Business Organizations Law Commons^™

Becker V. Becker, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 85 (Oct. 29, 2015), Paul George

Nevada Supreme Court Summaries

In response to a certified question by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada, the Court concluded that under NRS 21.090(1)(bb) a debtor can exempt his stock in the corporations described in NRS 78.746(2), but his economic interest in that stock is still subject to the charging order remedy in NRS 78.746(1).

Unlimited Liability In The Modern Context: An Examination Of Shareholder Liability In Nova Scotia Unlimited Liability Companies, Sarah P. Bradley

Dalhousie Law Journal

For over 30 years, unlimited liability companies have been ubiquitous in USCanadian M&A transactions. Typically interposed between a US parent company and a Canadian operating company, these entities quietly function to make such structures more tax efficient. They are facilitated by Nova Scotia's venerable Companies Act, which has allowed for the incorporation of corporations with unlimited liability for over a hundred years. Unlimited liability of shareholders is the singular defining characteristic of the ULC, but the precise nature of ULC shareholder liability was apparently regarded as something of a technicality and rarely, if ever, closely examined in the professional or …

4th And 205: How A Rush Of Global Comments Blocked The Sec’S First Attempted Punt Of Attorney-Client Privilege Under Sarbanes-Oxley, John Paul Lucci

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Shareholder Liability In Nova Scotia Unlimited Companies, Mohamed F. Khimji

Dalhousie Law Journal

Unlimited Companies incorporated under the Nova Scotia Companies Act (NSULCs) have, in recent decades, become recognized as tax efficient forms of business organizations. NSULCs differ from conventional business corporations in that their shareholders are exposed to liability for corporate obligations under the enabling legislation. This paper attempts to provide an analysis of the precise nature of unlimited liability faced by shareholders in such entities in response to recent bankruptcy litigation in the U.S. that raised the issue of the relationship between a shareholder's liability for a debt of the firm under the enabling legislation and under a contractual guarantee provided …

Securities Class Actions And Bankrupt Companies, James J. Park

Michigan Law Review

Securities class actions are often criticized as wasteful strike suits that target temporary fluctuations in the stock prices of otherwise healthy companies. The securities class actions brought by investors of Enron and WorldCom, companies that fell into bankruptcy in the wake of fraud, resulted in the recovery of billions of dollars in permanent shareholder losses and provide a powerful counterexample to this critique. An issuer's bankruptcy may affect how judges and parties perceive securities class actions and their merits, yet little is known about the subset of cases where the company is bankrupt. This is the first extensive empirical study …

Economics Of Bankruptcy – Introduction, Edward R. Morrison

Faculty Scholarship

This essay surveys important contributions to the economics of bankruptcy. It is an introductory chapter for a forthcoming volume (from Edward Elgar Press) that compiles the work of legal scholars as well as economists working in the field of corporate finance. The essay begins with the foundational theories of Baird, Jackson, and Rea and then collects scholarly work extending, testing, or revising those theories. At various points I identify questions that merit further study, particularly empirical testing.

Standing To Sue A Carrier's Killers , Davis J. Howard

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Mandatory Class Action Lawsuits As A Restructuring Technique, Bryant B. Edwards, Jeffrey A. Herbst, Selina K. Hewitt

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Considerations For Private Equity Firms When Utilizing Chapter 11 New Value Deals, Alexandra Wilde

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

The new value exception to the Chapter 11 absolute priority rule provides a narrow avenue for equity holders to retain an equity interest in a reorganized company over the objections of senior creditors and interest holders. With the increasing number of Chapter 11 reorganization filings by private equity owned companies, private equity firms may be interested in exploring ways to retain their equity ownership in the debtor company. This Note explores the unique implications a private equity firm may encounter when attempting to utilize the new value exception as a last resort to maintain ownership in a debtor company. Part …

The Transnational Law Market, Regulatory Competition, And Transnational Corporations, Horst Eidenmuller

