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Articles 1 - 30 of 126
Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation
Flowing Cleanly: The Proper Roles Of The Courts And The Ftc In The Information Marketplace Of Advertising, Kateri J. Son
Flowing Cleanly: The Proper Roles Of The Courts And The Ftc In The Information Marketplace Of Advertising, Kateri J. Son
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
After an introduction in Section I, Section II of this article will present the history of the commercial speech doctrine, illustrating the rules courts use to evaluate whether the FTC’s actions were constitutional. Section III will explain how the FTC combats deception and will describe the choice of remedies the FTC has available. Section IV will present and evaluate three potential solutions to the conflict between the courts and the FTC on First Amendment issues that courts have implemented. Finally, Section V argues that conflict between the two entities is inevitable, and therefore the middle approach is the best solution …
Shackles Or Safeguards?: Tailoring Ndas And Noncompetes To Protect Interests Without Imposing Uniform Restraints, Nadia Brenden
Shackles Or Safeguards?: Tailoring Ndas And Noncompetes To Protect Interests Without Imposing Uniform Restraints, Nadia Brenden
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
To better understand the implications of the FTC’s sweeping proposal and the need for a state-by-state approach, the following sections dive into the legal, historical, and comparative foundations of restrictive covenants, trace their evolution across jurisdictions, and explain why states—not federal agencies—are best positioned to strike the right balance. Part II provides an overview of legal doctrines governing the transmission of proprietary information, a history of the early applications of employment contracts, and a comparative analysis of international noncompete standards. Part III describes how different jurisdictions apply trade secret, contract, and employment law to protect business interests through enforceable agreements. …
Ftc V. Amazon: A Turning Point For Antitrust Law?, Matthew Cole Conover
Ftc V. Amazon: A Turning Point For Antitrust Law?, Matthew Cole Conover
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice
The United States is experiencing crippling economic inequalities that harken back to the Gilded Age. For the first time, legal scholars have turned to antitrust law to reverse this alarming trend. These scholars, including current Federal Trade Commission Chairwoman Lina Khan, are testing this ambitious theory in the E-commerce industry. E-commerce is a market largely dominated by one company: Amazon. With its dominance, Amazon lures small businesses into its third-party seller marketplace, where it controls those business’s prices and punishes those that resist. Lina Kahn’s FTC has formally launched its litigation campaign against Amazon, claiming that the company has violated …
Is A Ban On Non-Competes Supported By Empirical Evidence?, Sarah Oh Lam, Thomas Lenard, Scott Wallsten
Is A Ban On Non-Competes Supported By Empirical Evidence?, Sarah Oh Lam, Thomas Lenard, Scott Wallsten
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has proposed a rule to declare virtually all non-compete agreements unfair methods of competition under Section 5 of the FTC Act and therefore, illegal. However, the empirical literature on non-compete agreements cited by the FTC in its Notice for Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”) shows mixed results on earnings, job creation, firm formation, entrepreneurship, training, investment, and firm value. Evidence in other current studies also does not support an economy-wide ban. The FTC concludes that the proposed rule would yield net benefits even though by its own admission it lacks the information necessary to conduct a …
Pooling And Exchanging Competitively Sensitive Information Among Rivals: Absolutely Illegal Not Just Unreasonable, Peter C. Carstensen, Annkathrin Marschall
Pooling And Exchanging Competitively Sensitive Information Among Rivals: Absolutely Illegal Not Just Unreasonable, Peter C. Carstensen, Annkathrin Marschall
University of Cincinnati Law Review
