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Articles 301 - 330 of 453

Full-Text Articles in Business Organizations Law

Executive Compensation: If There's A Problem, What's The Remedy? The Case For "Compensation Discussion And Analysis", Jeffrey N. Gordon Jan 2005

Executive Compensation: If There's A Problem, What's The Remedy? The Case For "Compensation Discussion And Analysis", Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

High levels of executive compensation have triggered an intense debate over whether compensation results primarily from competitive pressures in the market for managerial services or from managerial overreaching. Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried have advanced the debate with their recent book, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, which forcefully argues that current compensation levels are best explained by managerial rent-seeking, not by arm's-length bargaining designed to create the optimum pay and performance nexus. This paper expresses three sorts of reservations with their analysis and advances its own proposals. First, enhancing shareholder welfare is not, as a …


Takeovers In The Boardroom: Burke Versus Schumpeter, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman Jan 2005

Takeovers In The Boardroom: Burke Versus Schumpeter, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman

Faculty Scholarship

We are delighted to participate in a 25th anniversary assessment of Martin Lipton's 1979 article, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom. This is a remarkably prescient article that demonstrates an uncanny ear for an emerging issue. From his vantage point inside targets' boardrooms – and, we assume, also from inside the nearby offices of investment bankers – Lipton spotted a gathering storm on the horizon and sought to channel the emerging issue of takeover policy in a direction that accorded with his own fundamental convictions as well as the interests of his clients. As every academic knows, early intervention …


In The Shadow Of Delaware - The Rise Of Hostile Takeovers In Japan, Curtis J. Milhaupt Jan 2005

In The Shadow Of Delaware - The Rise Of Hostile Takeovers In Japan, Curtis J. Milhaupt

Faculty Scholarship

Despite longstanding predictions to the contrary, hostile takeovers have arrived in Japan. This Essay explains why and explores the implications of this phenomenon, not only for Japanese corporate governance, but also for our understanding of corporate law development around the world today. Delaware law figures prominently in the recent Japanese events. A highprofile battle for corporate control has just generated a judicial standard for takeover defenses that might be called a Unocal rule with Japanese characteristics. Meanwhile, ministy-endorsed takeover guidelines have been formulated that are heavily influenced by the familiar "threat" and "proportionality" tests under Delaware law, along with many …


Some Reflections On Two-Sided Markets And Pricing, Victor P. Goldberg Jan 2005

Some Reflections On Two-Sided Markets And Pricing, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

We want to join Bob Pitofsky in thanking the participants in this symposium for their thoughtful contributions. The literature on two-sided markets, both analytical and policy oriented, has mushroomed and this timely set of essays represents a significant contribution. The first generation of this literature grew up around the credit card industry, largely as a result of the antitrust litigation that challenged a wide range of standard practices in that industry. However, the theoretical problems that were first uncovered in this context extend to many other activities as well. The full range of papers found in this symposium, which have …


Pay For Short-Term Performance: Executive Compensation In Speculative Markets, Patrick Bolton, José Scheinkman, Wei Xiong Jan 2005

Pay For Short-Term Performance: Executive Compensation In Speculative Markets, Patrick Bolton, José Scheinkman, Wei Xiong

Center for Contract and Economic Organization

We argue that the root cause behind the recent corporate scandals associated with CEO pay is the technology bubble of the latter half of the 1990s. Far from rejecting the optimal incentive contracting theory of executive compensation, the recent evidence on executive pay can be reconciled with classical agency theory once one expands the framework to allow for speculative stock markets.


The Post-Enron Identity Crisis Of The Business Lawyer, William H. Simon Jan 2005

The Post-Enron Identity Crisis Of The Business Lawyer, William H. Simon

Faculty Scholarship

The practices and institutions of business lawyering are undergoing a reassessment and revision as radical as anything that has occurred since the late nineteenth century, when the modern professional association and the modern corporate law firm were born. The pace of change has intensified,but its directions remain contested. The articles in this colloquium depict a corporate bar torn between competing role conceptions along a variety of dimensions.


