Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons^™

Modern Economic Analysis And Antitrust Law: A Guide, Steven C. Salop

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This book presents a modern economics approach to antitrust law. It expands upon and supplements traditional legal analysis of antitrust law and policy. It does so by analyzing antitrust legal standards and case law through the lenses of industrial organization economics and decision theory. The work is intended to be a comprehensive introductory guide for students, practitioners, and anyone else interested in learning the core of modern antitrust economics. Understanding the economics of antitrust and decision theory and applying that reasoning to specific cases and issues are critical steps for successfully studying and practicing antitrust law and policy. It treats …

Rewriting The Monopoly Playbook: Implications Of U.S. V. Google For Antitrust Jurisprudence, Amilcar Torres

University of Cincinnati Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Essence Of An Antitrust Violation, Thomas A. Lambert

Faculty Publications

Judicial embrace of the consumer welfare standard reduced the indeterminacy and political manipulability of U.S. antitrust law. Continual invocations of antitrust’s consumer welfare focus, however, have created the misimpression that consumer harm is a sufficient, not merely a necessary, condition for condemning antitrust-relevant behaviors like agreements in restraint of trade and exclusion-causing unilateral acts. Such a “consumer harm sufficiency” view underlay the plaintiffs’ claims in Epic Games v. Apple and FTC v. Qualcomm and has inspired scholarly proposals to condemn various antitrust-relevant behaviors simply because they occasion consumer harm.

Antitrust economics and dynamic efficiency considerations call for rejection of the …

The Fourth Estate's Estate, Ramsi Woodcock

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

The news industry in the United States faces a funding crisis because the tech giants, particularly Google and Facebook, have acceded to the advertising monopolies once enjoyed by the newspaper industry itself. Breakup of these monopolies is unlikely to restore the news industry’s profits, however, because search and social media will remain better ad distribution channels than the news whether search and social media are competitive or monopolized. A better solution to the funding crisis would be for government to divide the advertising distribution market, reallocating to the news industry some of the ad impressions taken from it by the …

The American Antimonopoly Tradition: Origins, Contradictions, Transformations, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Proponents of antitrust reform argue for the rediscovery of an American antimonopoly tradition that predated the Sherman Act by centuries and suggests the reimagination of a more robust contemporary policy against concentrated economic power. But historically there have been a number of distinct and often contradictory strands of American antimonopoly. The American colanists inherited a weak, recent, and largely invented antimonopoly common law tradition focused on exclusive grants of privilege from the crown. In the nineteenth century, antimonopoly became a generative and ubiquitous concept in state legislatures and courts, but one with multiple, inconsistent meanings that evolved in the decades …

Antitrust For Dominant Digital Platforms: An Alternative To The Monopoly Power Standard To Restore Competition, Jordan Ramsey

Senior Honors Theses

Antitrust law is meant to promote competition by prohibiting anticompetitive business practices such as mergers and acquisitions as well as exclusionary conduct. Judicial interpretation of antitrust law has allowed dominant digital platforms to undertake anticompetitive actions without prosecution. The Sherman Antitrust Act should be amended to remove the monopoly power standard that allows firms to engage in anticompetitive conduct as long as the conduct does not create or uphold monopoly power. The amendment would make anticompetitive conduct illegal regardless of monopoly power, as long as six proof requirements are met. This would result in lessened market concentration, which would benefit …

The Microsoft Litigation’S Lessons For United States V. Google, John E. Lopatka, William H. Page

University of Miami Law Review

The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and three overlapping groups of states have filed federal antitrust cases alleging Google has monopolized internet search, search advertising, internet advertising technologies, and app distribution on Android phones. In this Article, we focus on the DOJ’s claims that Google has used contracts with tech firms that distribute Google’s search services in order to exclude rival search providers and thus to monopolize the markets for search and search advertising—the two sides of Google’s search platform. The primary mechanisms of exclusion, according to the DOJ, are the many contracts Google has used to secure its …

The Necessity In Antitrust Law, Gregory Day

Washington and Lee Law Review

Antitrust rarely, if ever, gives primacy to a dispute’s subject matter. For instance, exclusionary conduct that raises the price of a lifesaving drug receives the same analysis as a restraint of baseball cards. Since antitrust’s purpose is to promote consumer welfare, the equal treatment of important and mundane goods might appear perplexing. After all, competition to produce affordable foods, medicines, and other necessities would seem to foster consumer welfare more than inane products do.

