Business Organizations Law Commons^™

A Restatement Of Corporate Criminal Liability’S Theory And Research Agenda, Samuel W. Buell

Faculty Scholarship

This Article, for a collection in which authors were asked to “imagine a world without corporate criminal liability,” specifies the material questions that should be addressed if debate about the doctrine is to progress past longstanding and oft-repeated assertions. The strongest case for corporate criminal liability is based on the potential for its unique reputational effects to contribute to the prevention and deterrence of crime within corporations. Further research should take up a variety of unanswered questions about those effects having to do with mechanisms and audiences. The relevant inquiries are both theoretical and empirical. Answers will lie in further …

The Corporate Governance Gap, Kobi Kastiel, Yaron Nili

Faculty Scholarship

A reliable system of corporate governance is considered an important requirement for the long-term success of public companies and for the good of society at large. After decades of research and policy advocacy, there is a growing sense that corporations are finally nearing the promised land: boards of public corporations seem more diverse, large investors seem more engaged, and directors seem more accountable than ever. But is this perception accurate? While many large, high-profile companies tend to serve as role models of desirable governance practices, the picture of corporate governance—as this Article reveals—is considerably different in the far corners of …

Board Gatekeepers, Yaron Nili

Faculty Scholarship

For the last decade, investors, scholars, and regulators have turned to independent directors in key leadership positions as a means to safeguard corporate boards’ ability to serve as a robust check on management’s power. As a result, a vast majority of public companies’ boards are now led by an Independent Chair, or, alternatively, include a Lead Independent Director.

These ostensible outsiders—which this Article calls “board gatekeepers”—are meant to be even more empowered and detached from management compared to the rest of the board. This allows them to serve an independent gatekeeping function—a necessary guardrail against management’s ability to exert undue …

Capital Discrimination, Ann Lipton

Publications

The law of business associations does not recognize gender. The rights and responsibilities imposed by states on business owners, directors, and officers do not vary based on whether the actors are male or female, and there is no explicit recognition of the influence of gender in the doctrine.

Sex and gender nonetheless may pervade business disputes. One co-owner may harass another co-owner; women equity holders may be forced out of the company; men may refuse to pay dividends to women shareholders.

In some contexts, courts do account for these dynamics, such as when married co-owners file for divorce. But business …

Circuit Split Analysis: Involuntary Arbitration Agreements, Tyler Blackington

Emory Business Law Review

No abstract provided.

Soft Law: The Optimal Legal Framework For Global Financial Regulation, Yussuf A. Aleem

Emory Business Law Review

The regulation of global finance comprises an unorthodox legal framework. Unlike other areas of economic regulation or international law, more generally, this framework is not directed through intergovernmental organizations with formal legal status. Moreover, commitments (or best practice standards) made by various regulatory officials are non-binding and subject to significant variation. This departure is especially unique when comparing financial regulation to areas such as international trade law or environmental law.[1]

The purpose of this Paper is to provide a positive analysis explaining the prevalence of this form of “soft” law, and normatively suggest why such a framework is the …

Realizing Diversity, Sustainability, And Stakeholder Capitalism, Peter H. Huang

Emory Business Law Review

Stakeholder capitalism conceives of capitalism with companies maximizing their long-term value, while considering in addition to the interests of their shareholders, also the interests of all their other stakeholders. Examples of such additional stakeholders include customers, employees, communities, creditors, competitors, society at large, and our planet. America today does not have stakeholder capitalism. Instead, America presently has shareholder capitalism, in which publicly held corporations only maximize their stock value to shareholders.

This Essay analyzes proposals for the United States Securities Exchange Commission to require that all reporting companies make periodic mandatory Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) disclosures of comparable, standardized, …

A Future Of Mandatory Environment, Social, And Governance (Esg) Disclosures: A Review Of Public Comments As A Case Study In The Impact Of Esg, Jessica Dennis Jackson

Emory Business Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Big Ban(G) Theory, Max Chen, Liu Ming Xin

Emory Business Law Review

The term “Big Tech” is referred to: Amazon, Apple, Facebook (Meta), Google and Microsoft. These companies are the five largest multinational online service or computer hardware and software companies and have the top position in the stock market by market share. Data indicated that these five firms have made over 700 acquisitions from 1987 to 2019. (Google 32%, Microsoft 31%, Apple 15%, Amazon 11%, and Facebook 11%). After 2001, The DOJ and FTC began to use NAICS codes to report HSR (Hart-Scott-Rodino) transactions. The code name is NAICS 518 for data processing, hosting, and related services (mainly including Google, Amazon, …

An Ocean Apart: The Mandatory Takeover Rule In Brazil And In Europe, Jorge Brito Pereira

Emory Business Law Review

The common statement that there are two different regulatory systems concerning the mandatory takeover rule – the market rule system and the equal opportunity system – is, in practice, overly simplistic: facing the choice between freedom and strict regulation on whether the control premium should be proportionally shared with all non-controlling shareholders, some jurisdictions have adopted a hybrid solution. The Brazilian mandatory takeover rule (re)approved in 2001 is a good example. This paper will comprehensively analyse the Brazilian and European rules on mandatory takeover bids, using empirical data about the Brazilian markets and details of various cases that tested the …

Universal Owners, Shareholder Primacy, And Stakeholderism, Daniel Irvin

Emory Business Law Review

The rise of massive asset owners like large pension funds and sovereign wealth funds has created interest in the phenomenon of Universal Owners. The climate crisis, environmental degradation, and worsening inequality have also led to challenges to the current models of corporate governance, with a particular interest on the idea of corporate purpose. This paper fills a gap by addressing the intersection of these two trends, proposing a framework by which Universal Owners should view corporate purpose. I argue that from a returns-maximizing perspective, Universal Owners should prefer a flavor of shareholder primacy that believes the corporation’s purpose is to …

Why Antitrust, Not Unionization, Is The Answer To Underpayment Of Student-Athletes, Evan Nelson

Emory Business Law Review

This Comment examines whether student-athletes should be allowed to unionize and collectively bargain for their rights and will present a legal argument against the unionization of student-athletes. The reasoning behind this argument is that student-athletes are not employees, and therefore, are not able to unionize. Even if student-athletes were categorized as employees, they would struggle to collectively bargain for their rights due to various states’ laws that prohibit public employees from unionizing. Rather, this Comment argues that the answer to solving college athlete underpayment is through the remedies that can be provided in antitrust law. The reasoning behind this argument …