Business Organizations Law Commons^™

The Lost Origins Of Antitrust, William Magnuson

Faculty Scholarship

Over the last decade, the once-sleepy field of antitrust has suddenly sprung to the forefront of public attention. The digitalization of the economy, the expansion of Big Tech, and the rise of platform monopolies have all raised deep questions about the nature of corporate power and law’s capacity to constrain it. Some scholars have argued that antitrust enforcement must be reinvigorated in substance and broadened in scope in order to combat rapidly rising economic inequality. Others have argued that antitrust law is ill-equipped to address these broad moral issues and instead must be re-focused on its traditional principles of consumer …

Flows, Financing Decisions, And Institutional Ownership Of The U.S. Equity Market, Alon Brav, Dorothy S. Lund, Lin Zhao

Faculty Scholarship

This Article analyzes the relationship between flows to institutional investment managers, corporate financing decisions, and institutional ownership of U.S. public equity. In so doing, it provides new evidence about the drivers of institutional investor growth in equity ownership over the past two decades. Contrary to conventional narrative, we find that equity capital flows into the “Big Three” investment managers have slowed in recent years, with substantial differences between each institution. We also present a framework to understand how fund characteristics and corporate actions such as stock buybacks and equity issuances combine to shape the evolution of institutional ownership, including that …

Defining Deference: Impacts Of Abandoning Chevron On Emerging Technology Governance And Administrative Law, R. Aubrey Davis Iii

Seattle University Law Review

Emerging technologies, particularly Artificial Intelligence (AI), often lead to unforeseen legal outcomes. Notable abuses in areas such as facial recognition, employment bias, and housing discrimination are well known. However, legislative responses to these issues either have been largely reactive or there has been no legislative response at all. In lieu of legislation, agencies have sought to fill the gap. For example, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recently proposed a rule mandating voter notification for all AI-generated political phone calls citing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) of 1991 as authority. However, the TCPA was originally passed to curtail telemarketing, not …

Data Advantage And Merger Review: Can Entrenchment Theory Reform Antitrust Enforcement?, Shin-Ru Cheng

Seattle University Law Review

A merger involving giant digital companies is likely to dampen competition, as it allows those companies to combine and control data access, enabling them to entrench their dominant positions in relevant markets and extend those positions into related markets. While competition law in many jurisdictions aims to prohibit mergers that may substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly, arguably the review of digital mergers is failing because antitrust agencies lack an effective approach to identify data-generated anticompetitive harms. This Article demonstrates that entrenchment theory, recently reintroduced in the 2023 U.S. Merger Guidelines, would help reform the process of antitrust enforcement. …

The “Marketplace” Myth: Addressing Amazon’S Defense To Product Liability Claims, Andrew Ackley

Seattle University Law Review Online

Many courts continue to analyze law as if we have not evolved from the early days of the internet, when Facebook was a “social networking” site, AOL made messages “instant,” and eBay let everyone auction random items. The internet connected people. Because it did not touch them, it could not harm them. However, with storefronts closing, brick-and-mortar retail chains declaring bankruptcy, and “Uber lots” popping up at airports, the internet “cloud” has touched down all over the country, and online businesses are now harming people just as human actors and brickand-mortar stores always have.

While generating thousands of new ride …

The Healing Power Of Antitrust, Theodosia Stavroulaki

Northwestern University Law Review

Millions of Americans live in hospital deserts—communities where people lack geographic access to hospitals and primary care physicians. People living in these deserts often miss doctor appointments, delay necessary care, and stop adhering to their treatment. In this way, hospital deserts exacerbate the health disparities plaguing America. This Article demonstrates that hospital deserts are not inevitable but the result of several business strategies—including noncompete agreements and merging with competitors—and antitrust enforcers’ unwillingness to recognize these harmful practices as antitrust violations. To cure the issue of hospital deserts, this Article makes three proposals. First, antitrust enforcers and the courts should expand …

Why We Need A Merger Cap: An Antitrust Lesson From General Electric, Carl T. Bogus

