Business Organizations Law Commons^™

"Special," Vestigial, Or Visionary? What Banking Regulation Tells Us About The Corporation—And Vice Versa, Robert C. Hockett, Saule T. Omarova

Seattle University Law Review

A remarkable yet seldom noted set of parallels exists between modern U.S. bank regulation, on the one hand, and what used to be garden-variety American corporate law, on the other hand. For example, just as bank charters are matters not of right but of conditional privilege even today, so were all corporate charters not long ago. Just as chartered banks are authorized to engage only in limited, enumerated activities even today, so were all corporations restricted not long ago. And just as banks are subject to strict capital regulation even today, so were all corporations not long ago. In this …

What Might Replace The Modern Corporation? Uberization And The Web Page Enterprise, Gerald F. Davis

Seattle University Law Review

The number of public corporations in the United States has been in decline for almost twenty years. Alternative forms of organization, from LLCs and benefit corporations to Linux and Wikipedia, provide robust competition to traditional corporations, while short-lived, project-based enterprises that assemble supply chains from available parts are increasingly cost effective. Yet our understanding of corporate governance has not kept pace with the new organization of the economy and we continue to treat the public corporation with dispersed ownership as the default form of doing business. Meanwhile, many of the corporations going public in recent years have abandoned traditional standards …

The Rhetoric Of Negative Externalities, Claire A. Hill

Seattle University Law Review

Negative externalities are costs imposed on third parties. The paradigmatic example is pollution. A firm manufactures a product that generates toxic waste, and dumps the waste; society pays for the associated cost, including, for instance, the community’s health problems caused by the waste. Profit is supposed to measure the firm’s revenues in excess of the associated costs; because this cost is not included, the firm’s profits are higher than they should be, and there is more pollution than there should be. What is privately optimal diverges from what is socially optimal. The concept of negative externalities is intuitively appealing. It …

The Widening Scope Of Directors' Duties: The Increasing Impact Of Corporate Social And Environmental Responsibility, Thomas Clarke

Seattle University Law Review

This Article concerns the widening scope of directors’ duties under the increasing impact of the pressures for corporate social and environmental responsibility. Narrow interpretations of directors’ duties that focus simply on the commercial success of the business and relegate other considerations to externalities are not tenable in the present context. The dawning realization of the global consequences of imminent climate change provides a series of inescapable challenges for business enterprises.

Bringing Continuity To Cryptocurrency: Commercial Law As A Guide To The Asset Categorization Of Bitcoin, Evan Hewitt

Seattle University Law Review

This Note will undertake to analyze bitcoin under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and the Internal Revenue Code (IRC)—two important sources of commercial law—to see whether any existing asset categories adequately protect bitcoin’s commercial viability. This Note will demonstrate that although commercial law dictates that bitcoin should—nay must—be regulated as a currency in order to sustain its existence, the very definition of currency seems to preclude that from happening. Therefore, this Note will recommend that we experiment with a new type of asset that receives currency-like treatment, specifically designed for cryptocurrencies, under which bitcoin can be categorized in order to …

The Theory Of Fields And Its Application To Corporate Governance, Neil Fligstein

Seattle University Law Review

My goal here is twofold. First, I want to introduce the theory of strategic action fields to the law audience. The main idea in field theory in sociology is that most social action occurs in social arenas where actors know one another and take one another into account in their action. Scholars use the field construct to make sense of how and why social orders emerge, reproduce, and transform. Underlying this formulation is the idea that a field is an ongoing game where actors have to understand what others are doing in order to frame their actions. Second, I want …

Agency Theory As Prophecy: How Boards, Analysts, And Fund Managers Perform Their Roles, Jiwook Jung, Frank Dobbin

Seattle University Law Review

In 1976, Michael Jensen and William Meckling published a paper reintroducing agency theory that explained how the modern corporation is structured to serve dispersed shareholders. They purported to describe the world as it exists but, in fact, they described a utopia, and their piece was read as a blueprint for that utopia. We take a page from the sociology of knowledge to argue that, in the modern world, economic theories function as prescriptions for behavior as much as they function as descriptions. Economists and management theorists often act as prophets rather than scientists, describing the world not as it is, …

