Business Organizations Law Commons^™

Explaining The Value Of Transactional Lawyering, Steven L. Schwarcz

ExpressO

This article attempts, empirically, to explain the value that lawyers add when acting as counsel to parties in business transactions. Contrary to existing scholarship, which is based mostly on theory, this article shows that transactional lawyers add value primarily by reducing regulatory costs, thereby challenging the reigning models of transactional lawyers as “transaction cost engineers” and “reputational intermediaries.” This new model not only helps inform contract theory but also reveals a profoundly different vision than existing models for the future of legal education and the profession.

Compensation Representatives: A Prudent Solution To Excessive Ceo Pay, Lawton W. Hawkins

ExpressO

Currently, CEO pay is determined by a company’s board of directors, subject to limited shareholder approval in certain circumstances. However, as Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried have demonstrated, boards of directors and CEOs do not necessarily engage in real arms length bargaining over CEO pay. Instead, CEOs may exert managerial power to extract economic rents above and beyond what they could have obtained in an arms length negotiation. To address the problem, Bebchuk and Fried have proposed that large shareholders be allowed to nominate candidates for the board, and that companies be required to pay the expenses for any proxy …

The Corporate Governance Industry, Paul Rose

ExpressO

This paper considers the role of the corporate governance industry as a voluntary regulator. The corporate governance industry influences (and in some cases effectively controls) the vote of trillions of dollars of equity, and affects the governance policies and fortunes of thousands of companies through proxy voting recommendations and governance ratings. This paper considers the increasing influence of the corporate governance industry, and argues that potential conflicts of interest within some governance firms cast doubt on the reliability of their proxy advice and governance ratings. Additionally, governance firms may be overstepping their expertise in proxy voting decisions and in governance …

Corporate Governance And The New Hedge Fund Activism: An Empirical Analysis, Thomas W. Briggs

ExpressO

Hedge funds are not normal institutional investors. They launch proxy fights for corporate control. Their recent successes and wolf pack tactics have garnered headlines but leave us with a question: what does hedge fund activism mean for corporate governance in the United States? This Article undertakes a legal, empirical, and theoretical study in an effort to answer this questioin. The heart of the Article is an empirical study of obtainable instances of hedge fund activism during 2005 and the 2006 proxy season. The Article starts by showing that the SEC opened the door to hedge fund activism when it stopped …

Reassessing Damages In Securities Fraud Class Actions, Elizabeth C. Burch

ExpressO

No coherent doctrinal statement exists for calculating open-market damages for securities fraud class actions. Instead, courts have tried in vain to fashion common-law deceit and misrepresentation remedies to fit open-market fraud. The result is a relatively ineffective system with a hallmark feature: unpredictable damage awards. This poses a significant fraud deterrence problem from both a practical and a theoretical standpoint.

In 2005, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to clarify open-market damage principles and to facilitate earlier dismissal of cases without compensable economic losses. Instead, in Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, it further confused the damage issue by (1) perpetuating the …

The Case Against Mandatory Annual Director Elections And Shareholders' Meetings, William K. Sjostrom

ExpressO

The article examines the mandatory requirement under state corporate law and stock exchange listing standards that public corporations hold annual shareholders’ meetings for the election of directors. Specifically, I question the value of requiring corporations to (1) elect directors annually, and (2) hold shareholders’ meetings annually. I critique the various justifications for these requirements and find none of them persuasive. I then explore a different approach taken by Minnesota with respect to the frequency of director elections and shareholders’ meetings and conclude that the approach is superior to the current scheme. Recognizing, however, that any less strict state approach is …

Ringing The Bell On The Nyse: Might A Nonprofit Stock Exchange Have Been Efficient?, Stephen F. Diamond

ExpressO

Abstract

This spring the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (Exchange or NYSE) completed an historic restructuring. On March 7, 2006, the NYSE completed its merger with Archipelago Holdings Inc. (Archipelago), a publicly traded electronic trading platform. As a result, the old NYSE itself became the New York Stock Exchange LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of NYSE Group, Inc. (NYSE Group). The former members, or seat holders, of the NYSE received one of three forms of consideration: all cash, all stock in NYSE Group, or a package of cash and stock. The NYSE Group then allowed those former members to offer …

Bond Repudiation, Tax Codes, The Appropriations Process And Restitution Post-Eminent Domain Reform, John H. Ryskamp

ExpressO

This brief comment suggests where the anti-eminent domain movement might be heading next.

