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Full-Text Articles in Business Organizations Law

Informed Trading And Cybersecurity Breaches, Joshua Mitts, Eric L. Talley Jan 2019

Informed Trading And Cybersecurity Breaches, Joshua Mitts, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

Cybersecurity has become a significant concern in corporate and commercial settings, and for good reason: a threatened or realized cybersecurity breach can materially affect firm value for capital investors. This paper explores whether market arbitrageurs appear systematically to exploit advance knowledge of such vulnerabilities. We make use of a novel data set tracking cybersecurity breach announcements among public companies to study trading patterns in the derivatives market preceding the announcement of a breach. Using a matched sample of unaffected control firms, we find significant trading abnormalities for hacked targets, measured in terms of both open interest and volume. Our results …


Limited Liability Limited, Daniel S. Kleinberger Jan 2019

Limited Liability Limited, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

Limited liability companies went mainstream in 1988, began to capture the market for closely held businesses in 1997, and now have the lion’s share of that market. Since the advent of limited liability companies, a corporate-like liability shield, in addition to pass-through status under federal income tax law, has been one of two hallmarks of a limited liability company. Indeed, for many years courts have described the limited liability company as “a hybrid business entity [that] provides members with limited liability to the same extent enjoyed by corporate shareholders.”

The LLC shield should therefore be easy to understand: a limited …


What Is A Charging Order And Why Should A Business Lawyer Care?, Daniel S. Kleinberger Jan 2019

What Is A Charging Order And Why Should A Business Lawyer Care?, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

Suppose your client has a judgment from a court in state X against a shareholder of a closely held corporation organized under the law of state X. You know that your client can levy on the judgment debtor’s shares to enforce the judgment and either obtain the shares (and attendant voting and economic rights) or trigger a pre-existing buy-out agreement with the shareholders or the corporation, which will replace the judgment debtor’s shares with right to payment. The relevant civil procedures may be complicated (or even arcane), but in theory your client’s remedy is straightforward.

Now suppose that the judgment …


The Creditors' Bargain Reconstituted: Comments On Barry Adler's The Creditors' Bargain Revisited, Edward Janger Jan 2019

The Creditors' Bargain Reconstituted: Comments On Barry Adler's The Creditors' Bargain Revisited, Edward Janger

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Board 3.0: An Introduction, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon Jan 2019

Board 3.0: An Introduction, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

This essay sketches out the case for a new model for public company boards: Board 3.0. The now-dominant public board model is an organizational experiment begun approximately 40 years ago, which replaced a prior organizational form that had fallen short. The current model, the “monitoring board,” is dominated by part-time independent directors who are dependent on company management for information and are otherwise heavily influenced by stock market prices as the measure of managerial performance. We have seen a recurrent pattern of monitoring boards composed of talented people that fail to effectively monitor. Nevertheless, when companies fall short in business …


Economic Democracy And Enterprise Form In Finance, William H. Simon Jan 2019

Economic Democracy And Enterprise Form In Finance, William H. Simon

Faculty Scholarship

This article considers the relative advantages of alternative enterprise forms in finance from the point of view of public accountability. The business corporation is compared to the state agency or authority, the cooperative, the state corporation, and the charitable nonprofit. These forms can be distinguished according to whether they aspire to enhance general electoral democracy or stakeholder democracy and whether their democratic controls operate directly or indirectly. The article suggests that the indirect democratic forms may be more promising than the direct ones. It also argues that the project of democratizing finance depends on the development of practices of multifactor …


