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Articles 91 - 120 of 453
Full-Text Articles in Business Organizations Law
Delegating Portfolio Management To Index Creators: The Consequences For Corporate Governance, Dorothy S. Lund
Delegating Portfolio Management To Index Creators: The Consequences For Corporate Governance, Dorothy S. Lund
Faculty Scholarship
The recent popularity of index investing and corresponding influx of assets into passively managed mutual funds has generated a large literature in law and in finance about the implications for securities markets, antitrust, corporate governance, and beyond. But few have explored the index landscape itself. Professor Robertson’s article is an important exception, and her findings — in particular, that indices are more diverse and dynamic than many would have expected — have implications for all of these debates.
Asking The Right Question: The Statutory Right Of Appraisal And Efficient Markets, Jonathan Macey, Joshua Mitts
Asking The Right Question: The Statutory Right Of Appraisal And Efficient Markets, Jonathan Macey, Joshua Mitts
Faculty Scholarship
In this article, we make several contributions to the literature on appraisal rights and cases in which courts assign values to a company's shares in the litigation context. First, we applaud the recent trend in Delaware cases to consider the market prices of the stock of the company being valued if that stock trades in an efficient market, and we defend this market-oriented methodology against claims that recent discoveries in behavioral finance indicate that share prices are unreliable due to various cognitive biases. Next, we propose that the framework and methodology for utilizing market prices be clarified. We maintain that …
Dark Trading At The Midpoint: Does Sec Enforcement Policy Encourage Direct Feed Arbitrage?, Robert P. Bartlett Iii, Justin Mccrary
Dark Trading At The Midpoint: Does Sec Enforcement Policy Encourage Direct Feed Arbitrage?, Robert P. Bartlett Iii, Justin Mccrary
Faculty Scholarship
Prevailing research in market microstructure posits that liquidity providers bypass queue lines on exchanges by offering liquidity in dark venues with de minimis sub-penny price improvement, thus exploiting an exception to the penny quote rule. We show that (a) the SEC enforces the quote rule to prevent sub-penny queuejumping in dark pools unless trades are “pegged” to the NBBO midpoint and (b) the documented increase in dark trading due to investor queue-jumping stems from increased midpoint trading. Although encouraging pegged midpoint orders can subject traders to direct feed arbitrage, we estimate that less than 2% of shares traded per year …
The Separation Of Platforms And Commerce, Lina M. Khan
The Separation Of Platforms And Commerce, Lina M. Khan
Faculty Scholarship
A handful of digital platforms mediate a growing share of online commerce and communications. By structuring access to markets, these firms function as gatekeepers for billions of dollars in economic activity. One feature dominant digital platforms share is that they have integrated across business lines such that they both operate a platform and market their own goods and services on it. This structure places dominant platforms in direct competition with some of the businesses that depend on them, creating a conflict of interest that platforms can exploit to further entrench their dominance, thwart competition, and stifle innovation.
This Article argues …
China As A "National Strategic Buyer": Toward A Multilateral Regime For Cross-Border M&A, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Curtis J. Milhaupt
China As A "National Strategic Buyer": Toward A Multilateral Regime For Cross-Border M&A, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Curtis J. Milhaupt
Faculty Scholarship
Unlike the case of cross-border trade, there is no explicit international governance regime for cross-border M&A; rather, there is a shared understanding that publicly traded companies are generally for purchase by any bidder – domestic or foreign – willing to offer a sufficiently large premium over a target’s stock market price. The unspoken premise that undergirds the system is that the prospective buyer is motivated by private economic gain-seeking.
The entry of China into the global M&A market threatens the fundamental assumptions of the current permissive international regime. China has become a significant player in the cross-border M&A market, particularly …
The Death Of Corporate Law, Zohar Goshen, Sharon Hannes
The Death Of Corporate Law, Zohar Goshen, Sharon Hannes
Faculty Scholarship
For decades, corporate law played a pivotal role in regulating corporations across the United States. Consequently, Delaware, the leading state of incorporation, and its courts came to occupy a central and influential position in corporate law and governance. This, however, is no longer the case: The compositional shift in equity markets from retail to institutional ownership has relocated regulatory power over corporations from courts to markets. Corporate law has, as a result, and as illustrated by the declined role of the Delaware courts, lost its pride of place and is now eclipsed by shareholder activism.
