Business Organizations Law Commons^™

Enron And The Corporate Lawyer: A Primer On Legal And Ethical Issues, Roger C. Cramton

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The stunning collapse of Enron, coupled with the large number of accounting irregularities and apparent corporate fraud, have created a climate in which reform and improvement of the law governing corporate lawyers is underway. The ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility has issued a preliminary report that recommends promising changes in the rules of professional conduct. And, the Corporate Reform Act of 2002 has changed the landscape by authorizing the SEC to promulgate rules of professional conduct for securities lawyers and directing the SEC to issue a rule requiring securities lawyers to climb the corporate ladder to prevent or rectify …

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act As Confirmation Of Recent Trends In Director And Officer Fiduciary Obligations, Lisa M. Fairfax

Faculty Scholarship

This Article argues that, instead of dramatically altering the responsibilities of corporate officers and directors, Sarbanes-Oxley confirms at least some case law and other recent articulations of management’s fiduciary duty. At a minimum, recent allegations regarding corporate misconduct may suggest some degree of confusion on the pat of corporate officers and directors about the manner in which they should comply with their fiduciary duty. By requiring more exacting standards of conduct from these corporate agents, Sarbanes-Oxley may not only clear up that confusion, but also may represent a natural extension of recent pronouncements by Delaware courts, the SEC and other …

Another Look At 401(K) Plan Investments In Employer Securities, 35 J. Marshall L. Rev. 539 (2002), Susan J. Stabile

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

And The Winner Is - Interpreting The Lead Plaintiff And The Lead Counsel Provisions Of The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Of 1995, Ashe P. Puri

Villanova Law Review (1956 - )

No abstract provided.

The Sec's Suspension And Bar Powers In Perspective, Jayne W. Barnard

Faculty Publications

Enron has brought about demands from many quarters to grant the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) new powers. Among the powers the SEC now seeks is the power to bar or suspend securities law violators from serving as an oflicer or director of any public company. Currently, the law assigns this power only to federal district courts. In this Essay, Professor Barnard traces the history of the current law; examining why Congress has expressly withheld suspension and bar powers from the SEC. She then argues that the courts have exercised their suspension and bar powers wisely, and that recent developments …

The Globalization Of Corporate And Securities Law: An Introduction To A Symposium, And An Essay On The Need For A Little Humility When Exporting One's Corporate Law, Franklin A. Gevurtz

McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles

No abstract provided.

The Investor Confidence Game, Lynn A. Stout

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Academic discussions of securities policy often assume that investors are hyperrational and distrustful actors who do not need the protections of the securities laws to avoid being defrauded. The time has come to recognize the limitations of this assumption and to consider as well the possibility and implications of investor trust. Experienced policymakers and businesspeople (and certainly experienced con artists) have long known that trust is a potent force in explaining and manipulating investor behavior. They are right. They are right to believe that investor confidence-meaning investor trust-is important to the market. They are right to think that trust has …

Don't Call Me A Securities Law Groupie: The Rise And Possible Demise Of The Group Pleading Protocol In 10b-5 Cases, William O. Fisher

Law Faculty Publications

Corporations often speak through documents. Some, like press releases, may not identify an author. Others, like 10-Ks, bear the signatures of many who did not write them but sign as required by law. In many cases, groups of individuals, working together, prepare these documents. When such documents contain misstatements, plaintiffs may not know initially who wrote them. To address this difficulty, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Second Circuits created a judge-made pleading protocol. This protocol permits plaintiffs to name officers, and in some cases directors, as defendants in securities fraud cases without pleading specific facts to …

Unocal Fifteen Year Later (And What We Can Do About It), Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

The coincidence of the new millennium and the fifteenth anniversary of the Delaware Supreme Court's announcement of a new approach to takeover law provides an occasion to evaluate a remarkable experiment in corporate law – the Delaware Supreme Court's development of an intermediate standard of review for appraising defensive tactics. This assessment reveals that Unocal has developed into an unexplained and likely inexplicable preference that control contests be resolved through elections rather than through market transactions. In doing so, the remarkable struggle between the chancery court and the supreme court for Unocal's soul is canvassed. The author also maintains that …

Tax Constraints On Indexed Options, David M. Schizer

Faculty Scholarship

Indexed stock option grants reward executives for outperforming a benchmark, such as the market as a whole or competitors in the same industry. These options offer superior incentives by limiting the influence of factors beyond an executive's control, such as general market and industry conditions. Yet indexed options are almost never used. Professor Saul Levmore seeks to explain this puzzle with norms. This comment on his article argues that tax plays a larger role in this puzzle than he acknowledges, although tax is not a complete explanation. Accounting and Professor Levmore's norms-based account are then briefly considered.

