Business Organizations Law Commons^™

The Federal Common Law Of Successor Liability And The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Taylor J. Phillips

William & Mary Business Law Review

In recent years, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have vigorously enforced the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The FCPA prohibits bribery of foreign government officials, and the statute provides for significant civil and criminal sanctions. Settling and remediating violations can cost corporate defendants millions, with several corporate enforcement actions exceeding $100 million in sanctions. Moreover, enforcement actions related to the FCPA often are not brought until many years after the alleged violations.

Because the massive potential liabilities associated with an FCPA violation may not manifest themselves until years after the violation occurred, prospective …

Disc To Fsc: A Small Business Alternative?, Scott J. Klosinski

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Tax Reform Act Of 1984 - International Related-Party Factoring - A Major Tax Loophole For Multinational Corporations Is Closed, Phil Conner

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Trending@Rwu Law: Professor Carl Bogus's Post: When Corporations Grow Too Powerful: Reviving An Old Debate, Carl Bogus

Law School Blogs

No abstract provided.

Glen W. Rollings Et Al., Order On Defendants' Motion To Dismiss And For Judgment On The Pleadings, Melvin K. Westmoreland

Superior Court of Fulton County: Metro Atlanta Business Case Division Opinions

No abstract provided.

Incorporating Legal Claims, Maya Steinitz

Faculty Scholarship

Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in commercial litigation funding. Whereas the judicial, legislative, and scholarly treatment of litigation finance has regarded litigation finance first and foremost as a form of champerty and sought to regulate it through rules of legal professional responsibility (hereinafter, the "legal ethics paradigm"), this Article suggests that the problems created by litigation finance are all facets of the classic problems created by "the separation of ownership and control" that have been a focus of business law since the advent of the corporate form. Therefore, an "incorporation paradigm," offered here, is more appropriate. "Incorporating …

Oppress Me No More: Amending The Illinois Llc Act To Provide Additional Remedies For Oppressed Minority Members, Paul T. Geske

Chicago-Kent Law Review

The limited liability company (LLC) has become the preeminent choice of entity for small and midsize businesses, but it suffers from some of the same problems as its older cousins, the close corporation and the partnership. One such problem is oppressive conduct directed at the minority in interest. This article examines claims of oppression brought by members of limited liability companies, with a special focus on the Illinois Limited Liability Company Act (ILLCA). The ILLCA only provides one remedy for oppression—dissolution and wind-up of the LLC. This sole remedy may be inadequate, given that courts have historically been reluctant to …

The Legal Quagmire Of Irc § 501(C)(4) Organizations And The Consequential Rise Of Dark Money In Elections, Daniel C. Kirby

Chicago-Kent Law Review

Section 501(c)(4) organizations have recently become a hot topic with respect to campaign finance. Following the 2010 Supreme Court case, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the number of IRC § 501(c)(4) organizations ballooned in number, and the amount of money flowing through § 501(c)(4) groups increased 2390 percent from the 2008 election cycle to the 2012 election cycle. This essay explores the dangers to the campaign finance system of the substantial increase in spending by IRC § 501(c)(4) organizations. The foundational claim of this essay is that IRC § 501(c) is in need of a statutory and regulatory overhaul …

Voluntary Plant Closings And Workforce Reductions In The European Communities, J. Pipkorn

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

The Political Economic Dimensions Of Executive Compensation Reform: Can The Foundations Of Shareholder Primacy Be Sustained In The Post - Crisis Regulatory Environment?, Dezso Peter Arpad Farkas

LLM Theses

What is absent in much of the literature on executive compensation reform is a deeper appreciation of the shift that has occurred since the latest financial crisis away from performance-based corporate governance arrangements to an approach that seeks to put the brakes on a runaway train, the shareholder value model and its relentless pursuit of shareholder wealth at all costs. By situating this debate into a broader discussion of corporate purpose, corporate governance and the law’s role in how business corporations are run in their social, economic and political environment this project seeks to shed some light onto what really …

Phishing And Vat Fraud In Co2 Permits: The Digital Invoice Customs Exchange Solution, Richard Thompson Ainsworth

Faculty Scholarship

In accordance with Directive 2003/87/EC of October 13, 2003, trade in greenhouse gas emissions commenced in the European Union (EU) on January 1, 2005. The EU-Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS) was born.

The EU has a Value Added Tax (VAT). VAT is a transaction-based levy on all trade in goods and services. Each Member State has a VAT as a condition of membership. Until January 3, 2017 transactions in CO2 permits are taxed as services. After this date they are exempt as financial instruments.