What explains the connection between …
Informed Trading And Cybersecurity Breaches, Joshua Mitts, Eric L. Talley
Informed Trading And Cybersecurity Breaches, Joshua Mitts, Eric L. Talley
Faculty Scholarship
Cybersecurity has become a significant concern in corporate and commercial settings, and for good reason: a threatened or realized cybersecurity breach can materially affect firm value for capital investors. This paper explores whether market arbitrageurs appear systematically to exploit advance knowledge of such vulnerabilities. We make use of a novel data set tracking cybersecurity breach announcements among public companies to study trading patterns in the derivatives market preceding the announcement of a breach. Using a matched sample of unaffected control firms, we find significant trading abnormalities for hacked targets, measured in terms of both open interest and volume. Our results …
Board 3.0: An Introduction, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Board 3.0: An Introduction, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Faculty Scholarship
This essay sketches out the case for a new model for public company boards: Board 3.0. The now-dominant public board model is an organizational experiment begun approximately 40 years ago, which replaced a prior organizational form that had fallen short. The current model, the “monitoring board,” is dominated by part-time independent directors who are dependent on company management for information and are otherwise heavily influenced by stock market prices as the measure of managerial performance. We have seen a recurrent pattern of monitoring boards composed of talented people that fail to effectively monitor. Nevertheless, when companies fall short in business …
Economic Democracy And Enterprise Form In Finance, William H. Simon
Economic Democracy And Enterprise Form In Finance, William H. Simon
Faculty Scholarship
This article considers the relative advantages of alternative enterprise forms in finance from the point of view of public accountability. The business corporation is compared to the state agency or authority, the cooperative, the state corporation, and the charitable nonprofit. These forms can be distinguished according to whether they aspire to enhance general electoral democracy or stakeholder democracy and whether their democratic controls operate directly or indirectly. The article suggests that the indirect democratic forms may be more promising than the direct ones. It also argues that the project of democratizing finance depends on the development of practices of multifactor …
Corporate Governance For Sustainability, Andrew Johnston, Jeroen Veldman, Robert G. Eccles, Simon Deakin, Jerry Davis, Marie-Laure Djelic, Katharina Pistor, Blanche Segrestin, William M. Gentry, Cynthia A. Williams, David Millon, Paddy Ireland, Beate Sjåfjell, Christopher M. Bruner, Lorraine E. Talbot, Hugh Christopher Willmott, Charlotte Villiers, Carol Liao, Bertrand Valiorgue, Jason Glynos, Todd L. Sayre, Bronwen Morgan, Rick Wartzman, Prem Sikka, Filip Gregor, David Carroll Jacobs, Roger Gill, Roger Brown, Vincenzo Bavoso, Neil Lancastle, Julie Matthaei, Scott Taylor, Ulf Larsson-Olaison, Jay Cullen, Alan J. Dignam, Thomas Wuil Joo, Ciarán O'Kelly, Con Keating, Roman Tomasic, Simon Lilley, Kevin Tennent, Keith Robson, Willy Maley, Iris H-Y Chiu, Ewan Mcgaughey, Chris Rees, Nina Boeger, Adam Leaver, Marc T. Moore, Leen Paape, Alan D. Meyer, Marcello Palazzi, Nitasha Kaul, Juan Felipe Espinosa-Cristia, Timothy Kuhn, David J. Cooper, Susanne Soederberg, Andreas Jansson, Susan Watson, Ofer Sitbon, Joan Loughrey, David Collison, Maureen Mcculloch, Navajyoti Samanta, Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Grahame F. Thompson, Andrew R. Keay, Alessia Contu, Andreas Rühmkorf, Richard Hull, Irene-Marie Esser, Nihel Chabrak
Corporate Governance For Sustainability, Andrew Johnston, Jeroen Veldman, Robert G. Eccles, Simon Deakin, Jerry Davis, Marie-Laure Djelic, Katharina Pistor, Blanche Segrestin, William M. Gentry, Cynthia A. Williams, David Millon, Paddy Ireland, Beate Sjåfjell, Christopher M. Bruner, Lorraine E. Talbot, Hugh Christopher Willmott, Charlotte Villiers, Carol Liao, Bertrand Valiorgue, Jason Glynos, Todd L. Sayre, Bronwen Morgan, Rick Wartzman, Prem Sikka, Filip Gregor, David Carroll Jacobs, Roger Gill, Roger Brown, Vincenzo Bavoso, Neil Lancastle, Julie Matthaei, Scott Taylor, Ulf Larsson-Olaison, Jay Cullen, Alan J. Dignam, Thomas Wuil Joo, Ciarán O'Kelly, Con Keating, Roman Tomasic, Simon Lilley, Kevin Tennent, Keith Robson, Willy Maley, Iris H-Y Chiu, Ewan Mcgaughey, Chris Rees, Nina Boeger, Adam Leaver, Marc T. Moore, Leen Paape, Alan D. Meyer, Marcello Palazzi, Nitasha Kaul, Juan Felipe Espinosa-Cristia, Timothy Kuhn, David J. Cooper, Susanne Soederberg, Andreas Jansson, Susan Watson, Ofer Sitbon, Joan Loughrey, David Collison, Maureen Mcculloch, Navajyoti Samanta, Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Grahame F. Thompson, Andrew R. Keay, Alessia Contu, Andreas Rühmkorf, Richard Hull, Irene-Marie Esser, Nihel Chabrak
