Business Organizations Law Commons^™

Socially-Minded Investors And Corporate Behavior, Merritt B. Fox, Menesh S. Patel

Faculty Scholarship

Many equity investors are concerned with the world’s worsening social and environmental problems and are losing faith in the capacity of political institutions to respond. Corporate behavior is often contributing to these problems. Some investors, at least if fully informed as to costs and benefits involved, would favor corrective changes to corporate behavior even where that would lessen their investment returns. Two important questions arise: (1) given existing law, are such willing-to-sacrifice equity investors currently affecting firm behavior; and (2) should there be legal reform that makes firms more sensitive to these willing-to-sacrifice investors’ preferences? This Article seeks to answer …

The Coming Privatization Of Corporate Law, Dorothy S. Lund, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

For more than a century, American corporate law has revolved around a simple competitive premise: State governments supply corporate law while companies choose their state of incorporation, and the market rewards the state offering the best corporate law product. Delaware’s longstanding market dominance (especially for public companies) is often explained through the confluence of its unusually attractive institutional package: expert judges, extensive precedent, a specialized bar, an enabling statute, and a legislature that — at least traditionally — treats corporate law as something to be calibrated technocratically rather than politicized.

Corporate Governance As Bloodsport, Jeremy Kidd, George A. Mocsary

Pepperdine Law Review

The modern Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) movement promotes diversion of corporate assets from shareholders to “stakeholders.” This is done in the name of a corporate duty to society. But “successful” ESG efforts threaten the success of the corporate form by inviting rent-seeking. This conflict between ESG principles and established theories and norms of corporate law is difficult to resolve because corporate law lacks the tools needed to understand the type of collective decision-making that occurs in the corporate setting. This Article is the first to apply public choice economics—the economic study of collective decision-making—to corporate decision-making to identify the …

Reporting Materiality Under The Sec Cybersecurity Disclosure Rules: How Corporate Boards Balance Duty And Risk For Cyber Threats And Incidents, Deborah Slattery-Pereira

American University Business Law Review

The Security Exchange Commission’s (SEC) cybersecurity rules require that public companies disclose a material cyber threat or incident and the impact of the incident on the company’s business Corporate boards must disclose any cyber-related information that would affect a reasonable shareholder’s investment decisions. These rules delegate to the corporate board and management the decision of which cybersecurity events qualify as material to investors. Directors and officers must also decide when and how to disclose to the SEC, and what information to report.

The SEC Cybersecurity Rules increase compliance and litigation costs for public companies, as shareholders can use this information …

Sustainability Assurance, Andrew F. Tuch, Luca Enriques, Alessandro Romano

Scholarship@WashULaw

A robust literature examines sustainability disclosures by public corporations, but legal scholarship has largely overlooked the role of third-party assurance—or verification—of such disclosures. This is a notable omission given the extensive literature on the auditing of financial statements, a related form of assurance.

This article responds by examining the role of assurance in sustainability reporting. In keeping with the theme of this symposium volume, it draws on US and EU law. Our discussion begins in Part I with sustainability disclosures, focusing on the requirements and practices of public companies. In Part II, we introduce sustainability assurance as well as assurance …

Asking The Right Questions: How Jill Fisch Debunks Narratives And Arrives At Solutions, Hillary A. Sale

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Without a doubt, Professor Jill E. Fisch is one of the most influential scholars in the corporate and securities law space. Whether we measure her contributions by awards, areas of influence, or volume, Professor Fisch’s work is at the top of the list. It is, indeed, no surprise that the Institute for Law and Economic Policy (ILEP) chose to honor Professor Fisch at this year’s corporate and securities symposium, hosted with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law. I am honored to write this introduction about Professor Fisch and explore her work and influence over time, with an emphasis …

Ai, New Technologies, And Corporate Governance: Three Phenomena, Martin Petrin

Seattle University Law Review

Artificial intelligence (AI) and other new technologies are increasingly influencing the operations, business models, and structures of companies. This Article focuses on three emerging phenomena that impact significant aspects of corporate governance and regulation: (1) perforation and blurring of firm boundaries through the ubiquitous use of externally provided AI services; (2) businesses engaging in strategic access and leveraging of critical resources held by third parties without owning them; and (3) the unusual hybrid role of online platforms between market facilitators and markets themselves. The Article explores how these phenomena challenge traditional views of firms as separate units, with technology leading …

The Limits Of Corporate Governance, Cathy Hwang, Emily Winston

Seattle University Law Review

What is the purpose of the corporation? For decades, the answer was clear: to put shareholders’ interests first. In many cases, this theory of shareholder primacy also became synonymous with the imperative to maximize shareholder wealth. In the world where shareholder primacy was a north star, courts, scholars, and policymakers had relatively little to fight about: most debates were minor skirmishes about exactly how to maximize shareholder wealth.

