Business Organizations Law Commons^™

Are Private Equity Funds Liable For Anticompetitive Acquisitions?, Aslihan Asil, Paulo Henrique Alcantara Ramos, Amanda Starc, Thomas Wollmann

Faculty Scholarship

Private equity acquisitions grew tenfold over the past two decades. Over the same period, their focus shifted from financial engineering to industry consolidation, raising antitrust concerns. Heightening these concerns, privately backed acquisitions of competitors historically escaped detection by federal antitrust authorities in their incipiency because they fell below the reporting thresholds of the Premerger Notification Program. However, academic studies and agency investigations are now unearthing these transactions. Most salient is a recent complaint filed by the Federal Trade Commission challenging a series of acquisitions stretching back ten years.

In the wave of litigation that is likely to follow this “groundbreaking” …

Purpose-Driven Compliance, Veronica Root Martinez

Faculty Scholarship

Whether it is a small brokerage firm in Ann Arbor, Michigan, a private university in Cambridge, Massachusetts, or a multinational conglomerate head-quartered in New York City, organizations understand that they are required to fulfill a range of compliance obligations. Compliance programs today tend to have two important characteristics in common. First, the notion that perfect compliance is an impossible goal is a key component of the understandings and expectations of many firms’ compliance programs. Second, organizations have almost uniformly adopted compliance programs in areas where enforcement activity has been significant—like in the areas of antibribery and anticorruption, anti-money laundering, antitrust, …

Interlocking Directorates In The United States, Yaron Nili

Faculty Scholarship

In corporate America, directors wield increasing influence across multiple companies, often within the same industry (“horizontal directors”), which creates tension between antitrust laws and corporate governance. Horizontal directors are well-positioned to bring industry expertise and potentially increase higher profits, benefiting shareholders but also possibly enabling potential collusion. This chapter provides an overview of the prevalence of horizontal directors, the regulatory grey space in which they exist and the connection to some recently debated issues, including that of common ownership by institutional investors. To inform this debate, this chapter provides a thorough overview of horizontal directors from corporate and antitrust perspectives …

The Hidden Cost Of Venture Capital, Emilie Aguirre

Faculty Scholarship

Founders, employees, consumers, and even funders increasingly expect businesses to pursue social goals alongside financial performance. Yet even the most committed firms have found it difficult to maintain social performance over time. Scholars in economics, management, and law have put forth several explanations for this “mission drift,” including inappropriate governance, poor management, lack of genuine commitment, and threat of takeovers. Puzzlingly, research to date primarily focuses on later-stage firms, even though the events and decisions that take place in a firm’s early stages can critically impact retention of its social performance.

Drawing from over five years of qualitative field research …

Shareholder Litigation In Delaware: An Empirical Investigation, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas, Lynn Bai

Faculty Scholarship

The empirical study of shareholder litigation in state courts is a seriously underexamined subject. To remedy this gap, we collected data on all 4,741 fiduciary duty complaints filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery over a sixteen-year period, from January 1, 2004, to December 31, 2019. After removing the duplicative cases consolidated into a lead complaint, the number of unique complaints was reduced to 2,958 in our dataset. In our coding, we examined over one hundred variables (with many variables being further subdivided into as many as eight subvariables) for each of these cases, including information about the parties, claims, …

Reexamining Enron's Regulatory Consequences, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

The downfall of Enron Corporation often epitomizes corporate fraud. One of the world’s fastest growing and most inventive companies, Enron had engaged in a range of complex structured hedging transactions designed to achieve accounting rather than operating results. Its principal motivation, though, was to avoid the risk of incurring financial-statement losses that could impair its credit rating and thereby destroy its primary business of derivatives-based energy trading.

Enron’s management has been criticized for engaging in these structured hedging transactions, and some of its managers were sent to jail. This symposium article concerning “Business and Financial Crimes” attempts to set forth …

Specialist Directors, Yaron Nili, Roy Shapira

Faculty Scholarship

What determines the effectiveness of corporate boards? Corporate legal scholars usually approach this question by focusing on directors’ incentives, such as counting how many directors are independent or whether the roles of the CEO and Chair are separated. Yet on the ground, the focus has been shifting to directors’ skill sets and experience. Investors, regulators, and courts are now pressuring companies to appoint directors with specific types of expertise. In response, more and more companies are adding what we term “specialist directors”: a DEI director, a climate director, a cyber director, and so on. These changes in board composition could …

Purpose Or Profit?: The Rise Of Public Benefit Corporations In The Technology Industry, Alanna Potter