Dialectical Regulation, Robert B. Ahdieh

Faculty Scholarship

While theories of regulation abound, woefully inadequate attention has been given to growing patterns of "intersystemic" and "dialectical" regulation in the world today. In this rapidly expanding universe of interactions, independent regulatory agencies, born of autonomous jurisdictions, nonetheless face a combination of jurisdictional overlap with, and regulatory dependence on, one another. Here, the cross-jurisdictional interaction of regulators is no longer the voluntary interaction embraced by transnationalists; it is, instead, an unavoidable reality of acknowledgement and engagement, potentially culminating in the integration of discrete sets of regulatory rules into a collective whole.

Such patterns of regulatory engagement are increasingly evident, across …

Take It Slow: A Novel Concept In The Life Of Sarbanes-Oxley, D. Skylar Rosenbloom

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect Of Corporate Deal Structures, Victor Fleischer

Michigan Law Review

Consider the unusual legal structures of the following four deals: When Google went public in 2004, it used an Internet auction to sell its stock to shareholders. When Ben & Jerry's went public in 1984, it sold its stock only to Vermont residents. Steve Jobs's contract with Apple entitles him to an annual cash salary of exactly one dollar. Stanley Works, a Connecticut toolmaker, considered reincorporating in Bermuda to reduce its tax liability. Under public pressure, it changed its mind and remains legally incorporated in Connecticut. What do these deals have in common? In each case, the legal infrastructure of …

Megasubsidiaries And Asset Sales Under Section 271: Which Shareholders Must Approve Subsidiary Asset Sales, Yaman Shukairy

Michigan Law Review

Corporate law statutes determine the nature of the relationship between shareholders, the principal owners of the corporation, and the board of directors, those w ho run and operate the corporation. Under the Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL"), many of the powers are delegated to the board of directors. More specifically, under section 141, "the business and affairs of every corporation . . . [are] managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . ." The Delaware courts have interpreted this provision by deferring to decisions by directors and their designated management under the business judgment …

The Chameleon Effect: Beyond The Bonding Hypothesis For Cross-Listed Securities, Cally Jordan

ExpressO

This paper is based on a presentation made at the New York Stock Exchange Conference on the Future of Global Equity Trading, March 12, 2004, Sarasota, FL.

Looking back, was it a momentary enthusiasm? The dramatic increase in cross-listed securities, particularly in the United States, was one of the remarkable phenomena of the 1990s capital markets. The bonding, or corporate governance, hypothesis was one of the more intriguing theories to surface to explain the phenomenon. Cross-listing, the hypothesis suggested, might be a bonding mechanism by which firms, incorporated in a jurisdiction with “weak protection” of minority shareholder rights or poor …

Managing Risk On A $25 Million Bet: Venture Capital, Agency Costs, And The False Dichotomy Of The Corporation, Robert P. Bartlett Iii

ExpressO

An implicit dichotomy of the corporation exists in legal scholarship. On one side of the dichotomy rests the publicly-held corporation suffering from a significant conflict of interest between its managers and dispersed shareholders; on the other side, the closely-held corporation plagued by inter-shareholder conflict.

This Article argues that understanding the agency problems that can exist within a firm demands a rejection of this traditional dichotomy and the theories of the firm built upon it. Using venture capital finance, this Article demonstrates for the first time how this dichotomy obscures how all firms - public and private - often face the …

Realigning The Corporate-Stockholder Relationship: Facilitating Stockholder Communications During Active Proxy Solicitations, Michael Burgoyne

Vanderbilt Law Review

The bankruptcy of the Enron Corporation in December of 2001 "sent shock waves throughout the country" that forced both Wall Street and the average investor to rethink our system of corporate governance. WorldCom, the second-largest long distance carrier in the United States, topped Enron by filing an even larger bankruptcy in 2002 with pre-petition assets estimated at a staggering $103,914,000,000. Although these were two of the largest bankruptcy filings in United States history, Enron and WorldCom were merely the tip of the iceberg. Similar scandals at Adelphia Communications, Arthur Andersen, Global Crossing, HealthSouth, Qwest, Rite Aid, Tyco, and Xerox represent …

Doing Deals In Japan: An Analysis Of Recent Trends & Developments For The U.S. Practitioner, Christopher T. Hines, Tatsuya Tanigawa, Andrew P. Hughes

