Business Organizations Law Commons^™

Required Disclosure And Corporate Governance, Merritt B. Fox

Faculty Scholarship

One of the most distinctive features of U.S. business law is the stringent requirements of ongoing disclosure imposed on issuers of publicly traded securities. This scheme usually has been justified as necessary to protect investors from making poor trading decisions as a result of being uninformed. Little scholarly attention, however, has been paid to the corporate governance effects of such required disclosure. In analyzing these effects, this article concludes that required disclosure can improve corporate governance in important ways. Indeed, improving corporate governance, not investor protection, provides the most persuasive justification for imposing on issuers the obligation to provide ongoing …

Does Venture Capital Require An Active Stock Market?, Ronald J. Gilson, Bernard S. Black

Faculty Scholarship

The United States has both an active venture capital industry and well-developed stock markets. Japan and Germany have neither. We argue here that this is no accident – that venture capital can flourish especially – and perhaps only – if the venture capitalist can exit from a successful portfolio company through an initial public offering (IPO), which requires an active stock market. Understanding the link between the stock market and the venture capital market requires understanding the contractual arrangements between entrepreneurs and venture capital providers especially the importance of exit by venture capitalists and the opportunity, present only if IPO …

Taking The "I" Out Of "Team": Intra-Firm Monitoring And The Content Of Fiduciary Duties, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

Depending on whom one asks, the last decades' proliferation of statutory business structures is a cause for either celebration or concern. Some laud this recent trend, arguing that a highly permutated menu of tax treatments, liability limitations, and governance hierarchies facilitates the alignment of legal status with organizational need. Others view statutory variety more skeptically, warning that it may simply portend greater cost externalization, strategic behavior, and distributional inequity. But one set of legal doctrines has persisted throughout: the concept of fiduciary duty. Indeed, fiduciary obligations remain fundamental to the legal governance structure of virtually every statutory business entity.

That …

Privatization And Corporate Governance: The Lessons From Securities Market Failure, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Should privatization be "fast" or "slow"? Should policymakers adopt a "Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead" approach that accepts the inevitability of some overreaching by controlling shareholders, but justifies this cost as necessary to realize and expedite the efficiency gains incident to privatization? Or should privatization proceed more cautiously because of the risks of market failure and political corruption that may result when control seekers are tempted to bribe and seduce the judicial and regulatory systems to achieve the private benefit of control? These tempting private benefits arise, of course, precisely to the extent that privatization preceded the creation of …

An Economic Analysis Of The Guaranty Contract, Avery W. Katz

Faculty Scholarship

Guaranty arrangements, in which one person stands as surety for a second person's obligation to a third, are ubiquitous in commercial transactions and in commercial law. In recent years, however, scholarly attention to the topic has been scant; and no one has systematically analyzed this body of law and practice from an economic policy perspective. Accordingly, this Article attempts to outline the basic economic logic underlying the guaranty relationship, and applies the results to a variety of specific issues in government policy and private planning. It poses and answers three main questions: First, why would a creditor prefer to make …

The Future As History: The Prospects For Global Convergence In Corporate Governance And Its Implications, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

What forces explain corporate structure and shareholder behavior? For decades this question has gone unasked, as both corporate law scholars and practitioners tacitly accepted the answer given in 1932 by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means that the separation of ownership and control stemming from ownership fragmentation explained and assured shareholder passivity. Over this decade, however, corporate law scholars have recognized that this standard answer begs an essential prior question: if ownership fragmentation explains shareholder passivity, what explains ownership fragmentation? Although the Berle and Means model assumed that large-scale enterprises could raise sufficient capital to conduct their operations only by attracting …

A Government For Our Time? Business Improvement Districts And Urban Governance, Richard Briffault

Faculty Scholarship

The emergence and rapid spread of business improvement districts ("BIDs") is one of the most important recent developments in American cities. BIDs have been controversial, with both supporters and proponents viewing the districts as part of a trend toward the privatization of the public sector. By examining the legal and political structures that determine BID formation, functions, finances and governance, this Article determines that BIDs are not private entities but are, instead, a distinctive hybrid of public and private elements. Moreover, although the particular fusion of public and private institutions, values and concerns embodied in the BID is unique, Professor …

The Legal Infrastructure Of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, And Covenants Not To Compete, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