Corporate Governance For Sustainability, Andrew Johnston, Jeroen Veldman, Robert G. Eccles, Simon Deakin, Jerry Davis, Marie-Laure Djelic, Katharina Pistor, Blanche Segrestin, William M. Gentry, Cynthia A. Williams, David Millon, Paddy Ireland, Beate Sjåfjell, Christopher M. Bruner, Lorraine E. Talbot, Hugh Christopher Willmott, Charlotte Villiers, Carol Liao, Bertrand Valiorgue, Jason Glynos, Todd L. Sayre, Bronwen Morgan, Rick Wartzman, Prem Sikka, Filip Gregor, David Carroll Jacobs, Roger Gill, Roger Brown, Vincenzo Bavoso, Neil Lancastle, Julie Matthaei, Scott Taylor, Ulf Larsson-Olaison, Jay Cullen, Alan J. Dignam, Thomas Wuil Joo, Ciarán O'Kelly, Con Keating, Roman Tomasic, Simon Lilley, Kevin Tennent, Keith Robson, Willy Maley, Iris H-Y Chiu, Ewan Mcgaughey, Chris Rees, Nina Boeger, Adam Leaver, Marc T. Moore, Leen Paape, Alan D. Meyer, Marcello Palazzi, Nitasha Kaul, Juan Felipe Espinosa-Cristia, Timothy Kuhn, David J. Cooper, Susanne Soederberg, Andreas Jansson, Susan Watson, Ofer Sitbon, Joan Loughrey, David Collison, Maureen Mcculloch, Navajyoti Samanta, Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Grahame F. Thompson, Andrew R. Keay, Alessia Contu, Andreas Rühmkorf, Richard Hull, Irene-Marie Esser, Nihel Chabrak Jan 2019

Corporate Governance For Sustainability, Andrew Johnston, Jeroen Veldman, Robert G. Eccles, Simon Deakin, Jerry Davis, Marie-Laure Djelic, Katharina Pistor, Blanche Segrestin, William M. Gentry, Cynthia A. Williams, David Millon, Paddy Ireland, Beate Sjåfjell, Christopher M. Bruner, Lorraine E. Talbot, Hugh Christopher Willmott, Charlotte Villiers, Carol Liao, Bertrand Valiorgue, Jason Glynos, Todd L. Sayre, Bronwen Morgan, Rick Wartzman, Prem Sikka, Filip Gregor, David Carroll Jacobs, Roger Gill, Roger Brown, Vincenzo Bavoso, Neil Lancastle, Julie Matthaei, Scott Taylor, Ulf Larsson-Olaison, Jay Cullen, Alan J. Dignam, Thomas Wuil Joo, Ciarán O'Kelly, Con Keating, Roman Tomasic, Simon Lilley, Kevin Tennent, Keith Robson, Willy Maley, Iris H-Y Chiu, Ewan Mcgaughey, Chris Rees, Nina Boeger, Adam Leaver, Marc T. Moore, Leen Paape, Alan D. Meyer, Marcello Palazzi, Nitasha Kaul, Juan Felipe Espinosa-Cristia, Timothy Kuhn, David J. Cooper, Susanne Soederberg, Andreas Jansson, Susan Watson, Ofer Sitbon, Joan Loughrey, David Collison, Maureen Mcculloch, Navajyoti Samanta, Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Grahame F. Thompson, Andrew R. Keay, Alessia Contu, Andreas Rühmkorf, Richard Hull, Irene-Marie Esser, Nihel Chabrak

Faculty Scholarship

The current model of corporate governance needs reform. There is mounting evidence that the practices of shareholder primacy drive company directors and executives to adopt the same short time horizon as financial markets. Pressure to meet the demands of the financial markets drives stock buybacks, excessive dividends and a failure to invest in productive capabilities. The result is a ‘tragedy of the horizon’, with corporations and their shareholders failing to consider environmental, social or even their own, long-term, economic sustainability.

With less than a decade left to address the threat of climate change, and with consensus emerging that businesses need …


Activist Directors And Agency Costs: What Happens When An Activist Director Goes On The Board?, John C. Coffee Jr., Robert J. Jackson Jr., Joshua Mitts, Robert Bishop Jan 2019

Activist Directors And Agency Costs: What Happens When An Activist Director Goes On The Board?, John C. Coffee Jr., Robert J. Jackson Jr., Joshua Mitts, Robert Bishop

Faculty Scholarship

We develop and apply a new and more rigorous methodology by which to measure and understand both insider trading and the agency costs of hedge fund activism. We use quantitative data to show a systematic relationship between the appointment of a hedge fund nominated director to a corporate board and an increase in informed trading in that corporation’s stock (with the relationship being most pronounced when the fund’s slate of directors includes a hedge fund employee). This finding is important from two different perspectives. First, from a governance perspective, activist hedge funds represent a new and potent force in corporate …


