Business Organizations Law Commons^™

Socially-Minded Investors And Corporate Behavior, Merritt B. Fox, Menesh S. Patel

Faculty Scholarship

Many equity investors are concerned with the world’s worsening social and environmental problems and are losing faith in the capacity of political institutions to respond. Corporate behavior is often contributing to these problems. Some investors, at least if fully informed as to costs and benefits involved, would favor corrective changes to corporate behavior even where that would lessen their investment returns. Two important questions arise: (1) given existing law, are such willing-to-sacrifice equity investors currently affecting firm behavior; and (2) should there be legal reform that makes firms more sensitive to these willing-to-sacrifice investors’ preferences? This Article seeks to answer …

Validating Valuation: How Statistical Learning Can Cabin Expert Discretion In Valuation Disputes, Andrew C. Baker, Jonah B. Gelbach, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

This article challenges conventional methods used in financial valuation across transactional and litigation domains. We show that conventional valuation methods allow for considerable discretion, making it possible for each side’s experts to submit dramatically varying valuations simply by choosing among facially reasonable values of parameters that must be selected to carry out conventional valuations. We use large-scale empirical simulations powered by real-world data to demonstrate the scope of such discretion. We next consider several alternatives based on data-driven machine learning approaches, and show that they offer both approximately unbiased estimates of valuation and substantially reduced variability in valuation results. Consequently, …

The Coming Privatization Of Corporate Law, Dorothy S. Lund, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

For more than a century, American corporate law has revolved around a simple competitive premise: State governments supply corporate law while companies choose their state of incorporation, and the market rewards the state offering the best corporate law product. Delaware’s longstanding market dominance (especially for public companies) is often explained through the confluence of its unusually attractive institutional package: expert judges, extensive precedent, a specialized bar, an enabling statute, and a legislature that — at least traditionally — treats corporate law as something to be calibrated technocratically rather than politicized.

Sticky Charters? The Surprisingly Tepid Embrace Of Officer-Protecting Waivers In Delaware, Jens Frankenreiter, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

This article examines the response to Delaware’s much-heralded 2022 legal reform that permitted corporations, for the first time, to adopt charter provisions exculpating corporate officers from liability for breaching their fiduciary duty of care. Contrary to widespread predictions that corporate actors would swiftly adopt officer exculpation provisions, our analysis — using both traditional and generative artificial intelligence (AI) methods — reveals a surprisingly low rate of uptake, over three years after the reform’s enactment.

Our study makes both methodological and substantive contributions. Methodologically, we present a novel application of large language models (LLMs) to identify and interpret technical clauses in …

Poor Esg: Regressive Effects Of Climate Stewardship, Zohar Goshen, Assaf Hamdani, Alex Raskolnikov

Faculty Scholarship

The rise of inequality and global warming are the two ultimate challenges of our time. After decades of congressional failure to address climate change, the private sector has stepped in and adopted a set of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) policies as a market-based solution to a public policy failure. ESG advocates hope that corporate executives would save our planet. Where Congress failed, ESG will succeed.

This Article argues that if ESG-driven climate stewardship ever achieves the scale necessary to have a real impact on global warming, it will hurt the poor. Legislative interventions to combat climate change are nearly …

U.S. Shareholder Activism: Convergence With Japan, Nobuhisa Ishizuka

Faculty Scholarship

To many observers long accustomed to slow, incremental change, the current boom in shareholder activism in Japan comes as a surprise. The opening for U.S.-style activists was created by market conditions that eventually resulted in policy changes that attracted significant numbers of foreign investors. However, even the current market would not have emerged without a parallel evolution in U.S. hedge-fund tactics, which gradually shifted over a number of years to a sophisticated and more nuanced approach, one based on partnership and dialogue with target companies, in contrast to adversarial relationships and public campaigns. This article attempts to place current trends …

Flows, Financing Decisions, And Institutional Ownership Of The U.S. Equity Market, Alon Brav, Dorothy S. Lund, Lin Zhao

Faculty Scholarship

This Article analyzes the relationship between flows to institutional investment managers, corporate financing decisions, and institutional ownership of U.S. public equity. In so doing, it provides new evidence about the drivers of institutional investor growth in equity ownership over the past two decades. Contrary to conventional narrative, we find that equity capital flows into the “Big Three” investment managers have slowed in recent years, with substantial differences between each institution. We also present a framework to understand how fund characteristics and corporate actions such as stock buybacks and equity issuances combine to shape the evolution of institutional ownership, including that …

"Activist" Versus "Passive" Investors: A Closer Look At Proxy Contests And The Contemporary Balance Of Advantage, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