In recent years, scholars and policymakers have rediscovered the concept of industrial districts – spatial concentrations of firms in the same industry or related industries. In this Article, Professor Gilson examines te relationship between high-technology industrial districts and legal infrastructure by comparing the legal regimes of California's Silicon Valley and Massachusetts's Route 128. He contends that legal rides governing employee mobility influence the dynamics of high technology industrial districts by either encouraging rapid employee movement between employers and to startups, as in Silicon Valley, or discouraging such movement, as in Route 128. Because California does not enforce post-employment covenants not …

Turning Servile Opportunities To Gold: A Strategic Analysis Of The Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

Perhaps no single motif permeates corporate law and governance literature like the problem of agency costs. Though modest in concept, the canonical principal-agent framework yields fundamental insights into virtually every economic relationship involving the firm. These insights, in turn, not only animate prevailing positive accounts of the modern corporation, but they also provide a normative basis for regulating the oft-lamented gulf between ownership and control.

Despite their pervasiveness, problems of agency costs are rarely more vexing than when an agent is also a potential competitor. A notable example of such a scenario occurs when a corporate manager acquires information about …

Why Ownership Matters? Entrepreneurship And The Restructuring Of Enterprises In Central Europe, Roman Frydman, Marek P. Hessel, Andrzej Rapaczynski

Faculty Scholarship

This paper, based on a study of mid-sized firms in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, seeks to explain the reasons behind the marked impact of ownership on firm performance which has been observed in a number of studies in Eastern Europe and other parts of the world. Focusing in particular on the differential impact of ownership on revenue and cost performance, the paper argues that privatized firms controlled by outside investors are more entrepreneurial than those controlled by corporate insiders or the state. The paper provides evidence that all state and privatized firms in transition economies engage in similar …

Individual Responsibility For The Investment Of Retirement Savings: A Cautionary View, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

These papers, including ones presented earlier this morning, raise questions about an adequate regime of consumer protection in an era in which responsibility for retirement savings and investment decisionmaking is being devolved, increasingly, to individuals. This shift to individual responsibility has also characterized many Social Security reform proposals, previously a bedrock system of publicly determined benefit levels. I find this devolution troubling; I think it is odd for individuals to have this responsibility. Individuals are not good risk bearers of market volatility, both in a financial sense and in a psychological sense. The consequence is that unless individuals are locked …

Controlling Corporate Agency Costs: A United States-Israeli Comparative Law, Zohar Goshen

Faculty Scholarship

The "Corporation" assumes a central position in modem economic life. This is due mainly to the fact that major portions of our economic activities are performed by corporations. Numerous authors have pondered the essence of the corporate phenomenon, proposing various theories for the uniqueness of the corporation as opposed to other possible structures for operating a business. The main line of analysis focuses on the central characteristic of the modem corporation: the separation of ownership and control. Managing a business through the means of a corporation allows one to exploit the advantages of specialization. On one hand, shareholders benefit from …

Deutsche Telekom, German Corporate Governance, And The Transition Costs Of Capitalism, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

In November 1996, Deutsche Telekom AG, the government-owned German telephone company, sold common stock representing approximately 25 percent of the company in a global stock offering that raised approximately DM 20 billion ($13 billion), the largest equity offering ever in Europe. In selling off this equity stake, the German government (i.e., the Federal Republic) had a number of motives. First, the sale was an important step in converting a government-run telephone monopoly into a nimble competitor in the emerging European and world telecommunications market. In anticipation of a fully competitive European telecommunications regime in 1998, Deutsche Telekom ("DT") had been …

Reflections In A Distant Mirror: Japanese Corporate Governance Through American Eyes, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

For the last ten years, Japanese corporate governance has served as a distant mirror in whose reflection American academics could better see the attributes of their own system. As scholars came to recognize that the institutional characteristics of the American and Japanese systems were politically and historically contingent, other countries' approaches became serious objects of study, rather than just way stations on the road to convergence. One learned about one's own system from the choices made by others.