This change in VAT treatment of CO2 permits is directly attributable to rampant fraud in the market. …

Shareholder Wealth Maximization And Its Implementation Under Corporate Law, Bernard S. Sharfman

Florida Law Review

This Article tackles the question of when courts should intervene in the decision-making of a corporation and review a corporate business decision for shareholder wealth maximization. This Article takes a very traditional approach to answering this question. It notes with approval that courts have historically been very hesitant to participate in the process of determining if a corporate decision is wealth maximizing. Courts have restrained themselves from interfering with board decision-making because they understand that it is the board of directors (the board) in coordination with executive management that has the best information and expertise to determine if a corporate …

Facilitating Successful Failures, Michelle M. Harner, Jamie Marincic Griffin

Florida Law Review

Approximately 80,000 businesses fail each year in the United States. This Article presents an original empirical study that surveys more than 400 business restructuring professionals. The study focuses on a critical factor that arguably contributes to these failures—the conduct of boards of directors and management. Anecdotal evidence suggests that management of distressed companies often bury their heads in the sand until it is too late to remedy the companies’ problems, a phenomenon commonly called “ostrich syndrome.” The data confirm this behavior, shows a prevalent use of loss framing, and suggest trends consistent with prospect theory. This Article draws on both …

Deferred Prosecutions And Corporate Governance: An Integrated Approach To Investigation And Reform, Lawrence A. Cunningham

Florida Law Review

When evaluating how to proceed against a corporate investigative target, law enforcement authorities often ignore the target’s governance arrangements, while subsequently negotiating or imposing governance requirements, especially in deferred prosecution agreements. Ignoring governance structures and processes amid investigation can be hazardous, and implementing improvised reforms afterwards may have severe unintended consequences—particularly when prescribing standardized governance devices. Drawing, in part, on new lessons from three prominent cases—Arthur Andersen, AIG, and Bristol-Myers Squibb—this Article criticizes prevailing discord and urges prosecutors to contemplate corporate governance at the outset and to articulate rationales for prescribed changes. Integrating the role of corporate governance into prosecutions …

Confronting The Two Faces Of Corporate Fraud, Miriam H. Baer

Florida Law Review

Some criminals engage in meticulous planning. Others commit crimes in the heat of the moment. Corporate fraud incorporates both planned and spur-of-the-moment misconduct. Although law and economics scholars have traditionally viewed corporate fraud as a manifestation of opportunism among the corporation’s agents, a new generation of scholars, influenced by findings in behavioral psychology, has focused on the temporal aspects of corporate misconduct. Wrongdoing comes about, not simply because an agent opportunistically takes advantage of her principal, but also because her short-term self falls prey to temptations and cognitive biases that effectively disable her law-abiding long-term self.

Although the law and …

The Joint Venture And Related Contract Laws Of Mainland China And Taiwan: A Comparative Analysis, Clyde D. Stoltenberg, David W. Mcclure

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Georgia Interlocal Risk Management Agency, Order On Defendant's Motion To Dismiss, Elizabeth E. Long

Superior Court of Fulton County: Metro Atlanta Business Case Division Opinions

No abstract provided.

Balance And Team Production, Kelli A. Alces

Seattle University Law Review

For decades, those holding the shareholder primacy view that the purpose of a corporation is to earn a profit for its shareholders have been debating with those who believe that corporations exist to serve broader societal interests. Adolph Berle and Merrick Dodd began the conversation over eighty years ago, and it continues today, with voices at various places along a spectrum of possible corporate purposes participating. Unfortunately, over time, the various sides of the debate have begun to talk past each other rather than engage with each other and have lost sight of whatever common ground they may be able …

The Boundaries Of "Team" Production Of Corporate Governance, Anthony J. Casey, M. Todd Henderson

Seattle University Law Review

We examine the cooperative production of corporate governance. We explain that this production does not occur exclusively within a “team” or “firm.” Rather, several aspects of corporate governance are quintessentially market products. Like Blair and Stout, we view the shareholder as but one of many stakeholders in a corporation. Where we depart from their analysis is in our view of the boundaries of a firm. We suggest that they overweight the intrafirm production of control. Focusing on the primacy of a board of directors, Blair and Stout posit a hierarchical team that governs the economic enterprise. We observe, however, that …

The Team Production Model As A Paradigm, Brian R. Cheffins

Seattle University Law Review

Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout suggested a few years after the publication of their 1999 Virginia Law Review article, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, that their team production model was poised to emerge as part of a new corporate law “paradigm.” In so doing, they specifically invoked Thomas Kuhn’s well-known analysis of scientific revolutions. This Article revisits Blair and Stout’s team production theory by offering a critique of their claim that their model is destined to become a new corporate law paradigm in the Kuhnian sense. In so doing the Article draws upon key corporate law theories and …

Testing The Normative Desirability Of The Mediating Hierarch, Zachary J. Gubler

Seattle University Law Review

In their influential article, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, Professors Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout explained how corporate law might be viewed as an attempt at solving what is known as the team production problem. At its core, this problem has to do with the opportunistic behavior that arises when multiple economic actors make investments—whether of labor, capital, or otherwise—in a business venture where these investments are said to be “firm specific” because they cannot be easily withdrawn and redeployed in other projects. The problem is how to construct a governance regime that will create incentives for the …

Team Production & The Multinational Enterprise, Virginia Harper Ho

Seattle University Law Review

Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s path-breaking article, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, advances a dual thesis: first, that team production theory does a better job than its competitors (in particular, principal–agent theory) of explaining the advantages of the public corporation and key features of corporate law; and second, that, as a matter of corporate law, corporate boards are charged with advancing the collective interest of all the contributors to the corporate enterprise rather than the shareholders’ interests alone. Its central insight is that the role of the independent, or insulated, corporate board is to serve as a “mediating …