Law And The Theory Of Fields, Frank Partnoy

Seattle University Law Review

The distinction between “material” and “existential” plays a prominent role in A Theory of Fields, and it played a prominent role in discussions at the Berle VII Symposium. In general, the authors advocated the importance of the ongoing use of social skills and the collaborative efforts to seek meaning, particularly in ways beyond the merely “material.” However, the extent to which rules might matter in these efforts was less clear. Overall, Fligstein and McAdam seek to use the concept of a strategic action field to develop a theory of social change and stability. Yet social change and stability are inextricably …

Notes On The Difficulty Of Studying The Corporation, Marina Welker

Seattle University Law Review

In the award-winning documentary The Corporation, public intellectuals and activists characterize corporations as “externalizing machines,” “doom machines,” “persons with no moral conscience,” and “monsters trying to devour as much profit as possible at anyone’s expense.” In other footage, people on the street personify corporations: “General Electric: a kind old man with lots of stories;” “Nike: young, energetic;” “Microsoft: aggressive;” “McDonald’s: young, outgoing, enthusiastic;” “Monsanto: immaculately dressed;” “Disney: goofy;” “The Body Shop: deceptive.” The documentary, like screenwriter and legal scholar Joel Bakan’s book The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power, imparts dissonant messages about corporations. On the one hand, …

Three Out Of Four Economists Recommend Raising The Minimum Wage! A Closer Look At The Debate Surrounding Seattle's Minimum Wage Ordinance, Erica Bergmann

Seattle University Law Review

This Note will discuss the implications of a high minimum wage by examining the debate around the Seattle Ordinance with a particular focus on the IFA lawsuit. To analyze the possible impacts of the Seattle Ordinance, current and historical arguments both in support of and in opposition to minimum wage laws are considered. This Note ultimately concludes that the U.S. District Court rightly denied the IFA’s motion for a preliminary injunction, which would have frustrated Seattle’s experiment before it began. Seattle’s plan to implement a $15 minimum wage, and similar experiments, should be permitted to proceed because the problem of …

Markovits On Defining Monopolization: A Comment, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

In this comment I focus on Richard Markovits’s definition of monopolization in his new book, Economics and the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law (Springer 2014), and also his assertion that monopolization is distributively unjust. I agree wholeheartedly with his approach to defining monopolization, though I might alter a few details. However, I think the distributive justice effects of monopolization are ambiguous.

The Social Enterprise Law Market, J. Haskell Murray

Maryland Law Review

During the last seven years, over thirty states have passed at least one social enterprise statute. These social enterprise statutes allow the formation of a plethora of new entity types, including low-profit limited liability companies, benefit corporations, benefit limited liability companies, public benefit corporations, and social purpose corporations. Social enterprises have attracted increasing academic attention, but virtually nothing has been written on if and how states are competing for these entities. This Article attempts to fill that void, while also providing a history of the social enterprise forms, a comparative analysis, and recommendations for states that wish to engage in …

Yates V. United States: Floundering About In The Choppy Waters Of Statutory Interpretation, Lindsay Defrancesco

Maryland Law Review

No abstract provided.

Community Economic Development, Legal Clinic Program

Course Descriptions and Information

This clinic emphasizes transactional practice skills. This clinic provides short term counseling in a broad range of small business matters such as corporations, limited liability companies, partnerships, intellectual property, copyright, trademark, privacy law, nonprofit organizations, art groups as well as the legal requirements for starting a small business. Students provide direct legal assistance, counseling, representation, community legal education, and informational materials to new and mature for-profit and non-profit organizations, individuals and community groups seeking to better the economic, social, equitable and cultural well-being of low income communities.

Community Economic Development Clinic, Legal Clinic Program

Clinical Programs Brochures

The Community Economic Development Clinic is an in-house small business transactional clinic designed to provide students with a broad study of the growing area of community economic development law. Services include legal business, policy and regulatory considerations that underlie efforts to enhance the economic viability of low-income communities through the development of entrepreneurship and affordable housing.