Faculty Scholarship
The current model of corporate governance needs reform. There is mounting evidence that the practices of shareholder primacy drive company directors and executives to adopt the same short time horizon as financial markets. Pressure to meet the demands of the financial markets drives stock buybacks, excessive dividends and a failure to invest in productive capabilities. The result is a ‘tragedy of the horizon’, with corporations and their shareholders failing to consider environmental, social or even their own, long-term, economic sustainability.
With less than a decade left to address the threat of climate change, and with consensus emerging that businesses need …
Activist Directors And Agency Costs: What Happens When An Activist Director Goes On The Board?, John C. Coffee Jr., Robert J. Jackson Jr., Joshua Mitts, Robert Bishop
Activist Directors And Agency Costs: What Happens When An Activist Director Goes On The Board?, John C. Coffee Jr., Robert J. Jackson Jr., Joshua Mitts, Robert Bishop
Faculty Scholarship
We develop and apply a new and more rigorous methodology by which to measure and understand both insider trading and the agency costs of hedge fund activism. We use quantitative data to show a systematic relationship between the appointment of a hedge fund nominated director to a corporate board and an increase in informed trading in that corporation’s stock (with the relationship being most pronounced when the fund’s slate of directors includes a hedge fund employee). This finding is important from two different perspectives. First, from a governance perspective, activist hedge funds represent a new and potent force in corporate …
Trade Openness And Antitrust Law, Anu Bradford, Adam S. Chilton
Trade Openness And Antitrust Law, Anu Bradford, Adam S. Chilton
Faculty Scholarship
Openness to international trade and adoption of antitrust laws can both curb anti-competitive behavior. But scholars have long debated the relationship between the two. Some argue that greater trade openness makes antitrust unnecessary, while others contend that antitrust laws are still needed to realize the benefits of trade liberalization. Data limitations have made this debate largely theoretical to date. We study the relationship between trade and antitrust empirically using new data on antitrust laws and enforcement activities. We find that trade openness and stringency of antitrust laws are positively correlated from 1950 to 2010 overall, but the positive correlation disappears …
Being True To Trulia: Do Disclosure-Only Settlements In Merger Objection Lawsuits Harm Shareholders?, Eric L. Talley, Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci
Being True To Trulia: Do Disclosure-Only Settlements In Merger Objection Lawsuits Harm Shareholders?, Eric L. Talley, Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci
Faculty Scholarship
A significant debate within mergers and acquisitions law concerns the explosive popularity of the “merger objection lawsuit” (MOL), a shareholder action seeking to enjoin an announced deal on fiduciary duty grounds. MOLs blossomed during the Financial Crisis, becoming popularly associated with “shareholder shakedowns,” whereby quick-triggered plaintiff attorneys would file against – and then rapidly settle with – acquirers, typically on non-monetary terms containing modest added disclosures in exchange for blanket class releases and attorney fee awards. This practice unleashed a torrent of criticism from lawyers, commentators, academics, and (ultimately) judges, culminating in a doctrinal shift in Delaware law in the …
Corporate Control And The Regulation Of Controlling Shareholders, Zohar Goshen, Assaf Hamdani
Corporate Control And The Regulation Of Controlling Shareholders, Zohar Goshen, Assaf Hamdani
Faculty Scholarship
In this chapter, we outline the theory of idiosyncratic vision and explored its implications. Our theory can be summarized as follows: First, while investors value control because it offers them protection from agency costs, entrepreneurs value control because it allows them to pursue their idiosyncratic vision. Second, any contract between entrepreneurs and investors represents a balance between the entrepreneurs’ freedom to secure their idiosyncratic vision and the investors’ protection against agency costs. Third, the investors and entrepreneurs will allocate cash-flow and control rights through the bargaining process to achieve this balance.