The era of the hostile takeover has clearly given way to the era of the proxy contest led by an activist hedge fund. Today, a record number of such contests are underway, and they have changed the board composition at many U.S. companies and caused a record number of CEO resignations. But there is a mystery here: when activist funds negotiate for changes with target managements, they often obtain meaningful changes in the board of directors and corporate policies. However, when activists attempt a proxy contest, they have generally been unsuccessful, winning only a small number of seats in a …

Purpose And Nonprofit Enterprise, Cathy Hwang, Dorothy S. Lund

Faculty Scholarship

Nonprofit enterprise is responsible for a large share of economic activity across the globe. And yet, leading theories fail to explain why nonprofit business survives and even thrives across a vast number of industries, ranging from artificial intelligence to beer brewing, despite an absence of shareholder control. Indeed, as shareholder ownership and intervention rights have become the core component of successful corporate governance, this success is all the more surprising.

This Essay offers a novel “purposeful enterprise” theory to explain the puzzling success of nonprofit enterprises. Drawing on research in behavioral economics and organizational science, it argues that organizational purpose …

Leaving Delaware? The Essential Role Of Specialized Corporate Courts, Zohar Goshen, Tomer S. Stein

Faculty Scholarship

Following the Delaware Court of Chancery’s invalidation of Elon Musk’s fifty-six- billion-dollar compensation package, Tesla moved its incorporation from Delaware to Texas. Shortly thereafter, Delaware’s legislature, seeking to protect Delaware’s dominant incorporation position, passed the most sweeping corporate law amendments in fifty years.

Both supporters of Musk and defenders of Delaware’s judiciary have accused each other of partisanship, but neither side has addressed the central question: What is the role of specialized corporate courts?

This Essay presents a novel theory of why such courts are necessary. Corporate disputes are distinct because they arise within ongoing relationships between shareholders and management, …

Will Systematic Stewardship Save The Planet?, Zohar Goshen, Assaf Hamdani

Faculty Scholarship

The largest institutional investors have solidified their status as “universal owners,” holding almost eighty percent of the U.S. stock market. The growing influence of these investors over the companies they invest in has sparked optimism among scholars and activists that asset managers will use their clout to steer firms towards Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) objectives. But such optimism may be misplaced. Focusing on carbon emission reduction, we argue that universal owners lack the necessary incentives and competence to pressure corporations to lower emissions.

Universal owners market ESG investments with conflicting promises of “doing well while doing good.” The untenable …

Too Many Mergers? The Golden Parachute As A Driver Of M&A Activity In The 21st Century, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

This Article argues that the corporate governance regime in the United States has produced a level of mergers and acquisition activity greater than the social optimum because of the current version of the “golden parachute,” a super-bonus payoff to a target CEO. In the late nineteenth through the twentieth century, M&A activity was characterized by “waves” that reflected adaptations to changing external environment, whether the efficient production frontier, regulatory constraints, or capital market developments. Economically-motivated parties saw the opportunities in changing the boundaries of the firm; successful first-movers spawned imitators, hence a wave, which eventually subsided, often alongside deteriorating capital …

The Past, Present, And Future Of Proxy Voting Choice, Dorothy S. Lund

Faculty Scholarship

This article provides an early attempt at understanding what voluntary pass-through voting could mean for the marketplace. I first provide an overview of my argument in my 2018 Journal of Corporation Law article and the events that followed. I then survey passthrough voting initiatives that have taken hold at three asset managers — BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street. I then conclude with some preliminary observations about how voting choice is likely to affect the proxy voting landscape and outline open questions.

Beyond Issuers: The Future Of Private Securities Litigation, Joshua Mitts

Faculty Scholarship

Private securities litigation has traditionally been viewed as a subfield of corporate governance, reducing agency costs by disciplining wayward management. In this brief Symposium essay, I argue that the future of private securities litigation lies beyond issuers. I discuss how a fraud claim under Rule 10b-5 can be understood as a kind of economic tort, and set out, in broad strokes, an economic analysis of claims against non-issuer defendants. I then consider emerging trends in the case law against non-issuers in social media and market manipulation cases. I conclude by identifying some challenges and opportunities for securities litigation in a …

Toward A Dynamic View Of Corporate Purpose, Dorothy S. Lund

Faculty Scholarship

Scholars debating the corporation’s role in society generally advance the view that there is only one desirable orientation for corporations and their management. Specifically, proponents of a stakeholder governance model contend that focusing management on a broad set of corporate constituents maximizes overall welfare, while advocates of a shareholder-centric directive counter that prioritizing shareholders creates social welfare by rendering the firm most profitable. This Article offers another view: It suggests that the welfare-maximizing purpose for corporations could change depending on external economic conditions, which both of these positions assume away. Specifically, shareholder primacy is likely to promote welfare in a …