Duke Law & Technology Review

Over the last several years, the demand for socially responsible companies has exploded. Many states have responded to this demand by offering a new corporate form, the public benefit corporation (“PBC”), which arguably allows companies to prioritize social benefit in a way that traditional corporations cannot. The technology industry has adopted the PBC structure at higher rates than corporations in other industries. This Note offers reasons for the appeal of PBCs to corporations generally and to the technology sector in particular. This Note also explores why technology companies may be able to achieve the goals discussed without the need for …

Reframing The Dei Case, Veronica Root Martinez

Faculty Scholarship

Corporate firms have long expressed their support for the idea that their organizations should become more demographically diverse while creating a culture that is inclusive of all members of the firm. These firms have traditionally, however, not been successful at improving demographic diversity and true inclusion within the upper echelons of their organizations. The status quo seemed unlikely to move, but expectations for corporate firms were upended after the #MeToo Movement of 2017 and 2018, which was followed by corporate support of the #BlackLivesMatter Movement in 2020. These two social movements, while distinct in many ways, forced firms to rethink …

Public Reporting Of Monitorship Outcomes, Veronica Root Martinez

Faculty Scholarship

When a corporation engages in misconduct that is widespread or pervasive, courts, regulators, or prosecutors often insist that the firm obtain assistance from an independent third party — a monitor — to oversee the firm’s remediation effort. The largest firms in the world — from Deutsche Bank, to Volkswagen, to Carnival Cruise Lines — have found themselves having to retain a monitor for corporate misconduct, despite attempts to avoid a monitorship entirely. Traditionally, monitors, or their special master forebearers, were utilized by courts to assist in overseeing compliance with court orders, and their work was both accessible and transparent. As …

Is Corporate Law Nonpartisan?, Ofer Eldar, Gabriel V. Rauterberg

Faculty Scholarship

Only rarely does the United States Supreme Court hear a case with fundamental implications for corporate law. In Camey v. Adams, however, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to address whether the State of Delaware's requirement of partisan balance for its judiciary violates the First Amendment. Although the Court disposed of the case on other grounds, Justice Sotomayor acknowledged that the issue "will likely be raised again." The stakes are high because most large businesses are incorporated in Delaware and thus are governed by its corporate law. Former Delaware governors and chief justices lined up to defend the state's "nonpartisan" …

Corporate Governance And Risk-Taking: A Statistical Approach, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Because prudent corporate governance often requires managers to take risks based on statistically expected outcomes, corporate failures that have a small but finite chance of occurring cannot always be prevented. This Article makes three related claims about risk-taking in corporate governance.

This Article’s first claim is that managers should not automatically be presumed to be at fault for corporate failures that result from risk-taking decisions based on statistical methodologies that reasonably justify the decisions ex ante. Conceptually, the business judgment rule should protect corporate managers for engaging in a reasonable decision-making process, including one that is statistically based. Jurisdictionally, however, …

Independence Reconceived, Claire Hill, Yaron Nili

Faculty Scholarship

What makes a director independent? Scholars, regulators, and investors have grappled for decades with the fleeting notion of director independence. Originally conceived as guardians of shareholder interests that could safeguard a corporate board’s ability to check management’s power, independent directors have become a marquee feature of modern corporate governance. But do the corporate actions of directors that are considered “independent” under current standards comport with what we think independence requires? In many cases, the answer would seem to be “no.” From a lack of observable financial impact to the unabated flow of corporate scandals, independent directors seem to keep failing …

Side Letter Governance, Elisabeth De Fontenay, Yaron Nili

Faculty Scholarship

A standard feature of the private equity industry, “side letters” are confidential agreements between the sponsor and individual investors that give the latter special rights, beyond those that apply to other investors in the private equity fund. Yet side letters have become a flashpoint for prominent critics of the industry, who argue that they allow private equity sponsors to benefit their favored investors at the expense of smaller, less sophisticated ones. Others have argued that, to the contrary, side letters are merely an efficient means of price discrimination—charging different prices to different investors, according to their willingness to pay—a practice …

Misaligned Measures Of Control: Private Equity's Antitrust Loophole, Aslihan Asil, John M. Barrios, Thomas G. Wollmann

Faculty Scholarship

Agencies and legislators have raised concerns that acquisitions backed by private equity (PE) threaten competition, but few, if any, have offered explanations as to why they pose a unique threat. In this article, we argue that many PE-backed acquisitions may avoid antitrust enforcement because they escape detection. Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, parties intending to merge must notify federal authorities and wait for clearance. However, various exemptions exist based on the size of the transaction, parties involved, and proportion of control conferred by the merger. Recent work demonstrates that to police mergers effectively, agencies must be informed about transactions …