As it came to be conceived, the Japanese corporation of the 1980s represented quite a different method of organizing production. Styled the …

The Folklore Of Investor Capitalism, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Ideally, Thurman Arnold should review this book. In his The Folklore of American Capitalism, Arnold dissected the ideology and rationalizations by which the business community of an earlier day defended its legitimacy and perquisites. Michael Useem, a sociologist at the Wharton School, also has an interest in the ideology of the business community: how corporate managers view the new institutional investors, how they justify resistance, and the tensions and inconsistencies between their critiques of money managers and their own behavior. This is an underutilized perspective (which law and economics inherently tends to overlook), and Useem is at his best …

The Role Of Secured Credit In Small-Business Lending, Ronald J. Mann

Faculty Scholarship

The traditional perspective holds that large firms in our economy use unsecured credit and small firms use secured credit. Existing scholarship, however, has provided little explanation of that pattern. In a recent article, I attributed the use of unsecured credit by large firms to the limited capacity of secured credit to lower the lending costs of creditworthy companies. This article uses data from a dozen interviews with small-business bankers to explain the small-business half of that lending pattern. To the extent smallbusiness lenders require secured credit, they do so largely for one significant benefit: secured credit allows small-business lenders to …

Rethinking Disclosure Liability In The Modern Era, Merritt B. Fox

Faculty Scholarship

The state of issuer disclosure in 1997 is like the proverbial half-filled glass. On one hand, as Dean Seligman has amply demonstrated in his contribution to this symposium, the glass is half empty in the sense that the legal incentives for established issuers to engage in high quality disclosure at the time that they sell new securities have decreased in recent decades. Due to the more liberal exemptions available under Regulation S, Rule 144A, Regulation D and Regulation A, a much smaller portion of such sales is even subject to the formal disclosure oriented registration process under Section 5 of …

Brave New World?: The Impact(S) Of The Internet On Modern Securities Regulation, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

It is now a trite commonplace that the advent of the Internet will in time revolutionize securities regulation. Merely the facts that the Internet has somewhere between thirty and sixty million users worldwide today (with an estimated ten to thirty million in the United States) and that some 800,000 U.S. investors already have online brokerage accounts establish that there is a potential global market that can be accessed at very low cost. But the magnitude of the market says little about what will be the character and effect of this approaching revolution.

Technological change is not a new phenomenon for …

"Just Say Never?" Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, And Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay For Warren Buffett, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

My topic is Buffett on mergers and acquisitions and how his sage advice on the importance of shareholder choice should be taken to heart by the Delaware Supreme Court, which will soon face far-reaching questions on the distribution of power between shareholders and the board of directors. Recent judicial decisions in other jurisdictions: (i) have declared that a board can maintain a poison pill in the face of a premium hostile bid, the power to "just say no;" (ii) have validated the board's adoption of a so-called "deadhand pill," a poison pill that can be redeemed only by continuing directors; …

The Shaping Force Of Corporate Law In The New Economic Order, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

My topic for this Allen Chair lecture is the shaping force of corporate governance in the new economic order. It is easy to think of corporate law as an arcane field with mysterious terms and peculiar rules, ultimately of interest only to those who are prepared to bill at least 2000 hours a year to unravel its complexities. This is the view that there is a pointless mystery about shareholders, directors, common stocks, debentures, and the bizarre creature my class encountered recently, a convertible exchangeable cumulative preferred stock; and that ultimately corporate law and practice consists of the expert manipulation …

Controlling Strategic Voting: Property Rule Or Liability Rule, Zohar Goshen

Faculty Scholarship

Strategic voting – situations where voters place their votes according to their assessment of how other voters will behave rather than according to their actual preference – results in distorted decisionmaking. Strategic voting can cause the company to lose desired transactions and can also be used to coerce voters into accepting alternatives they would have otherwise rejected. An analysis of the various types of strategic voting situations which arise in corporate law demonstrates the author's argument that strategic voting is inherent in the voting mechanism, regardless of the type of group involved or of the decision being made. Maintaining a …

The Role Of Criminal Law In Policing Corporate Misconduct, Gerard E. Lynch

Faculty Scholarship

In the early 1990s, I spent a couple of years as Chief of the Criminal Division in the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York. One of my principal responsibilities was to hear "appeals" from defense lawyers, usually, although not exclusively, in white collar crime cases. These lawyers felt that their clients should not be indicted, or that the plea offer they had received from the prosecutor in charge of the case was unduly severe. Sometimes their arguments were essentially factual contentions that the government had the wrong take on the evidence – that the …

The Future Of Corporate Governance In The United States, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

This article is an interview of Professor Ronald J. Gilson, Charles J. Meyers Professor of Law and Business, Columbia University Law School. The interviewer is Cheryl L. Conner, a third year law student at the University of Richmond School of Law and the Managing Editor of the Richmond Journal of Law and Technology.