Separation And The Function Of Corporation Law, Ronald J. Gilson Jan 2005

Separation And The Function Of Corporation Law, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

I am delighted to participate in taking up Professor William Klein's suggestion that we could learn something by attempting a functional typology of corporation law. As a starting point, any typology must be animated by an underlying theory whose terms dictate the lines the typology draws. I want to focus my contribution at the level of the theory that might animate the architecture of this grid. To see what I mean by this, think of the Sesame Street version of Edward Levi's classic, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning. The character points at a board on which there are pictures …


A Theory Of Corporate Scandals: Why The U.S. And Europe Differ, John C. Coffee Jr. Jan 2005

A Theory Of Corporate Scandals: Why The U.S. And Europe Differ, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

A wave of financial irregularity broke out in the United States in 2001-2002, culminating in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. A worldwide stock market bubble burst over this same period, with the actual market decline on a percentage basis being somewhat more severe in Europe. Yet, no corresponding wave of financial scandals involving a similar level of companies broke out in Europe. Indeed, those scandals that did arise in Europe often had American roots (e.g., Vivendi, Ahold, Adecco, etc.). Given the higher level of public and private enforcement in the United States for securities fraud, this contrast seems perplexing.

What …


What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social And Economic History Of The 1990s, John C. Coffee Jr. Jan 2004

What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social And Economic History Of The 1990s, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

The sudden explosion of corporate accounting scandals and related financial irregularities that burst over the financial markets between late 2001 and the first half of 2002 – Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia and others – raises an obvious question: Why now? What explains the concentration of financial scandals at this moment in time? Much commentary has rounded up the usual suspects and placed the blame on a decline in business morality, an increase in "infectious greed," or other similarly subjective trends that cannot be reliably measured. Although none of these possibilities can be dismissed out of hand, approaches that simply reason …


Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence Of Form Or Function, Ronald J. Gilson Jan 2004

Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence Of Form Or Function, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

Globalization has led to a remarkable resurgence in the study of comparative corporate governance. This area of scholarship had been largely the domain of taxonomists, intent on cataloguing the central characteristics of national corporate governance systems, and then classifying different systems based on the specified attributes. The result was an interesting, if perhaps somewhat dry, enterprise. We learned that national corporate governance systems differed dramatically along a number of seemingly important dimensions. Some corporate governance systems, notably those of the United States and other Anglo-Saxon countries, are built on the foundation of a stock market-centered capital market. Other systems, like …


The Alien Tort Statute, Civil Society, And Corporate Responsibility, Sarah H. Cleveland Jan 2004

The Alien Tort Statute, Civil Society, And Corporate Responsibility, Sarah H. Cleveland

Faculty Scholarship

The topic of this panel is civil participation in the global trading system, with a particular focus on Doe v. Unocal Corp. and use of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) to enforce fundamental human rights norms against multinational corporations. These comments will therefore attempt to locate Doe v. Unocal and other ATS litigation in the broader efforts of civil society to establish and maintain normative principles for corporate responsibility in the global trading regime. This comment first explains the role of ATS litigation in the broader civil society context and the contribution of ATS cases to the development and enforcement …


What's So Special About Multinational Enterprises: A Comment On Avi-Yonah, Merritt B. Fox Jan 2004

What's So Special About Multinational Enterprises: A Comment On Avi-Yonah, Merritt B. Fox

Faculty Scholarship

My analysis of the legal challenges posed by the growth of MNEs is based on an examination of a number of the examples used by Avi-Yonah to illustrate the working of his framework: piercing the corporate veil for mass torts (as in the Bhopal toxic chemical release), bribery, bankruptcy, child labor and antitrust. My approach focuses on the ways in which MNEs are special. To what extent do particular forms of behavior occurring within MNEs raise regulatory problems similar to problems raised by the same behavior occurring within other institutional arrangements, and to what extent does it raise problems that …


Measuring Share Price Accuracy, Merritt B. Fox Jan 2004

Measuring Share Price Accuracy, Merritt B. Fox

Faculty Scholarship

This Article concerns how to measure share price accuracy. It is prompted by the fact that many scholars believe that the prices established in the stock market affect the efficiency of the real economy. In their view, more accurate prices increase the amount of value added by capital-utilizing enterprises as these enterprises use society's scarce resources for the production of goods and services. More accurate share prices help improve both the quality of choice among new proposed investment projects in the economy and the operation of existing real assets currently in corporate hands.