Company Registration And The Private Placement Exemption, Merritt B. Fox

Faculty Scholarship

Over the last twenty years, there has been a steady shift in securities disclosure regulation away from its traditional transactional basis toward a system of company registration. Under the transaction based approach, each new public offering of a security has to be registered under the Securities Act of 1933 (the "1933 Act"), a requirement that reflects the SEC's traditional concern that the most important time to have high-quality disclosure is at the moment of a securities offering. Under the company registration approach, an established, publicly traded issuer would register just once, provide information thereafter on a periodic basis, and then …

Limited Liability Companies In The Decade Of The 1990'S. Legislative And Case Law Developments And Their Implications For The Future, Charles W. Murdock

Faculty Publications & Other Works

No abstract provided.

Do Norms Matter?: A Cross-Country Evaluation, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

This Article starts with the recognition that the average private benefits of control vary significantly across countries. But why? The simplest explanation ascribes this variation to differences in law between jurisdictions: for example, the law of jurisdiction X could privilege controlling shareholders by allowing them to extract benefits from their corporation in the form of above-market salaries or non-pro-rata payments in connection with self-dealing transactions. But, this explanation cannot fit all cases. To illustrate, if the substantive law is essentially similar between two jurisdictions while the private benefits of control appear to be significantly different, then some other explanation must …

Seeking Sunlight In Santa Fe's Shadow: The Sec's Pursuit Of Managerial Accountability, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

My aim in this paper is not to justify at length an expansive "new corporation law" perspective, though I do believe in it. Nor do I want to try to resolve a controversial question that the new learning admittedly leaves open: which jurisdictional body should set the disclosure and antifraud standards insofar as they are designed to promote better corporate governance? To say that corporate and securities law are largely unitary does not necessarily mean that centralization of authority in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) is the right choice. Perhaps the states, foreign countries, or stock exchanges …

Looking A Gift Horse In The Mouth: An Analysis Of Free Internet Stock Offerings, Joel Michael Schwarz

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

How much should an investor pay for one share of stock in Yahoo? Or a share of stock in America Online? As publicly traded companies, one need only consult the stock charts in any local newspaper to determine the value the market has placed on these shares. Despite what many Internet sector analysts have professed to be astronomically high valuations, these publicly traded companies possess easily verifiable valuations determined by the free market forces that constitute the building blocks of our economy, and safeguarded by the oversight of federal regulators such as the Securities & Exchange Commission ("SEC"). But what …

The Determinants Of Shareholder Voting On Stock Option Plans, Randall S. Thomas, Kenneth J. Martin

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Over the past decade, executive compensation has become a controversial topic. Increasingly, corporate boards of directors are confronted by angry shareholder groups over the size and composition of executive pay packages. One of the most important focal points for these tensions arises when shareholders are asked by the board to approve the creation of new stock option plans, or the amendment of existing plans. This article seeks to identify the factors that lead shareholders to support or oppose stock option plans. We examine the justifications for the widespread use of stock options and identify several benefits from stock option plans …

Corporate Governance In The Former Soviet Union: The Failure Of The Self-Enforcing Model, J. Robert Brown Jr., Kostyantyn Shkurupiy

Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship

With the fall of the Soviet Union, a number of newly independent countries emerged, many of them attempting to put in place market based institutions and legal regimes. A number of corporate scholars from the United States participated in the development of these legal regimes. In the area of corporate law, problems arose from poor draftsmanship, lack of adequate expertise and institutions, poorly functioning courts, the problem of hold over directors from the Soviet period, and corruption. As a result of these and other factors, traditional corporate statutes of the type used in most developed countries did not work effectively. …

The Direction Of Corporate Law: The Scholars' Perspective, John C. Coffee Jr., Richard A. Booth Marbury Research Professor Of Law, R. Franklin Balotti, David C. Mcbride, Edward P. Welch

Faculty Scholarship

Transcript of a panel on a scholar's approach to corporation law.

Convergence And Its Critics: What Are The Preconditions To The Separation Of Ownership And Control?, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Recent commentary has argued that deep and liquid securities markets and a dispersed shareholder base are unlikely to develop in civil law countries and transitional economies for a variety of reasons, including (1) the absence of adequate legal protections for minority shareholder, (2) the inability of dispersed shareholders to hold control or pay an equivalent control premium to that which a prospective controlling shareholder will pay and (3) the political vulnerability of dispersed shareholder ownership in left-leaning "social democracies." Nonetheless, this article finds that significant movement in the direction of dispersed ownership has occurred and is accelerating across Europe. To …

Executives And Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation Of Incentive Compatibility, David M. Schizer

Faculty Scholarship

Options are granted to executives to inspire better performance by tying pay to the employer's stock price. Yet this incentive rationale no longer holds if executives can use the derivatives market to simulate a sale of their options, a practice known as hedging. This Article evaluates the effectiveness of existing legal constraints on hedging by executives, including limits derived from contract, securities and tax law. Although investment bankers have been searching for ways around these constraints, the bottom line is that, at least for now, executives are unable to hedge option grants: While contractual limits are rare, the securities law …

Teaching Corporate Law From An Option Perspective, Peter H. Huang

Publications

No abstract provided.

