedience should remain a separate fiduciary duty in nonprofit governance. While traditionally recognized alongside the duties of care and loyalty, the duty of obedience has become increasingly impractical and largely redundant in modern nonprofit law. The Article argues that obedience is better understood as a foundational principle underlying other fiduciary duties rather than an independent obligation. Ultimately, it advocates for eliminating the duty of obedience as a standalone duty while preserving its role in promoting accountable and mission-driven nonprofit governance.
Sticky Charters? The Surprisingly Tepid Embrace Of Officer-Protecting Waivers In Delaware, Jens Frankenreiter, Eric L. Talley
Sticky Charters? The Surprisingly Tepid Embrace Of Officer-Protecting Waivers In Delaware, Jens Frankenreiter, Eric L. Talley
Faculty Scholarship
This article examines the response to Delaware’s much-heralded 2022 legal reform that permitted corporations, for the first time, to adopt charter provisions exculpating corporate officers from liability for breaching their fiduciary duty of care. Contrary to widespread predictions that corporate actors would swiftly adopt officer exculpation provisions, our analysis — using both traditional and generative artificial intelligence (AI) methods — reveals a surprisingly low rate of uptake, over three years after the reform’s enactment.
Our study makes both methodological and substantive contributions. Methodologically, we present a novel application of large language models (LLMs) to identify and interpret technical clauses in …
U.S. Shareholder Activism: Convergence With Japan, Nobuhisa Ishizuka
U.S. Shareholder Activism: Convergence With Japan, Nobuhisa Ishizuka
Faculty Scholarship
To many observers long accustomed to slow, incremental change, the current boom in shareholder activism in Japan comes as a surprise. The opening for U.S.-style activists was created by market conditions that eventually resulted in policy changes that attracted significant numbers of foreign investors. However, even the current market would not have emerged without a parallel evolution in U.S. hedge-fund tactics, which gradually shifted over a number of years to a sophisticated and more nuanced approach, one based on partnership and dialogue with target companies, in contrast to adversarial relationships and public campaigns. This article attempts to place current trends …
Contractualizing Corporate Governance, Jonathan C. Lipson, Eli Alexander Evans
Contractualizing Corporate Governance, Jonathan C. Lipson, Eli Alexander Evans
University of Miami Law Review
The relationship between fiduciary duty and contract has never been clear. The law of fiduciaries has long constrained discretionary control of other people’s property, notably in corporate governance, where directors owe a corporation duties of care and loyalty. Yet, contract has also had the capacity to modify these duties in important—but uncertain—ways because neither body of law contains a meta-rule specifying which would “trump” in the event of conflict. Uncertainty was rarely problematic, however, because directors lacked the power to fully contract away their control of the corporation or their concomitant fiduciary duties.
This has changed in the past thirty …
Values Primacy & Total Governance Through Activism, Carliss N. Chatman, Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci
Values Primacy & Total Governance Through Activism, Carliss N. Chatman, Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci
Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters
In the aftermath of George Floyd’s murder, public companies swift-ly pledged sweeping equity commitments—only to abandon them under political and market pressure. These reversals were not aberrations. They were opportunistic, performative, and reactionary marketing responses. They expose a governance regime in which stakeholder interests are structurally reversible because they remain doctrinally optional, lacking the institutional interlock needed to create binding accountability across stakeholder roles.
This Article explores how stakeholder power is already embedded in corporate governance through interlocking initiatives grounded in shared values. Stakeholder activism—boycotts, proxy votes, viral campaigns—is not merely expressive; it is an overlooked form of governance. Drawing …
"Activist" Versus "Passive" Investors: A Closer Look At Proxy Contests And The Contemporary Balance Of Advantage, John C. Coffee Jr.
"Activist" Versus "Passive" Investors: A Closer Look At Proxy Contests And The Contemporary Balance Of Advantage, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
The era of the hostile takeover has clearly given way to the era of the proxy contest led by an activist hedge fund. Today, a record number of such contests are underway, and they have changed the board composition at many U.S. companies and caused a record number of CEO resignations. But there is a mystery here: when activist funds negotiate for changes with target managements, they often obtain meaningful changes in the board of directors and corporate policies. However, when activists attempt a proxy contest, they have generally been unsuccessful, winning only a small number of seats in a …
The Boundaries Of Corporate Politicking, Ashlee A. Paxton-Turner
The Boundaries Of Corporate Politicking, Ashlee A. Paxton-Turner
Law Faculty Publications
As corporations become red brands and blue brands (whether purposely or accidentally), they are participating in the American political landscape in ways distinct from lobbying and political spending. Specifically, corporations are increasingly making statements or launching ad campaigns that appear to support one side (or the other) of a political or social debate. This Article refers to that activity as “corporate politicking.” Unlike political spending or lobbying, corporate politicking lacks a legal definition and is far less regulated—whether internally or externally.
