Business Organizations Law Commons^™

The Liability Trap: Why The Alec Anti-Esg Bills Create A Legal Quagmire For Fiduciaries Connected With Public Pensions, David J. Berger, David H. Webber, Beth M. Young

Faculty Scholarship

Two proposed bills barring public pensions from considering environmental, social, and governance investment criteria create massive legal risk for any pension fiduciary or service provider. The American Legislative Exchange Council “boycott bill” and the “fiduciary duty” bill, if adopted, would impose irreconcilable legal requirements on such fiduciaries, and subject them to compliance with arbitrary and unworkable legal demands.

The main legal problems the bills create fall into four categories:

(1) the unworkable distinction between “pecuniary” and “non-pecuniary,” a distinction so blurry that the bills are self-contradictory, as we demonstrate;

(2) the clash between the bills’ definition of materiality and that …

Square-Peg Frauds, Miriam Baer

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Reframing The Dei Case, Veronica Root Martinez

Faculty Scholarship

Corporate firms have long expressed their support for the idea that their organizations should become more demographically diverse while creating a culture that is inclusive of all members of the firm. These firms have traditionally, however, not been successful at improving demographic diversity and true inclusion within the upper echelons of their organizations. The status quo seemed unlikely to move, but expectations for corporate firms were upended after the #MeToo Movement of 2017 and 2018, which was followed by corporate support of the #BlackLivesMatter Movement in 2020. These two social movements, while distinct in many ways, forced firms to rethink …

Fezzik, Are There Rocks Ahead? Navigating The Oppression Doctrine In The Age Of Llcs, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

For many decades, the law of closely held businesses was the law of closely held corporations. For entrepreneurs and attorneys, the corporate liability shield was the key desideratum, and before the advent of limited liability companies the corporation was essentially the only game in town. Unfortunately, for many decades the liability shield came with a potentially dangerous price for minority owners. The traditional corporate norms of majority rule empowered majority shareholders to “oppress” minority shareholders or defeat such shareholders’ “reasonable expectations.”

Today, in almost all U.S. jurisdictions special rules protect minority shareholders from outright expropriation; controlling share-holders must avoid abusing …

Systematic Stewardship: It's Up To The Shareholders – A Response To Profs. Kahan And Rock, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

As the author of an article entitled “Systematic Stewardship,” I read Professors Kahan and Rock’s article “Systematic Stewardship with Tradeoffs” (K&R) with considerable interest. I acknowledge the limits on deep asset manager engagement with sources of systematic risk in light of present institutional arrangements and the politics of the moment. Yet I think the most important move in the K&R analysis — the privileging of a “single firm focus” in corporate law instead of a “portfolio firm focus” — simply doesn’t account for the evolution that has already occurred in law and practice.

Long before the development of index funds, …

Debt Textualism And Creditor-On-Creditor Violence: A Modest Plea To Keep The Faith, Eric L. Talley, Sneha Pandya

Faculty Scholarship

In this article, we argue that debt textualism played a key role in laying the groundwork for our present malaise by encouraging contracts to become increasingly bloated, complex, and rigid up to the point of buckling completely. The dense contractual landscape wrought by debt textualism, when freshly populated with a calculating coterie of financial mercenaries, has transformed corporate lending markets into an elaborate and costly contest of Hunger Games-worthy contractual “gotcha” where (a) lenders scour loan agreements for unappreciated loopholes to undercut borrowers; (b) borrowers do the same in an attempt to counteract lenders; and (c) permutated coalitions from …

Contract Production In M&A Markets, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, Matthew Jennejohn, Robert E. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

Contract scholarship has devoted considerable attention to how contract terms are designed to incentivize parties to fulfill their obligations. Less attention has been paid to the production of contracts and the tradeoffs between using boilerplate terms and designing bespoke provisions. In thick markets everyone uses the standard form despite the known drawbacks of boilerplate. But in thinner markets, such as the private deal M&A world, parties trade off costs and benefits of using standard provisions and customizing clauses. This Article reports on a case study of contract production in the M&A markets. We find evidence of an informal information network …