Trade Openness And Antitrust Law, Anu Bradford, Adam S. Chilton Jan 2019

Trade Openness And Antitrust Law, Anu Bradford, Adam S. Chilton

Faculty Scholarship

Openness to international trade and adoption of antitrust laws can both curb anti-competitive behavior. But scholars have long debated the relationship between the two. Some argue that greater trade openness makes antitrust unnecessary, while others contend that antitrust laws are still needed to realize the benefits of trade liberalization. Data limitations have made this debate largely theoretical to date. We study the relationship between trade and antitrust empirically using new data on antitrust laws and enforcement activities. We find that trade openness and stringency of antitrust laws are positively correlated from 1950 to 2010 overall, but the positive correlation disappears …


The Outsized Influence Of The Fcpa?, Veronica Root Martinez Jan 2019

The Outsized Influence Of The Fcpa?, Veronica Root Martinez

Faculty Scholarship

The current power and influence of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) is really quite remarkable when one considers the statute was largely ignored for its first twenty-five years of existence. This statute, meant to reign in corruption by United States companies doing business abroad; has generated billions of dollars in revenue for the United States government; prompted the development of law firm practice groups and law school courses; become the subject of numerous scholarly articles; and has, arguably, made anti-bribery efforts the highest of priorities for multinational corporations engaged in robust compliance efforts. Corporations, scholars, and the public would …


Successor Ceos, Yaron Nili Jan 2019

Successor Ceos, Yaron Nili

Faculty Scholarship

Recent years have seen a push towards separating the roles of CEO and chairperson of the board. While many companies still maintain a combined CEO-chair role, investors consistently express their concern that the dual CEO-chair position jeopardizes the independence and effectiveness of the board. Yet, while investors and academic research have focused on one channel for achieving such separation—through the appointment of an independent director as chair—a second has been left relatively unexplored. In fact, in many cases, as this Article documents, the separation of CEO-chair has occurred through the second channel: the current CEO-chair steps down as CEO while …


The Enduring Distinction Between Business Entities And Security Interests, Ofer Eldar, Andrew Verstein Jan 2019

The Enduring Distinction Between Business Entities And Security Interests, Ofer Eldar, Andrew Verstein

Faculty Scholarship

What are business entities for? What are security interests for? The prevailing answer in legal scholarship is that both bodies of law exist to partition assets for the benefit of designated creditors. But if both bodies of law partition assets, then what distinguishes them? In fact, these bodies of law appear to be converging as increasing flexibility irons out any differences. Indeed, many legal products, such as securitization vehicles, insurance products known as captive insurance, and mutual funds, employ entities to create distinct asset pools. Moreover, recent legal innovations, such as “protected cells,” which were created to facilitate such products, …


Being True To Trulia: Do Disclosure-Only Settlements In Merger Objection Lawsuits Harm Shareholders?, Eric L. Talley, Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci Jan 2019

Being True To Trulia: Do Disclosure-Only Settlements In Merger Objection Lawsuits Harm Shareholders?, Eric L. Talley, Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci

Faculty Scholarship

A significant debate within mergers and acquisitions law concerns the explosive popularity of the “merger objection lawsuit” (MOL), a shareholder action seeking to enjoin an announced deal on fiduciary duty grounds. MOLs blossomed during the Financial Crisis, becoming popularly associated with “shareholder shakedowns,” whereby quick-triggered plaintiff attorneys would file against – and then rapidly settle with – acquirers, typically on non-monetary terms containing modest added disclosures in exchange for blanket class releases and attorney fee awards. This practice unleashed a torrent of criticism from lawyers, commentators, academics, and (ultimately) judges, culminating in a doctrinal shift in Delaware law in the …


Corporate Control And The Regulation Of Controlling Shareholders, Zohar Goshen, Assaf Hamdani Jan 2019

Corporate Control And The Regulation Of Controlling Shareholders, Zohar Goshen, Assaf Hamdani

Faculty Scholarship

In this chapter, we outline the theory of idiosyncratic vision and explored its implications. Our theory can be summarized as follows: First, while investors value control because it offers them protection from agency costs, entrepreneurs value control because it allows them to pursue their idiosyncratic vision. Second, any contract between entrepreneurs and investors represents a balance between the entrepreneurs’ freedom to secure their idiosyncratic vision and the investors’ protection against agency costs. Third, the investors and entrepreneurs will allocate cash-flow and control rights through the bargaining process to achieve this balance.

