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Articles 61 - 88 of 88
Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation
The Ftc's Procedural Advantage In Discovering Concerted Action, William H. Page
The Ftc's Procedural Advantage In Discovering Concerted Action, William H. Page
UF Law Faculty Publications
Scholars have long argued that Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act can or should be interpreted to reach more conduct than Section 1 of Sherman Act - whether, in other words, there are gaps in the coverage of Section 1 that allow certain forms of anticompetitive conduct that Section 5 should condemn. Perhaps the most important issue in the interpretation of Section 1 concerns how courts should distinguish conscious parallelism from unlawful concerted action. In this paper, I argue that there is no substantive gap between the two antitrust statutes on this issue-both statutes prohibit (and permit) the …
Should Concentration Be Dropped From The Merger Guidelines?, Jonathan Baker, Steven Salop
Should Concentration Be Dropped From The Merger Guidelines?, Jonathan Baker, Steven Salop
Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals
As members of the ABA Antitrust Section's Task Force on Fundamental Theory, we are pleased to provide a brief discussion of the appropriate role of market concentration in the review of mergers under the antitrust laws. This paper, organized in four main parts, will offer some suggestions for revising the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines. A final section of this work will analyze whether it would be preferable to conduct merger analysis by applying Professor Michael E. Porter's business strategy framework rather than the Merger Guidelines.
Online Auction Fraud: Are The Auction Houses Doing All They Should Or Could To Stop Online Fraud?, James M. Snyder
Online Auction Fraud: Are The Auction Houses Doing All They Should Or Could To Stop Online Fraud?, James M. Snyder
Federal Communications Law Journal
In April 1998, the FTC released a consumer alert pertaining to the increasing problem of online auction fraud. As the number of online auction participants increased, online auction fraud was becoming more prevalent. The FTC requested comments regarding methods that would be appropriate for curbing the increase in consumer deception. Many in the online auction industry proposed voluntary self-regulation. This Note exposes the inadequacy of industry self-regulation by analogizing online auction abuse with the misuse and near downfall of the 900-number industry. This Note proposes that only a regime of strict industry guidelines that the FTC initiates will halt online …
Market Power And The Ftc, John C. Hilke
Market Power And The Ftc, John C. Hilke
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology
Although the DOJ/FTC Merger Guidelines provide a firm foundation for analyzing changes in prospective market power resulting from a proposed merger, the analysis does not focus on detecting or measuring market power that may already exist in the market. Further, antitrust enforcement is focused on anti-competitive mergers and unfair forms of competition. From an antitrust perspective, a firm that lawfully acquired market power does not commit an antitrust offense merely by exercising that power, unless it engages in unfair methods of competition to protect that power.
Annual Survey Of Virginia Law: Antitrust And Trade Regulation, Michael F. Urbanski, James R. Creekmore
Annual Survey Of Virginia Law: Antitrust And Trade Regulation, Michael F. Urbanski, James R. Creekmore
University of Richmond Law Review
During the past year, the United States Supreme Court, in two decisions of significance, refused to summarily censure conduct having legitimate, procompetitive benefits. In similar fashion, the United States Court ofAppeals for the Fourth Circuit continued to scrutinize antitrust claims, rejecting those failing to measure up to pleading and proof requirements, while also reaffirming the vitality of the state action immunity doctrine as a bar to those that did. Meanwhile, Virginia's federal district courts grappled with time worn conspiracy challenges to medical staff privileging decisions, while simultaneously forging new ground in one of the first cases to consider market definition …
Econometric Analysis In Ftc V. Staples, Jonathan Baker
Econometric Analysis In Ftc V. Staples, Jonathan Baker
Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals
In mid-1997, a federal district court in Washington, DC, granted the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC's) request for a preliminary injunction blocking the proposed merger of Staples and Office Depot (Federal Trade Commission v. Staples, Inc. [hereafter, Staples] 1997a). The transaction would have combined two of the nation's three leading office superstore chains. The firms chose not to pursue the case further after the preliminary injunction was issued, thus giving up on their efforts to merge.