Publicizing Corporate Secrets, Christopher J. Morten

Faculty Scholarship

Federal regulatory agencies in the United States hold a treasure trove of valuable information essential to a functional society. Yet little of this immense and nominally “public” resource is accessible to the public. That worrying phenomenon is particularly true for the valuable information that agencies hold on powerful private actors. Corporations regularly shield vast swaths of the information they share with federal regulatory agencies from public view, claiming that the information contains legally protected trade secrets (or other proprietary “confidential commercial information”). Federal agencies themselves have largely acceded to these claims and even fueled them, by construing restrictively various doctrines …

Public Reporting Of Monitorship Outcomes, Veronica Root Martinez

Faculty Scholarship

When a corporation engages in misconduct that is widespread or pervasive, courts, regulators, or prosecutors often insist that the firm obtain assistance from an independent third party — a monitor — to oversee the firm’s remediation effort. The largest firms in the world — from Deutsche Bank, to Volkswagen, to Carnival Cruise Lines — have found themselves having to retain a monitor for corporate misconduct, despite attempts to avoid a monitorship entirely. Traditionally, monitors, or their special master forebearers, were utilized by courts to assist in overseeing compliance with court orders, and their work was both accessible and transparent. As …

Saving Climate Disclosure, Scott Hirst

Faculty Scholarship

Designing a regulatory response to climate change is one of the defining challenges of our era. In an attempt to address it, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has recently proposed a historic rule requiring climate-related disclosure by companies, resting squarely on the rationale of "investor demand." The proposed climate disclosure rule has met with an unprecedented response, some of it reflective of investor demand, but also including a broad array of opponents critical of the rule, who cast doubt on the rule's validity. A judicial challenge is all but inevitable.

This Article explains that the best way for the …

The Sec's Compensation Clawback Loophole, David I. Walker

Faculty Scholarship

The SEC has recently released final rules implementing the executive incentive compensation recovery or “clawback” provisions of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act. These rules are aimed at recovering from executives incentive compensation determined to be excessive in light of a subsequent accounting restatement. Unfortunately, the SEC’s rules create a loophole by excluding purely time-vested stock and stock option grants from the reach of the new clawback regime. This aspect of the rulemaking seems inconsistent with the intent of Congress, and the result likely will be to distort executive pay practices in a perverse fashion, shifting compensation back in the direction of …

How Much Do Investors Care About Social Responsibility?, Scott Hirst, Kobi Kastiel, Tamar Kricheli-Katz

Faculty Scholarship

Perhaps the most important corporate law debate over the last several years concerns whether directors and executives should manage the corporation to maximize value for investors or also take into account the interests of other stakeholders and society. But, do investors themselves wish to maximize returns, or are they willing to forgo returns for social purposes? And more broadly, do market participants, such as investors and consumers, differ from donors in the ways in which they prioritize monetary gains and the promotion of social goals?

This project attempts to answer these questions with evidence from an experiment conducted with 279 …

Is Corporate Law Nonpartisan?, Ofer Eldar, Gabriel V. Rauterberg

Faculty Scholarship

Only rarely does the United States Supreme Court hear a case with fundamental implications for corporate law. In Camey v. Adams, however, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to address whether the State of Delaware's requirement of partisan balance for its judiciary violates the First Amendment. Although the Court disposed of the case on other grounds, Justice Sotomayor acknowledged that the issue "will likely be raised again." The stakes are high because most large businesses are incorporated in Delaware and thus are governed by its corporate law. Former Delaware governors and chief justices lined up to defend the state's "nonpartisan" …

Corporate Governance And Risk-Taking: A Statistical Approach, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Because prudent corporate governance often requires managers to take risks based on statistically expected outcomes, corporate failures that have a small but finite chance of occurring cannot always be prevented. This Article makes three related claims about risk-taking in corporate governance.

