Business Organizations Law Commons^™

Team Production And Securities Laws, Urska Velikonja

Seattle University Law Review

In the seminal paper that this symposium celebrates, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout made two related points. First, that Delaware law does not require shareholder primacy in public corporations. Rather, the broad deference afforded to the decisions of predominantly independent corporate boards of directors is consistent with a contrary theory, that of team production, or, as they call it, “the mediating hierarch” theory. The fundamental role of the board of directors is to mediate between the interests of various stakeholders that contribute to the corporation’s output. As a result, Delaware courts have repeatedly …

With The Emergence Of Public Benefit Corporations, Directors Of Traditional For-Profit Companies Should Tread Cautiously, But Welcome The Opportunity To Invest In Social Enterprise, Mckenzie Holden Granum

Seattle University Law Review

Social entrepreneurship has become the popular term used to describe business forms that aim to produce profits while also seeking to significantly advance one or more social or environmental goals. In response to an increase in social entrepreneurship across sectors—from progressive industries like organic farming to conservative industries such as insurance and banking—several states have adopted new corporate governance structures. Such legislation allows incorporating businesses to choose an off-the-shelf formation type that embeds a social mission into its legal structure. The bulk of the newly implemented statutory forms provide not only a new framework for social entrepreneurs to work within, …

Boards Of Directors As Mediating Hierarchs, Margaret M. Blair

Seattle University Law Review

In June of 2014, the board of directors of Demoulas Supermarkets, Inc.—better known as Market Basket, a mid-sized chain of grocery stores in New England—decided to oust the man who had been CEO for the previous six years, Arthur T. Demoulas. Most likely, the board of directors did not anticipate what happened next: Thousands of employees, customers, and fans of Market Basket boycotted the stores and staged noisy public protests asking the board to reinstate “Arthur T.” The reaction by employees and customers made what had been a simmering, nasty, intrafamily feud within the closely held Market Basket chain into …

The Long Road To Reformulating The Understanding Of Directors' Duties: Legalizing Team Production Theory?, Thomas Clarke

Seattle University Law Review

In this Article, the historical evolution of corporate governance is considered, highlighting the different eras of governance, the dominant theoretical and practical paradigms, and the reformulation of paradigms and counter paradigms. Two alternative and sharply contrasting theorizations, one collective and collaborative (the work of Berle and Means), the other individualistic and contractual (agency theory and shareholder value) are focused upon. The explanatory potential of Blair and Stout’s team production theory is elaborated, along with its conception of the complexity of business enterprise, with a mediating hierarch (the board of directors) securing a balance between the interests of different stakeholders. The …

Team Production Theory And Private Company Boards, Elizabeth Pollman

Seattle University Law Review

In their path-breaking article, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout provided a new theory of the board of directors in a corporation. Drawing on the economic theory of team production, Blair and Stout argued that the board of directors serves as a mediating hierarchy for the firm as a whole, encouraging firm-specific investments from team members and reducing shirking and opportunistic behavior. While Blair and Stout provided a dramatically different view of the corporation from the conventional principal-agent account, they also delineated limitations to their proposed theory. Most importantly, they suggested that the …

Shareholder Wealth Maximization As Means To An End, Robert P. Bartlett, Iii

Seattle University Law Review

In several recent cases, the Delaware Chancery Court has emphasized that where a conflict of interest exists between holders of a company’s common stock and holders of its preferred stock, the standard of conduct for directors requires that they strive to maximize the value of the corporation for the benefit of its common stockholders rather than for its preferred stockholders. This article interrogates this view of directors’ fiduciary duties from the perspective of incomplete contracting theory. Building on the seminal work of Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart, incomplete contracting theory examines the critical role of corporate control rights for addressing …

Lobbying, Pandering, And Information In The Firm, Adam B. Badawi

Seattle University Law Review

In their classic and insightful article on team production in corporate law, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout identify the minimization of rent-seeking as one of the chief benefits of vesting ultimate authority over a firm with the board of directors. In their analysis, this problematic rent-seeking arises when parties need to divide the gains from production after the fact. The squabbling that is likely to ensue may threaten to eat away most, or all, of the gains that come from productive activity. If parties know that this sort of rent-seeking will occur, they may not engage in productive activity in …