Part I of this Essay discusses the shortcomings of shareholder primacy and stakeholder governance, arguing that neither of these modes of governance provides an adequate framework for incentivizing corporations to do good. …

Sticky Charters? The Surprisingly Tepid Embrace Of Officer-Protecting Waivers In Delaware, Jens Frankenreiter, Eric L. Talley

Scholarship@WashULaw

This article investigates the reaction to a much-heralded 2022 legal reform in Delaware that permitted a corporation’s charter to exculpate its officers from monetary exposure for breaching their fiduciary duty of care. To isolate reactions to this statutory reform, we make extensive use of generative AI tools to identify and interpret charter amendments that introduce officer-facing waivers. We find a surprisingly tepid rate of uptake among Delaware corporations through the end of the first post-reform year, notwithstanding widespread predictions that corporate entities would quickly storm the exculpation exits once permitted to do so.

Our study makes two contributions to the …

Sex & Startups, Jens Frankenreiter, Talia B. Gillis, Eric L. Talley

Scholarship@WashULaw

Venture capital is widely perceived to have a gender problem. Both founders seeking capital and the investors themselves are overwhelmingly male, fomenting concerns about how—and how fairly—the VC sector distributes its economic gains. Although gender disparities in funding are well documented, we still know little about whether the governance of VC-backed startups similarly manifests gender imbalances. This knowledge gap is critical, since VC investments often carry strings attached, in the form of cash flow and control rights that can vary substantially from deal to deal.

This study unveils a first-of-its-kind dataset that offers detailed insights into the governance of VC-backed …

The Rise Of Corporate Guidelines In The United States, 2005-2021: Theory And Evidence, Asaf Eckstein

Indiana Law Journal

Institutional investors are legally obliged to be faithful stewards of their portfolio companies. Yet, the conventional wisdom among commentators is that institutional investors have failed to perform this obligation because they are not incentivized to make adequate investments in corporate governance. This Article contends that this criticism is based on an incomplete analysis that misses a critical aspect of the operation of institutional investors. The critics focus exclusively on institutional investors’ efforts in actively engaging with the managements of their portfolio companies. They ignore, however, an important passive governance tool that institutional investors routinely use: corporate guidelines. Corporate guidelines are …

Regulating The Corporate Governance Of State-Owned Enterprises In Investment Arbitration, Mark Mclaughlin

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

The renaissance of sovereign investment is one of the defining economic trends of the 21st century. While many states have benefitted, and continue to benefit, from an influx of state-backed foreign investment, this embrace is not without its hesitancies. Host states are particularly concerned that state-owned enterprises (SOE s) pursue non-commercial policy objectives, maintain lower levels of transparency than their private counterparts, and operate with inferior standards of responsible business conduct. In response, domestic regulators have enacted a series of countermeasures for SOE investment, including requirements that such enterprises must invest on a “commercial basis.” However, the regulation of foreign …

Corporate Governance And Gender Equality: A Study Of Comply-Or-Explain Disclosure Regulation, Aaron A. Dhir, Sarah Kaplan, Maria Arabella Robles

Seattle University Law Review

In 2020, the Nasdaq Stock Market filed a proposal with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission seeking permission to adopt a board diversity-related disclosure requirement for its listed companies. In 2021, the SEC approved the proposal, thus entrenching Nasdaq’s position as the most significant stock exchange to date to mandate listing rules that reflect the intention of diversifying corporate boardrooms. Nasdaq’s movement into the diversity space is not the first attempt to address homogeneous boards in the U.S. In 2009, the SEC adopted a rule requiring publicly traded firms to report on whether they consider diversity in identifying director nominees. …

Fairness Opinions And Spac Reform, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

This paper assesses the emerging regulatory framework for special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs). According to this framework mergers of SPACs, known as de-SPACs, must be “fair” to public (or unaffiliated) SPAC shareholders, and transaction participants face heightened liability risk for disclosure errors. In this environment, third-party fairness opinions have been regarded as a de facto requirement for de-SPACs.