Can Section 11 Be Saved?: "Tracing" A Path To Its Survival, John C. Coffee Jr., Joshua Mitts

Faculty Scholarship

Last term, a unanimous Supreme Court held in Slack Techs. v Pirani that purchasers of securities must “trace” their shares to the registration statement that contains the alleged misstatement or omission in order to be able to assert a claim under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. Lawyers and law firms on both sides of the case agreed (with differing emotions) that the decision eclipsed Section 11, which had been the federal securities laws’ strongest litigation remedy for investors. We disagree with this conclusion that Section 11 is doomed, but we recognize the danger. Both in an amicus …

Sex & Startups, Jens Frankenreiter, Talia B. Gillis, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

Private law offers a unique solution to the problem of long-term fiscal commitment. When Congress enacts a spending program that will take many years to reach fruition, there is a risk of a subsequent Congress or President cutting off funding in the interim. There is no escape from the problem within appropriations law itself. One solution, however, is to entrust private sector allies as vessels of long-term commitment. As a matter of political economy, that solution draws on policy-feedback theory. As a matter of law, the solution rests on a mechanism that Congress already uses but has not recognized its …

Fixing Mfw: Fairness And Vision In Controller Self-Dealing, Zohar Goshen, Assaf Hamdani, Dorothy S. Lund

Faculty Scholarship

The legal regime governing controlling shareholders relies on the ability of Delaware courts to police conflicted transactions under the stringent "entire fairness" standard of review. This review involves both implicit valuation – evaluating the transaction process, and explicit valuation – assessing the fairness of the transaction's financial terms. This Article reveals a critical flaw in this regime: courts cannot reliably engage in valuation when the transaction involves an entrepreneur's idiosyncratic vision for the company. As a result, there is a gaping hole in Delaware's framework for policing the fairness of controller transactions.

Delaware courts have developed guardrails to avoid judicial …

Altering Rules: The New Frontier For Corporate Governance, Gabriel Rauterberg, Sarath Sanga

Faculty Scholarship

Corporate law has taken a contractarian turn. Shareholders are increasingly contracting around its foundational rules — statutory rights, the fiduciary duty of loyalty, even the central role of the board — and Delaware courts are increasingly enforcing these contracts. In the one case where they did not, the legislature swiftly overruled the decision and adopted a new statutory provision permitting boards to completely cede their powers to a shareholder by contract. These developments have sparked a polarized debate, with some calling for a return to mandatory rules, while others push for total contractual freedom.

We argue, however, that the best …

Enforcing Legacy Environmental Liabilities For Offshore Oil And Gas Infrastructure, Martin Lockman, Romany M. Webb

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law

For more than a century, American fossil fuel companies have extended their operations offshore to exploit the vast oil and gas reserves that lie under the seafloor. Since 1953, the Department of the Interior (DOI) has operated a complex system of offshore leasing that allows private oil and gas companies to operate in federal waters. DOI’s leasing regime requires companies to plug wells, remove offshore platforms, and generally return their operation sites to a safe and stable condition when their leases end. This process, known as “decommissioning,” can cost tens or hundreds of millions of dollars for each offshore platform. …

The 2023 Merger Guidelines: An Assessment, Herbert Hovenkamp, Tim Wu, James Keyte

Faculty Scholarship

The 2023 Merger Guidelines1 are ten months old, but they still need some unpacking. To help our readers think through the issues that the Guidelines raise, Antitrust magazine asked two experienced legal scholars — Professors Tim Wu and Herbert Hovenkamp — to discuss the Guidelines with Antitrust editorial board member James Keyte. This discussion took place on May 28, 2024. The transcript has been edited for length and readability.

The Surprising Survival – So Far – Of The Corporate Contribution Ban, Richard Briffault

Faculty Scholarship

In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme Court invalidated the longstanding ban on the expenditure of corporate funds in federal election campaigns. In so doing, the Court dismissed outright an argument that had long been the foundation for the restriction of corporate money in election campaigns — that, due to the “substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages which go with the corporate form[,]” corporate money poses a distinct threat to the integrity of democracy. Instead, viewing corporations as essentially “associations of citizens,” Citizens United determined that “the First Amendment does not permit Congress to …

Giant Asset Managers, The Big Three, And Index Investing, Dorothy S. Lund, Adriana Z. Robertson