The History Of Team Production Theory, Ron Harris

Seattle University Law Review

In this short Essay, the author consider the team production theory developed by Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout1 from a historical perspective, in three senses. First, does the theory fit the historical use of the corporate form? Second, can it explain the development of corporation law doctrines? And third, can we place the development of the theory as such into the intellectual history of corporation theories at large? The author will state my bottom line up front: while the Article finds the team production theory insightful and useful for my historical research, for teaching corporation law, and for thinking about …

Revising Federal Securityholder Communication Rules To Respond To Pension Funds' Increasing Market Presence, Kenneth R. Lehman

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Reves Revisited, Janet Kerr, Karen M. Eisenhauer

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Collateral Participant Liability Under State Securities Laws, Douglas M. Branson

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, Stephen M. Bainbridge

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

The New Uniform Statute Of Limitations For Federal Securities Fraud Actions: Its Evolution, Its Impact, And A Call For Reform, Anthony Michael Sabino

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Corporations As Ships: An Inquiry Into Personal Accountability And Institutional Legitimacy , Art Wolfe

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Striking The Wrong Balance: Constituency Statutes And Corporate Governance , Edward D. Rogers

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

How Long Can This Go On? The Controversy Over The Application Of The Statute Of Limitations To S Corporations And Their Shareholders, J. Marcus Sommers

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

"The End Of The Beginning?": A Comprehensive Look At The U.N.'S Business And Human Rights Agenda From A Bystander Perspective, Jena Martin Amerson

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

With the endorsement of the Guiding Principles regarding the issue of business and human rights, an important chapter has come to a close. Beginning with the then U.N. Secretary-General’s “global compact” speech in 1999, the international legal framework for business and human rights has undergone tremendous change and progress. Yet, for all these developments, there has been no exhaustive examination in the legal academy of all of these events; certainly there is no one piece that discusses or analyzes all the major instruments that have been proposed and endorsed by the U.N. on the subject of business and its relationship …

Normative Justifications For Lax (Or No) Corporate Fiduciary Duties: A Tale Of Problematic Principles, Imagined Facts And Inefficient Outcomes, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Corporate fiduciary duty standards are at an all-time low in this country. Ironically, the deterioration in standards has come to full maturity during the last two decades, a period of significant and notorious corporate managerial failures.

The deterioration in the standards by which we measure the appropriateness of the actions of corporate managers has been fueled by influential judges' and scholars' ("Advocates"'), who vigorously-and seemingly quite effectively-argue in favor of a lax fiduciary duty regime for corporate managers.

Normative justifications for lax corporate fiduciary duty standards, however, are weak. The justifications fail to provide a persuasive reason to abandon the …

Congress, Corporate Boards, And Oversight: A Public Law/Private Law Comparison, Paul S. Miller

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Promoting Distributional Equality For Women: Some Thoughts On Gender And Global Corporate Citizenship In Foreign Direct Investment, Rachel J. Anderson

Scholarly Works

This essay applies a legal theory of global corporate citizenship to the question of women’s distributional equality in foreign direct investment. It proposes ways that a legal theory of mandatory global corporate citizenship can expand the ways we think about regulating transnational corporations and promoting gender equality.

Twenty-Eight Words: Enforcing Corporate Fiduciary Duties Through Criminal Prosecution Of Honest Services Fraud, Lisa L. Casey

Journal Articles

This article examines the federal government's growing use of 18 U.S.C. § 1346 to prosecute public company executives for breaching their fiduciary duties. Section 1346 is a controversial but under-examined statute making it a felony to engage in a scheme "to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services." Although enacted by Congress over twenty years ago, the Supreme Court repeatedly declined to review the statute, until now. In 2009, Justice Antonin Scalia pointed to the numerous interpretive questions dividing the federal appellate courts and proclaimed that it was "quite irresponsible" to let the "current chaos prevail." Since then, …

Shareholders In The Jury Box: A Populist Check Against Corporate Mismanagement, Ann M. Scarlett

All Faculty Scholarship

The recent subprime mortgage disaster exposed corporate officers and directors who mismanaged their corporations, failed to exercise proper oversight, and acted in their self-interest. Two previous waves of corporate scandals in this decade revealed similar misconduct. After the initial scandals, Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission attempted to prevent the next crisis in corporate governance through legislative and regulatory actions such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Those attempts failed. Shareholder derivative litigation has also failed because judges accord corporate executives great deference and thus rarely impose liability for breaches of fiduciary duties.

