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Articles 31 - 60 of 130
Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation
The (Limited) Constitutional Right To Compete In An Occupation, Rebecca Haw Allensworth
The (Limited) Constitutional Right To Compete In An Occupation, Rebecca Haw Allensworth
William & Mary Law Review
Is there a constitutional right to compete in an occupation? The “right to earn a living” movement, gaining steam in policy circles and winning some battles in the lower courts, says so. Advocates for this right say that the right to compete in an occupation stands on equal footing with our most sacred constitutional rights such as the right to be free from racial discrimination. This Article takes a different view, arguing that while there is a limited constitutional right to compete in an occupation, it is—and should be—weaker than these advocates claim. Some state licensing laws run afoul of …
“Competition Policy In Its Broadest Sense:” Michael Pertschuk’S Chairmanship Of The Federal Trade Commission 1977-1981, William E. Kovacic
“Competition Policy In Its Broadest Sense:” Michael Pertschuk’S Chairmanship Of The Federal Trade Commission 1977-1981, William E. Kovacic
William & Mary Law Review
In the late 1960s and through the 1970s, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) undertook an ambitious program of reforms. Among other measures, the agency expanded the focus of antitrust enforcement to address economic concentration, including the use of Section 5 of the FTC Act to restructure dominant firms and oligopolies. In many ways Michael Pertschuk, who chaired the agency from 1977 to 1981, became the symbol of the FTC’s efforts to stretch the boundaries of antitrust policy—to pursue a conception of “competition policy in its broadest sense.” Despite a number of valuable accomplishments, the FTC achieved relatively few litigation successes, …
Antitrust And The Politics Of State Action, Thomas B. Nachbar
Antitrust And The Politics Of State Action, Thomas B. Nachbar
William & Mary Law Review
In North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners, the Court refused to exempt the board from the second element of Parker immunity—active supervision by the state—because the Board was made up largely of “active market participants.” This Article argues that the “active market participant” rule laid out in North Carolina State Board, while intuitively appealing, ignores important political values represented by antitrust law, values most evident in the context of state action immunity. By focusing on the potential market harm from self-interested regulators, the Court ignored a series of political harms inherent in the structure of the North …
The Global Dominance Of European Competition Law Over American Antitrust Law, Anu Bradford, Adam S. Chilton, Katerina Linos, Alex Weaver
The Global Dominance Of European Competition Law Over American Antitrust Law, Anu Bradford, Adam S. Chilton, Katerina Linos, Alex Weaver
Faculty Scholarship
The world’s biggest consumer markets – the European Union and the United States – have adopted different approaches to regulating competition. This has not only put the EU and US at odds in high-profile investigations of anticompetitive conduct, but also made them race to spread their regulatory models. Using a novel dataset of competition statutes, we investigate this race to influence the world’s regulatory landscape and find that the EU’s competition laws have been more widely emulated than the US’s competition laws. We then argue that both “push” and “pull” factors explain the appeal of the EU’s competition regime: the …
How Google Perceives Customer Privacy, Cyber, E-Commerce, Political And Regulatory Compliance Risks, Lawrence J. Trautman
How Google Perceives Customer Privacy, Cyber, E-Commerce, Political And Regulatory Compliance Risks, Lawrence J. Trautman
William & Mary Business Law Review
By now, almost every business has an Internet presence. What are the major risks perceived by those engaged in the universe of Internet businesses? What potential risks, if they become reality, may cause substantial increases in operating costs or threaten the very survival of the enterprise?
This Article discusses the relevant annual report disclosures from Alphabet, Inc. (parent of Google), along with other Google documents, as a potentially powerful teaching device. Most of the descriptive language to follow is excerpted directly from Alphabet’s (Google) regulatory filings. My additions about these entities include weaving their disclosure materials into a logical presentation …
Anticompetitive Manipulation Of Rems: A New Exception To Antitrust Refusal-To-Deal Doctrine, Tyler A. Garrett
Anticompetitive Manipulation Of Rems: A New Exception To Antitrust Refusal-To-Deal Doctrine, Tyler A. Garrett
William & Mary Law Review
No abstract provided.