Journal of Legislation

This Article makes a modest proposal from a radical perspective. The proposal is this: Once a firm reaches a certain size, it should be prohibited from growing larger through mergers or acquisitions. The radical perspective is that antitrust law should be concerned with corporate size. It was a century ago that Louis D. Brandeis coined the term “curse of bigness,” and his concern about the social and political consequences of corporate size has long since fallen out of favor. Today, the consensus view is that antitrust should be concerned exclusively with economics. Current doctrine allows corporations to merge, provided only …

Anticompetitive Directors, Lane Miles, Mark A. Lemley, Rory Van Loo

Faculty Scholarship

Antitrust scholars have virtually ignored the question of who controls corporations by sitting on their boards of directors. We show that the problem of who sits on boards of directors is considerably greater than previously believed. Drawing on a new dataset spanning both public and private companies across multiple industries, we find evidence that individual board members sit simultaneously on boards of competitors throughout the economy, despite such “interlocking directorates” being illegal under antitrust law. Many of these individuals are senior directors at private equity, venture capital, and other firms investing in the competing firms on whose boards they sit. …

The Failings Of Post-War Japanese Antitrust Reforms, Gregory Hayes

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

This paper discusses the antitrust reform measures taken during the occupation of Japan following the end of World War II. These antitrust reforms included the dissolution of the zaibatsu business groups and the adoption of the Antimonopoly Act. However, the trust-busting and antitrust measures taken by Japan failed to prevent the eventual rise of keiretsu business groups and lower the concentration of corporate ownership in Japan. The primary reasons behind this failure were the inability of the reformers to fully dismantle the zaibatsu business groups and the changing priorities of the reformers due to the growing threat of the spread …

The 2023 Merger Guidelines: An Assessment, Herbert Hovenkamp, Tim Wu, James Keyte

Faculty Scholarship

The 2023 Merger Guidelines1 are ten months old, but they still need some unpacking. To help our readers think through the issues that the Guidelines raise, Antitrust magazine asked two experienced legal scholars — Professors Tim Wu and Herbert Hovenkamp — to discuss the Guidelines with Antitrust editorial board member James Keyte. This discussion took place on May 28, 2024. The transcript has been edited for length and readability.

Getting Merger Guidelines Right, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This paper is on the new Merger Guidelines. It makes several arguments. First, that the Guidelines should be understood as existing in a political equilibrium. Second, that the new structural presumption of the Merger Guidelines (HHI = 1,800) is too strict, and that an economically reasonable revision in the structural presumption would have increased rather than decreased the threshold. Whereas the new Guidelines lowers the threshold to HHI 1,800 from HHI 2,500, an economically reasonable revision would have increased the threshold to HHI 3,200. I justify this argument using a bare-bones model of Cournot competition. Third, it seems unlikely, …

The Failure Of "Quick Look" Analyses Of Antitrust Claims, Jonathan Berman

American University Business Law Review

Before courts can determine whether a defendant may have violated antitrust laws, they must first select the appropriate mode of analysis: the fact-intensive rule of reason, summary condemnation under the per se rules, or a quick look analysis. “Quick look” is intended to shorten and simplify inquiries into conduct that does not fall under the per se rules but that nonetheless has obvious anticompetitive effects.

The quick look doctrine, however, has failed to streamline antitrust litigation, and the related caselaw has failed to develop concrete or usable rules. Despite decades of litigation, the quick look doctrine remains of dubious legal …

Antitrust, Amazon, And Algorithmic Auditing, Jens Frankenreiter, Abhisek Dash, Abhijnan Chakraborty, Saptarshi Ghosh, Animesh Mukherjee, Stefan Bechtold, Krishna P. Gummadi

Scholarship@WashULaw

In digital markets, antitrust law and special regulations aim to ensure that markets remain competitive despite the dominating role that digital platforms play today in everyone's life. Unlike traditional markets, market participant behavior is easily observable in these markets. We present a series of empirical investigations into the extent to which Amazon engages in practices that are typically described as self-preferencing. We discuss how the computer science tools used in this paper can be used in a regulatory environment that is based on algorithmic auditing and requires regulating digital markets at scale.

The Rise Of Labor Issues As An Antitrust Priority, Richard Dagen, Maryanne Magnier

Emory Business Law Review

No abstract provided.