A study of all fairness opinions used in de-SPACs from 2019 to 2023 shows that these opinions suffer profound methodological problems and fail in their intended purpose. To be fair to public shareholders, a de-SPAC should represent value to these shareholders of …

Artificial Intelligence And Corporate Decisions: Fantasy, Reality Or Destiny, Jingchen Zhao

Catholic University Law Review

Fueled by the ever-growing significance of big data and advances in AI, tasks in relation to decision-making in contemporary societies have been increasingly delegated to AI at different levels. While there is massive investment all over the world related to one side of AI, namely engineering, it is also important to create rules and competence related to humanistic AI and its effects on people and societies. This article aims to examine AI’s role in the boardroom and associated legal challenges, by exploring the interplay between AI and corporate law and governance. We observe that the delegation of board tasks to …

Corporate Governance Guidelines: How To Improve Disclosure And Promote Better Corporate Governance In Public Companies, Jennifer O'Hare

Faculty Publications

If you are a shareholder of a public corporation, you may think it would be easy to find basic information about your shareholder rights, such as whether shareholders have the right to call special stockholder meetings. You would probably assume that the information would be disclosed in the company’s “Corporate Governance Guidelines,” (CGGs) which, according to a New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) rule, must be posted on the company’s website for shareholder review. But, as this article shows, companies are not required to disclose information about shareholder rights in their corporate governance guidelines, and most companies have chosen not to …

Don't Forget The "G" In Esg: The Sec And Corporate Governance Disclosure, Jennifer O'Hare

Faculty Publications

For years, many shareholders—both institutional and individual investors—have pressured the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to require public companies to disclose more information about the environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) risks facing the company. However, the SEC has generally refused calls to require public corporations to disclose, for example, how they are addressing climate change or workforce diversity challenges. With a new president in the White House and a new administration at the SEC, the SEC will soon propose new ESG disclosure rules, requiring more information about the “E” and the “S” in ESG. But the SEC has forgotten the …

Theranos: Case Study And Examination Of The Fraud Triangle, Abbey Jennings

Finance Undergraduate Honors Theses

Fraud is a serious issue which carries significant implications. Fraud committed by top level managers is particularly grievous, as it ripples through a firm, harming the company’s shareholders, employees, and credibility, while posing a threat to individuals and society (Zahra, et al.). A common framework in auditing, the fraud triangle, outlines three factors that if present, increase the risk or enable fraud to occur. The three factors are incentive, opportunity, and rationalization to commit fraud (Barlow).

In 2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) charged Elizabeth Holmes, founder and CEO of a supposedly groundbreaking health tech company, Theranos, with what …

Crime And The Corporation: Making The Punishment Fit The Corporation, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

The debate over corporate criminal liability has long involved a fight between proponents who argue that corporate liability is necessary for effective deterrence and opponents who claim that it “punishes the innocent.” This Article agrees and disagrees with both sides. Corporate criminal liability could play a critical role in establishing an effective deterrent to organizational misconduct, but today it largely fails. Currently, we have a system that combines Deferred Prosecution Agreements, Non-Prosecution Agreements, and extraordinarily generous sentencing credits for compliance plans that have failed, and the result is a system that is more carrots than sticks. The evidence seems clear …

Barbarians Inside The Gates: Raiders, Activists, And The Risk Of Mistargeting, Zohar Goshen, Reilly S. Steel

Faculty Scholarship

This Article argues that the conventional wisdom about corporate raiders and activist hedge funds — raiders break things and activists fix them — is wrong. Because activists have a higher risk of mistargeting — mistakenly shaking things up at firms that only appear to be underperforming — they are much more likely than raiders to destroy value and, ultimately, social wealth.

As corporate outsiders who challenge the incompetence or disloyalty of incumbent management, raiders and activists play similar roles in reducing “agency costs” at target firms. The difference between them comes down to a simple observation about their business models: …

Good Corporate Governance Policies And Disclosure Mechanisms In Startup Companies, Yahel Kaplan

University of Miami Business Law Review

In the past decades, particularly following the collapse of huge corporation such as WorldCom and Enron due to dubious or illegal financial management, countries began gradually increasing the oversight of publicly traded companies with few jurisdictions conjuring recommended corporate governance codes (RCGC) to ensure sufficient oversight, reduce manager’s ability to loot their companies, and ensure that shareholders’ and stakeholders’ interests are monitored effectively by companies. While RCGC was intended namely for public company, several organizations called for the adoption of RCGC in startup companies. Startup companies suffer from various failures which the classic corporate laws are not equipped to address …

The Use And Misuse Of Fiduciary Duties: Corporate Social Responsibility And The Standard Of Review, Jonathan R. Povilonis

William & Mary Business Law Review

This Article provides a crucial corrective to the “corporate social responsibility” debate, which concerns whether corporations have the obligation to protect or serve the interests of groups other than their shareholders, like employees or customers (often called “stakeholders”). Scholars on one side of the debate have repeatedly presumed that corporate directors’ fiduciary duties to shareholders play an important role in protecting shareholders from decisions that favor stakeholders at their expense. Scholars on the other side agree that fiduciary duties provide meaningful protection against unfavorable conduct but argue that directors should also owe fiduciary duties to stakeholders so they may be …