In addition, this chapter demonstrates that ownership structures are …
Insulation By Separation: When Dual-Class Stock Met Corporate Spin-Offs, Young Ran Kim, Geeyoung Min
Insulation By Separation: When Dual-Class Stock Met Corporate Spin-Offs, Young Ran Kim, Geeyoung Min
Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership
The recent rise of shareholder engagement has revamped companies’ corporate governance structures so as to empower shareholder rights and to constrain managerial opportunism. The general trend notwithstanding, this Article uncovers corporate spin-off transactions — which divide a single company into two or more companies — as a unique mechanism that insulates the management from shareholder intervention. In a spin-off, the company’s managers can fundamentally change the governance arrangements of the new spun-off company without being subject to monitoring mechanisms, such as shareholder approval or market check. Furthermore, most spin-off transactions enjoy tax benefits. The potential agency problems associated with the …
The Core Corporate Governance Puzzle: Contextualizing The Link To Performance, Merritt B. Fox, Ronald J. Gilson, Darius Palia
The Core Corporate Governance Puzzle: Contextualizing The Link To Performance, Merritt B. Fox, Ronald J. Gilson, Darius Palia
Faculty Scholarship
There is a puzzle at the core of corporate governance theory. Prior scholarship reports a strong relationship between firms best at creating shareholder value and those rated highly by the established corporate governance indices. Little work explores why, however. We hypothesize that the link between governance and performance depends centrally on context. We illustrate the importance of context by exploring circumstances when a firm's governance structure can operate as a signal of the quality of its management. The idea is that better managers are on average more likely to choose a highly rated governance structure than are bad managers because …
Active Firms And Active Shareholders: Corporate Political Activity And Shareholder Proposals, Geeyoung Min, Hye Young You
Active Firms And Active Shareholders: Corporate Political Activity And Shareholder Proposals, Geeyoung Min, Hye Young You
Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership
This article reveals the positions of corporations not only as active players in politics but also as targets of activist shareholders with opposing political preferences. We examine whether a firm’s political orientation, as measured by its political spending, serves as a driver of shareholder proposal submissions, one manifestation of shareholder activism. Using data on S&P 500 companies for 1997–2014, we find that the divergence in political orientation between shareholders and corporate management is strongly associated with the number of submissions of shareholder proposals on environmental or social issues. Firms that contribute more to the Republican Party are more likely to …
Eroding "Checks" On Presidential Authority – Norms, The Civil Service, And The Courts, Peter L. Strauss
Eroding "Checks" On Presidential Authority – Norms, The Civil Service, And The Courts, Peter L. Strauss
Faculty Scholarship
Susan Rose-Ackerman's "Executive Rulemaking and Democratic Legitimacy: 'Reform' in the United States and the United Kingdom's Route to Brexit" insightfully illuminates important differences between parliamentary and presidential systems of government in relation to executive bodies' production of the large volume of secondary legislation common, indeed inevitable, for both. Agreeing heartily with her conclusion that the weakness of parliamentary engagement with secondary legislation, and limited judicial review of its production, counsels greater provision for public participation and transparency of action at the agency level, there is little for me to add. Aware, too, as she remarks, that others have dealt more …
Outcome Report Of Roundtable On International Investment Regime And Access To Justice, Michelle Chan, Kanika Gupta, Jesse Coleman, Kaitlin Y. Cordes, Lise Johnson
Outcome Report Of Roundtable On International Investment Regime And Access To Justice, Michelle Chan, Kanika Gupta, Jesse Coleman, Kaitlin Y. Cordes, Lise Johnson
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications
On October 18, 2017, the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights and the CCSI co-hosted a one-day roundtable on the impacts of the international investment regime on access to justice for investment-affected individuals and communities.