Hollywood's Triple Threat: Writers, Actors, And Antitrust Regulators Take On The Streaming Giants, Remy S. Farkas

American University Business Law Review

In the summer of 2023, Hollywood froze when actors, writers, and crew took to the picket lines. Their gripe: the recent mega mergers by media conglomerates. The Writers Guild Association and Screen Actors Guild American Federation of Television and Radio Artists joined forces to protest recent acquisitions by Disney, Amazon, and Netflix; these companies vertically integrated within the industry, which allowed them to exploit workers, limit content, and raise prices for consumers. In the same summer, the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission released Draft Merger Guidelines, which included thirteen new guidelines for evaluating whether a merger violates antitrust …

When Can An Agreement On Environmental Policies Comply With U.S. Antitrust Laws?, Nathan Mendelsohn

Emory Business Law Review

No abstract provided.

Federal Enforcers Signal Heightened Scrutiny Of Algorithm Use To Inform Pricing Decisions, Lohr A. Beck, Carley H. Thompson

Emory Business Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Public’S Companies, Andrew K. Jennings

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

This Essay uses a series of survey studies to consider how public understandings of public and private companies map into urgent debates over the role of the corporation in American society. Does a social-media company, for example, owe it to its users to follow the free-speech principles embodied in the First Amendment? May corporate managers pursue environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) policies that could reduce short-term or long-term profits? How should companies respond to political pushback against their approaches to free expression or ESG?

The studies’ results are consistent with understandings that both public and private companies have greater public …

Inflation, Market Failures, And Algorithms, Rory Van Loo

Faculty Scholarship

Inflation is a problem of tremendous scale. But the leading response to inflation-raising interest rates-also poses economic risks. Raising interest rates rapidly may increase unemployment and heighten the chance of recession. This Article argues that there is a better way to think about antiinflation policy. Rather than defaulting to interest rate hikes that harm markets, policymakers should prioritize laws that lower prices while improving markets. Most importantly, there is evidence that businesses have raised prices by colluding with one another, exploiting consumers' behavioral and informational limits, and lobbying for protectionist laws that block competition. Artificial intelligence pricing algorithms and dark …

The Battle With Big Tech: Analyzing Antitrust Enforcement And Proposed Reforms, Youngjae Lee, Morgan Hagenbuch

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Stakeholderism Silo Busting, Aneil Kovvali

Articles by Maurer Faculty

The fields of antitrust, bankruptcy, corporate, and securities law are undergoing tumultuous debates. On one side in each field is the dominant view that each field should focus exclusively on a specific constituency—antitrust on consumers, bankruptcy on creditors, corporate law on shareholders, and securities regulation on financial investors. On the other side is a growing insurgency that seeks to broaden the focus to a larger set of stakeholders, including workers, the environment, and political communities. But these conversations have largely proceeded in parallel, with each debate unfolding within the framework and literature of a single field. Studying these debates together …

Mergers, Antitrust, And The Interplay Of Entrepreneurial Activity And The Investments That Fund It, Gary Dushnitsky, D. Daniel Sokol

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

This Article addresses the potentially negative implications of proposed antitrust legislation on the entrepreneurial ecosystem in general, with a particular focus on the venture capitalists (VCs) that fund it. First, it offers a review of how antitrust merger law currently works and how proposed legislative changes to antitrust may threaten the innovative Venture Capital (VC)-backed ecosystem that has made the United States the center of global innovation across many different industries. Accompanying this review are some empirical observations. Second, recognizing that the understanding of innovative entrepreneurial activity calls for a deep appreciation of those who back it, the Article also …

Output Effect Of Private Antitrust Enforcement, Sinchit Lai

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

A growing body of literature evaluates the impact of antitrust laws on economic growth. Most of these empirical studies identify a positive impact; however, the existing literature only studies the effect of the existence of antitrust laws, but not their enforcement. To fill this gap in the literature, this Article uses private antitrust case filing numbers to examine the growth effect. Employing U.S. data and, after addressing endogeneity, using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression analysis, I identify a negative and robust association between private enforcement and output on a national level in the short run over the period from …

