Business Organizations Law Commons^™

The Evolution Of Entrepreneurial Finance: A New Typology, J. Brad Bernthal

Publications

There has been an explosion in new types of startup finance instruments. Whereas twenty years ago preferred stock dominated the field, startup companies and investors now use at least eight different instruments—six of which have only become widely used in the last decade. Legal scholars have yet to reflect upon the proliferation of instrument types in the aggregate. Notably missing is a way to organize instruments into a common framework that highlights their similarities and differences.

This Article makes four contributions. First, it catalogues the variety of startup investment forms. I describe novel instruments, such as revenue-based financing, which remain …

Shareholder Voting And The Symbolic Politics Of Corporation As Contract, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

American corporations are structured in such a way that shareholders, and shareholders alone, have the right to vote in all significant corporate decisions. Over the years, this exclusive shareholder franchise has been supported by an ongoing procession of justifications. But as those arguments have fallen by the wayside, shareholder primacists have circled back and latched upon a final argument for the special voting status of shareholders, arguing that this fundamental feature of corporate governance is the product of the set of freely-bargained-for agreements among all corporate constituents. Because this set of agreements reflects the preferences of all parties to the …

Jumpstart Regulation Crowdfunding: What Is Wrong And How To Fix It, Jo Won

Lewis & Clark Law Review

In 2015, the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted Regulation Crowdfunding, which permitted small businesses and startups to raise capital from the general public online. Unfortunately, Regulation Crowdfunding failed its essential purpose to facilitate capital formation for small businesses and startups due to its high transaction costs and low offering limit. But it turns out that equity crowdfunding in other countries—especially in Great Britain—is highly successful, and in some cases, exceeds venture capital funding. In these countries, equity crowdfunding’s transaction costs and disclosure requirements are much lower than, and issuers may raise more money than, offerings under Regulation Crowdfunding. Furthermore, the …

Corporate Personhood And The History Of The Rights Of Corporations: A Reflection On Adam Winkler’S Book We The Corporations: How American Businesses Won Their Civil Rights, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

Adam Winkler’s book We the Corporations: How American Businesses Won Their Civil Rights is an impressive work on several different levels. Because so much of the development of American constitutional law over the centuries has involved businesses, the book is a nearly comprehensive legal history of federal constitutional law. It certainly would be worthwhile reading for anyone interested in the constitutionality of economic regulation in the United States, spanning the controversies over the first and second Banks of the United States, through the Lochner era and present-day clashes over corporate campaign spending, and religiously-based exemptions to generally applicable laws such …

Who's Causing The Harm?, Catherine A. Hardee

Kentucky Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Tournament Of Managers: Lessons From The Academic Leadership Market, Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

Why do firms usually make, not buy, their chief executive officers (CEOs)? Public corporations hire their CEOs from within the firm 78% of the time. They do so although earlier studies have found no clear evidence that internal hires perform better than external ones. So why do firms prefer them? Few scholars have focused on this simple question.

The reason why firms favor internal candidates matters not only in its own right, but also for an overlooked reason: it informs the controversial question of executive compensation. Currently board-compensation committees look to peer benchmarks to set executive pay. But, taking cues …

Will Swing Pricing Save Sedentary Shareholders?, Anne M. Tucker, Holly Van Den Toorn

Scholarly Works

This Article explains and explores new Securities Exchange Commission rules authorizing optional swing pricing for mutual funds. Swing pricing is an anti-dilution tool intended to protect sedentary investors who enter, and stay, in a fund. Workers setting aside money for retirement are often sedentary investors. Mutual funds are the mainstay vehicle for retirement investors, yet as sedentary shareholders they can experience significant asset dilution over their savings lifetime. Swing pricing—a mutual fund pricing mechanism that allocates transaction costs to the triggering shareholders—could save sedentary shareholders, collectively, billions of dollars. The mutual fund industry's operational complexities and competing regulatory obligations may …

20/20 Vision In The Long & Short-Termism Debate, Anne M. Tucker

Scholarly Works

What is an optimal investment time horizon—for institutions, individual shareholders and corporations? This question can evoke emotional, ideological, and theoretical responses. The answers usually deeply entrenched debates over the fundamental roles of markets versus regulation and between the appropriate loci of corporate power: the board of directors versus the shareholders. Too long-term and it is myopia; too near-term and is it short-termism. Neither label is inconsequential, so the debates are not tepid, academic, or marginal.