This Article’s central contribution is an administrable framework to demarcate corporate politicking from other corporate activities and decisions. It …
Purpose And Nonprofit Enterprise, Cathy Hwang, Dorothy S. Lund
Purpose And Nonprofit Enterprise, Cathy Hwang, Dorothy S. Lund
Faculty Scholarship
Nonprofit enterprise is responsible for a large share of economic activity across the globe. And yet, leading theories fail to explain why nonprofit business survives and even thrives across a vast number of industries, ranging from artificial intelligence to beer brewing, despite an absence of shareholder control. Indeed, as shareholder ownership and intervention rights have become the core component of successful corporate governance, this success is all the more surprising.
This Essay offers a novel “purposeful enterprise” theory to explain the puzzling success of nonprofit enterprises. Drawing on research in behavioral economics and organizational science, it argues that organizational purpose …
Book Review - Board-Shareholder Dialogue: Policy Debate, Legal Constraints And Best Practices Edited By Luca Enriques And Giovanni Strampelli, Cambridge, Cup, 2024, 574 Pp., £130.00 (Hardback) Isbn: 9781009360760, Martin Petrin
Articles & Book Chapters
No abstract provided.
Performance Leads Governance: A Comment On Professor Tallarita’S Dual-Class Analysis, David J. Berger, Pierluigi Matera
Performance Leads Governance: A Comment On Professor Tallarita’S Dual-Class Analysis, David J. Berger, Pierluigi Matera
Faculty Scholarship
The rise of dual-class stock structures in corporate governance has sparked intense academic, legal, and regulatory debate. In his recent contribution, Dual-Class Contracting, Professor Tallarita persuasively challenges some contemporary interpretations of contractarian theories by showing that dual-class structures do not reflect bespoke bargaining or firm-specific negotiation, but rather result from lawyer-driven standardization, social norms, and path dependency.
Drawing on Tallarita’s empirical findings, we argue that the reality of dual-class structures extends beyond governance formality. Specifically, we contend that investor behavior is driven not by structural governance ideals, but by corporate performance and mission alignment. Companies increasingly design governance structures based …
The New Framework For Directors’ Duty To Creditors And The Challenges Ahead – Foo Kian Beng V Op3 International Pte Ltd (In Liquidation) [2024] 1 Slr 361, Jonathan Ren Hao Cheong
The New Framework For Directors’ Duty To Creditors And The Challenges Ahead – Foo Kian Beng V Op3 International Pte Ltd (In Liquidation) [2024] 1 Slr 361, Jonathan Ren Hao Cheong
Singapore Law Journal (Lexicon)
In Foo Kian Beng v OP3 International Pte Ltd (in liquidation) [2024] 1 SLR 361, the Singapore Court of Appeal introduced a two-step, three-category framework for evaluating whether a director has breached his fiduciary duty to consider the interests of creditors. This decision not only affirms the traditional understanding of the duty in other common law jurisdictions but also provides directors with clearer guidance on managing the affairs of the company in times of financial distress. This article builds upon the discussion in Foo Kian Beng by evaluating the new framework established by the SGCA. It also identifies potential challenges …
Too Many Mergers? The Golden Parachute As A Driver Of M&A Activity In The 21st Century, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Too Many Mergers? The Golden Parachute As A Driver Of M&A Activity In The 21st Century, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Faculty Scholarship
This Article argues that the corporate governance regime in the United States has produced a level of mergers and acquisition activity greater than the social optimum because of the current version of the “golden parachute,” a super-bonus payoff to a target CEO. In the late nineteenth through the twentieth century, M&A activity was characterized by “waves” that reflected adaptations to changing external environment, whether the efficient production frontier, regulatory constraints, or capital market developments. Economically-motivated parties saw the opportunities in changing the boundaries of the firm; successful first-movers spawned imitators, hence a wave, which eventually subsided, often alongside deteriorating capital …
The Past, Present, And Future Of Proxy Voting Choice, Dorothy S. Lund
The Past, Present, And Future Of Proxy Voting Choice, Dorothy S. Lund
Faculty Scholarship
This article provides an early attempt at understanding what voluntary pass-through voting could mean for the marketplace. I first provide an overview of my argument in my 2018 Journal of Corporation Law article and the events that followed. I then survey passthrough voting initiatives that have taken hold at three asset managers — BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street. I then conclude with some preliminary observations about how voting choice is likely to affect the proxy voting landscape and outline open questions.
