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Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

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Full-Text Articles in Business Organizations Law

An Issue Of Absolution: Section 391 Of The Companies Act, Pearlie Koh Sep 2003

An Issue Of Absolution: Section 391 Of The Companies Act, Pearlie Koh

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

There is an obvious tension in the imposition of directors’ duties. Whilst directors being the management, and therefore the eyes, ears and brain of the corporate person, must be given sufficient discretion to take on entrepreneurial (and hence risky) ventures with a view to profit maximisation, there is also the need to curb excesses, as the potential or opportunity for mismanagement, negligence and fraud is omnipresent. [T]his short article considers section 391 of the Companies Act (Cap 50), arguably the statutory nemesis of directors’ duties. Section 391 gives jurisdiction to the court hearing the case to relieve an officer from …


Once A Director, Always A Fiduciary?, Pearlie Koh Jul 2003

Once A Director, Always A Fiduciary?, Pearlie Koh

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

The corporate director is subject to duties of good faith and loyalty. As he stands in a fiduciary position vis-a-vis the company on whose board he sits, he is subject to strict obligations of self-denial. Indeed, ensuring adherence to an absolute rule in this regard is justified by the need to control, albeit in a necessarily imperfect and arguably ineffective manner, the exercise of discretion by the director who stands in an undoubted position of power with respect to the company. A director therefore is obliged to avoid a conflict of interests and is prohibited from profiting from his office. …


The Director's Fiduciary Obligations: A Fresh Look?, Pearlie Koh Mar 2003

The Director's Fiduciary Obligations: A Fresh Look?, Pearlie Koh

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

It is a pillar of equity that a person in a fiduciary position must not make a profit out of his trust which is part of the wider rule that a trustee must not place himself in a position where his duty and his interest may conflict (per Lord Upjohn in Phipps v. Boardman [1967] 2 A.C. 46, 123). The House of Lords in Regal (Hastings) v. Gulliver [1942] 1 All E.R. 378 demonstrated the unrelenting nature, and some have argued inequitable severity (see, e.g., Jones, (1968) 84 L.Q.R. 472), of the director-fiduciary’s obligations to his company. Such absolutism (Lowry …


The Statutory Derivative Action In Singapore: A Critical And Comparative Examination, Pearlie Koh Jan 2001

The Statutory Derivative Action In Singapore: A Critical And Comparative Examination, Pearlie Koh

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

As a mechanism for shareholder control of corporate wrongs and thus as a tool of corporate governance, the statutory derivative action has had much international attention given to it, particularly in the last 10 years. Singapore introduced its statutory derivative action in 1993 and since then, there have been two reported cases in which the action was invoked. In this paper, I consider the Singapore derivative action as contained in sections 216A and 216B of the Singapore Companies Act. The approach taken is a comparative one as I also look at the statutory derivative actions in Australia and other common …


For Better Of For Worse: The Statutory Derivative Action In Singapore, Pearlie Koh Mar 1995

For Better Of For Worse: The Statutory Derivative Action In Singapore, Pearlie Koh

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

Managerial accountability (or the lack of it) to shareholders has been described as “one of the major socio-legal problems of the twentieth century”. That such a comment has come to be made seems inevitable given the fact that common law courts have consistently upheld, in the absence of fraud, the managerial authority of the Board against the shareholders in general meeting. The Directors have almost absolute authority to decide what is, in their opinion, in the commercial interests of the company. The concerns of shareholders are obvious in public companies where, for the sake of economic efficiency and as a …