An agreement to exchange competitive sensitive information among rivalrous competitors usually results from an intent to inhibit or restrict the discretion of those firms to engage in competition. Basic economic logic about competition leads to that conclusion. Hence, such an exchange is in itself a naked agreement in restraint of trade without legal justification. Currently, case law requires a more convoluted and irrelevant inquiry into market definition and market power before a court can condemn such agreements. This is the result of ambiguous Supreme Court decisions as well as the recognition that in a few instances there are plausible arguments …
Antitrust And The Corporate Tax, 1909–1928, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
Antitrust And The Corporate Tax, 1909–1928, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
Book Chapters
In “Antitrust and the Corporate Tax, 1909–1928,” Reuven Avi-Yonah examines a twentieth-century antitrust measure that lay outside the Sherman Act per se—the corporate tax act of 1909. After the enactment of the Clayton Act and the creation of the FTC in 1914, the corporate tax’s antimonopoly reputation faded somewhat. Between 1919 and 1928 most of its antitrust features were eliminated, and they would not be revived during the New Deal. Nevertheless, Avi-Yonah argues that the corporate tax still retains some potential to contribute to limiting the power of monopolies, especially if the progressive corporate tax rate structure adopted in the …
Antitrust For Dominant Digital Platforms: An Alternative To The Monopoly Power Standard To Restore Competition, Jordan Ramsey
Antitrust For Dominant Digital Platforms: An Alternative To The Monopoly Power Standard To Restore Competition, Jordan Ramsey
Senior Honors Theses
Antitrust law is meant to promote competition by prohibiting anticompetitive business practices such as mergers and acquisitions as well as exclusionary conduct. Judicial interpretation of antitrust law has allowed dominant digital platforms to undertake anticompetitive actions without prosecution. The Sherman Antitrust Act should be amended to remove the monopoly power standard that allows firms to engage in anticompetitive conduct as long as the conduct does not create or uphold monopoly power. The amendment would make anticompetitive conduct illegal regardless of monopoly power, as long as six proof requirements are met. This would result in lessened market concentration, which would benefit …
Stakeholderism Silo Busting, Aneil Kovvali
Stakeholderism Silo Busting, Aneil Kovvali
Articles by Maurer Faculty
The fields of antitrust, bankruptcy, corporate, and securities law are undergoing tumultuous debates. On one side in each field is the dominant view that each field should focus exclusively on a specific constituency—antitrust on consumers, bankruptcy on creditors, corporate law on shareholders, and securities regulation on financial investors. On the other side is a growing insurgency that seeks to broaden the focus to a larger set of stakeholders, including workers, the environment, and political communities. But these conversations have largely proceeded in parallel, with each debate unfolding within the framework and literature of a single field. Studying these debates together …
Q&A With Lina Khan, Chair Of The U.S. Federal Trade Commission And Mark Glick, Professor Of Economics At The University Of Utah, Lina M. Khan
Faculty Scholarship
Let me tell you a little about Lina. Lina attended Yale Law school and while a third-year law student she wrote her famous and influential article Amazon’s Anti-Trust Paradox. Then, after graduating from law school, she worked as the legal director at the Open Markets Institute and during that period she continued to write a large number of influential antitrust papers. She then joined the faculty of my alma mater, Columbia Law School. In 2019, she was appointed as counsel to the U.S. House Judiciary Subcomittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law and, in 2021, President Biden appointed her …
Section 5 In Action: Reinvigorating The Ftc Act And The Rule Of Law, Lina M. Khan
Section 5 In Action: Reinvigorating The Ftc Act And The Rule Of Law, Lina M. Khan
Faculty Scholarship
The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 didn’t just create a new agency. It created new law for that agency to enforce. The heart of that law is Section 5, which provides that ‘unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce’ are ‘hereby declared unlawful’. In passing this law, Congress also tasked the FTC with identifying the range of methods of competition that qualify as unfair, since lawmakers recognized they could not specify them all prospectively.