The proposition that more accurate share prices …


Market Design With Endogenous Preferences, Aviad Heifetz, Ella Segev, Eric L. Talley Jan 2004

Market Design With Endogenous Preferences, Aviad Heifetz, Ella Segev, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

This paper explores the interdependence between market structure and an important class of extra-rational cognitive biases. Starting with a familiar bilateral monopoly framework, we characterize the endogenous emergence of preference distortions during bargaining which cause negotiators to perceive their private valuations differently than they would outside the adversarial negotiation context. Using this model, we then demonstrate how a number of external interventions in the structure and/or organization of market interactions (occurring before trade, after trade, or during negotiations themselves) can profoundly alter the nature of these dispositions. Our results demonstrate that many such interventions frequently (though not always) share qualitatively …


Choice As Regulatory Reform: The Case Of Japanese Corporate Governance, Ronald J. Gilson, Curtis J. Milhaupt Jan 2004

Choice As Regulatory Reform: The Case Of Japanese Corporate Governance, Ronald J. Gilson, Curtis J. Milhaupt

Faculty Scholarship

The fact of a small number of hostile takeover bids in Japan the recent past, together with technical amendments of the Civil Code that would allow a poison pill-like security, raises the question of how a poison pill would operate in Japan should it be widely deployed. This paper reviews the U.S. experience with the pill to the end of identifying what institutions operated to prevent the poison pill from fully enabling the target board to block a hostile takeover. It then considers whether similar ameliorating institutions are available in Japan, and concludes that with the exception of the court …


Prescribing The Pill In Japan?, Curtis J. Milhaupt Jan 2004

Prescribing The Pill In Japan?, Curtis J. Milhaupt

Faculty Scholarship

Contrary to popular belief, corporate Japan is changing incrementally, to be sure, but changing nonetheless. One of the areas of greatest potential change is the legal and business environment for mergers and acquisitions ("M&A"), including hostile M&A. Recent amendments to Japan's Commercial Code in the areas of stock swaps and divestitures are helping to facilitate M&A transactions. At the same time, the constellation of shareholders in Japanese firms is changing as cross-shareholding declines and foreign investment increases. M&A activity in Japan has increased significantly in recent years.


The Poison Pill In Japan: The Missing Infrastructure, Ronald J. Gilson Jan 2004

The Poison Pill In Japan: The Missing Infrastructure, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

The coming of hostile takeovers to Japan has been anticipated, and anticipated, and anticipated. Each report of a reduction in the size of crossholdings among Japanese companies and in the size of Japanese bank stockholdings in their clients has given rise to an expectation that now, at last, hostile offers would emerge. It is not surprising that commentators looked forward, optimistically, to the arrival of a potentially disruptive takeover technique. The extended Japanese recession, together with management resistance to internally implemented restructurings and the barriers to externally imposed restructurings, has created the potential for substantial private and social gain from …


Uncorporated Professionals, John Romley, Eric L. Talley Jan 2004

Uncorporated Professionals, John Romley, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

Professional service providers who wish to organize as multi-person firms have historically been limited to the partnership form. Such organizational forms trade the benefit of risk diversification off against the costs of diluted incentives and liability exposure in choosing their optimal size. More recently, states have permitted limited-liability entities that combine the simplicity, flexibility and tax advantages of a partnership with the liability shield of a corporation. We develop a game theoretic model of professional-firm organization that integrates the provision of incentives in a multi-person firm with the choice of business form. We then test the model's predictions with a …


Partnoy's Complaint: A Response, John C. Coffee Jr. Jan 2004

Partnoy's Complaint: A Response, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

My article attempts to strike a balance and find a middle ground between the polar positions of those who favor strict liability (of whom Professor Partnoy is probably the most notable) and recent critics who believe it would produce market failure. Necessarily, those who take a middle position are exposed to fire from both sides. Although I admire Professor Partnoy's originality and incisive style, I do not believe that the market could easily survive his reforms and suspect that he has undervalued the hidden costs of strict liability. Deterrence is needed – but there can be too much of a …


