Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons^™

Reverse Settlements As Patent Invalidity Signals, Gregory Dolin

All Faculty Scholarship

Over the last decade a new type of settlements, commonly referred to as “reversed payment settlements” or simply “reverse settlements,” emerged in litigation over patents covering pharmaceutical products. What differentiates these new settlements from their traditional counterparts is that whereas traditionally, the alleged trespasser on someone else's rights pays the rights-holder to settle the litigation, in these new settlements it is the rights holder that pays the alleged trespasser. These settlements are a direct consequence of the various incentives provided by the Hatch-Waxman Act - an Act designed to increase competition between brand name and generic manufactures of pharmaceutical products. …

2008 And 2009 Eu Competition Law And Sector-Specific Regulatory Case Law Developments With A Nexus To Poland, Dagmara Kośka, Krzysztof Kuik

Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies

The 2008 issue of YARS contained an overview of EU law developments in the period of time from 2004 to 2007. This overview covers the years 2008-2009. It confirms that State aid cases remained numerous (6 in total) and that the Commission’s enforcement activities in the area of State aid control continued at a similar pace as before. With respect to other areas of competition law and policy, the overall picture shows a relatively high level of scrutiny in mergers (5) and antitrust cases or inquiries (2). Moreover, EU Courts adopted several decisions in Polish cases, notably in the regulatory …

Is Novelty Obsolete? Chronicling The Irrelevance Of The Invention Date In U.S. Patent Law, Dennis D. Crouch

Faculty Publications

This paper presents a normative study of patent applicant use of invention-date rights during ex parte prosecution.

When Second Comes First: Correcting Patent’S Poor Secondary Incentives Through An Optional Patent Purchase System, Jordan Barry

ExpressO

As research has advanced, technologies have become more closely knit, and the relationships between them—both complementary and competitive—have become increasingly important. Unfortunately, the patent system’s use of monopoly power to reward innovators creates inefficient results by overly encouraging the development of substitute technologies and discouraging the development of complementary technologies. This paper explains how an optional patent purchase system could help ameliorate such problems and discusses the implications of such a system.

Patent Ships Sail An Antitrust Sea, Joseph Scott Miller

Seattle University Law Review

The deeper truths evoked by patent ships sailing an antitrust sea are three. First, free competition is the pervasive, baseline reality, the background norm; patent protection is the temporary, partial exception. Second, we grasp both patent and antitrust policy with a common science: economics. Third, although neither patent nor antitrust law doctrines are good tools for fixing fundamental problems in the other body of law, both bodies of law help us better understand the shortcomings of the other. I explore these ideas in turn, below.

Independent Ink At The Crossroads Of Antitrust And Intellectual Property Law: The Court's Holding Regarding Market Power In Cases Involving Patents And Implications In Cases Involving Copyrights, Leonard J. Feldman, Rima J. Alaily, Chad D. Farrell

Seattle University Law Review

By eliminating the market power presumption for patent holders, Independent Ink calls into question the presumption's continued validity for tying arrangements involving copyrights. While the Court's holding directly applies only to patents, we present three reasons why, after Independent Ink, the presumption can no longer be viable in antitrust lawsuits challenging a tying arrangement involving a copyrighted product. First, the Court's rationale for eliminating the presumption including citations to extensive academic writings, agency guidelines, and legislative amendments precludes the presumption's continued application in any other context. Second, copyrights are significantly less likely than patents to confer market power because …

Antitrust Issues In The Settlement Of Patent Disputes, Part Iii, Thomas B. Leary

Seattle University Law Review

Once again, I will address the issue of litigation settlements between companies that hold patents on pharmaceutical products (sometimes "pioneers") and would-be generic entrants ("generics") who challenge the validity of the patent and/or a claim of infringement. This discussion will focus on the Tamoxifen opinion, with passing reference to other decisions. Obviously, reasonable people can disagree on these issues, but I still believe the Commission's approach in Schering was correct.

Patent Ships Sail An Antitrust Sea, Joseph S. Miller

Scholarly Works

This brief essay arises from my participation in an April 2006 conference at Seattle University Law School, entitled At the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law: Looking Both Ways to Avoid a Collision. This intersection metaphor is a common one for describing antitrust law's relationship with intellectual property law, among both courts and commentators. This essay explores a different metaphor: patent ships sail an antitrust sea, protecting those aboard from competition's harshest dangers - but only for a time. The nautical metaphor evokes three ideas that the crossroads metaphor does not. First, vigorous competition is the pervasive, baseline reality; …

Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate The Antitrust Laws, Christopher M. Holman

Faculty Works

The term "reverse payment" has been used as shorthand to characterize a variety of diverse agreements between patent owners and alleged infringers that involve a transfer of consideration from the patent owner to the alleged infringer. Reverse payment settlements are particularly associated with drug patent challenges mounted by generic drug companies under the Hatch-Waxman Act. Many, including the Federal Trade Commission, would characterize these agreements as antitrust violations. However, courts have generally declined to find these agreements in violation of the antitrust laws based solely on the presence of a reverse payment.