This Article’s first claim is that managers should not automatically be presumed to be at fault for corporate failures that result from risk-taking decisions based on statistical methodologies that reasonably justify the decisions ex ante. Conceptually, the business judgment rule should protect corporate managers for engaging in a reasonable decision-making process, including one that is statistically based. Jurisdictionally, however, …

Independence Reconceived, Claire Hill, Yaron Nili

Faculty Scholarship

What makes a director independent? Scholars, regulators, and investors have grappled for decades with the fleeting notion of director independence. Originally conceived as guardians of shareholder interests that could safeguard a corporate board’s ability to check management’s power, independent directors have become a marquee feature of modern corporate governance. But do the corporate actions of directors that are considered “independent” under current standards comport with what we think independence requires? In many cases, the answer would seem to be “no.” From a lack of observable financial impact to the unabated flow of corporate scandals, independent directors seem to keep failing …

Side Letter Governance, Elisabeth De Fontenay, Yaron Nili

Faculty Scholarship

A standard feature of the private equity industry, “side letters” are confidential agreements between the sponsor and individual investors that give the latter special rights, beyond those that apply to other investors in the private equity fund. Yet side letters have become a flashpoint for prominent critics of the industry, who argue that they allow private equity sponsors to benefit their favored investors at the expense of smaller, less sophisticated ones. Others have argued that, to the contrary, side letters are merely an efficient means of price discrimination—charging different prices to different investors, according to their willingness to pay—a practice …

Misaligned Measures Of Control: Private Equity's Antitrust Loophole, Aslihan Asil, John M. Barrios, Thomas G. Wollmann

Faculty Scholarship

Agencies and legislators have raised concerns that acquisitions backed by private equity (PE) threaten competition, but few, if any, have offered explanations as to why they pose a unique threat. In this article, we argue that many PE-backed acquisitions may avoid antitrust enforcement because they escape detection. Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, parties intending to merge must notify federal authorities and wait for clearance. However, various exemptions exist based on the size of the transaction, parties involved, and proportion of control conferred by the merger. Recent work demonstrates that to police mergers effectively, agencies must be informed about transactions …

The Failure Of Market Efficiency, William Magnuson

Faculty Scholarship

Recent years have witnessed the near total triumph of market efficiency as a regulatory goal. Policymakers regularly proclaim their devotion to ensuring efficient capital markets. Courts use market efficiency as a guiding light for crafting legal doctrine. And scholars have explored in great depth the mechanisms of market efficiency and the role of law in promoting it. There is strong evidence that, at least on some metrics, our capital markets are indeed more efficient than they have ever been. But the pursuit of efficiency has come at a cost. By focusing our attention narrowly on economic efficiency concerns—such as competition, …

"Keep To The Code”: A Global Code Of Conduct For Third-Party Funders, Victoria Sahani

Faculty Scholarship

Global commercial third-party funding has given rise to wide-ranging regulatory approaches worldwide. Consequently, funders can engage in cross-border regulatory arbitrage by exploiting regulatory gaps within and among nations. This Article argues that the global community of nations should articulate a universal approach to the behavioral expectations of third-party funders operating transnationally, independent of local laws regarding the technical business of funding. It asserts that the key to fostering the ethical development of the third-party funding industry is to develop a globally applicable but locally enforced code of conduct or professional responsibility for the industry. Moreover, a successful regime for funder …

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (Spacs) And The Sec, Neal Newman, Lawrence J. Trautman

Faculty Scholarship

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) are simply enterprises that raise money from the public with the intention of purchasing an existing business and becoming publicly traded in the securities markets. If the SPAC is successful in raising money and the acquisition takes place, the target company takes the SPAC’s place on a stock exchange in a transaction that resembles a public offering. Also known as “blank-check” or “reverse merger” companies, this process avoids many of the pitfalls of a traditional initial public offering.

During late 2020 and 2021 an unprecedented surge in the popularity and issuance of Special Purpose Acquisition …

A Proposed Sec Cyber Data Disclosure Advisory Commission, Lawrence J. Trautman, Neal Newman

Faculty Scholarship

Constant cyber threats result in: intellectual property loss; data disruption; ransomware attacks; theft of valuable company intellectual property and sensitive customer information. During March 2022, The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a proposed rule addressing Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy, Governance, and Incident Disclosure, which requires: 1. Current reporting about material cybersecurity incidents; 2. Periodic disclosures about a registrant’s policies and procedures to identify and manage cybersecurity risks; 3. Management’s role in implementing cybersecurity policies and procedures; 4. Board of directors’ cybersecurity expertise, if any, and its oversight of cybersecurity risk; 5. Registrants to provide updates about previously reported cybersecurity …

The Uniform Commercial Code Survey: Introduction, Jennifer S. Martin, Colin P. Marks, Wayne Barnes

Faculty Scholarship

The survey that follows highlights the most important developments of 2021 dealing with domestic and international sales of goods, personal property leases, payments, letters of credit, documents of title, investment securities, and secured transactions.