Beyond Issuers: The Future Of Private Securities Litigation, Joshua Mitts
Beyond Issuers: The Future Of Private Securities Litigation, Joshua Mitts
Faculty Scholarship
Private securities litigation has traditionally been viewed as a subfield of corporate governance, reducing agency costs by disciplining wayward management. In this brief Symposium essay, I argue that the future of private securities litigation lies beyond issuers. I discuss how a fraud claim under Rule 10b-5 can be understood as a kind of economic tort, and set out, in broad strokes, an economic analysis of claims against non-issuer defendants. I then consider emerging trends in the case law against non-issuers in social media and market manipulation cases. I conclude by identifying some challenges and opportunities for securities litigation in a …
Toward A Dynamic View Of Corporate Purpose, Dorothy S. Lund
Toward A Dynamic View Of Corporate Purpose, Dorothy S. Lund
Faculty Scholarship
Scholars debating the corporation’s role in society generally advance the view that there is only one desirable orientation for corporations and their management. Specifically, proponents of a stakeholder governance model contend that focusing management on a broad set of corporate constituents maximizes overall welfare, while advocates of a shareholder-centric directive counter that prioritizing shareholders creates social welfare by rendering the firm most profitable. This Article offers another view: It suggests that the welfare-maximizing purpose for corporations could change depending on external economic conditions, which both of these positions assume away. Specifically, shareholder primacy is likely to promote welfare in a …
Blunting The “Tools At Hand”: Recent Developments In Delaware Books-And-Records Demand Law, Daniel Meyer
Blunting The “Tools At Hand”: Recent Developments In Delaware Books-And-Records Demand Law, Daniel Meyer
University of Miami Business Law Review
In recent years, and despite their heeding the guidance of Delaware courts, stockholders’ use of the statutory books-and-records investigation mechanism under Delaware Code Title 8, Section 220 (“Section 220”) has been much maligned, with commentators blaming Section 220 actions for straining judicial resources and causing companies unnecessary costs and burdens. Moreover, Delaware’s legislature and courts have taken steps to curb stockholders’ inspection rights, blunting a crucial tool needed to develop allegations in meritorious cases so that stockholders can bring cases that survive motions to dismiss and continue into plenary discovery.
Instead of blindly accepting a narrative regarding a Section 220 …
Sex & Startups, Jens Frankenreiter, Talia B. Gillis, Eric L. Talley
Sex & Startups, Jens Frankenreiter, Talia B. Gillis, Eric L. Talley
Faculty Scholarship
Private law offers a unique solution to the problem of long-term fiscal commitment. When Congress enacts a spending program that will take many years to reach fruition, there is a risk of a subsequent Congress or President cutting off funding in the interim. There is no escape from the problem within appropriations law itself. One solution, however, is to entrust private sector allies as vessels of long-term commitment. As a matter of political economy, that solution draws on policy-feedback theory. As a matter of law, the solution rests on a mechanism that Congress already uses but has not recognized its …
The Merging Of Ownership And Control, Tomer S. Stein
The Merging Of Ownership And Control, Tomer S. Stein
Scholarly Works
What if shareholders controlled every decision their company makes? This seemingly simple idea threatens to upend the modern corporation.
Shareholders own the corporation and directors and officers manage the corporation—a “separation of ownership and control” that has become a defining characteristic of our modern economy. As per conventional wisdom, the law enables separation of ownership and control by not prohibiting owners and employees from exercising their contractual freedom to hire and work for one another.