Corporate Governance Reform In Post-Crisis Financial Firms: Two Fundamental Tensions, Christopher Bruner

Scholarly Works

The manner in which financial firms are governed directly impacts the stability and sustainability of both the financial sector and the "real" economy, as the financial crisis and associated regulatory reform efforts have tragically demonstrated. However, two fundamental tensions continue to complicate efforts to reform corporate governance in post-crisis financial firms. The first relates to reliance on increased equity capital as a buffer against shocks and a means of limiting leverage. The tension here arises from the fact that no corporate constituency desires risk more than equity does, and that risk preference only tends to be stronger in banks, and …

Distributed Ledgers, Traceable Shares, And The Division Of Power In Corporate Law, Christopher M. Bruner

Scholarly Works

Review of Traceable Shares and Corporate Law, 113 Nw. U. L. Rev. __ by George S. Geis (forthcoming 2018)

Center-Left Politics And Corporate Governance: What Is The 'Progressive' Agenda?, Christopher Bruner

Scholarly Works

For as long as corporations have existed, debates have persisted among scholars, judges, and policymakers regarding how best to describe their form and function as a positive matter, and how best to organize relations among their various stakeholders as a normative matter. This is hardly surprising given the economic and political stakes involved with control over vast and growing "corporate" resources, and it has become commonplace to speak of various approaches to corporate law in decidedly political terms. In particular, on the fundamental normative issue of the aims to which corporate decision-making ought to be directed, shareholder-centric conceptions of the …

The Weakening Of Fiduciary Law, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

In the 1970s and 80s, as major financial institutions grew and diversified their operations, courts and scholars recognized that fiduciary law posed profound challenges for the organizational practices of these firms. The challenges were considered existential by some: firms, ultimately, would need to slim down their operations, and perhaps even need to disaggregate some units, to avoid fiduciary liability. However, since these challenges were recognized, financial conglomerates have grown massively and focused more on taking direct stakes as principals, a practice that accentuates the risk of conflicts of interest.

How were financial conglomerates able to continue growing and diversifying despite …

Contractarian Theory And Unilateral Bylaw Amendments, Albert H. Choi, Geeyoung Min

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

Corporate directors have been utilizing a potent mechanism in dealing with shareholder activism and shareholder litigation: the right to unilaterally amend corporate bylaws. Directors have exercised this right, for instance, to impose various requirements on who can nominate a director or call a special shareholder meeting, or to designate an exclusive forum where the shareholders can bring suit. Based on the theory that corporate charters and bylaws constitute a “contract” between the shareholders and the corporation, courts have blessed many of the bylaws that directors have unilaterally adopted. This Article examines the contractarian theory by drawing a parallel between amending …

Corporate Culture And Competition Compliance In East Asia, Jingyuan Ma, Mel Marquis

South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business

No abstract provided.

Appraisal Arbitrage And Shareholder Value, Scott Callahan, Darius Palia, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

Post-merger appraisal rights have been the focus of heated controversy within mergers and acquisitions circles in recent years. Traditionally perceived as an arcane and cabalistic proceeding, the appraisal action has recently come to occupy center stage through the ascendancy of appraisal arbitrage — whereby investors purchase target-company shares shortly after an announcement principally to pursue appraisal. Such strategies became more feasible and profitable a decade ago, on the heels of two seemingly technocratic reforms in Delaware: (i) the statutory codification of pre-judgment interest, pegging a presumptive rate at five percent above the federal discount rate; and (ii) the Transkaryotic opinion, …