The "Possession Vs. Use" Debate In The Context Of Securities Trading By Traditional Insiders: Why Silence Can Never Be Golden, Donna M. Nagy

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Traditional insiders occupy a very special position in the scheme of federal securities regulation. However, in a misguided quest for a single answer to the possession vs. use debate, courts, commentators, and even the SEC have tended to marginalize the significant differences between traditional insiders and other securities traders who may possess material nonpublic information. In the aftermath of the circuit court decisions in United States v. Smith and Securities and Exchange Commission v. Adler, courts and the SEC should follow a categorical approach in addressing the possession vs. use question, and should recognize that silence can never be golden …

Required Disclosure And Corporate Governance, Merritt B. Fox

Faculty Scholarship

One of the most distinctive features of U.S. business law is the stringent requirements of ongoing disclosure imposed on issuers of publicly traded securities. This scheme usually has been justified as necessary to protect investors from making poor trading decisions as a result of being uninformed. Little scholarly attention, however, has been paid to the corporate governance effects of such required disclosure. In analyzing these effects, this article concludes that required disclosure can improve corporate governance in important ways. Indeed, improving corporate governance, not investor protection, provides the most persuasive justification for imposing on issuers the obligation to provide ongoing …

Why The Law Hates Speculators: Regulation And Private Ordering In The Market For Otc Derivatives, Lynn A. Stout

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

A wide variety of statutory and common law doctrines in American law evidence hostility towards speculation. Conventional economic theory, however, generally views speculation as an efficient form of trading that shifts risk to those who can bear it most easily and improves the accuracy of market prices. This Article reconciles the apparent conflict between legal tradition and economic theory by explaining why some forms of speculative trading may be inefficient. It presents a heterogeneous expectations model of speculative trading that offers important insights into antispeculation laws in general, and the ongoing debate concerning over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives in particular.

Although trading …

Privatization And Corporate Governance: The Lessons From Securities Market Failure, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Should privatization be "fast" or "slow"? Should policymakers adopt a "Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead" approach that accepts the inevitability of some overreaching by controlling shareholders, but justifies this cost as necessary to realize and expedite the efficiency gains incident to privatization? Or should privatization proceed more cautiously because of the risks of market failure and political corruption that may result when control seekers are tempted to bribe and seduce the judicial and regulatory systems to achieve the private benefit of control? These tempting private benefits arise, of course, precisely to the extent that privatization preceded the creation of …

Shareholder Derivative Litigation And Corporate Governance, Mark J. Loewenstein

Publications

In approving settlements of derivative actions that include fees for plaintiff's attorney, courts typically announce that attorney's fees are approved if a substantial benefit is obtained. In fact, courts, particularly Delaware courts, approve settlements in shareholder derivative actions that included substantial fees for plaintiff's attorney, despite the absence of a corresponding benefit to the corporation. Frequently, the "benefit" obtained is a reform in corporate governance, which is of dubious value to the corporation. To deter frivolous litigation, courts should resist the temptation to approve these settlements just to dispose of the litigation. The paper concludes that fees should not be …

Modern Partnership Interests As Securities: The Effect Of Rupa, Rulpa, And Llp Statutes On Investment Contract Analysis, James B. Porter

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism By Labor Unions, Stewart J. Schwab, Randall S. Thomas

Michigan Law Review

Labor unions are active again - but this time as capitalists. The potential strength of union pension funds has long been noted, but until recently unions have held their stock passively or invested in union-friendly companies. In the 1990s, however, unions have become the most aggressive of all institutional shareholders. In most cases, it is hard to find a socialist or proletarian plot in what unions are doing with their shares. Rather, labor activism is a model for any large institutional investor attempting to maximize return on capital. Unions, union pension funds, individual union members, and labor-oriented investment funds are …

State Securities Litigation May No Longer Be A Class Act: Federal Preemption Looms On The Horizon, Susan J. Becker

Law Faculty Articles and Essays

State courhouse doors may soon be closed to class actions by shareholders of nationally traded stocks seeking redress for alleged misstatements and omissions in the issuer's financial forecasts.

Reframing The Misappropriation Theory Of Insider Trading Liability: A Post-O'Hagan Suggestion, Donna M. Nagy

Articles by Maurer Faculty

For almost two decades, the United States Supreme Court was silent as to the validity of the so-called 'fraud on the source" misappropriation theory of insider trading liability. This changed in June 1997 when the theory received a resounding endorsement from the Court in United States v. O'Hagan.

Critics of O'Hagan have argued that the Court's decision reaches too far. However, this Article contends that the Court actually endorsed a theory that does not reach far enough. By analyzing and critiquing the reasoning of the majority opinion in O'Hagan, this Article demonstrates that the Court's unnecessarily restrictive misappropriation theory will …