Enabling Esg Accountability: Focusing On The Corporate Enterprise, Rachel Brewster

Faculty Scholarship

Environmental, social, and governance accountability for companies has become an important topic in popular and academic debate in modern society. The idea that corporations should have ESG goals has been embraced by major investment companies, employees, and many corporations themselves. Yet, less attention has been focused on how corporate enterprise law—which governs how corporations structure their relationships between parent corporations and their subsidiaries—creates or contributes to the ESG concerns that the public has with corporations in the first place. Modern enterprise law allows corporations, particularly those operating across national borders, to use their subsidiaries to avoid responsibility for their public …

Virtual Annual Meetings: A Path Toward Shareholder Democracy And Stakeholder Engagement, Yaron Nili, Megan Wischmeier Shaner

Faculty Scholarship

From demanding greater executive accountability to lobbying for social and environmental policies, shareholders influence how managers run modern companies. In corporate doctrine, the principal venue reserved for shareholders to influence and engage with management and each other is the annual share-holders meeting. Historically, the annual meeting was a vibrant forum for share-holder democracy and occasionally even a platform for debating pressing social issues. For decades, however, the role of the annual meeting in corporate governance has been in decline, resulting in today’s largely pro forma annual meetings. This Article explores how technological integration can resurrect the annual meeting as the …

The Diversity Risk Paradox, Veronica Root Martinez

Faculty Scholarship

There is a growing body of literature discussing the proper role of diversity, equity, and inclusion efforts by and within public firms. A combination of forces brought renewed energy to this topic over the past few years. The #MeToo movement demonstrated a whole host of inequities faced by women within workplaces. Business Roundtable’s 2019 Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation rejected the view that the purpose of the corporation was solely to be focused on the maximization of shareholder wealth. And, in 2020, the murder of George Floyd ignited a racial reckoning within the United States, which prompted many …

A Restatement Of Corporate Criminal Liability’S Theory And Research Agenda, Samuel W. Buell

Faculty Scholarship

This Article, for a collection in which authors were asked to “imagine a world without corporate criminal liability,” specifies the material questions that should be addressed if debate about the doctrine is to progress past longstanding and oft-repeated assertions. The strongest case for corporate criminal liability is based on the potential for its unique reputational effects to contribute to the prevention and deterrence of crime within corporations. Further research should take up a variety of unanswered questions about those effects having to do with mechanisms and audiences. The relevant inquiries are both theoretical and empirical. Answers will lie in further …

The Corporate Governance Gap, Kobi Kastiel, Yaron Nili

Faculty Scholarship

A reliable system of corporate governance is considered an important requirement for the long-term success of public companies and for the good of society at large. After decades of research and policy advocacy, there is a growing sense that corporations are finally nearing the promised land: boards of public corporations seem more diverse, large investors seem more engaged, and directors seem more accountable than ever. But is this perception accurate? While many large, high-profile companies tend to serve as role models of desirable governance practices, the picture of corporate governance—as this Article reveals—is considerably different in the far corners of …

Board Gatekeepers, Yaron Nili

Faculty Scholarship

For the last decade, investors, scholars, and regulators have turned to independent directors in key leadership positions as a means to safeguard corporate boards’ ability to serve as a robust check on management’s power. As a result, a vast majority of public companies’ boards are now led by an Independent Chair, or, alternatively, include a Lead Independent Director.

These ostensible outsiders—which this Article calls “board gatekeepers”—are meant to be even more empowered and detached from management compared to the rest of the board. This allows them to serve an independent gatekeeping function—a necessary guardrail against management’s ability to exert undue …

Social Corporate Governance, Jeremy Mcclane, Yaron Nili

Faculty Scholarship

Corporate directors, like most people, are social creatures, and their social networks affect their decisions. But directors’ social networks remain both understudied and under-theorized by scholars and inconsistently addressed by courts. This Article comprehensively examines the importance of director networks to corporate governance for the first time. Using qualitative and quantitative data, the Article uncovers the importance of director networks to corporate governance and the implications that network theory poses for the study of corporate law. In doing so, the Article tackles an understudied corner of corporate decision-making at a critical time, when directors have an outsized influence over their …

Beyond Profit, Emilie Aguirre

Faculty Scholarship

Etsy was a crown jewel of socially responsible businesses. It prioritized female entrepreneurship, its employees, and environmental stewardship. It was widely admired as a company pursuing social goals alongside profit goals. But after scaling up through an IPO, Etsy fell apart both socially and financially. Similar stories proliferate in the world of socially conscious business. What happened? Standard accounts point to greedy investors, capitalism, and short-termism as the culprits.