Assistance may be provided to groups that promote community and economic development in the following areas: community preservation, development and empowerment; drug prevention; homelessness; literacy; micro-enterprise development; social welfare; youth and teen development entrepreneurship; and creating and maintaining low-income and affordable housing.

Economic Ideology And The Rise Of The Firm As Criminal Enterprise, June Carbone, William K. Black

Faculty Works

No abstract provided.

A Model Company Act And A Model Company Court, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

This paper is a contribution to a symposium on the European Model Company Act ("EMCA ") in which I argue that a model company court powerfully complements the EMCA. A particular characteristic of company law complicates the intermediating role of a model act in a federal system. Because complex corporate transactions inevitably are associated with significant uncertainty, especially when they present conflicts of interest, transaction designers and legislative drafters tend to frame applicable contractual and legal rules as standards, such as fairness and equal treatment, rather than as rules. In turn, the effectiveness of a standard in the face of …

Corporate Governance Changes As A Signal: Contextualizing The Performance Link, Merritt B. Fox, Ronald J. Gilson, Darius Palia

Faculty Scholarship

Promoting “good” corporate governance has become an important concern. One result has been the creation of indexes that purport to measure the quality of a firm’s corporate governance structure. Prior scholarship reports a positive relationship between firms with good corporate governance index ratings and stock-price-based measures of a firm’s ability to create share value, such as Tobin’s Q. Little work, however, explores why we observe this relationship.

We hypothesize one reason for the relationship is that a rating-altering change in corporate governance structure can be a signal concerning the quality of a firm’s management. Changes in governance structures that result …

The New Business Rule And Compensation For Lost Profits, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

For many years most American jurisdictions applied the “new business” rule, denying recovery of lost profits for new businesses. The majority position today rejects the per se rule, treating the issue as a rule of evidence — lost profits must be proved with “reasonable certainty.” This paper argues that the new business rule ought not be viewed as merely a matter of whether the evidence is sufficient to surmount the “reasonable certainty” hurdle. The confusion arises because courts have lumped together a number of different problems. By breaking these out, a more nuanced picture emerges. For one category, in particular, …

Preserving The Corporate Superego In A Time Of Activism: An Essay On Ethics And Economics, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

This essay focuses on the impact of recent changes in corporate governance on ethical behavior within the public corporation. It argues that a style of corporate behavior – one characterized by a risk tolerant, even reckless, pursuit of short-term profits and a disregard for the interests of non-shareholder constituencies – is attributable in significant part to recent changes in corporate governance, including the rise of hedge fund activism, greater use of incentive compensation, and the appearance of blockholder directors. It then surveys feasible responses intended to strengthen the role of the boards as the corporation’s conscience and superego. Given the …

Bringing International Tax Policy Into The 21st Century, Michael J. Graetz

Faculty Scholarship

Michael J. Graetz delivered the following remarks at the Tax Policy Center's "A Corporate Tax for the 21st Century" conference on July 14 in Washington. These remarks are substantially taken from his April 2015 Ross Parsons Lecture at the University of Sydney Law School.

Impact Investing As A Form Of Lobbying And Its Corporate-Governance Effects, Andrzej Rapaczynski

Faculty Scholarship

Impact investment is attractive to many because it seems to combine support for progressive causes with an apparent commitment to the principles of a market economy. In fact, however, a rational impact investor is not simply creating demand for certain types of corporate actions; he/she is attempting to use corporate governance mechanisms to influence fiduciary decisions of the management. The cost of this tactic for the health of the capitalist economy is potentially very considerable. The American capitalist system relies heavily on a relatively fragile corporate governance arrangement in which the agency problems of a modern corporation are minimized by …

The Corporation's Place In Society, Gabriel Rauterberg

Faculty Scholarship

The vast majority of economic activity is now organized through corporations. The public corporation is usurping the state’s role as the most important institution of wealthy capitalist societies. Across the developed world, there is increasing convergence on the shareholder-owned corporation as the primary vehicle for creating wealth. Yet nothing like this degree of convergence has occurred in answering the fundamental questions of corporate capitalism: What role do corporations serve? What is the goal of corporate law? What should corporate managers do? Discussion of these questions is as old as the institutions involved.