From Corporate Law To Corporate Governance, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

In the 1960s and 1970s, corporate law and finance scholars gave up on their traditional approaches. Corporate law had become “towering skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together and containing nothing but wind.” In finance, the theory of the firm was recognized as an “empty box.” This essay tracks how corporate law was reborn as corporate governance through three examples of how we have usefully complicated the inquiry into corporate behavior. Part I frames the first complication, defining governance broadly as the company’s operating system, a braided framework of legal and non-legal elements. Part II adds a second complication by …

Shareholder Voice In Corporate Charter Amendments, Geeyoung Min

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

State corporate laws require shareholder approval for corporate charter amendments, but only the board of directors has the power to propose how to amend charters. The directors’ exclusive power over charter amendment proposals creates a potential for managerial opportunism by refusing to propose amendments that empower shareholders or by pursuing amendments that favor managers. While shareholder approval can theoretically serve as a check against such opportunism, dispersed shareholders’ rational apathy and collective action problems, can also prevent them from being effective monitors. Prior scholarship has thus viewed charter amendments with suspicion, but there has been no systematic, empirical examination to …

Greater Expectations: Strategies For Effective Board Meeting Preparation, Jonathan Kim, Marcel Bucsescu

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

Directors face an increasingly complex environment in which their businesses operate. That complexity can present opportunities for corporations that adapt, and also places new pressures on boards to respond effectively. One strategy for directors to consider is to adapt their approaches to preparing for board meetings by focusing not just on company specific reporting and decisions, but also by acting as the “eyes and ears” for management on key issues for the company. This article makes practical suggestions for directors to consider as they approach their board meeting preparation with this broader view in mind.

The Changing Landscape Of The Capital Markets, Barbara Krumsiek

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

Much has been made of the rise of activist hedge funds over the past five years. But the shifts in the makeup of the investor community run much deeper than that, impacting both capital formation and capital deployment.

From the proliferation of hedge funds and the emergence of SRI and other new investment strategies, to the massive shift of funds to passive investors, the intermediation of the investment chain, and the concentration of ownership in the largest institutional investors, understanding the trend lines in the capital markets is integral to understanding where governance and the performance of public corporations goes …

Environmental And Social Sustainability In The Boardroom, Jon Lukomnik

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

The last 10 years has seen a remarkable shift in the attention and importance of social and environmental issues for public corporations. This has meant an increased focus by boards on these important matters.

Climate change, human rights, corporate political influence, and inequality are just some of the issues that are being raised by shareholders and other stakeholders. As calls for corporate transparency grow, how boards incorporate these issues into their decision making processes, disclose them, and address them from a risk perspective will continue to garner attention.

Uncharted Waters? Legal Ethics And The Benefit Corporation, Joseph Pileri

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

Corporate law norms are reflected in lawyers’ ethical duties. The enactment of benefit corporation legislation across the country signals a legislative acknowledgment that corporate law can serve as a public, rather than a merely private, ordering mechanism. Benefit corporations expressly adopt a public benefit as a legal purpose of the enterprise. While many have written about this important development with respect to corporate fiduciary law, this essay is the first to explore the professional and ethical responsibility of lawyers representing benefit corporations. In the last century, as scholars and courts drove an understanding of corporate law that elevated the interests …

International Financial Regulatory Standards And Human Rights: Connecting The Dots, Daniel D. Bradlow, Motoko Aizawa, Margaret Wachenfeld

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

This paper’s hypothesis is that the international standard setting bodies (SSBs) could improve the quality of their international standards by incorporating a human rights analysis. It focuses on five SSBs and seven of their international standards and its findings include the following: First, the standards all implicate the right of non-discrimination, and the rights to information, privacy and an effective remedy. Second, they each raises economic, social and cultural rights issues, including the obligation to allocate ‘maximum available resources’ to the progressive realization of economic, social and cultural rights; the human rights responsibilities of private actors exercising delegated regulatory authority, …