Competition Law Gone Global: Introducing The Comparative Competition Law And Enforcement Datasets, Anu Bradford, Adam S. Chilton, Chris Megaw, Nathaniel Sokol
Competition Law Gone Global: Introducing The Comparative Competition Law And Enforcement Datasets, Anu Bradford, Adam S. Chilton, Chris Megaw, Nathaniel Sokol
Faculty Scholarship
Competition law has proliferated around the world. Due to data limitations, however, there is little systematic information about the substance and enforcement of these laws. In this paper, we address that problem by introducing two new datasets on competition law regimes around the world. First, we introduce the Comparative Competition Law Dataset, which codes competition laws in 130 jurisdictions between 1889 to 2010. Second, we introduce the Comparative Competition Enforcement Dataset, which provides data on competition agencies’ resources and activities in 100 jurisdictions between 1990 and 2010. These datasets offer the most comprehensive picture of competition law yet assembled and …
Competition Law Around The World From 1889 To 2010: The Competition Law Index, Anu Bradford, Adam S. Chilton
Competition Law Around The World From 1889 To 2010: The Competition Law Index, Anu Bradford, Adam S. Chilton
Faculty Scholarship
Competition laws have become a mainstay of regulation in market economies today. At the same time, past efforts to study the drivers or effects of these laws have been hampered by the lack of systematic measures of these laws across a wide range of years or countries. In this paper, we draw on new data on the evolution of competition laws to create a novel Competition Law Index (the “CLI”) that measures the stringency of competition regulation from 1889 to 2010. We then employ the CLI to examine trends in the intensity of competition regulation over time and across key …
The Raising Rivals' Cost Foreclosure Paradigm, Conditional Pricing Practices, And The Flawed Incremental Price-Cost Test, Steven C. Salop
The Raising Rivals' Cost Foreclosure Paradigm, Conditional Pricing Practices, And The Flawed Incremental Price-Cost Test, Steven C. Salop
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
There are two overarching legal paradigms for analyzing exclusionary conduct in antitrust – predatory pricing and the raising rivals’ costs characterization of foreclosure. Sometimes the choice of paradigm is obvious. Other times, it may depend on the structure of the plaintiff’s allegations. Some types of conduct, notably conditional pricing practices (CPPs), might appear by analogy to fit into both paradigms. CPPs involve pricing that is conditioned on exclusivity or some other type of favoritism in a customer’s purchases or input supplier’s sales. The predatory pricing paradigm would attack the low prices of CPPs. By contrast, the RRC foreclosure paradigm would …
More Than Just A Toothache? N.C. Dental Leaves Medical Boards Vulnerable: A Look At Telemedicine Companies And Antitrust Challenges To State Prescription Drug Rules, Alexander R. Kalyniuk
More Than Just A Toothache? N.C. Dental Leaves Medical Boards Vulnerable: A Look At Telemedicine Companies And Antitrust Challenges To State Prescription Drug Rules, Alexander R. Kalyniuk
William & Mary Business Law Review
Encouraged by technological advancements and favorable provisions within the Affordable Care Act, telemedicine companies that offer online doctor visits are thriving in the health care industry. Online doctor visits are a relatively new and cost-efficient method to provide medical care over long distances that do not require patients to step outside their homes. However, many state medical board scope-of-practice rules prohibit physicians from prescribing medications without an in-person physical examination of the patient, which impedes telemedicine companies from offering their online services in those states. To circumvent this barrier, telemedicine companies may have a prima facie case under § 1 …
Modifying Merger Consent Decrees To Improve Merger Enforcement Policy, Steven C. Salop
Modifying Merger Consent Decrees To Improve Merger Enforcement Policy, Steven C. Salop
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This article analyzes my short proposal for reviewing and modifying merger consent decrees to permit additional relief if the provisions of the initial consent merger are found to fail to preserve or restore competition in a reasonable period of time after the merger was consummated. My proposal also would involve more frequent reviews of consummated mergers that have been cleared without challenge, particularly those that were close calls. While “Don't Look Back” might be the best anthem for artists, economic decision theory would not support that approach to merger policy.