Gatekeeper Failure And Reform: The Challenge Of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, John C. Coffee Jr. Jan 2004

Gatekeeper Failure And Reform: The Challenge Of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Securities markets have long employed "gatekeepers" – independent professionals who pledge their reputational capital – to protect the interests of dispersed investors who cannot easily take collective action. The clearest examples of such reputational intermediaries are auditors and securities analysts, who verify or assess corporate disclosures in order to advise investors in different ways. But during the late 1990s, these protections seemingly failed, and a unique concentration of financial scandals followed, all involving the common denominator .of accounting irregularities. What caused this sudden outburst of scandals, involving an apparent epidemic of accounting and related financial irregularities, that broke over the …


Corporate Governance, Executive Compensation And Securities Litigation, Eric L. Talley, Gudrun Johnsen Jan 2004

Corporate Governance, Executive Compensation And Securities Litigation, Eric L. Talley, Gudrun Johnsen

Faculty Scholarship

It is generally accepted that good corporate governance, executive compensation and the threat of litigation are all important mechanisms for incentivizing managers of public corporations. While there are significant and robust literatures analyzing each of these policy instruments in isolation, their mutual relationship and interaction has received somewhat less attention. Such neglect is mildly surprising in light of a strong intuition that the three devices are structurally related to one another (either as complements or substitutes). In this paper, we construct an agency cost model of the firm in which corporate governance protections, executive compensation levels, and litigation incentives are …


Engineering A Venture Capital Market: Lessons From The American Experience, Ronald J. Gilson Jan 2003

Engineering A Venture Capital Market: Lessons From The American Experience, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

The venture capital market and firms whose creation and early stages were financed by venture capital are among the crown jewels of the American economy. Beyond representing an important engine of macroeconomic growth and job creation, these firms have been a major force in commercializing cutting-edge science, whether through their impact on existing industries as with the radical changes in pharmaceuticals catalyzed by venture-backed firms' commercialization of biotechnology, or by their role in developing entirely new industries as with the emergence of the Internet and World Wide Web. The venture capital market thus provides a unique link between finance and …


Whom (Or What) Does The Organization's Lawyer Represent?: An Anatomy Of Intraclient Conflict, William H. Simon Jan 2003

Whom (Or What) Does The Organization's Lawyer Represent?: An Anatomy Of Intraclient Conflict, William H. Simon

Faculty Scholarship

Professional responsibility issues involving organizational clients are distinctively difficult because organizations consist of constituents with conflicting interests. Legal doctrine has only recently begun to address the effect of internal conflict on a lawyer's responsibilities to an organizational client. Under current doctrine, the lawyer's responsibilities differ strongly depending on whether the representation is characterized as 'joint" representation of the organization 's constituents or "entity" representation. This Article argues that the choice between the two characterizations often has been arbitrary and that the underlying differences between them have been misunderstood. With respect to entity representation, it criticizes a prominent tendency in the …


Controlling Controlling Shareholders, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon Jan 2003

Controlling Controlling Shareholders, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

The rules governing controlling shareholders sit at the intersection of the two facets of the agency problem at the core of public corporations law. The first is the familiar principal-agency problem that arises from the separation of ownership and control. With only this facet in mind, a large shareholder may better police management than the standard panoply of market-oriented techniques. The second is the agency problem that arises between controlling and non-controlling shareholders, which produces the potential for private benefits of control. There is, however, a point of tangency between these facets. Because there are costs associated with holding a …


Employee Stock Ownership After Enron: Proceedings Of The 2003 Annual Meeting, Association Of American Law Schools Section On Employee Benefits, Norman P. Stein, Colleen E. Medill, Susan J. Stabile, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Louis H. Diamond, Damon Silvers, Patricia E. Dilley Jan 2003

Employee Stock Ownership After Enron: Proceedings Of The 2003 Annual Meeting, Association Of American Law Schools Section On Employee Benefits, Norman P. Stein, Colleen E. Medill, Susan J. Stabile, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Louis H. Diamond, Damon Silvers, Patricia E. Dilley