The Case For Preemptive Oligopoly Regulation, Jeffrey D. Manns

Indiana Law Journal

One of the few things former President Donald Trump and leading Democrats appear to agree on is the need to subject Big Technology (“Big Tech”) firms to antitrust scrutiny. But unsurprisingly they disagree about how to address the problem. Senator Elizabeth Warren and many other leading Democrats have called for breaking up large technology firms, such as Google, Amazon, and Facebook, in a revival of the trust-busting progressive era of the early twentieth century. In contrast, the Trump administration triggered more traditional antitrust monopoly review of potential anticompetitive activities of a number of leading technology firms, which is more likely …

Common Ownership: Do Managers Really Compete Less?, Merritt B. Fox, Menesh S. Patel

Faculty Scholarship

This Article addresses an important question in modern antitrust: when large investment funds have holdings across an industry, is competition depressed?

The question of the impact of common ownership on competition has gained much attention as the role of institutional shareholding has grown, with the funds of the three largest management companies holding in aggregate approximately 21% of the shares of a typical S&P 500 firm. It is a source of acute disagreement among scholars and policymakers, with some who believe common ownership does depress competition seeking antitrust law reforms that would significantly constrain how investment funds operate. Neglected in …

Vertical Mergers In A Model Of Upstream Monopoly And Incomplete Information, Serge Moresi, David Reitman, Steven C. Salop, Yianis Sarafidis

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

We examine the role of private information on the impact of vertical mergers. A vertical merger can improve the information that is available to an upstream monopolist because, after the merger, the monopolist can observe the cost of its downstream merger partner. In the pre-merger world, because the costs of the downstream firms are private information, the monopolist has incomplete information and cannot implement the monopoly outcome: The expected pre-merger equilibrium price of the downstream product is lower than the monopoly price. After a vertical merger, the equilibrium input price that is charged to the downstream rival can either increase …

In Defense Of Breakups: Administering A “Radical” Remedy, Rory Van Loo

Faculty Scholarship

Calls for breaking up monopolies—especially Amazon, Facebook, and Google—have largely focused on proving that past acquisitions of companies like Whole Foods, Instagram, and YouTube were anticompetitive. But scholars have paid insufficient attention to another major obstacle that also explains why the government in recent decades has not broken up a single large company. After establishing that an anticompetitive merger or other act has occurred, there is great skepticism of breakups as a remedy. Judges, scholars, and regulators see a breakup as extreme, frequently comparing the remedy to trying to “unscramble eggs.” They doubt the government’s competence in executing such a …

Antitrust Changeup: How A Single Antitrust Reform Could Be A Home Run For Minor League Baseball Players, Jeremy Ulm

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act to protect competition in the marketplace. Federal antitrust law has developed to prevent businesses from exerting unfair power on their employees and customers. Specifically, the Sherman Act prevents competitors from reaching unreasonable agreements amongst themselves and from monopolizing markets. However, not all industries have these protections.

Historically, federal antitrust law has not governed the “Business of Baseball.” The Supreme Court had the opportunity to apply antitrust law to baseball in Federal Baseball Club, Incorporated v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs; however, the Court held that the Business of Baseball was not …

Vertical Merger Enforcement Actions: 1994–April 2020, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. Culley

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

We have revised our earlier listing of vertical merger enforcement actions by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission since 1994. This revised listing includes 66 vertical matters beginning in 1994 through April 2020. It includes challenges and certain proposed transactions that were abandoned in the face of Agency concerns. This listing can be treated as an Appendix to Steven C. Salop and Daniel P. Culley, Revising the Vertical Merger Guidelines: Policy Issues and an Interim Guide for Practitioners, 4 JOURNAL OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 1 (2016).

The New Gatekeepers: Private Firms As Public Enforcers, Rory Van Loo

Faculty Scholarship

The world’s largest businesses must routinely police other businesses. By public mandate, Facebook monitors app developers’ privacy safeguards, Citibank audits call centers for deceptive sales practices, and Exxon reviews offshore oil platforms’ environmental standards. Scholars have devoted significant attention to how policy makers deploy other private sector enforcers, such as certification bodies, accountants, lawyers, and other periphery “gatekeepers.” However, the literature has yet to explore the emerging regulatory conscription of large firms at the center of the economy. This Article examines the rise of the enforcer-firm through case studies of the industries that are home to the most valuable companies, …