ExpressO

This article examines the process which is currently being played out in Japan by: (i) analyzing the recent changes in Japanese law of relevance to M&A deals, (ii) discussing some recent contested deals in Japan that may shed some light on current market practices, and (iii) providing an overview of the key issues that a U.S. practitioner will likely face when working on a Japanese deal…A good starting point in better understanding the remarkable changes in the Japanese M&A markets is to review the recent amendments to Japanese law, certain policy initiatives by the functional regulators, and other guidelines issued …

Voluntary Adoption Of Corporate Governance Mechanisms, Anita I. Anand, Frank Milne, Lynnette Purda

ExpressO

We examine the extent to which firms adopt recommended but not required corporate governance guidelines and establish that firms voluntarily implement suggested domestic best practices and the mandatory practices of neighboring countries as well. Drawing on the intuition of a principal-agent model in which the entrepreneur cannot fund all positive NPV projects, we hypothesize that access to capital is a primary determinant of the willingness of firms to voluntarily adopt corporate governance mechanisms. Our empirical results provide significant evidence that firms voluntarily adopt corporate governance guidelines. These results suggest that global competition for capital encourages firms to voluntarily adopt governance …

Manipulative Behavior In Auction Ipos, Mira Ganor

ExpressO

Book-building, the prevailing method for initial public offerings (IPOs), is widely considered flawed, because it results in stock under-pricing. Auction-IPO, on the other hand, is considered, by conventional wisdom, an alternative method that will eliminate the under-pricing. This paper shows how, contrary to customary belief, auction-IPOs may well result in under-pricing. In auction-IPOs, the under-pricing of the stock price is induced by undetected investors’ manipulative strategic behavior. I analyze the requirements for such strategic behavior in a linear model. To reduce investors’ incentive to manipulate their bid in the auction, this paper proposes to restrict auction participants from trading in …

Who Will Control Frankenstein?: The Korean Chaebol's Corporate Governance, Jeong Seo

Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law

In a chaebol, because a dominant family exercises control with only a small equity-holding, a sharp disparity exists between cashflow rights and voting rights. The controller reduces managerial agency costs but creates his own agency costs. Furthermore, the disparity exacerbates the controller's agency costs. Outsider shareholders' voting rights are ineffectual in eradicating this problem. Therefore, external monitoring devices over the chaebol controller are required.

Korea has relied on government regulation-including attempts to change chaebols' ownership structures-to address this problem. Unfortunately, without well-functioning capital markets, the regulation has proved ineffective. As observed in the SK scandal, a market for …

The Substantive Limits Of Liability For Inaccurate Predictions, Hugh C. Beck

ExpressO

In 1995, Congress enacted a statutory safe harbor to encourage companies to disclose more forward-looking information. Unfortunately, the case law interpreting the safe harbor has failed to yield intelligible standards for evaluating allegations of fraudulent forward-looking statements. As a result, companies have been reluctant to increase disclosures of forward-looking information and the legislation’s ultimate objective - to enhance allocative efficiency - has not been met. The article argues that two characteristics of the pre-1995 development of regulatory and judicial approaches to forward-looking information are primarily responsible for the continuing confusion in this area of the law. The first is a …

Enron And The Special Purpose Entity. Use Or Abuse? The Real Problem - The Real Focus, Neal F. Newman

ExpressO

In December of 2001, Enron Corporation filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code; one of the largest corporate bankruptcy filings at that time. When the investigations commenced and the tangled Enron web was unraveled, it was discovered that Enron had perpetrated a very sophisticated form of accounting fraud through its repeated use of what are referred to as Special Purpose Entities (“SPEs”). In their most basic forms, SPEs are business entities formed for the purpose of conducting a well specified activity such as construction of a gas pipeline, or collection of a specific group of accounts …

The Dutch Auction Myth, Peter B. Oh

ExpressO

The initial public offering process is under assault. Critics of this process have woven a complex set of interconnected objections to the orthodox method for conducting IPOs, pricing of shares, and allocating them to preferred investors. These critics instead point to online auctions as an alternative IPO method that can provide more equitable access, efficient prices, and egalitarian allocations. These claims rest on Google’s recent IPO and W.R. Hambrecht + Co.’s OpenIPO mechanism, conventionally regarded as impure variants of what is known as a descending-bid or Dutch auction (Dutch IPO).