Held at Columbia University in New York, the roundtable brought together 32 individuals from civil society organizations, communities affected by investments at the heart of investor-state claims, governments, academia, donor organizations, UN mandate holders, and other stakeholder groups. The roundtable provided an opportunity for participants to: (i) explore and assess the specific impacts of international investment agreements and investor-state dispute settlement on access …
The Macpherson-Henningsen Puzzle, Victor P. Goldberg
The Macpherson-Henningsen Puzzle, Victor P. Goldberg
Faculty Scholarship
In the landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick, an automobile company was held liable for negligence notwithstanding a lack of privity with the injured driver. Four decades later, in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, the court held unconscionable the standard automobile company warranty which limited its responsibility to repair and replacement, even in a case involving physical injury. This suggests a puzzle: if it were so easy for firms to contract out of liability, did MacPherson accomplish anything?
Sexual Harassment And Corporate Law, Daniel Hemel, Dorothy S. Lund
Sexual Harassment And Corporate Law, Daniel Hemel, Dorothy S. Lund
Faculty Scholarship
The #MeToo movement has shaken corporate America in recent months, leading to the departures of several high-profile executives as well as sharp stock price declines at a number of firms. Investors have taken notice and taken action: Shareholders at more than a half dozen publicly traded companies have filed lawsuits since the start of 2017 alleging that corporate fiduciaries breached state law duties or violated federal securities laws in connection with sexual harassment scandals. Additional suits are likely in the coming months.
This Article examines the role of corporate and securities law in regulating and remedying workplace sexual misconduct. We …
The Rise Of Foreign Ownership And Corporate Governance, Merritt B. Fox
The Rise Of Foreign Ownership And Corporate Governance, Merritt B. Fox
Faculty Scholarship
This chapter explores the link between corporate governance and the rise of foreign ownership. It presents statistics that illustrate the dramatic rise in foreign ownership over the last few decades and then seeks to explain this rise and its relationship to corporate governance. In order to situate the subject under study within its larger context, this explanation starts with an exploration of the factors independent of corporate-governance considerations that favor a global market for securities and those that impede it. It will be shown that the rise in foreign ownership globally can be explained in significant part by the weakening …
Is Corporate Governance A First Order Cause Of The Current Malaise?, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Is Corporate Governance A First Order Cause Of The Current Malaise?, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Faculty Scholarship
The US has evolved a regime of high-powered corporate governance in which managerial performance is disciplined through shareholder value metrics. This paper argues against over-stating the importance of this regime in creating problems of inequality, greater economic insecurity, and slower economic growth. Corporate governance acts principally as the transmission mechanism to the behaviour of the particular firm of changes in the global and domestic competitive environment. The critical problem is a risk-shift from shareholders, who now have access to robust diversification against firm-specific risks, and towards employees, whose concentrated firm-specific investments are hard to protect or diversify. The paper argues …
Economic Individualism And Preference Formation, Andrzej Rapaczynski
Economic Individualism And Preference Formation, Andrzej Rapaczynski
Faculty Scholarship
This note examines some issues involved in an attempt to go beyond the assumption, long-made by most economists, that people’s preferences are simply to be treated as “given” and that the principle of consumer sovereignty entails a refusal to consider some (or some people’s) revealed preferences as more authoritative than others. The most important break with that assumption has been the development of behavioral economics, which shows that people may not always know what they really want, and that economists have to develop a more critical approach, distinguishing people’s true preferences from those that are merely apparent. While this approach, …
How Investors Can (And Can't) Create Social Value, Paul Brest, Ronald J. Gilson, Mark A. Wolfson
How Investors Can (And Can't) Create Social Value, Paul Brest, Ronald J. Gilson, Mark A. Wolfson
Faculty Scholarship
Most investors throughout the world have a single goal: to earn the highest risk- adjusted financial returns. They would not accept a lower financial return from an investment that also produced social benefits.