In addition, this chapter demonstrates that ownership structures are …


Shareholders United?, Andrew K. Jennings Jan 2019

Shareholders United?, Andrew K. Jennings

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Teaching Communication Skills In Transactional Simulations, Eric J. Gouvin, Katherine M. Koops, James E. Moliterno, Carol E. Morgan, Carol D. Newman Jan 2019

Teaching Communication Skills In Transactional Simulations, Eric J. Gouvin, Katherine M. Koops, James E. Moliterno, Carol E. Morgan, Carol D. Newman

Faculty Scholarship

This Article describes the role of communication exercises in transactional law and skills education, and provides several examples of such exercises. After a discussion of fundamental differences between communication in the context of litigation and transactional law, the Article discusses exercises designed to improve written communication skills, including the use of e-mail, in the context of transactional law. It follows with a similar discussion of exercises focusing on oral communication skills, including listening, interviewing, counseling, negotiation, and presentations. The Article concludes with examples of exercises combining oral and written communication skills in the context of simulated transactions.


Basic And Non-Basic Tax Tips For Leasing Lawyers, Bradley T. Borden Jan 2019

Basic And Non-Basic Tax Tips For Leasing Lawyers, Bradley T. Borden

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


The Core Corporate Governance Puzzle: Contextualizing The Link To Performance, Merritt B. Fox, Ronald J. Gilson, Darius Palia Jan 2019

The Core Corporate Governance Puzzle: Contextualizing The Link To Performance, Merritt B. Fox, Ronald J. Gilson, Darius Palia

Faculty Scholarship

There is a puzzle at the core of corporate governance theory. Prior scholarship reports a strong relationship between firms best at creating shareholder value and those rated highly by the established corporate governance indices. Little work explores why, however. We hypothesize that the link between governance and performance depends centrally on context. We illustrate the importance of context by exploring circumstances when a firm's governance structure can operate as a signal of the quality of its management. The idea is that better managers are on average more likely to choose a highly rated governance structure than are bad managers because …


Eroding "Checks" On Presidential Authority – Norms, The Civil Service, And The Courts, Peter L. Strauss Jan 2019

Eroding "Checks" On Presidential Authority – Norms, The Civil Service, And The Courts, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

Susan Rose-Ackerman's "Executive Rulemaking and Democratic Legitimacy: 'Reform' in the United States and the United Kingdom's Route to Brexit" insightfully illuminates important differences between parliamentary and presidential systems of government in relation to executive bodies' production of the large volume of secondary legislation common, indeed inevitable, for both. Agreeing heartily with her conclusion that the weakness of parliamentary engagement with secondary legislation, and limited judicial review of its production, counsels greater provision for public participation and transparency of action at the agency level, there is little for me to add. Aware, too, as she remarks, that others have dealt more …


Activist Directors And Agency Costs: What Happens When An Activist Director Goes On The Board?, John C. Coffee Jr., Robert J. Jackson Jr., Joshua R. Mitts, Robert E. Bishop Jan 2019

Activist Directors And Agency Costs: What Happens When An Activist Director Goes On The Board?, John C. Coffee Jr., Robert J. Jackson Jr., Joshua R. Mitts, Robert E. Bishop

Faculty Scholarship

We develop and apply a new and more rigorous methodology by which to measure and understand both informed trading and the agency costs of hedge fund activism. We use quantitative data to show a systematic relationship between the appointment of a hedge fund-nominated director to a corporate board and an increase in informed trading in that corporation’s stock (with the relationship being most pronounced when the fund’s slate of directors includes a hedge fund employee). This finding is important from two different perspectives. First, from a governance perspective, activist hedge funds represent a new and potent force in corporate governance. …


Beyond The Numbers: Substantive Gender Diversity In Boardrooms, Yaron Nili Jan 2019