This is a straightforward reading of the statute, and yet it is somewhat controversial. There is a school of thought that considers Section 5’s …
Developments In The Laws Affecting Electronic Payments And Financial Services, Sarah Jane Hughes, Stephen T. Middlebrook, Tom Kierner
Developments In The Laws Affecting Electronic Payments And Financial Services, Sarah Jane Hughes, Stephen T. Middlebrook, Tom Kierner
Articles by Maurer Faculty
The past year proved to be a busy period for the regulation of electronic payments and financial services. In this year’s survey, we discuss rulemakings, enforcement actions, and other litigation that has significantly impacted the law governing payments and financial services. Part II addresses the ongoing fight between federal and state authorities over which should properly regulate Fin- Tech entities and describes some new steps the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) has taken to assert its authority in this area. Part III details an enforcement action that California regulators took against a FinTech company they determined had …
Returning To The Statutory Text: Why The Language Of Section 13(B) Requires Courts To Narrowly Construe The Ftc’S Ability To Obtain Injunctive Relief, Christopher Halm
Returning To The Statutory Text: Why The Language Of Section 13(B) Requires Courts To Narrowly Construe The Ftc’S Ability To Obtain Injunctive Relief, Christopher Halm
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforces over 70 laws in the areas of antitrust and consumer protection, and one valuable tool to support their enforcement is Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“Section 13(b)”). Section 13(b), among other features, grants the FTC authority to seek an injunction in district court against any defendant that is “about to violate” one or more of those laws. For the past three decades, courts have adopted a permissive judicial interpretation of that language, authorizing injunctions against defendants when the allegedly impending violations were only “likely to recur” based on past misconduct. This …
To Win Friends And Influence People: Regulation And Enforcement Of Influencer Marketing After Ten Years Of The Endorsement Guides, Craig C. Carpenter, Mark Bonin Ii
To Win Friends And Influence People: Regulation And Enforcement Of Influencer Marketing After Ten Years Of The Endorsement Guides, Craig C. Carpenter, Mark Bonin Ii
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law
For the last ten years, social media influencer marketing has been regulated by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) under the FTC’s Section 5 “unfair practices” authority, guided by the Endorsement Guides, a “best practices” document published by the FTC. This is a fairly “light” regulatory scheme where violators typically enter no-money, no-fault consent decrees and generally undertake to do a better job following the Endorsement Guides in the future. During this time, the practice has flourished, and companies are spending significant portions of their marketing budgets on social media influencer advertising. Recently, the FTC has submitted proposals for increased enforcement …
Unfair-But-Not-Deceptive: Confronting The Ambiguity In Washington State’S Consumer Protection Act, Emily Beale
Unfair-But-Not-Deceptive: Confronting The Ambiguity In Washington State’S Consumer Protection Act, Emily Beale
Seattle University Law Review
This Comment will argue that Washington state courts must promulgate a new, workable definition of “unfair-but-not-deceptive” under Washington’s Consumer Protection Act. Washington courts have acknowledged that a business act or practice can be unfair but not deceptive, but a simple recognition does not fulfill the liberal intentions of the Consumer Protection Act. By continuously declining to define unfair- but-not-deceptive, Washington courts have left consumers vulnerable and without recourse. This Comment will highlight the approaches developed by the federal government and other state governments on how to confront the ambiguity of unfair-but-not-deceptive and will propose a concrete definition for the term.
Antitrust In Attention Markets: Objections And Responses, John M. Newman
Antitrust In Attention Markets: Objections And Responses, John M. Newman
Articles
The modern antitrust enterprise finds itself under attack. Critics complain that enforcement agencies have done nothing to stem an ever-rising tide of market concentration and corporate power. At the center of this critique lies Silicon Valley, home of a new generation of tech giants.
This symposium contribution contends that attention markets represent the largest sector of the modern economy to have gone unnoticed by antitrust regulators. If it is to fulfill its congressional mandate, the antitrust enterprise must begin paying attention to attention markets. A number of objections to this straightforward point have been raised, but each collapses under close …
Scrutinizing Anticompetitive State Regulations Through Constitutional And Antitrust Lenses, Daniel A. Crane
Scrutinizing Anticompetitive State Regulations Through Constitutional And Antitrust Lenses, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
State and local regulations that anticompetitively favor certain producers to the detriment of consumers are a pervasive problem in our economy. Their existence is explicable by a variety of structural features—including asymmetry between consumer and producer interests, cost externalization, and institutional and political factors entrenching incumbent technologies. Formulating legal tools to combat such economic parochialism is challenging in the post-Lochner world, where any move toward heightened judicial review of economic regulation poses the perceived threat of a return to economic substantive due process. This Article considers and compares two potential tools for reviewing such regulations—a constitutional principle against anticompetitive parochialism …
Books And Olive Oil: Why Antitrust Must Deal With Consolidated Corporate Power, Carl Bogus
Books And Olive Oil: Why Antitrust Must Deal With Consolidated Corporate Power, Carl Bogus
Law Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Welcome And Introductory Remarks, Jonathan Baker
Welcome And Introductory Remarks, Jonathan Baker
Presentations
Video link: https://vimeo.com/352303633 Audio link: https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/audio-video/audio/economics-big-data-privacy-competition-introduction The Federal Trade Commission held the sixth session in its Hearings initiative, with two and a half days of sessions on November 6 – 8, 2018, at American University Washington College of Law, in Washington, D.C. The hearings examined the role that data play in competition and innovation and will also consider the antitrust analysis of mergers and firm conduct where data is a key asset or product. The Commission invited public comment on these issues, including the questions listed below. Comments were due January 7, 2019. If any entity has provided funding for …
Has The Us Economy Become More Concentrated And Less Competitive: A Review Of The Data, Jonathan Baker, Steven Berry, Fiona Scott Morton, Joshua Wright, Gregory Werden
Has The Us Economy Become More Concentrated And Less Competitive: A Review Of The Data, Jonathan Baker, Steven Berry, Fiona Scott Morton, Joshua Wright, Gregory Werden
Legislative Testimony & Comments
FTC Chairman Joe Simons presented opening remarks, followed by a day of discussion by a distinguished set of panelists who discussed the following topics (some of which will be discussed on the rescheduled date):
- the current landscape of competition and consumer protection law and policy;
- whether the U.S. economy has become more concentrated and less competitive;
- the regulation of consumer data;
- antitrust law and the consumer welfare standard; and
- the analysis of vertical mergers.