Faculty Scholarship

A robust literature describes the incentives and stewardship practices of the “Big Three” asset managers (BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street Global Advisors), often referring to these asset managers as “passive.” This is so common that the “Big Three,” “index fund,” and “passive manager” are used almost interchangeably by both academics and practitioners. This shorthand emerged in the foundational scholarship in this area, and while it may remain useful in certain contexts, its casual use obscures important features of the market and contributes to misperceptions. In this chapter, we demonstrate that it is a mistake to equate passive investing with index …

Transaction-Specific Tax Reform In Three Steps: The Case Of Constructive Ownership, Thomas J. Brennan, David M. Schizer

Faculty Scholarship

Similar investments are often taxed differently, rendering our system less efficient and fair. In principle, fundamental reforms could solve this problem, but they face familiar obstacles. So instead of major surgery, Congress usually responds with a Band-Aid, denying favorable treatment to some transactions, while preserving it for others. These loophole-plugging rules have become a staple of tax reform in recent years. But unfortunately, they often are ineffective or even counterproductive. How can Congress do better? As a case study, we analyze Section 1260, which targets a tax-advantaged way to invest in hedge funds. This analysis is especially timely because a …

Esg As A Test Case For The Convergence Thesis In Corporate Law: Notes From India, Rudresh Mandal

LL.M. Essays & Theses

This paper uses four concepts key to the ESG agenda – investor stewardship codes, corporate purpose, independent directors and ESG disclosures – to examine which way the corporate convergence pendulum is swinging in India. It finds that none of the aforesaid concepts are examples of perfect convergence or perfect divergence. Instead, they lie somewhere in the convergence-divergence matrix – India’s investor stewardship codes and framework on independent directors are examples of formal convergence but functional divergence, and her corporate law provisions on corporate purpose and ESG disclosure are functionally convergent, but formally divergent. The dichotomies in the analysis are explained …

Public Primacy In Corporate Law, Dorothy S. Lund

Faculty Scholarship

This Article explores the malleability of agency theory by showing that it could be used to justify a “public primacy” standard for corporate law that would direct fiduciaries to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of the public. Employing agency theory to describe the relationship between corporate management and the broader public sheds light on aspects of firm behavior, as well as the nature of state contracting with corporations. It also provides a lodestar for a possible future evolution of corporate law and governance: minimize the agency costs created by the divergence of interests between management and …

"Don't Go Chasing Waterfalls": Fiduciary Duties In Venture Capital Backed Startups, Sarath Sanga, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

We develop a model of venture capital contracting and use it to evaluate an emergent set of judicial precedents in corporate law, which we label the Trados doctrine. In our model, founders hold common stock, while venture capital investors hold convertible preferred stock. We show that preferred shareholders have inefficient incentives to liquidate low-valued firms and to continue high-valued firms, while common shareholders inefficiently favor the opposite. The extent of incentive misalignment depends on the firm’s intrinsic and outside valuations, and it is most severe around preferred shareholders’ liquidation preference and conversion point. Although legal liability rules can rectify these …

Is Corporate Law Nonpartisan?, Ofer Eldar, Gabriel Rauterberg

Faculty Scholarship

Only rarely does the United States Supreme Court hear a case with fundamental implications for corporate law. In Carney v. Adams, however, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to address whether the State of Delaware’s requirement of partisan balance for its judiciary violates the First Amendment. Although the Court disposed of the case on other grounds, Justice Sotomayor acknowledged that the issue “will likely be raised again.” The stakes are high because most large businesses are incorporated in Delaware and thus are governed by its corporate law. Former Delaware governors and chief justices lined up to defend the state’s …

Systematic Stewardship: It's Up To The Shareholders – A Response To Profs. Kahan And Rock, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

As the author of an article entitled “Systematic Stewardship,” I read Professors Kahan and Rock’s article “Systematic Stewardship with Tradeoffs” (K&R) with considerable interest. I acknowledge the limits on deep asset manager engagement with sources of systematic risk in light of present institutional arrangements and the politics of the moment. Yet I think the most important move in the K&R analysis — the privileging of a “single firm focus” in corporate law instead of a “portfolio firm focus” — simply doesn’t account for the evolution that has already occurred in law and practice.

Long before the development of index funds, …

Publicizing Corporate Secrets, Christopher J. Morten

Faculty Scholarship

Federal regulatory agencies in the United States hold a treasure trove of valuable information essential to a functional society. Yet little of this immense and nominally “public” resource is accessible to the public. That worrying phenomenon is particularly true for the valuable information that agencies hold on powerful private actors. Corporations regularly shield vast swaths of the information they share with federal regulatory agencies from public view, claiming that the information contains legally protected trade secrets (or other proprietary “confidential commercial information”). Federal agencies themselves have largely acceded to these claims and even fueled them, by construing restrictively various doctrines …