In fact, defendants generally win antitrust lawsuits even when monopolizing necessities because the primary method of antitrust review is notably deferential to defendants. To explain this …

The New Era Of Nfl Antitrust Law, The Sunday Ticket Package: Was The Ninth Circuit Ruling A Touchdown Or A Penalty?, Maya Rustom

Pepperdine Law Review

Americans love football, but every year thousands of fans are forced to pay exorbitant annual fees if they chose to have access to out-of-market games. In other words, if fans don’t live in the territory of their favorite team, they can either pay an excessive annual fee to watch their team play or miss out on the majority of games every season. This arrangement is a result of DirecTV’s Sunday Ticket Package, which is an exclusive distributorship agreement with the NFL that prevents fans from watching live out-of-market games unless they pay the annual subscription fee. This Comment addresses and …

The Political Face Of Antitrust, Spencer Weber Waller

Faculty Publications & Other Works

The last twenty years have brought antitrust back to the fore as a political issue of greater salience. Several booms and busts in the economy have highlighted the issue of corporate power in the economy and the political system. The growing influence and aggressiveness of the European Union and other jurisdictions' competition laws have highlighted the relative retreat in the United States. Political movements in the United States have brought issues of corporate power and its abuse back into the public limelight and with them a greater political salience for antitrust in the election cycle of 2020.

Vertical Mergers In A Model Of Upstream Monopoly And Incomplete Information, Serge Moresi, David Reitman, Steven C. Salop, Yianis Sarafidis

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

We examine the role of private information on the impact of vertical mergers. A vertical merger can improve the information that is available to an upstream monopolist because, after the merger, the monopolist can observe the cost of its downstream merger partner. In the pre-merger world, because the costs of the downstream firms are private information, the monopolist has incomplete information and cannot implement the monopoly outcome: The expected pre-merger equilibrium price of the downstream product is lower than the monopoly price. After a vertical merger, the equilibrium input price that is charged to the downstream rival can either increase …

Dilemmas Of The Heat Sector – A Few Words About Competition And Monopoly In The District Heating Sector, Marcin Kraśniewski

internetowy Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy i Regulacyjny (internet Quarterly on Antitrust and Regulation)

The dilemmas of the system heat sector boil down to the scope of the interference of the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK President) and the President of the Energy Regulatory Office (URE President) in the functioning of heating companies. The article proposes a thesis which states that despite the liberalization measures in the district heating sector, the sector remains a natural monopoly. This results in the primacy of the URE President as the regulator of this sector and, at the same time, in the limited scope of influence of the UOKiK President as an antitrust …

Submission Of Robert H. Lande To House Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee Investigation Of Digital Platforms, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

The House Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee asked me to submit suggestions concerning the adequacy of existing antitrust laws, enforcement policies, and enforcement levels insofar as they impact the state of competition in the digital marketplace. My submission recommends the following nine reforms:

1. A textualist analysis of the Sherman Act shows that Section 2 actually is a no-fault monopolization statute. At a minimum Congress should enact a strong presumption that every firm with a 67% market share has violated Section 2. This would move the Sherman Act an important step in the right direction, the direction Congress intended in 1890. My …

Rethinking Major League Baseball’S Antitrust Exemption, Roger D. Blair, Wenche Wang

UF Law Faculty Publications

For nearly a century, Major League Baseball (MLB) has enjoyed antitrust immunity. No other sports league or organization is similarly exempt. Shielded by precedent from antitrust prosecution, MLB clubs are free to exploit both monopolistic and monopsonistic power. In this paper, we call for a repeal of MLB’s antitrust exemption. In doing so, we examine some recent antitrust challenges to MLB conduct, the current interest of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in labor market issues, the welfare consequences of the exemption, and a policy recommendation for legislative action.