The Wolf At The Door: The Impact Of Hedge Fund Activism On Corporate Governance, John C. Coffee Jr., Darius Palia

Faculty Scholarship

Hedge fund activism has recently spiked, almost hyperbolically. No one disputes this, and most view it as a significant change. But, their reasons differ. Some see activist hedge funds as the natural champions of dispersed and diversified shareholders, who are less capable of collective action in their own interest. A key fact about activist hedge funds is that they are undiversified and typically hold significant stakes in the companies that comprise their portfolios. Given their larger stakes and focused holdings, they are less subject to the “rational apathy” that characterizes more diversified and even indexed investors, such as pension and …

Shareholder Political Primacy, Jay B. Kesten

Scholarly Publications

Corporate political activity raises an important and difficult question of corporate law: who decides when the corporation should speak and what it should say? In several cases, the Supreme Court has provided a clear answer: shareholders, acting through the procedures of corporate democracy. While this holding has attracted substantial academic and public criticism, there has been no sustained evaluation (beyond identifying the potential agency costs of corporate political activity) of the possibility that the Supreme Court's appeal to the fraught concept of "corporate democracy," though woefully under-theorized, might be the best allocation of power in the limited context of corporate …

Short-Termism And Long-Termism, Michal Barzuza, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

A significant debate in corporate law and finance concerns the role of activist investors (especially hedge funds) in corporate governance. Activists, it is often alleged, imprudently privilege short term earnings over superior (but less liquid) long term investments. Activists counter that they target managers who unjustifiably cling to questionable strategies. While this debate is hardly new, it has grown increasingly fractious of late. We analyze the activism debate within a theoretical securities-market setting. In our framework – which draws from an emerging literature in empirical and experimental finance – managers are differentially overconfident (causing them to favor long-term projects), while …

Designing Corporate Bailouts, Antonio E. Bernardo, Eric L. Talley, Ivo Welch

Faculty Scholarship

Although common economic wisdom suggests that government bailouts are inefficient because they reduce incentives to avoid failure and induce excessive entry by marginal firms, in practice bailouts are difficult to avoid for systemically significant enterprises. Recent experience suggests that bailouts also induce litigation from shareholders and managers complaining about expropriation and wrongful termination by the government. Our model shows how governments can design tax-financed corporate bailouts to reduce these distortions and points to the causes of inefficiencies in real-world implementations such as the Troubled Asset Relief Program. Bailouts with minimal distortion depend critically on the government’s ability to expropriate shareholders …

Follow The Money: Essays On International Taxation – Introduction, Michael J. Graetz

Faculty Scholarship

Publicity about tax avoidance techniques of multinational corporations and wealthy individuals has moved discussion of international income taxation from the backrooms of law and accounting firms to the front pages of news organizations around the world. In the words of a top Australian tax official, international tax law has now become a topic of barbeque conversations. Public anger has, in turn, brought previously arcane issues of international taxation onto the agenda of heads of government around the world.

Despite all the attention, however, issues of international income taxation are often not well understood. This Introduction outlines a collection of essays, …

The Corporation’S Place In Society, Gabriel Rauterberg

Michigan Law Review

The vast majority of economic activity is now organized through corporations. The public corporation is usurping the state’s role as the most important institution of wealthy capitalist societies. Across the developed world, there is increasing convergence on the shareholder-owned corporation as the primary vehicle for creating wealth. Yet nothing like this degree of convergence has occurred in answering the fundamental questions of corporate capitalism: What role do corporations serve? What is the goal of corporate law? What should corporate managers do? Discussion of these questions is as old as the institutions involved.

Between Scylla And Charybdis: Taxing Corporations Or Shareholders (Or Both), David M. Schizer

Faculty Scholarship

The United States taxes both corporations and shareholders on corporate profits. In principle, the United States could rely on only one of these taxes, as many commentators have suggested. Although choosing to tax the corporation or its owners may seem like taking money from one pocket or the other, this Essay emphasizes a key difference: These taxes prompt different planning. Relying on one or the other mitigates some distortions and leaks, while exacerbating others. As a result, choosing which to impose is like navigating between Scylla and Charybdis.

In response, this Essay recommends using both taxes for three reasons. First, …