But this Paper identifies a more fundamental problem: business law is not designed to facilitate scale-ups for companies that articulate objectives beyond profit. It lacks a durable commitment mechanism for these …

Whistleblowers: Implications For Corporate Governance, Deborah A. Demott

Faculty Scholarship

Often overlooked in academic accounts of corporate governance and the actors who populate governance structures, whistleblowers are no more visible in formal governance frameworks. Within a corporation, whistleblowers may be lower-rank employees, not directors or officers; they may report perceptions of wrongdoing to others within the corporation or inform governmental or other actors who are externally situated. Nonetheless, it is striking how often retrospective accounts of corporate scandals involve episodes of internal whistleblowing associated with governance and compliance failures. This paper argues that incorporating whistleblowers into formal governance structures could spur more proactive involvement by directors in monitoring compliance with …

A Revised Monitoring Model Confronts Today's Movement Toward Managerialism, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas

Faculty Scholarship

There are many lessons to be drawn from the sweep of history. In law, the compelling story repeatedly told is the observable co-movement of law on the one hand, and economic, social, and political changes on the other hand. Aberrations, however, do arise but generally do not persist in the long term. Contemporary corporate law seems to be on the cusp of such an abnormality as legal developments and proposed reforms for corporate law are currently conflicting with the direction in which the host environment is moving. This article identifies a series of contemporary judicial and regulatory corporate governance developments …

Regulating Financial Guarantors, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

To improve financial regulation, scholars have engaged in extensive research over the past decade to try to understand why systemically important financial firms engage in excessive risk-taking. None of that research fully explains, however, the unusually excessive risk-taking by financial guarantors such as bond insurers, protection sellers under credit-default-swap (CDS) derivatives, credit enhancers in securitization transactions, and even issuers of standby letters of credit. With tens of trillions of dollars of financial guarantees outstanding, the potential for failure is massive. This Article argues that financial guarantor risk-taking is influenced by a previously unrecognized cognitive bias, which it calls “abstraction bias.” …

The Sec's Shareholder Proposal Rule: Creating A Corporate Public Square, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas

Faculty Scholarship

In this Article, we take advantage of this Symposium’s goals to think broadly about the future of Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the shareholder proposal rule. We set forth a vision for the rule to address boardroom insularity by likening the shareholder proposal rule as the public square for shareholders. The existence of such a forum would redound to the benefit of investors, officers, and boards of directors as a fount of current and useful information about their investors’ and stakeholders’ concerns.

The New Public/Private Equilibrium And The Regulation Of Public Companies, Elisabeth De Fontenay, Gabriel Rauterberg

Faculty Scholarship

This Symposium Article examines how the public/private divide works today and maps out some of the potential implications for major issues in securities law. Classic debates in securities law were often predicated on the idea that public companies are a coherent class of firms that differ markedly from private companies. For more than fifty years after the adoption of the federal securities laws, this view was justified. During that period, the vast majority of successful and growing private firms eventually accepted the regulatory obligations of being public in order to access a wider and deeper pool of capital, among other …

Equality Metrics, Veronica Root Martinez, Gina-Gail S. Fletcher

Faculty Scholarship

This time is different. This time the death of another Black man at the hands of white police officers prompted calls for change not only within police departments, but across all aspects of American life. Those calls for change resulted in significant displays of support for the Black Lives Matter movement and interest in how to eliminate systemic racism and promote racial diversity and justice within one’s daily life and workplace. For the most part, corporations were quick to publicly align themselves with the movement. When carefully examined, however, many of the statements issued by corporations in support of the …

Transnational Anti-Bribery Law, Kevin E. Davis, Veronica Root Martinez

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter focuses on private firms’ compliance with norms concerning transnational bribery. It begins with an overview of the regulatory context and obstacles to effective enforcement of norms against transnational bribery. It then reviews how compliance is defined, how it ought to be defined, and obstacles to the achievement of optimal compliance. Finally, it ends by focusing on the next steps forward in this space: (1) greater information sharing from private firms to outsiders in order to better analyze and evaluate the current efficacy of compliance programs targeting anti-bribery, and (2) increased coordination between enforcement agencies at the national and …