Antitrust And Two-Sided Platforms: The Failure Of American Express, John B. Kirkwood

Faculty Articles

Two-sided platforms serve two sets of customers and enable them to interact with each other. The five most valuable corporations in America – Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft – all operate two-sided platforms. But despite their growing power, the Supreme Court's American Express decision has made it harder to stop them from stifling competition. This Article systematically exposes the flaws in the Court's reasoning and identifies the principles that should govern future cases. The Court’s most fundamental error was to require plaintiffs in rule of reason cases to make an initial showing of consumer harm that weighs the effects …

The Sherman Act Is A No-Fault Monopolization Statute: A Textualist Demonstration, Robert H. Lande, Richard O. Zerbe Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

The drafters of the Sherman Act originally designed Section 2 to impose

sanctions on all monopolies and attempts to monopolize, regardless whether the

firm had engaged in anticompetitive conduct. This conclusion emerges from the

first ever textualist analysis of the language in the statute, a form of interpretation

originally performed only by Justice Scalia but now increasingly used by the

Supreme Court, including in its recent Bostock decision.

Following Scalia’s methodology, this Article analyzes contemporaneous

dictionaries, legal treatises, and cases and demonstrates that when the Sherman

Act was passed, the word “monopolize” simply meant that someone had acquired

a monopoly. …

Antitrust & Corruption: Overruling Noerr, Tim Wu

Faculty Scholarship

We live in a time when concerns about influence over the American political process by powerful private interests have reached an apogee, both on the left and the right. Among the laws originally intended to fight excessive private influence over republican institutions were the antitrust laws, whose sponsors were concerned not just with monopoly, but also its influence over legislatures and politicians. While no one would claim that the antitrust laws were meant to be comprehensive anti-corruption laws, there can be little question that they were passed with concerns about the political influence of powerful firms and industry cartels.

Since …

Coty, Amazon, And The Future Of Vertical Restraints: Evolving Distribution Norms On Both Atlantic Shores, Chris Sagers

Law Faculty Articles and Essays

No abstract provided.

Given Today's New Wave Of Protectionsim, Is Antitrust Law The Last Hope For Preserving A Free Global Economy Or Another Nail In Free Trade's Coffin?, Allison Murray

Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review

No abstract provided.

Platforms, American Express, And The Problem Of Complexity In Antitrust, Chris Sagers

Law Faculty Articles and Essays

Everything about Ohio v. American Express was wrong and the adoption of “two-sided platform” reasoning into American antitrust law might be one of its worst, most regrettable wrong turns in decades. That is not because the original theoretical model of two-sided interaction has anything wrong with it at all. It is rather that nothing could be gained by incorporating it that could be worth the result in the American Express case itself, or the difficulty that has likely been invited into antitrust litigation. The consequences are hard to predict, but they may be severely limiting to our already moribund antitrust …

Books And Olive Oil: Why Antitrust Must Deal With Consolidated Corporate Power, Carl Bogus

Law Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Taking Antitrust Away From The Courts, Ganesh Sitaraman

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

A small number of firms hold significant market power in a wide variety of sectors of the economy, leading commentators across the political spectrum to call for a reinvigoration of antitrust enforcement. But the antitrust agencies have been surprisingly timid in response to this challenge, and when they have tried to assert themselves, they have often found that hostile courts block their ability to foster competitive markets. In other areas of law, Congress delegates power to agencies, agencies make regulations setting standards, and courts provide deferential review after the fact. Antitrust doesn’t work this way. Courts – made up of …

An Examination Of Product Hopping By Brand-Name Prescription Drug Manufacturers: The Problem And A Proposed Solution, Daniel Burke