Night Landings On An Aircraft Carrier: Hospital Mergers And Antitrust Law, Thomas L. Greaney
Night Landings On An Aircraft Carrier: Hospital Mergers And Antitrust Law, Thomas L. Greaney
All Faculty Scholarship
Abstract: Analysis of the competitive effects of hospital mergers requires antitrust tribunals to make exceedingly fine-tuned appraisals of complex economic relationships. The law requires fact finding in a number of complex areas, e.g., defining product and geographic markets, predicting the possibility of that firms will engage in coordinated behavior; and assessing efficiencies flowing from the merger. Further complicating the process is the fact that these decisions require judgments regarding what the future may hold in an industry undergoing revolutionary change. Like pilots landing at night aboard an aircraft carrier, courts are aiming for a target that is small, shifting and …
Annual Survey Of Virginia Law: Antitrust And Trade Regulation, Michael F. Urbanski, Francis H. Casola
Annual Survey Of Virginia Law: Antitrust And Trade Regulation, Michael F. Urbanski, Francis H. Casola
University of Richmond Law Review
Group boycott and antitrust conspiracy claims met with little success in Virginia this year. Both federal and state courts are increasingly wary of allowing cases to proceed where the essential elements of antitrust claims are not established or where no impact on competition is proven. Moreover, procedural and evidentiary difficulties have plagued antitrust plaintiffs this year. In short, the cases reflect judicial analysis that is both sophisticated and resistant to allowing meritless antitrust claims to get to a jury.
Annual Survey Of Virginia Law: Antitrust And Trade Regulation, Michael F. Urbanski, Francis H. Casola
Annual Survey Of Virginia Law: Antitrust And Trade Regulation, Michael F. Urbanski, Francis H. Casola
University of Richmond Law Review
Once again this past year, the Fourth Circuit and the federal courts in Virginia proved inhospitable to antitrust plaintiffs. Plaintiffs consistently lost on summary judgment and only one plaintiff survived a motion to dismiss. The only major development in the law in the Fourth Circuit came from the Western District of Virginia where Judge James C. Turk refused to recognize the theory of monopoly leveraging under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
Managed Competition, Integrated Delivery Systems And Antitrust, Thomas L. Greaney
Managed Competition, Integrated Delivery Systems And Antitrust, Thomas L. Greaney
All Faculty Scholarship
A central question confronting proponents of managed competition during the health reform debate in 1994 was whether competitive networks or integrated delivery systems would emerge. Under reformers’ vision, controlling costs depended on the emergence of a sufficient number of efficient and viable integrated delivery systems. Conversely, if one or a few integrated networks dominate the market for physician or hospital services, rivalry on the main issues of health care cost control would likely dissipate. This article argues that vigilant and sensible antitrust enforcement was also a prerequisite for the success of the managed competition model. Despite the considerable emphasis on …
Annual Survey Of Virginia Law: Antitrust And Trade Regulation, Michael F. Urbanski, Francis H. Casola
Annual Survey Of Virginia Law: Antitrust And Trade Regulation, Michael F. Urbanski, Francis H. Casola
University of Richmond Law Review
During the past year, Virginia's federal courts published surprisingly few antitrust opinions. These few opinions indicate fact-specific analysis and little significant development to the law. However, the decisions reflect the continued difficulties faced by private antitrust plaintiffs alleging conspiracy claims and criminal antitrust defendants prosecuted for conduct which is illegal per se. Antitrust plaintiffs, however, have enjoyed measured, if only temporary, success. For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment against a durable medical equipment company alleging monopolization claims against a hospital and its affiliated medical equipment company. In another …
The Federal Trade Commission's Evolving Deception Policy, Jack E. Karns
The Federal Trade Commission's Evolving Deception Policy, Jack E. Karns
University of Richmond Law Review
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has regulated competitive business activities since its inception in 1915. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) empowers the Commission to enjoin certain unfair -and deceptive business practices. As is the case with other regulatory statutes, Congress chose not to define certain terms in the FTCA, such as "deceptive," leaving this task to the FTC and the federal courts. The result has been a steady flow of federal case law clarifying the definition of a deceptive business act or practice.
New Forces Chip Away At Agencies' Policy Of Antitrust Abandonment, Joe Sims, Robert H. Lande
New Forces Chip Away At Agencies' Policy Of Antitrust Abandonment, Joe Sims, Robert H. Lande
All Faculty Scholarship
Antitrust is at a crossroads. the federal agencies are dominated by the economic approach of the Chicago school, but congress and the states are expressing sharp dissent.
Competitive Reform In Health Care: The Vulnerable Revolution, Thomas L. Greaney
Competitive Reform In Health Care: The Vulnerable Revolution, Thomas L. Greaney
All Faculty Scholarship
This article, written at the dawn of the era of "competitive reform" in health care examines the case and prospects for the introduction of competition in health care delivery and financing. It observes the failures of the ancienne regime of fee for service payment and professional sovereignty and discusses the benefits of market-oriented policy. Its contribution, still salient today, is the lesson that competition cannot succeed without regulation. It identifies legislative, professional, and cultural hurdles to effective implementation of competitive norms and policies that have impeded the success of competition policy in health care.