Faculty Scholarship

This session is entitled "Employee Stock Ownership After Enron," and I assume that title has drawn into this room people who know something about either Enron or employee stock, or both. For our purposes, the Enron story has as its focus the Enron 401(k) plan, which was the principal retirement plan for most Enron employees. Employees could make elective contributions to the 401(k) plan, which offered nineteen investment options, one of which was Enron stock. The 401(k) plan also provided that Enron would match employee contributions up to 3 percent of compensation. Enron's match, however, was made in Enron stock. …


Governance Failures Of The Enron Board And The New Information Order Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Jeffrey N. Gordon Jan 2003

Governance Failures Of The Enron Board And The New Information Order Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

Analysis of the corporate governance crisis that manifested itself in the United States at the turn of the millennium requires separating its various strands. The Enron Corporation ("Enron") debacle and the dot corn bubble and collapse, for example, share some common elements but in other ways they are quite different. In both cases investors became aggressively enamored of an unsustainable business model. In the dot com case it was the belief that an innovator in a rapidly growing market could attain powerful first mover advantages that would produce an eventual cascade of profits, so that a current and increasing stream …


The Efficiency Of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets Reality, Zohar Goshen Jan 2003

The Efficiency Of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets Reality, Zohar Goshen

Faculty Scholarship

Corporate self-dealing may be controlled either by legal rules or by the unconstrained forces of the market. The regulatory options include an absolute prohibition on self-dealing, a prohibition on voting with conflicting interests (the "majority of the minority" requirement), and an imposition of fairness duties (the 'fairness test"). Using an economic analysis, this Article presents a unique theoretical framework for evaluating the relative efficiency of the attempts to control self-dealing adopted by five countries: The United States (Delaware in particular), the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and Italy.

The Article's analysis of the self-dealing problem is based on the novel theory …


Local Institutions, Foreign Investment And Alternative Strategies Of Development: Some Views From Practice, Tamara Lothian, Katharina Pistor Jan 2003

Local Institutions, Foreign Investment And Alternative Strategies Of Development: Some Views From Practice, Tamara Lothian, Katharina Pistor

Faculty Scholarship

This Essay summarizes the major insights gained from a panel discussion with legal practitioners about the relevance of local institutions to foreign direct investors. The Essay offers a critique of policy conclusions drawn from empirical studies that suggest a positive correlation between legal institutions and foreign investment flows. It points out that the data used in these studies are far too general to allow policy conclusions and that neither the data nor the policy conclusions are sufficiently attuned to the challenges or opportunities that foreign direct investment projects face on the ground. According to the results of the panel discussion, …


Unregulable Defenses And The Perils Of Shareholder Choice, Jennifer Arlen, Eric L. Talley Jan 2003

Unregulable Defenses And The Perils Of Shareholder Choice, Jennifer Arlen, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

A significant debate rages within corporate law scholarship as to whether shareholders or managers should be granted authority over the tender offer process once a bid is imminent. Both sides generally agree that the issue depends on whether shareholders are capable of exercising informed choice over takeover bids. Supporters of managerial veto power contend that the arguments favoring professional management of publicly held firms carry over into the tender offer context. Proponents of shareholder choice, on the other hand, argue that shareholders can act on their own behalf in the special circumstances surrounding contests for corporate control.

This Article challenges …


Robust Public Debate: Realizing Free Speech In Workplace Representation Elections, Kate Andrias Jan 2003

Robust Public Debate: Realizing Free Speech In Workplace Representation Elections, Kate Andrias

Faculty Scholarship

The First Amendment stands as a guarantor of political freedom and as the “guardian of our democracy.” It seeks to expand the vitality of public discourse in order to enable Americans to become aware of the issues before them and to pursue their ends fully and freely. As the Supreme Court wrote in the canonical case of New York Times Co. v . Sullivan, the First Amendment’s function is to create the “uninhibited, robust and wide-open” public debate necessary for the exercise of self-governance.

The Amendment plays a prominent role in the regulation of workplace representation elections, the process …