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

In many regions of the world and across various fields, law has become a product. Individuals and companies seek attractive legal regulations, and countries advertise their legal wares globally as they compete for customers. Transnational corporations in particular are prominent actors in the emerging transnational law market. This article investigates the causes of this development and discusses these changes with respect to company law, contract law, the law of dispute resolution, and insolvency law. It assesses the market for legal rules and its practical consequences, and it provides legal policy recommendations for an efficient framework of the transnational law market. …

A Test Case In International Bankruptcy Protocols: The Lehman Brothers Insolvency, Jamie Altman

San Diego International Law Journal

Part II of this Article, explains the competing theories underlying bankruptcy systems: universalism and territorialism. Part III details various statutory solutions to international bankruptcy problems. Next, Part IV analyzes the provisions of the Lehman Protocol in depth. Part V then examines the precedent upon which the Lehman Protocol relies. Part VI assesses potential threats to the Protocol?s success. This leads to Part VII, which contains suggestions for future protocols. Finally, Part VIII concludes.

Assessing The Chrysler Bankruptcy, Mark J. Roe, David Skeel

Michigan Law Review

Chrysler entered and exited bankruptcy in forty-two days, making it one of the fastest major industrial bankruptcies in memory. It entered as a company widely thought to be ripe for liquidation if left on its own, obtained massive funding from the United States Treasury, and exited via a pseudo-sale of its main assets to a new government-funded entity. The unevenness of the compensation to prior creditors raised concerns in capital markets, which we evaluate here. We conclude that the Chrysler bankruptcy cannot be understood as complying with good bankruptcy practice, that it resurrected discredited practices long thought interred in the …

Simultaneous Distress Of Residential Developers And Their Secured Lenders An Analysis Of Bankruptcy & Bank Regulation , Sarah Pei Woo

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

The Tenth Annual A. A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture On Corporate, Securities, & Financial Law, Elisse B. Walter

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Collective Bargaining Agreements In Corporate Reorganizations, Andrew B. Dawson

Articles

Congress enacted § 1113 to the Bankruptcy Code in 1984 in order to establish a standard for the rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements. But the statute's ambiguous language has caused a split between the Second and Third Circuits, and has precipitated a lengthy academic debate largely centered on the interpretation of one word: "necessary." This debate has focused on proper statutory interpretation as well as deeper concerns regarding the policy goals behind the Bankruptcy Code. The present study reports data that indicate that the different interpretations are irrelevant in practice. No matter how "necessary" is defined, the result is always …

Chrysler, Gm And The Future Of Chapter 11, Edward R. Morrison

Faculty Scholarship

Although they caused great controversy, the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies broke no new ground. They invoked procedures that are commonly observed in modern Chapter 11 reorganization cases. Government involvement did not distort the bankruptcy process; it instead exposed the reality that Chapter 11 offers secured creditors – especially those that supply financing during the bankruptcy case – control over the fate of distressed firms. Because the federal government supplied financing in the Chrysler and GM cases, it possessed the creditor control normally exercised by private lenders. The Treasury Department found itself with virtually the same, unchecked power that the FDIC …

D&O Insurance In Bankruptcy: Just Another Business Contract, Elina Chechelnitsky

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Creditor Control And Conflict In Chapter 11, Kenneth M. Ayotte, Edward R. Morrison

Faculty Scholarship

We analyze a sample of large privately and publicly held businesses that filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions during 2001. We find pervasive creditor control. In contrast to traditional views of Chapter 11, equity holders and managers exercise little or no leverage during the reorganization process. 70 percent of CEOs are replaced in the two years before a bankruptcy filing, and few reorganization plans (at most 12 percent) deviate from the absolute priority rule to distribute value to equity holders. Senior lenders exercise significant control through stringent covenants, such as line-item budgets, in loans extended to firms in bankruptcy. Unsecured creditors …