Provider-Sponsored Alternative Health Care Delivery Systems: Reducing Antitrust Liability After Maricopa, James H. Walsh, Howard Feller
Provider-Sponsored Alternative Health Care Delivery Systems: Reducing Antitrust Liability After Maricopa, James H. Walsh, Howard Feller
University of Richmond Law Review
The phenomenal rate of inflation experienced by the health care industry in the past several years has been a substantial cause of concern for everyone affected-physicians, hospitals, insurers, employers and consumers. Public reaction to the tremendous increase in health care costs has created pressure on health care providers to compete on the basis of price and to deliver services more efficiently. The recent growth of alternative health care delivery systems (ADSs) has been a direct response to a number of problems created by increasing health care costs including increased competition in health care delivery, resistance by payors and consumers to …
The Role Of Economic Analysis In Legal Education, Ernest Gellhorn, Glen O. Robinson
The Role Of Economic Analysis In Legal Education, Ernest Gellhorn, Glen O. Robinson
Journal of Legal Education
No abstract provided.
The Ftc And Pricing: Of Predation And Signaling, George A. Hay
The Ftc And Pricing: Of Predation And Signaling, George A. Hay
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
This paper summarizes and comments on two recent FTC cases. The first case involved accusations of predatory pricing against Borden, the manufacturer of ReaLemon, the dominant brand of reconstituted lemon juice. The second involved price-signaling and other so-called facilitating practices by the four makers of lead-based antiknock compounds.
Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly, And Antitrust Law, George A. Hay
Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly, And Antitrust Law, George A. Hay
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
The Deregulation Of Industry: How Far Should We Go?, Wesley J. Liebeler
The Deregulation Of Industry: How Far Should We Go?, Wesley J. Liebeler
Indiana Law Journal
Colloquium: The Deregulation of Industry
Buyers Liability Under Sections 2(D) And 2(E) Of The Robinson-Patman Act - Max Factor & Co. And Shulton, Inc.
Maryland Law Review
No abstract provided.
Voluntary Compliance: An Adjunct To The Mandatory Processes
Voluntary Compliance: An Adjunct To The Mandatory Processes
Indiana Law Journal
Symposium on the Federal Trade Commission: A Program of Enforcement
The Gasoline Price Wars: A Case Study Of The Shortcomings Of The Mandatory Processes
The Gasoline Price Wars: A Case Study Of The Shortcomings Of The Mandatory Processes
Indiana Law Journal
Symposium on the Federal Trade Commission: A Program of Enforcement
Enforcement, Voluntary Compliance, And The Federal Trade Commission, Daniel Jay Baum, Eugene R. Baker
Enforcement, Voluntary Compliance, And The Federal Trade Commission, Daniel Jay Baum, Eugene R. Baker
Indiana Law Journal
Symposium on the Federal Trade Commission: A Program of Enforcement
Interstate Dissemination Of Advertising: Jurisdiction Which Must Be Earned
Interstate Dissemination Of Advertising: Jurisdiction Which Must Be Earned
Indiana Law Journal
Symposium on the Federal Trade Commission: A Program of Enforcement
Effective Guidance Through Cease And Desist Orders: The T-V Commercial
Effective Guidance Through Cease And Desist Orders: The T-V Commercial
Indiana Law Journal
Symposium on the Federal Trade Commission: A Program of Enforcement
Five Thousand Dollars A Day, H. Thomas Austern
Five Thousand Dollars A Day, H. Thomas Austern
Kentucky Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Regulation Of Business-Robinson-Patman Act-Defense Of Meeting A Competitor's Price, Willis B. Snell S. Ed.
Regulation Of Business-Robinson-Patman Act-Defense Of Meeting A Competitor's Price, Willis B. Snell S. Ed.
Michigan Law Review
Standard Oil sold gasoline to "jobber" customers at a price lower than that at which it sold to other customers in the area. The price differentials were not justified by lower costs. The jobbers made both wholesale and retail sales of the gasoline; some of them passed on the reduced prices by sales at less than the prevailing rates in the area. The F.T.C. held that Standard's price differential violated section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. Standard contended that the differential was established in good faith to meet an equally low price of a …
Regulation Of Business-Robinson-Patman Act-Defense Of Meeting A Competitor's Price, Willis B. Snell S. Ed.
Regulation Of Business-Robinson-Patman Act-Defense Of Meeting A Competitor's Price, Willis B. Snell S. Ed.
Michigan Law Review
Standard Oil sold gasoline to "jobber" customers at a price lower than that at which it sold to other customers in the area. The price differentials were not justified by lower costs. The jobbers made both wholesale and retail sales of the gasoline; some of them passed on the reduced prices by sales at less than the prevailing rates in the area. The F.T.C. held that Standard's price differential violated section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. Standard contended that the differential was established in good faith to meet an equally low price of a …