Taking Antitrust Away From The Courts, Ganesh Sitaraman
Taking Antitrust Away From The Courts, Ganesh Sitaraman
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
A small number of firms hold significant market power in a wide variety of sectors of the economy, leading commentators across the political spectrum to call for a reinvigoration of antitrust enforcement. But the antitrust agencies have been surprisingly timid in response to this challenge, and when they have tried to assert themselves, they have often found that hostile courts block their ability to foster competitive markets. In other areas of law, Congress delegates power to agencies, agencies make regulations setting standards, and courts provide deferential review after the fact. Antitrust doesn’t work this way. Courts – made up of …
Healthcare Mergers And Acquisitions In An Era Of Consolidation: A Review And A Call For Agency Collaboration In Antitrust Enforcement, Anna Molinari
Healthcare Mergers And Acquisitions In An Era Of Consolidation: A Review And A Call For Agency Collaboration In Antitrust Enforcement, Anna Molinari
Pepperdine Law Review
Healthcare companies are consolidating at an alarming rate. From hospitals, to providers’ offices, to insurance companies, there are increasingly fewer consumer choices and more monopolies, which calls for heightened antitrust enforcement. Interestingly, antitrust enforcement authority in the healthcare industry is shared between the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which presides over hospital and provider mergers, and the Department of Justice (DOJ), which presides over health insurance mergers. Although the FTC has challenged many hospital and provider mergers, the DOJ has only challenged six health insurance mergers. Furthermore, last year, the DOJ ultimately approved all health insurance mergers. In 2017, in United …
Trade Associations, Information Exchange, And Cartels, Spencer Weber Waller
Trade Associations, Information Exchange, And Cartels, Spencer Weber Waller
Faculty Publications & Other Works
Trade associations can play a procompetitive role in an economy but, as an association of actual and potential competitors, can also raise important competition law issues that must be addressed carefully by legal counsel. This Issue Paper presents a hypothetical problem that illustrates many of the issues that counsel can confront in representing a trade association, its members, or company executives. The Issue Paper raises many of the issues from a United States' perspective with occasional comparative examples from other jurisdictions. Carefully consider how your jurisdiction would, and should, address these all too real issues. In thinking about the …
Let The State Decide: The Efficient Antitrust Enforcer And The Avoidance Of Anticompetitive Remedies, Andrew J. Fuller
Let The State Decide: The Efficient Antitrust Enforcer And The Avoidance Of Anticompetitive Remedies, Andrew J. Fuller
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
If the antitrust remedy a private party pursues would likely have anticompetitive consequences, would only the government constitute an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws? Imagine that a plaintiff sues for a remedy so large that the award of the remedy would meaningfully increase market concentration by sending the defendants into bankruptcy. Is such a plaintiff an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws? Should courts hold that in this situation only the government should be able to challenge the alleged conduct? These questions have gone unaddressed in academic literature because litigation rarely raises the specter of the anticompetitive remedy. Recently, …
Peeling Back The Student Privacy Pledge, Alexi Pfeffer-Gillett
Peeling Back The Student Privacy Pledge, Alexi Pfeffer-Gillett
Scholarly Articles
Education software is a multi-billion dollar industry that is rapidly growing. The federal government has encouraged this growth through a series of initiatives that reward schools for tracking and aggregating student data. Amid this increasingly digitized education landscape, parents and educators have begun to raise concerns about the scope and security of student data collection.