This Article demonstrates that this widely held view is incomplete and detrimental to the economy. Much of the economic activity that utilizes the corporate form …
Texas, Delaware, And The New Controller Primacy, Christine Hurt
Texas, Delaware, And The New Controller Primacy, Christine Hurt
Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters
In January 2024, Elon Musk, CEO of Tesla, Inc., initiated the process of moving Tesla’s state of incorporation from Delaware to Texas, citing concerns over Delaware corporate law. The move sparked discussions about the dominance of Delaware corporate law and its recent rulings, with critics accusing Court of Chancery judges of favoring shareholder interests over controller innovation and managerial discretion.
The shift away from Delaware is set against a backdrop of increasing judicial scrutiny in the Delaware Court of Chancery, where plaintiffs have recently seen successes in litigation against controlling shareholders, corporate directors, and officers. Concerns over Delaware’s evolving legal …
Unflexed Muscle: Sec Enforcement And Officer Sox 302 Certifications, Marc I. Steinberg, A.B. Steinberg
Unflexed Muscle: Sec Enforcement And Officer Sox 302 Certifications, Marc I. Steinberg, A.B. Steinberg
Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters
This article represents the first work to analyze the Securities and Exchange Commission’s neglect in its enforcement of the chief executive officer (CEO) and chief financial officer (CFO) Sarbanes-Oxley certification requirement. The article addresses the appropriate construction of the statute’s reach, the enforcement proceedings instituted by the SEC under this provision, and the Commission’s failure to fulfill its legislative directive to enforce this statute and Rule 13a-14 promulgated thereunder. In its implementation of the CEO and CFO certification requirement, the SEC has brought relatively few enforcement actions during over a two-decade period. Its enforcement with respect to CEOs and CFOs …
On Blockchain As A Tool Against Corporate Corruption, Yannis Normand
On Blockchain As A Tool Against Corporate Corruption, Yannis Normand
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business
Over the last decades domestic and international legal frameworks have successfully coalesced to limit corrupt behavior worldwide. However, despite their success, current regulatory tools are not sufficiently well-equipped to address corruption in modern economic settings. These mechanisms can often be too costly to implement, too cumbersome to induce compliance, politically manipulatable, and may disincentivize foreign investment and internal corporate monitoring efforts. To address such drawbacks, policymakers should consider the introduction of blockchain-based tools in developing future anti-corruption efforts.
Blockchain can serve as a foundation for structures that can make it more attractive, easier and cost-efficient to monitor economic transactions, to …
A Democratic Participation Model For Corporate Governance, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie
A Democratic Participation Model For Corporate Governance, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie
Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters
Corporate law is in the grip of a fundamental conundrum: whether corporations should seek only to serve shareholders or instead attend to the interests of all stakeholders. The doctrine of shareholder primacy, which focuses the corporation’s attention on the goal of maximizing shareholder wealth, has been startingly successful, capturing the theory and practice of corporate governance for roughly fifty years. But recently the costs of this monomaniacal focus on the financial interests of one set of corporate participants have become clearer. At a time when the original reasons for restricting the corporate franchise to shareholders have been shown to rest …
Labor Law, Ownership, And The Firm, Sanjukta Paul
Labor Law, Ownership, And The Firm, Sanjukta Paul
Articles
In shaping economic coordination within and across both firms and markets, one significant action of law is to allocate privileges or rights between people or groups of people. These include the right to coordinate with other people or groups of people in particular ways regarding core economic decisions-a type of activity that is not always or in all circumstances legally permissible. An area that makes this more general action of law especially concrete is antitrust or competition law, with its collection of "exemptions." Antitrust's formal and informal exemptions quite directly allocate economic coordination rights, for particular kinds of activity, and …
Queers, Closets, And Corporate Governance, Darren Rosenblum
Queers, Closets, And Corporate Governance, Darren Rosenblum
Faculty Publications
The past few years have seen several corporate diversity initiatives that include Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer (LGBTQ+) people. In 2020, Nasdaq, the world’s second-largest stock exchange, and California, the largest state, both adopted rules to encourage board diversity for underrepresented groups, including LGBTQ+ people. Since that time, the Los Angeles Superior Court struck down California’s law, the Fifth Circuit invalidated Nasdaq’s rule, and the Trump administration initiated a slew of anti-Diversity Equity and Inclusion (DEI) and anti-LGBTQ+ measures. In the context of this sharp ideological turn, this Article attempts to step back and tackle a larger question: how can …