This article begins in Section II with an …

Digital Wars -- Legal Battles And Economic Bottlenecks In The Digital Information Industries, Curt A. Hessler

ExpressO

The Digital Age has spawned major legal battles over the fundamental principles of intellectual property law and antitrust law. These diverse struggles can best be analyzed using the basic norm of "value added" from neo-classical normative economics. This analysis suggests that current intellectual property doctirnes provide excessive protection and current antitrust doctrines remain awkward in dealing with the cross-market leveraging of monopoly power in the presence of "natural monopolies" created by network effects.

Can A Bankrupt Company Assign Its Patent License To The Highest Bidder, Even When The License Itself Forbids Assignment? Why Everex Systems, Inc. V. Cadtrak Corp. Gives An Unconvincing Answer, Matthew D. Siegel

ExpressO

A patent licensee that declares bankruptcy will often want to assign its rights under the license to another party in exchange for much-needed cash. The Bankruptcy Code generally allows debtors to assign executory contracts, including patent licenses, in this way. Indeed, the Code permits debtors to assign a contract even if the contract itself contains a “no-assign” clause, i.e., a clause expressly forbidding assignment. But there is an exception: The Code will defer to certain kinds of otherwise applicable non-bankruptcy law that would normally prevent the contract from being assigned. In particular, the Code will not allow assignment by a …

Resolving The Patent-Antitrust Paradox Through Tripartite Innovation, Michael A. Carrier

Vanderbilt Law Review

The issues presented by-the intersection of the patent system and the antitrust laws have never been as pressing as they are today. The number of issued patents is skyrocketing. Companies are more frequently entering into arrangements with competitors not only to recover their investment from creating patented products but also to avoid the patent landmines that line the path of innovation. They form patent pools for laser eye surgery, MPEG-2 video compression technology, and DVD formatting; enter into alliances, mergers, and settlements in the biopharmaceutical industry; refuse to license their patented products in various industries; and cross-license their patents in …

Anticompetitive Settlement Of Intellectual Property Disputes, Mark D. Janis, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Mark A. Lemley

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

Notes On Trademark Monopolies, Wendy J. Gordon, Glynn S. Lunney Jr.

Scholarship Chronologically

Since 1742, when Lord Hardwicke seemingly equated trademark protection with monopoly in one of the first trademark cases, until the mid- 1950s, concerns that trademarks represented a form of illegitimate monopoly effectively constrained the growth of trademark protection. In the twentieth century, Edward Chamberlain became the leading proponent of the trademark as monopoly view with the publication of his work, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, in 1933. In his work, Chamberlain argued that a trademark enabled its owner to differentiate her products and then to exclude others from using the differentiating feature. By doing so, trademark protection can effectively …

When Is Property Intellectual: The Leveraging Problem Essays, Mark R. Patterson

Faculty Scholarship

Patents and copyrights protect inventions and expression; they do not protect products. This distinction, I argue in this essay, is a key to the antitrust problem of the "leveraging" of intellectual property. In a typical leveraging case, the manufacturer of a durable good, like a copier or computer, refuses to sell replacement parts for its equipment unless the purchaser also hires the manufacturer to service the equipment. Such a practice can be illegal under antitrust law, but when the leveraging products-in this example, replacement parts-are protected by patent or copyright, the manufacturer will often claim that the leveraging is a …

The Franchisor's Dilemma: Justifying Tying Arrangements In Antitrust Suits., Larry R. Patton

St. Mary's Law Journal

Tying Arrangements within the Franchise market suppress competition by denying competitors free access to the market for a tied product. A tie-in or tied product is an item, distinguishable from the franchise itself, forced upon a franchise, to secure the license. The two defenses used in validating a tied product are: (1) that the tying product in “good will” serves a satisfactory purpose in conjunction with the tied product, and (2) the tied protect serves to protect the quality of the trademarked product. This study examines case law and how the application of the Sherman and Clayton Anti-Trust Acts in …

United States V. Glaxo Group Ltd., Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Supreme Court Case Files

No abstract provided.

Tying Arrangement With Trademark As The Tying Item Is Not A Per Se Violation Of The Antitrust Laws-Susser V. Carvel Corp., Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

Several independent franchised soft ice-cream outlets brought suit for treble damages against Carvel Corporation, the franchising company, alleging that the contract between them constituted an illegal tying arrangement in violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act and sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The contract bound the dealers to purchase from Carvel-appointed suppliers all commodities sold as part of the retail dairy composite. Plaintiffs stipulated that they would rely on per se violations at trial. The district court found that the plaintiffs had failed to show the alleged violations and, in any case, the defendant had proved …

Know-How Licensing And The Antitrust Laws, David R. Macdonald

Michigan Law Review

The purpose of this article is to re-analyze the present antitrust status of know-how licensing for the purpose of clarifying the extent of the protection which the exploiter of know-how may accord himself without abusing the public interest in unfettered competition.