Hostile Takeovers And Overreliance, Anthony Niblett

Seattle University Law Review

Commentators have argued that employees should be compensated in the event of a hostile takeover; otherwise, the threat of such a takeover will fail to incentivize firm-specific investments by employees. Such deferred compensation is analogous to the payment of damages following a breach of contract. The analogous breach, here, is the breach of an implicit contract between management and employees. Employees trusted management to compensate them for firm-specific investments not explicitly contracted for. This Article uses a familiar result from the contract law literature: There is no measure of damages for breach of contract that can generate both efficient breach …

Buying Teams, Andres Sawicki

Seattle University Law Review

The Sixth Annual Berle Symposium reflects on Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s classic article: A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law. Blair and Stout recast the modern law of public corporations through the lens of the team production theory of the firm. Here, I apply Blair and Stout’s insights—emphasizing the value of team production, independent monitors, and intellectual property rights—to a novel corporate transaction structure: the acqui-hire. In an acqui-hire, a publicly owned technology firm wants to add a start-up’s engineers. Instead of simply hiring them, though, it buys the start-up, discards most of its assets, and retains the start-up’s …

Team Production And Securities Laws, Urska Velikonja

Seattle University Law Review

In the seminal paper that this symposium celebrates, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout made two related points. First, that Delaware law does not require shareholder primacy in public corporations. Rather, the broad deference afforded to the decisions of predominantly independent corporate boards of directors is consistent with a contrary theory, that of team production, or, as they call it, “the mediating hierarch” theory. The fundamental role of the board of directors is to mediate between the interests of various stakeholders that contribute to the corporation’s output. As a result, Delaware courts have repeatedly …

With The Emergence Of Public Benefit Corporations, Directors Of Traditional For-Profit Companies Should Tread Cautiously, But Welcome The Opportunity To Invest In Social Enterprise, Mckenzie Holden Granum

Seattle University Law Review

Social entrepreneurship has become the popular term used to describe business forms that aim to produce profits while also seeking to significantly advance one or more social or environmental goals. In response to an increase in social entrepreneurship across sectors—from progressive industries like organic farming to conservative industries such as insurance and banking—several states have adopted new corporate governance structures. Such legislation allows incorporating businesses to choose an off-the-shelf formation type that embeds a social mission into its legal structure. The bulk of the newly implemented statutory forms provide not only a new framework for social entrepreneurs to work within, …

Boards Of Directors As Mediating Hierarchs, Margaret M. Blair

Seattle University Law Review

In June of 2014, the board of directors of Demoulas Supermarkets, Inc.—better known as Market Basket, a mid-sized chain of grocery stores in New England—decided to oust the man who had been CEO for the previous six years, Arthur T. Demoulas. Most likely, the board of directors did not anticipate what happened next: Thousands of employees, customers, and fans of Market Basket boycotted the stores and staged noisy public protests asking the board to reinstate “Arthur T.” The reaction by employees and customers made what had been a simmering, nasty, intrafamily feud within the closely held Market Basket chain into …

The Long Road To Reformulating The Understanding Of Directors' Duties: Legalizing Team Production Theory?, Thomas Clarke

Seattle University Law Review

In this Article, the historical evolution of corporate governance is considered, highlighting the different eras of governance, the dominant theoretical and practical paradigms, and the reformulation of paradigms and counter paradigms. Two alternative and sharply contrasting theorizations, one collective and collaborative (the work of Berle and Means), the other individualistic and contractual (agency theory and shareholder value) are focused upon. The explanatory potential of Blair and Stout’s team production theory is elaborated, along with its conception of the complexity of business enterprise, with a mediating hierarch (the board of directors) securing a balance between the interests of different stakeholders. The …

The Agency Cost Paradigm: The Good, The Bad, And The Ugly, Claire A. Hill, Brett H. Mcdonnell

Seattle University Law Review

In the “managerialist” world that preceded our present shareholder value world, some corporate managers could, and did, help themselves when they should have been doing their jobs. The modern agency cost paradigm has focused attention on this problem, in part by conceptualizing the duty of corporate managers as maximizing shareholder value. This paradigm has had a variety of effects: some good, some bad, and some ugly. The agency cost paradigm has had a good effect by focusing on the problem of managerial enrichment and providing a simple, clear benchmark—shareholder value-- that may quickly indicate when managers are performing badly. However, …

A Theory Of The Just Corporation, Ronit Donyets-Kedar

Seattle University Law Review

In their seminal article A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout hold that the modern corporation is best understood in terms of team production. Challenging the principal–agent model, Blair and Stout offer an analysis that considers the various stakeholders of the corporation as members of a team. Accordingly, they suggest, the purpose of corporate law is to provide a response to the problems created by collective production processes, in particular those pertaining to the distribution of profits stemming from the cooperation. According to Blair and Stout, the solution to this problem is to be found …