Bankruptcy Vérité, Lynn M. Lopucki, Joseph W. Doherty

Michigan Law Review

In the empirical study we report in Bankruptcy Fire Sales, we compared the recoveries from the going-concern bankruptcy sales of twenty-five large, public companies with the recoveries from the bankruptcy reorganizations of thirty large, public companies. We found that, controlling for the asset size of the company and its presale or pre-reorganization earnings ("EBITDA"), reorganization recoveries were more than double sale recovenes. We are honored that Professor James J. White has chosen to comment on our study. White is an eloquent defender of the status quo, pulls no punches, and always has something interesting to say. Bankruptcy Noir is …

Bankruptcy's Rarity: An Essay On Small Business Bankruptcy In The United States, Edward R. Morrison

Faculty Scholarship

Most nations have enacted statutes governing business liquidation and reorganization. These statutes are the primary focus when policymakers and scholars discuss ways to improve laws governing business failure. This focus is misplaced, at least for distressed small businesses in the United States.

Evidence from a major credit bureau shows that over eighty percent of these businesses liquidate or reorganize without invoking the formal Bankruptcy Code.

The businesses instead invoke procedures derived from the laws of contracts, secured lending, and trusts. These procedures can be cheaper and speedier than a formal bankruptcy filing, but they typically require unanimous consent of senior, …

Bankruptcy Noir, James J. White

Articles

In Bankruptcy Fire Sales, Professor LoPucki and Dr. Doherty do two things. First, they present provocative data about the relative payoff to be had in Chapter 11 by a full reorganization compared with the payoff from a section 363 sale without a full reorganization. Second, they give a yet more provocative explanation for their data. Taking a page from Professor LoPucki's recent book, they blame the meager return that they observe on 363 sales on the unprincipled behavior of the lawyers, managers, creditors, investment bankers, and even judges involved in the sales. Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty's data appear to …

Attorneys As Debt Relief Agencies: Constitutional Considerations, Marisa Terranova

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Managers’ Fiduciary Duties In Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos In Delaware (And Elsewhere), Rutheford B. Campbell Jr., Christopher W. Frost

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

The inherent conflict between creditors and shareholders has long occupied courts and commentators interested in corporate governance. Creditors holding fixed claims to the corporation's assets generally prefer corporate decision making that minimizes the risk of firm failure. Shareholders, in contrast, have a greater appetite for risk, because, as residual owners, they reap the rewards of firm success while sharing the risk of loss with creditors.

Traditionally, this conflict is mediated by a governance structure that imposes a fiduciary duty on the corporation's managers-its officers and directors-to maximize the value of the shareholders' interests in the firm. In this traditional view, …

Twilight In The Zone Of Insolvency: Fiduciary Duty And Creditors Of Troubled Companies - Presentation Of Much Ado About Little? Directors' Fiduciary Duties In The Vicinity Of Insolvency, Stephen M. Bainbridge

Journal of Business & Technology Law

No abstract provided.

Twilight In The Zone Of Insolvency: Fiduciary Duty And Creditors Of Troubled Companies - Comparative & International Perspectives, Andres Engert, Reid Feldman, Pamela L.J. Huff, Donna W. Mckenzie-Skene

Journal of Business & Technology Law

No abstract provided.

Much Ado About Little? Directors' Fiduciary Duties In The Vicinity Of Insolvency, Stephen M. Bainbridge

Journal of Business & Technology Law

No abstract provided.

The Duty To Creditors Reconsidered - Filling A Much Needed Gap In Corporation Law, Richard A. Booth

Journal of Business & Technology Law

No abstract provided.

Directors' Duty To Creditors Of A Financially Distressed Company: A Perspective From Across The Pond, Donna W. Mckenzie-Skene

Journal of Business & Technology Law

No abstract provided.

Gap Filling In The Zone Of Insolvency, Frederick Tung

Journal of Business & Technology Law

No abstract provided.

Directors' Duty To Creditors And The Debt Contract, Simone M. Sepe

Journal of Business & Technology Law

No abstract provided.