Industry players, rather than policymakers, have so far led efforts to protect student data. Central to these efforts is the Student Privacy Pledge, a set of standards that providers of digital education services have voluntarily adopted. By many accounts, the Pledge has been a success. …
State-Action Immunity And Section 5 Of The Ftc Act, Daniel A. Crane, Adam Hester
State-Action Immunity And Section 5 Of The Ftc Act, Daniel A. Crane, Adam Hester
Michigan Law Review
The state-action immunity doctrine of Parker v. Brown immunizes anticompetitive state regulations from preemption by federal antitrust law so long as the state takes conspicuous ownership of its anticompetitive policy. In its 1943 Parker decision, the Supreme Court justified this doctrine, observing that no evidence of a congressional will to preempt state law appears in the Sherman Act’s legislative history or context. In addition, commentators generally assume that the New Deal court was anxious to avoid re-entangling the federal judiciary in Lochner-style substantive due process analysis. The Supreme Court has observed, without deciding, that the Federal Trade Commission might …
Book Review: Foreign Commerce And The Antitrust Laws. By Wilbur L. Fugate. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 2d Ed. 1973. Pp Xxv, 491. $35.00., Paul P. Harbrecht
Book Review: Foreign Commerce And The Antitrust Laws. By Wilbur L. Fugate. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 2d Ed. 1973. Pp Xxv, 491. $35.00., Paul P. Harbrecht
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law
No abstract provided.
Merger And Acquisition Due Diligence Part Ii- The Devil In The Details, James A. Sherer, Taylor M. Hoffman, Kevin M. Wallace, Eugenio E. Ortiz, Trevor J. Satnick
Merger And Acquisition Due Diligence Part Ii- The Devil In The Details, James A. Sherer, Taylor M. Hoffman, Kevin M. Wallace, Eugenio E. Ortiz, Trevor J. Satnick
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology
Our prior scholarship examined the legal and technical challenges involved in modern Merger & Acquisition ("M&A") due diligence practices associated with transactions ("Deals"), given recent but steady advances in technology and related increases in sophistication seen in Deal participants-primarily the organizations or assets targeted (the "Targets") as part of the Deal, and the organizations that pursued and/or resulted from the Deal (the "Acquirers"). We then proposed a framework addressing five particular verticals of interest and concern: data privacy ("DP"), information security ("IS"), e-Discovery, information governance ("IG"), and the due diligence and record keeping associated with the Deal itself ("Deal Information") …
A Profile Of Bio-Pharma Consolidation Activity, Jordan Paradise
A Profile Of Bio-Pharma Consolidation Activity, Jordan Paradise
Faculty Publications & Other Works
No abstract provided.
The New Road To Serfdom: The Curse Of Bigness And The Failure Of Antitrust, Carl T. Bogus
The New Road To Serfdom: The Curse Of Bigness And The Failure Of Antitrust, Carl T. Bogus
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
This Article argues for a paradigm shift in modern antitrust policy. Rather than being concerned exclusively with consumer welfare, antitrust law should also be concerned with consolidated corporate power. Regulators and courts should consider the social and political, as well as the economic, consequences of corporate mergers. The vision that antitrust must be a key tool for limiting consolidated corporate power has a venerable legacy, extending back to the origins of antitrust law in early seventeenth century England, running throughout American history, and influencing the enactment of U.S. antitrust laws. However, the Chicago School’s view that antitrust law should be …
Into The Amazon: Clarity And Transparency In Ftc Section 5 Merger Doctrine, Christina C. Ma
Into The Amazon: Clarity And Transparency In Ftc Section 5 Merger Doctrine, Christina C. Ma
St. John's Law Review
(Excerpt)
Part I of this Article provides a description of the enforcement procedures available to the DOJ and the FTC and of the existing standards guiding enforcement. Part II discusses how agency settlements and greater court deference to the agencies has changed the landscape of merger enforcement, raising transparency and accountability concerns. These concerns are magnified within the FTC because of its administrative proceeding and section 5 powers, ultimately providing the FTC with greater opportunity to shape merger law. Despite the expansive discretion available to the FTC, section 5 case law is sparse. Part III tracks early attempts to broaden …