To prevent the next crisis in …

Regulatory Competition, Choice Of Forum And Delaware’S Stake In Corporate Law, Faith Stevelman

Articles & Chapters

As Delaware corporate law confronts the twenty-first-century global economy, the state's legislators and jurists are becoming sensitive to increased threats to the law's sustained preeminence. The increased presence of federal laws and regulations in areas of corporate governance traditionally allocated to the states has been widely noted. The growth of federal corporate law standards may be undermining Delaware's confidence in the sustained prosperity of its chartering business - which has been a vital source of revenues and prestige for Delaware, its equity courts, and especially its corporate bar. The Delaware Court of Chancery appears to be concerned about the emigration …

Jiminy Cricket For The Corporation: Understanding The Corporate Conscience, Colin P. Marks

Faculty Works

Historically, the corporation has evolved since the late eighteenth century from a relative few, specially chartered associations, generally organized to complete projects for the public good to the modern profit-making behemoths of modern America. Along the way, corporations have been subjected to regulation, often in response to public outcry against perceived abuses of power. This corporate evolution has also resulted in a general separation of ownership and control, though that is not to say that corporate mangers act completely free from external pressures such as to make a profit. With regard to the corporate "conscience," though corporations do not have …

Branding The Small Wonder: Delaware's Dominance And The Market For Corporate Law, Omari Scott Simmons

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

The False Promise Of One Share, One Vote, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie

All Faculty Scholarship

Shareholder democracy has blossomed. The once moribund shareholder franchise is now critical in takeover contests, merger decisions, and board oversight. However, the mechanisms of this vote remain largely under theorized. In this Article, we use voting rights and social choice theory to develop a new approach to the corporate franchise. Political democracies typically tie the right to vote to the level of a person's interest in the outcome of the election. Corporate democracies, on the other hand, tend to define the requisite institutional interest quite narrowly, and thus restrict the right to vote to shareholders alone. This restriction has found …

One Share, One Vote And The False Promise Of Shareholder Homogeneity, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Shareholder democracy has blossomed. The once moribund shareholder franchise is now critical in takeover contests, merger decisions, and board oversight. However, the mechanisms of this vote remain largely undertheorized. In this Article, we use voting rights and social choice theory to develop a new approach to the corporate franchise. Political democracies typically tie the right to vote to the level of a person's interest in the outcome of the election. Corporate democracies, on the other hand, tend to define the requisite institutional interest quite narrowly, and thus restrict the right to vote to shareholders alone. This restriction has found its …

Managers’ Fiduciary Duties In Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos In Delaware (And Elsewhere), Rutheford B. Campbell Jr., Christopher W. Frost

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

The inherent conflict between creditors and shareholders has long occupied courts and commentators interested in corporate governance. Creditors holding fixed claims to the corporation's assets generally prefer corporate decision making that minimizes the risk of firm failure. Shareholders, in contrast, have a greater appetite for risk, because, as residual owners, they reap the rewards of firm success while sharing the risk of loss with creditors.

Traditionally, this conflict is mediated by a governance structure that imposes a fiduciary duty on the corporation's managers-its officers and directors-to maximize the value of the shareholders' interests in the firm. In this traditional view, …

Corporations And Political Speech: Should Speech Equal Money?, David Skover, Lisa Danetz, Martin Redish, Scott Thomas

Seattle University Law Review

Welcome now to the panel on corporations and political speech. We will explore the First Amendment jurisprudence of campaign finance regulation and some of the more controversial issues raised by corporate involvement in the marketplace of political ideas and elections.

Protecting The Polity: Strategies For Reform, Dana Gold, Solange Bitol-Hansen, Charlie Cray, Bruce Freed

Seattle University Law Review

This session is Protecting the Polity: Strategies for Reform, and we frame this as additional strategies that are actually percolating in a concrete way out in the real world, not just in the world of academic theory, to promote citizen participation in a democracy that countenances corporate influence in the political process.