Big Three Power, And Why It Matters, Lucian Bebchuk, Scott Hirst

Faculty Scholarship

This Article focuses on the power and corporate governance significance of the three largest index fund managers commonly referred to collectively as the “Big Three.” We present current evidence on the substantial voting power of the Big Three and explain why it is likely to persist and, indeed, further grow. We show that, due to their voting power, the Big Three have considerable influence on corporate outcomes through both what they do and what they fail to do. We also discuss the Big Three’s undesirable incentives both to underinvest in stewardship and to be excessively deferential to corporate managers.

In …

Deregulation And The Lawyers' Cartel, Nuno Garoupa, Milan Markovic

Faculty Scholarship

At one time, the legal profession largely regulated itself. However, based on the economic notion that increased competition would benefit consumers, jurisdictions have deregulated their legal markets by easing rules relating to attorney advertising, fees, and, most recently, nonlawyer ownership of law firms. Yet, despite reformers’ high expectations, legal markets today resemble those of previous decades, and most legal services continue to be delivered by traditional law firms. How to account for this seeming inertia?

We argue that the competition paradigm is theoretically flawed because it fails to fully account for market failures relating to asymmetric information, imperfect information, and …

Forecasting The How And Why Of Corporate Crime's Demise, Miriam H. Baer

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Golden Shares And Social Enterprise, Naveen Thomas

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Humanities Strike Back: (E)Esg And Justice Strine Challenge Gamer Shareholder Primacy, David H. Webber

Faculty Scholarship

Leo E. Strine, Jr. is closing in on Blair and Stout for the undisputed title of all-time top-scoring stakeholderist.³ I don't intend to squander this opportunity to roast and toast him by weighing the pros and cons of basketscoring primacy. Instead, my aim is to surface an overlooked argument in the debate over shareholder primacy and stakeholderism, the case for which has been recently reinvigorated by Strine's work. My argument is this: one underappreciated aspect of shareholder primacy's appeal is that it creates a competition with a single endpoint, basically a game, and that the exhilarating tournament that results, …

The Economic (In) Significance Of Executive Pay Esg Incentives, David I. Walker

Faculty Scholarship

The hottest topic in corporate governance circles today involves company commitments to and pursuit of ESG (environmental, social, and governance) initiatives in addition to the traditional pursuit of profits. One facet of this debate has to do with how to motivate executives to pursue ESG goals. Increasingly, companies tie executive pay to ESG performance, although even strong ESG advocates debate the advisability of doing so. This Article joins the fray by closely examining ESG-based CEO pay arrangements at a subset of companies with leadership positions on the Business Roundtable, an industry trade group that embraced ESG in a 2019 statement …

The Partnership Mystique: Law Firm Finance And Governance For The 21st Century American Law Firm, Maya Steinitz

Faculty Scholarship

This Article identifies and analyzes the de facto and de jure end of lawyers' exclusivity over the practice of law in the United States. This development will have profound implications for the legal profession, the careers of individual lawyers, and the justice system as a whole.

First, the Article argues that various financial products that have recently flooded the legal market are functionally equivalent to investing in and owning law firms and create all the same governance challenges as allowing nonlawyers to directly own stock in law firms.

Second, the Article analyzes Arizona's groundbreaking legalization of nonlawyer participation in law …

Anonymous Companies, William J. Moon

Faculty Scholarship

Hardly a day goes by without hearing about nefarious activities facilitated by anonymous “shell” companies. Often described as menaces to the financial system, the creation of business entities with no real operations in sun-drenched offshore jurisdictions offering “zero percent” tax rates remains in vogue among business titans, pop stars, multimillionaires, and royals. The trending headlines and academic accounts, however, have paid insufficient attention to the legal uses of anonymous companies that are both ubiquitous and almost infinite in their variations.

This Article identifies privacy as a functional feature of modern business entities by documenting the hidden virtues of anonymous companies—business …