Understanding The Big Three’S Wavering Support Of Environmental And Social Shareholder Proposals, Jeff Schwartz, Jefferson Jensen
Understanding The Big Three’S Wavering Support Of Environmental And Social Shareholder Proposals, Jeff Schwartz, Jefferson Jensen
Seattle University Law Review
Because of their substantial equity portfolios, BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street (the Big 3) are central players in corporate governance. It is, therefore, critical to understand how they vote. One puzzle is that their support for shareholder proposals on environmental and social matters appears to waiver. In 2020, for instance, BlackRock supported 11.1% of environmental proposals at S&P 500 firms. In 2021, it seemingly reversed course, supporting 55.2%. It then flipped again, supporting 32.1% in 2022. Such statistics suggest that the Big 3 are constantly changing their views on these topics. This Article seeks to better understand whether this is …
Altering Rules: The New Frontier For Corporate Governance, Gabriel Rauterberg, Sarath Sanga
Altering Rules: The New Frontier For Corporate Governance, Gabriel Rauterberg, Sarath Sanga
Faculty Scholarship
Corporate law has taken a contractarian turn. Shareholders are increasingly contracting around its foundational rules — statutory rights, the fiduciary duty of loyalty, even the central role of the board — and Delaware courts are increasingly enforcing these contracts. In the one case where they did not, the legislature swiftly overruled the decision and adopted a new statutory provision permitting boards to completely cede their powers to a shareholder by contract. These developments have sparked a polarized debate, with some calling for a return to mandatory rules, while others push for total contractual freedom.
We argue, however, that the best …
Interlocking Directorates In The United States, Yaron Nili
Interlocking Directorates In The United States, Yaron Nili
Faculty Scholarship
In corporate America, directors wield increasing influence across multiple companies, often within the same industry (“horizontal directors”), which creates tension between antitrust laws and corporate governance. Horizontal directors are well-positioned to bring industry expertise and potentially increase higher profits, benefiting shareholders but also possibly enabling potential collusion. This chapter provides an overview of the prevalence of horizontal directors, the regulatory grey space in which they exist and the connection to some recently debated issues, including that of common ownership by institutional investors. To inform this debate, this chapter provides a thorough overview of horizontal directors from corporate and antitrust perspectives …
The Hidden Cost Of Venture Capital, Emilie Aguirre
The Hidden Cost Of Venture Capital, Emilie Aguirre
Faculty Scholarship
Founders, employees, consumers, and even funders increasingly expect businesses to pursue social goals alongside financial performance. Yet even the most committed firms have found it difficult to maintain social performance over time. Scholars in economics, management, and law have put forth several explanations for this “mission drift,” including inappropriate governance, poor management, lack of genuine commitment, and threat of takeovers. Puzzlingly, research to date primarily focuses on later-stage firms, even though the events and decisions that take place in a firm’s early stages can critically impact retention of its social performance.
Drawing from over five years of qualitative field research …
Corporate Scenarios: Drawing Lessons From History, Madison Condon
Corporate Scenarios: Drawing Lessons From History, Madison Condon
Faculty Scholarship
As corporations are increasingly pressed to reveal information about their exposure to climate-related risks, they are often asked to undertake and disclose the outcome of “scenario analysis.” In this exercise, corporations, including financial institutions, examine how their business would fare under different pathways the future may take. One oft-used scenario, for example, is the International Energy Agency’s “Net-Zero by 2050: A Roadmap for the Energy Sector.” This Essay presents a history of the use of scenarios as a corporate planning tool, particularly in the oil industry, arguing that it is key for understanding our present moment and the role of …
Unequal Ownership, Ofer Eldar, Rory Van Loo
Unequal Ownership, Ofer Eldar, Rory Van Loo
Faculty Scholarship
Market concentration and weak competition do not just lead to lower efficiency but also result in corporate profits flowing primarily to wealthy households that own a disproportionate share of public corporations. We demonstrate that this is a growing distributional problem not only due to familiar reasons in the literature, most notably shifts in market power, but also due to changes in the socio-economic makeup of ownership. Over the past twenty years, households in the bottom 90 percent of wealth have seen their share of stock ownership decline by half. That is, the ownership of corporations has become increasingly concentrated among …