Cleveland State Law Review

The balance between incentivizing innovation through exclusivity protection and maintaining competitive market conditions—including prices for consumers—is a difficult line to toe. Product hopping has characteristics that constitute a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act because companies can maintain monopoly power in the pharmaceutical market. While some monopoly power is justified as an incentive for incredibly costly innovation, extended periods of exclusivity harms consumers by keeping prescription drug prices artificially inflated. Allowing generic drug manufacturers to compete sooner in the prescription drug market by disallowing product hopping by name-brand pharmaceutical drug companies will aid in driving down prices. Courts should adopt …

Antitrust's Unconventional Politics, Daniel A. Crane

Law & Economics Working Papers

For the first time in a generation, political pressure is growing to reform antitrust in a considerably more interventionist direction. To the bafflement of many observers, these political pressures are emerging simultaneously from both wings of the political spectrum. Although unconventional in presentist right/left terms, antitrust's ideological ambiguity has longstanding historical roots. This Essay examines three historical friction points that help explain the current political dislocations around antitrust reform: (1) the coupling of ideological aversion to large scale in government and business; (2) the shifting meaning of the word "monopoly," from exclusive governmentally granted privilege to privately obtained market power; …

Beyond Brooke Group: Bringing Reality To The Law Of Predatory Pricing, C. Scott Hemphill, Philip J. Weiser

Publications

This Feature offers a roadmap for bringing and deciding predatory pricing cases under the Supreme Court’s restrictive Brooke Group decision. Brooke Group requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant set a price below cost and had a sufficient likelihood of recouping its investment in predation. This framework, which was adopted without any contested presentation of its merits, has endured despite its flaws. Beyond this framework, the Court opined in dicta that predation is implausible.

We identify points of flexibility within the Court’s framework that permit an empirically grounded evaluation of the predation claim. Under the price-cost test, a plaintiff …

United States Versus Microsoft: A Case Study, Michael Betts

Oklahoma Journal of Law and Technology

No abstract provided.

Louis Brandeis And Contemporary Antitrust Enforcement, Kenneth G. Elzinga, Micah Webber

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Market Power And Inequality: The Antitrust Counterrevolution And Its Discontents, Lina M. Khan, Sandeep Vaheesan

Faculty Scholarship

In recent years, economic inequality has become a central topic of public debate in the United States and much of the developed world. The popularity of Thomas Piketty’s nearly 700-page tome, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, is a testament to this newfound focus on economic disparity. As top intellectuals, politicians, and public figures have come to recognize inequality as a major problem that must be addressed, they have offered a range of potential solutions. Frequently mentioned proposals include reforming the tax system, strengthening organized labor, revising international trade and investment agreements, and reducing the size of the financial sector.

One …

The Role Of Design Choice In Intellectual Property And Antitrust Law, Stacey Dogan

Faculty Scholarship

When is it appropriate for courts to second-guess decisions of private actors in shaping their business models, designing their networks, and configuring the (otherwise non-infringing) products that they offer to their customers? This theme appears periodically but persistently in intellectual property and antitrust, especially in disputes involving networks and technology. In both contexts, courts routinely invoke what I call a “non-interference principle” — the presumption that market forces ordinarily bring the best outcomes for consumers, and that courts and regulators should not meddle in the process. This non-interference principle means, for example, that intermediaries need not design their networks to …

Monopoly Power With A Short Selling Constraint, Robert Baumann, Bryan Engelhardt, David L. Fuller

Economics Department Working Papers

We show if a speculator can benefit from reducing a monopoly’s rents through short selling, then a speculator may take a short position in a monopoly, overcome the barriers to entry, and compete with the monopoly. The competition drives down the monopoly’s rents, and as a result, the short position becomes profitable and covers the cost of entry. If entry is impossible, then the speculator may coordinate and pay the firm’s counter-parties to stop trading with the monopoly rather than entering. Either way, increasing a speculator’s ability to short a firm’s rents results in a constraint on the monopoly and …