Private Ownership And Corporate Performance: Some Lessons From Transition Economies, Roman Frydman, Cheryl W. Gray, Marek P. Hessel, Andrzej Rapaczynski

Faculty Scholarship

Data on mid-sized firms in three transition economies provide strong evidence that private ownership – for worker ownership – improves corporate performance. And the privatized firms' superior ability to generate revenues allows those firms to sustain or expand employment.

Using a large sample of data on mid-sized firms in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapacynski compare the performance of privatized and state firms in the environment of the postcommunist transition.

They find strong evidence that private ownership – for worker ownership – improves corporate performance. They find no evidence of the privatization shock that was …

The Net Profits Puzzle, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

The use of "net profits" clauses in the movie business poses a problem. The standard perception is that Hollywood accounting results in successful films showing no net profits. If that is indeed so, then why have they survived for over four decades? This Essay argues that a successful movie will fail to yield net profits only if a "gross participant" (a major star whose compensation is in part a function of the film's gross receipts) becomes associated with the film. Since the net profits participants typically are associated with a project first, the question becomes: Why would they be willing …

The Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions Change The Outcome Of Corporate Control Contests?, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

What, if anything, can institutional investors do to influence the course and outcome of corporate control contests? The traditional answer was relatively little. To be sure, institutions could tender their shares in a tender offer or vote in a proxy contest to oust the incumbent board, but such a role was essentially reactive and contingent. It required that an offer actually be made before institutions could respond on an after-the-fact basis. Similarly, institutions have occasionally conducted precatory proxy campaigns calling upon the board to redeem its poison pill, but management was free to ignore these requests (and has done so).

Searching For Negotiability In Payment And Credit Systems, Ronald J. Mann

Faculty Scholarship

The casual observer of the legal academy would assume that negotiability is a legal principle of foundational importance to our nation's payment and credit systems. All of the obvious indicators support that assumption. Among other things, the 1980s witnessed a major effort by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to update and revise the relevant provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. Similarly, negotiability continues to occupy a safe position in law school curricula, as prominent academics at our most elite schools continue to write casebooks focusing on negotiability. Most recently, for example, …

F. Hodge O'Neal Corporate And Securities Law Symposium: Path Dependence And Comparative Corporate Governance, Ronald J. Mann, Curtis J. Milhaupt

Faculty Scholarship

The study of institutions, and particularly the study of institutions that societies use to govern business enterprises, is at a point of transition. In the last two or three decades, scholars focusing on economic principles to define appropriate legal rules and corporate institutions rose up to challenge the traditional orthodoxy of corporate governance found in the Berle and Means corporation.

One of the most exciting trends in the literature rests upon the "increasing marginal returns" school of economics associated with Brian Arthur and the Santa Fe Institute. The traditional neoclassical economic theory of production, familiar from decades of undergraduate and …

Venture Capital And The Structure Of Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, Ronald J. Gilson, Bernard S. Black

Faculty Scholarship

The United States has many banks that are small relative to large corporations and play a limited role in corporate governance, and a well developed stock market with an associated market for corporate control. In contrast, Japanese and German banks are fewer in number but larger in relative size and are said to play a central governance role. Neither country has an active market for corporate control. We extend the debate on the relative efficiency of bank- and stock market-centered capital markets by developing a further systematic difference between the two systems: the greater vitality of venture capital in stock …

Positivism And The Separation Of Law And Economics, Avery W. Katz

Faculty Scholarship

The modem field of law and economics – that is, the application of economic analysis to legal subjects other than trade and business regulation – is now over thirty years old, but it remains controversial in the legal academy and, to a lesser extent, in the profession at large. Since its beginnings in the early 1960s, the economic approach has provoked substantial opposition and antagonism. The sources of this resistance, however, are a matter of dispute. Many economists and economically influenced lawyers attribute it to more traditional lawyers' reluctance to learn a new and unfamiliar set of concepts and techniques. …