Beyond The Numbers: Substantive Gender Diversity In Boardrooms, Yaron Nili

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Private Equity's Governance Advantage: A Requiem, Elisabeth De Fontenay Jan 2019

Private Equity's Governance Advantage: A Requiem, Elisabeth De Fontenay

Faculty Scholarship

Private equity’s original purpose was to optimize companies’ governance and operations. Reuniting ownership and control in corporate America, the leveraged buyout (or the mere threat thereof) undoubtedly helped reform management practices in a broad swath of U.S. companies. Due to mounting competitive pressures, however, private equity is finding relatively fewer underperforming companies to fix. This is particularly true of U.S. public companies, which are continuously dogged by activist hedge funds and other empowered shareholders looking for any sign of slack.

In response, private equity is shifting its center of gravity away from governance reform, towards a dizzying array of new …


Is There A First-Drafter Advantage In M&A?, Adam B. Badawi, Elisabeth De Fontenay Jan 2019

Is There A First-Drafter Advantage In M&A?, Adam B. Badawi, Elisabeth De Fontenay

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Soft And Hard Strategies: The Role Of Business In The Crafting Of International Commercial Law, Susan Block-Lieb Jan 2019

Soft And Hard Strategies: The Role Of Business In The Crafting Of International Commercial Law, Susan Block-Lieb

Faculty Scholarship

Part I returns to the classic definition of hard international law initially put forward by Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal and related IR scholars and analyzes existing commercial law treaties in light of this definition. It concludes that virtually none of these commercial law treaties constitute “hard” international law because nearly all commercial law treaties rely on national courts for enforcement. But Abbott and Snidal’s focus on the extent to which international law is legalized—and especially the extent to which it is enforced by international actors—may matter less with commercial than other more public international lawmaking. This is because the …


Sorting Out White-Collar Crime, Miriam Baer Dec 2018

Sorting Out White-Collar Crime, Miriam Baer

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Firm Value And Intracorporate Arbitration, Andrew K. Jennings Oct 2018

Firm Value And Intracorporate Arbitration, Andrew K. Jennings

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Disruptive Philanthropy: Chan-Zuckerberg, The Limited Liability Company, And The Millionaire Next Door, Dana Brakman Reiser Sep 2018

Disruptive Philanthropy: Chan-Zuckerberg, The Limited Liability Company, And The Millionaire Next Door, Dana Brakman Reiser

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Serial Collusion By Multi-Product Firms, Michael J. Meurer, William Kovacic, Robert Marshall Aug 2018

Serial Collusion By Multi-Product Firms, Michael J. Meurer, William Kovacic, Robert Marshall

Faculty Scholarship

We provide empirical evidence that many multi-product firms have each participated in several cartels over the past 50 years. Standard analysis of cartel conduct, as well as enforcement policy, is rooted in the presumption that each cartel in which a given firm participates is a singular activity, independent of other cartel conduct by the firm. We argue that this analysis is deficient in many respects in the face of serial collusion by multi-product firms. We offer policy recommendations to reign in serial collusion, including a mandatory coordinated effects review for any merger involving a serial colluder, regardless of the apparent …


The Governing Authority's Responsibilities In Compliance And Risk Management, As Seen In The American Law Institute's Draft Principles Of Compliance, Risk Management, And Enforcement, James Fanto Jul 2018

The Governing Authority's Responsibilities In Compliance And Risk Management, As Seen In The American Law Institute's Draft Principles Of Compliance, Risk Management, And Enforcement, James Fanto

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Franchise Regulation For The Fissured Economy, Andrew Elmore Jul 2018

Franchise Regulation For The Fissured Economy, Andrew Elmore

Faculty Scholarship

Franchise stores employ nearly nine million people in the United States. Many franchisors, which own trademarks that they license to franchisees, are among the largest, most sophisticated corporations in the United States. Yet franchise store employees are often paid below the minimum wage and frequently report unsafe workplaces and workplace discrimination.

The thesis of this Article is that widespread employment law noncompliance in franchise stores is symptomatic of the failure of employment law to recognize the measures that franchisors use to protect their brand in franchise stores. Franchisors often develop intensive relationships with franchisees and franchise store employees as representatives …