More recently, an increasing number of socially-motivated investors have goals beyond maximizing returns. They also seek to align their investments with their social values (value alignment), and some also seek to cause the companies in which they invest to create more social value as a result of their investment (social value creation). We show in this essay that while it is relatively easy to achieve value alignment, …
Can Restitution Save Fragile Spiderless Networks?, Ariel Porat, Robert E. Scott
Can Restitution Save Fragile Spiderless Networks?, Ariel Porat, Robert E. Scott
Faculty Scholarship
This Article examines the dramatic increase in business networks in recent decades and considers whether the law can play a useful role in supporting the efficient functioning of these inter-firm relationships for coordination and cooperation. Repeat play, reputational sanctions, and norms of trust and reciprocity are the common explanations for the flourishing of networks in many industries and places. But the evidence also shows that a certain class of networks often fails to survive or function effectively and beneficial cooperation among these network members is impaired. These fragile networks develop organically without a controlling party or hierarchy at the center …
Valuation Disputes In Corporate Bankruptcy, Kenneth M. Ayotte, Edward R. Morrison
Valuation Disputes In Corporate Bankruptcy, Kenneth M. Ayotte, Edward R. Morrison
Faculty Scholarship
Prior scholarship points to disagreements about valuation and judicial valuation error as key drivers of Chapter 11 outcomes. Avoiding valuation disputes and valuation errors is also the underlying driver of most proposed reforms, from Baird’s auctions to Bebchuk’s options. In this paper, we undertake a detailed examination of bankruptcy court opinions involving valuation disputes. Our paper has two goals. The first is to understand how parties and their expert witnesses justify their opposing views to the judge, and how judges decide between them. The second is to provide practical guidance to judges in resolving valuation disputes. We document surprisingly pervasive …
Foreword – The 2017 Tax Cuts: How Polarized Politics Produced Precarious Policy, Michael J. Graetz
Foreword – The 2017 Tax Cuts: How Polarized Politics Produced Precarious Policy, Michael J. Graetz
Faculty Scholarship
By lowering the corporate tax rate from 35% to 21%, the 2017 tax legislation brought the U.S. statutory rate into closer alignment with the rates applicable in other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nations, thereby decreasing the incentive for businesses to locate their deductions in the United States and their income abroad. Its overhaul of the U.S. international income tax rules simultaneously reduced preexisting incentives for U.S. multinationals to reinvest their foreign earnings abroad and put a floor on the benefits of shifting profits to low-tax jurisdictions. The 2017 legislation also added an unprecedented, troublesome lower rate for …
The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, Dorothy S. Lund
The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, Dorothy S. Lund
Faculty Scholarship
American investors have begun to embrace the reality that academics have been championing for decades — that a broad-based, passive indexing strategy is superior to picking individual stocks or investing in actively managed funds. But there are several reasons to believe that the rise of passive investing will have harmful consequences for firm governance, shareholders, and the economy. First, because passive funds seek only to match the performance of an index — not outperform it — they lack a financial incentive to ensure that each of the companies in their very large portfolios are well-run. Second, passive funds face an …
The State's Role In The Regulation And Provision Of Legal Services In South Africa And The United States: Supporting, Nudging Or Interfering?, Helen Kruuse, Philip Genty
The State's Role In The Regulation And Provision Of Legal Services In South Africa And The United States: Supporting, Nudging Or Interfering?, Helen Kruuse, Philip Genty
Faculty Scholarship
An independent legal profession is said to be “the bulwark of a free and democratic society.” It is also said that a high measure of independence of mind and action by legal actors is necessary for the maintenance of the rule of law. However, too often, there is the allegation (within the sociological literature in particular) that the legal profession has used the concepts of independence and the rule of law as a shield or cuirass rather than as a sword. The image of lawyers representing unpopular clients fearlessly and advocating on behalf of unpopular causes, so as to uphold …