This article assesses the empirical and theoretical case for Dutch …

Sarbanes-Oxley Act Of 2002: Are Multi-National Corporations Unduly Burdened?, William Alan Nelson

ExpressO

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted by Congress in response to the frauds perpetrated by several large U.S. companies; Enron and WorldCom were the main catalysts for the swift regulatory response. Though the primary impetus of Sarbanes-Oxley was to deter corruption domestically, its impact has had multinational reach. Problems arise when foreign corporations domiciled outside the United States are subject to both U.S. securities law and the laws of their home country, particularly when the laws are in conflict. This five part comment examines the effect that the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 has had on multinational corporations. The comment begins by …

Entrenched Managers & Corporate Social Responsibility, Shane M. Shelley

ExpressO

A growing number of academics have suggested U.S. corporate governance laws bestow too much power on managers. Much of the research focuses on the relationship between corporate governance arrangements, which supply a means to managerial power, and the financial performance of corporations. This exclusive focus on financial performance may be misguided. Although profits serve as a proxy for the benefits corporations provide society, they do not always adequately reflect the costs of the activities that generated them. In this sense, financial performance may not give an accurate, or at least complete, picture of the real value of corporations. Whether managers …

Overvalued Equity And The Case For An Asymmetric Insider Trading Regime, Thomas A. Lambert

ExpressO

The forty-year debate over whether insider trading should be regulated has generally proceeded in all-or-nothing terms: Either all insider trading should be permitted (subject only to private restrictions imposed by issuers themselves), or none should. This Article argues for an asymmetric insider trading policy under which insider trading that decreases the price of an overvalued stock is generally permitted, but insider trading that increases the price of an undervalued stock is generally prohibited. Concluding that the net investor benefits of price-decreasing insider trading exceed those of price-enhancing insider trading, the Article argues that an asymmetric insider trading regime likely represents …

The Marginal Incentive Of Insider Trading: An Economic Reinterpretation Of The Case Law, Kristoffel R. Grechenig

ExpressO

Commentators on insider trading are divided into two camps, one in favor of regulation, the other in favor of deregulation. The arguments for the two positions are manifold but not irreconcilable. I show that important gains to social welfare come with insider trading on negative information (sales), whereas losses often result from the use of positive information (purchases). Thus, I look at a regulation that allows insiders to use negative but not positive non-public information. Because positive information will be disclosed much sooner than negative information, the marginal incentive (and marginal gain to social welfare, respectively) of insider trading as …

Equal Treatment Of Foreign Shareholders In Transnational Securities Class Action Against A Foreign Issuer—A Chinese Example, Clark Yao

ExpressO

As the world economy and financial markets become increasingly more integrated, cross-boarder securities transaction becomes a daily event. Because Unite States has the world’s largest and arguably most liquid capital markets, it has attracted a significant number of foreign companies to cross-list their stocks in a U.S. stock exchange. Unavoidably, such transactions will not only bring out fortune, but also disputes between transacting parties. Relying on the powerful federal securities law , U.S. investors who have bought or sold such stocks have routinely sued foreign stock issuers through class action when the stock prices went down, alleging their loss is …

Legislation And Legitimation: Congress And Insider Trading In The 1980s, Thomas W. Joo

ExpressO

Legislation and Legitimation:

Congress and Insider Trading in the 1980s

Abstract

Orthodox corporate law-and-economics holds that American corporate and securities regulation has evolved inexorably toward economic efficiency. That position is difficult to square with the fact that regulation is the product of government actors and institutions. Indeed, the rational behavior assumptions of law-and-economics suggest that those actors and institutions would tend to place their own self-interest ahead of economic efficiency. This article provides anecdotal evidence of such self-interest at work. Based on an analysis of legislative history—primarily Congressional hearings—this article argues that Congress had little interest in the economic policy …

Comparative Corporate Governance: Irish, American, And European Responses To Corporate Scandals, Manish Gupta

ExpressO

A comparative review of legislative reactions to corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom. This paper examines American, Irish, and European Union legislation meant to deal with regulating corporations.

Strengthening Investor Confidence In Europe: U.S.-Style Securities Class Actions And The Acquis Communautaire, Stefano M. Grace

Florida State University Journal of Transnational Law & Policy

No abstract provided.