Cancer's Ip, Jacob S. Sherkow

Articles & Chapters

The state of publicly funded science is in peril. Instead, new biomedical research efforts — in particular, the recent funding of a “Cancer Moonshot” — have focused on employing public-private partnerships, joint ventures between private industry and public agencies, as being more politically palatable. Yet, public-private partnerships like the Cancer Moonshot center on the production of public goods: scientific information. Using private incentives in this context presents numerous puzzles for both intellectual property law and information policy. This Article examines whether—and to what extent — intellectual property and information policy can be appropriately tailored to the goals of public-private partnerships. …

The Cambridge Handbook Of Social Enterprise Law, Lloyd Histoshi Mayer

Books

Book Chapters

Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Creating a Tax Space for Social Enterprise, in The Cambridge Handbook of Social Enterprise Law 157 (Benjamin Means & Joseph W. Yockey eds., 2018)

While still relatively few in number compared to traditional nonprofit and for-profit organizations, the rise of social enterprises represents a possible disruption of not only existing models of doing business but also areas of law that in many respects have seen little fundamental change for decades. One such area is domestic tax law, where social enterprises currently find themselves subject to the rules of for-profit activities and entities. Here, both scholars …

A Relationship Of Reciprocal Influence: Singapore Company Law And The Economy, Vincent Ooi, Cheng Han Tan

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

A strong reciprocal relationship has existed between Singapore Company Law (“SCL”) and the economy since Independence in 1965. Swift Parliamentary responses to economic events and successful implementation of Government policies has made it possible to clearly attribute cause and effect to statutory amendments and economic events in turn, proving the reciprocal relationship between the two. The first theme of this paper seeks to explain the fundamental characteristics of SCL that have resulted in such an unusually strong reciprocal relationship: the 1) Autochthonous nature of SCL; 2) Responsive nature of legislation; and 3) Government control at multiple levels of implementation. The …

Should Securities Regulators Allow Companies Going Public With Dual-Class Shares?, Aurelio Gurrea-Martinez

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

In the past years, several companies, such as Google, Linkedin, Facebook, and Alibaba, went public with dual-class share structures, that is, share structures that typically include two classes of ordinary shares carrying unequal voting rights. Those shares with more voting rights (eg, ‘class A’ shares) are usually held by the company´s founders and executives, while the rest of the company´s share capital, formed by stock with regular voting rights (eg, ‘class B’ shares), is generally sold to outside investors.

Singapore, Country Study Prepared For Global Philanthropy Environment Index, Tan K. B. Eugene

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

No abstract provided.

Adolf Berle During The New Deal: The Brain Truster As An Intellectual Jobber, Robert Thompson

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Thirty-seven year old law professor Adolf Berle had a career year in 1932. His book published that year, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (written with Gardiner Means), framed the fundamental twentieth century change in understanding modern corporations. Berle’s exchange with Merrick Dodd on the purpose of the corporation that played out that spring on the pages of the Harvard Law Review launched a still fierce debate over the role of shareholders and other stakeholders. His service as a brain truster for Franklin Roosevelt during the fall election gave voice to the transformative economic policies of the New Deal. This …

Delaware's Retreat: Exploring Developing Fissures And Tectonic Shifts In Delaware Corporate Law, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Individual Autonomy In Corporate Law, Elisabeth De Fontenay

Faculty Scholarship

The field of corporate law is riven with competing visions of the corporation. This Article seeks to identify points of broad agreement by negative implication. It examines two developments in corporate law that have drawn widespread criticism from corporate law scholars: the Supreme Court's recognition of corporate religious rights in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby and the Nevada legislature's decision to eliminate mandatory fiduciary duties for corporate directors and officers. Despite their fundamental differences, both resulted in expanding individual rights or autonomy within the corporation-for shareholders and managers, respectively.

The visceral critiques aimed at these two developments suggest a broadly shared …