Designing Dual-Class Sunsets: The Case For A Transfer-Centered Approach, Marc T. Moore

William & Mary Business Law Review

Dual-class stock (DCS) structures, and their implications for managerial accountability and corporate governance more broadly, have become prevalent concerns for corporate lawyers and policymakers. Recent academic and practitioner debates on DCS have tended to focus less on the general merits and drawbacks of DCS versus one share/one vote structures, and more on the specific common-ground concern as to whether and how such structures are subjected to contingent reversal or “sunset”. This Article compares the relative advantages and disadvantages of time-, ownership- and transfer-centered models of DCS sunset provisions. It argues in favor of the transfer-centered model on the grounds that: …

Spirit Of The Corporation, Russell Powell

Seattle University Law Review

This Article provides a contemporary theoretical framework for Berle’s insight as a basis for considering its legal and ethical implications for corporate governance. Part II attempts to unpack contemporary understandings of spirit in order to provide a helpful working definition. Part III considers the origins and essential traits of the modern business corporation in the United States. The question posed by Berle—whether corporations can or ought to have a sort of moral orientation—is discussed in Part IV, while Part V ponders potential policy shifts that might tilt the orientation of the “spirit of the corporation” toward the common good. Part …

Sacred Corporate Law, Giancarlo Anello, Mohamed Arafa, Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci

Seattle University Law Review

This Article investigates the sacred origins of the corporate form. It sheds light on the sacred rituals performed to establish Ancient Roman cities as legal entities. It discusses the role of the Roman Catholic Church in developing the corporate form and in giving birth to a systemized set of rules regulating corporations, which we commonly call corporate law. It analyzes the limitations to the use of the corporate form in Islamic law as well as the streams of Islamic law jurisprudence that recognize legal capacity to specific entities with religious, social, or charitable purposes. It surveys the characteristics of two …

Spirit Of The Corporation, Russell Powell

Seattle University Law Review

Christian theologians have analyzed the productive and destructive qualities of institutions, sometimes attributing to them human virtues and vices. In City of God, Saint Augustine describes a utopian vision of human community within a Christian context as an alternative to the flawed “City of Man.” Contemporary theologians and sociologists have described collective structures of human behavior in institutions as having a kind of “spirit” analogous to the individual human “spirit.” Institutions are then assumed to take on an existence separate from the individuals within them, and in fact, the “spirit” of an institution influences the behavior of individuals. In The …

Fiduciary Judgment Rules, Julian Velasco

Journal Articles

Because of the strong moral rhetoric and robust equitable remedies available in fiduciary law, it is not surprising to find lawyers and legal scholars seeking to expand the reach of fiduciary law principles into new relationships and new areas of law. However, expansion often does not work very well because of the demanding and pervasive nature of fiduciary duties. Thus, jurists often turn to the business judgment rule and its policy of underenforcement of fiduciary duties as a way to fit fiduciary law principles into other areas of law. The problem with this approach is that it is based on …

Cleaning Corporate Governance, Jens Frankenreiter, Cathy Hwang, Yaron Nili, Eric Talley

Scholarship@WashULaw

Although empirical scholarship dominates the field of law and finance, much of it shares a common vulnerability: an abiding faith in the accuracy and integrity of a small, specialized collection of corporate governance data. In this paper, we unveil a novel collection of three decades’ worth of corporate charters for thousands of public companies, which shows that this faith is misplaced.

We make three principal contributions to the literature. First, we label our corpus for a variety of firm- and state-level governance features. Doing so reveals significant infirmities within the most well-known corporate governance datasets, including an error rate exceeding …

Why We Need Better Corporate Governance Data, Jens Frankenreiter, Cathy Hwang, Yaron Nili, Eric L. Talley

Scholarship@WashULaw

Three decades of finance, economics, and legal studies in corporate governance have been built substantially on data sets with nearly unknown provenance. A new paper sets to correct this fatal flaw of contemporary corporate governance research by debuting a brand new resource—the Cleaning Corporate Governance database.

Externalities And The Common Owner, Madison Condon

Washington Law Review

Due to the embrace of modern portfolio theory, most of the stock market is controlled by institutional investors holding broadly diversified economy-mirroring portfolios. Recent scholarship has revealed the anti-competitive incentives that arise when a firm’s largest shareholders own similarly sized stakes in the firm’s industry competitors. This Article expands the consideration of the effects of common ownership from the industry level to the market portfolio level and argues that diversified investors should rationally be motivated to internalize intra-portfolio negative externalities. This portfolio perspective can explain the increasing climate change related activism of institutional investors, who have applied coordinated shareholder power …