Predicting the impact of proposed mergers and remedies on consumers …
In Praise Of All Or Nothing Dichotomous Categories: Why Antitrust Law Should Reject The Quick Look, Alan J. Meese
In Praise Of All Or Nothing Dichotomous Categories: Why Antitrust Law Should Reject The Quick Look, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Evaluating Joint Ventures: Economic Analysis Checklist, Steven C. Salop
Evaluating Joint Ventures: Economic Analysis Checklist, Steven C. Salop
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This short article (for a symposium on joint ventures) provides practitioners and law professor with a 20 question checklist to guide the competitive effects analysis of the formation of a joint venture and the specific restraints and conduct of the venture. The questions mainly focus on ventures among actual or potential competitors, though some of the questions also are relevant for ventures involving complementary product firms. The questions concern potential competitive harms, potential competitive benefits, and the determination of net competitive effects. While this sequencing follows the standard burden-shifting formulation of the rule of reason decision process, the article notes …
Revising The U.S. Vertical Merger Guidelines: Policy Issues And An Interim Guide For Practitioners, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. Culley
Revising The U.S. Vertical Merger Guidelines: Policy Issues And An Interim Guide For Practitioners, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. Culley
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Mergers and acquisitions are a major component of antitrust law and practice. The U.S. antitrust agencies spend a majority of their time on merger enforcement. The focus of most merger review at the agencies involves horizontal mergers, that is, mergers among firms that compete at the same level of production or distribution.
Vertical mergers combine firms at different levels of production or distribution. In the simplest case, a vertical merger joins together a firm that produces an input (and competes in an input market) with a firm that uses that input to produce output (and competes in an output market). …
Measuring Monopsony: Using The Antitrust Toolbox To Protect Market Competition And Help The Television Consumer, Jacob M. Derr
Measuring Monopsony: Using The Antitrust Toolbox To Protect Market Competition And Help The Television Consumer, Jacob M. Derr
William & Mary Law Review
No abstract provided.
Antitrust Law And The Minor League Reserve System, Ryan Mabry
Antitrust Law And The Minor League Reserve System, Ryan Mabry
Kaleidoscope
Minor League Baseball is a half-billion dollar a year industry in the United States. It has grown to its current state under an umbrella of protection from U.S. antitrust statutes. Beginning with the Federal Baseball decision in 1922, the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that professional baseball is exempt from both the Sherman and Clayton Acts— the seminal federal government statutes regarding antitrust. This status is unique; no other professional sport enjoys such immunity. If the exemption were lost, the effects on this staple of American culture would likely be extremely disruptive. Throughout this project, I analyzed the effects that …
Cguppi: Scoring Incentives To Engage In Parallel Accommodating Conduct, Serge Moresi, David Reitman, Steven C. Salop, Yianis Sarafidis
Cguppi: Scoring Incentives To Engage In Parallel Accommodating Conduct, Serge Moresi, David Reitman, Steven C. Salop, Yianis Sarafidis
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
We propose an index for scoring coordination incentives, which we call the “coordination GUPPI” or cGUPPI. While the cGUPPI can be applied to a wide range of coordinated effects concerns, it is particularly relevant for gauging concerns of parallel accommodating conduct (PAC), a concept that received due prominence in the 2010 U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines. PAC is a type of coordinated conduct whereby a firm raises price with the expectation—but without any prior agreement—that one or more other firms will follow and match the price increase. The cGUPPI is the highest uniform price increase that all the would-be coordinating firms …
Spirit Airlines, Inc. V. Northwest Airlines, Inc.: A Case For Increased Regulation Of The Airline Industry, Erica Wessling
Spirit Airlines, Inc. V. Northwest Airlines, Inc.: A Case For Increased Regulation Of The Airline Industry, Erica Wessling
William & Mary Business Law Review
The relatively short history of the airline industry is characterized by sudden shifts and divergent standards that attempt to negotiate a complex market. High demand, uniqueness of service, and difficulty of market entry render the market particularly susceptible to monopolization among competitors. Recently, the rise of the low-cost carrier business model has exposed high barriers to entry into the airline market. In attempts to remedy the harm against both prospective market entrants and consumers, lowcost carriers have levied price predation claims against entrenched legacy airlines. Due to the difficulty in negotiating the divide between predatory behavior and lawful competition, courts …
Regulating Professional Sports Leagues, Nathaniel Grow
Regulating Professional Sports Leagues, Nathaniel Grow
Washington and Lee Law Review
Four monopoly sports leagues currently dominate the U.S. professional sports industry. Although federal antitrust law—the primary source of regulation governing the industry—would normally be expected to provide a significant check on anticompetitive, monopolistic behavior, it has failed to effectively govern the leagues due to both their well-entrenched monopoly status and the unique level of coordination necessary among their respective teams. Consequently, the four leagues today each, in many respects, enjoy unregulated monopoly status in what is estimated to be a $67 billion industry.
As one might expect, these leagues use their largely unchecked monopoly power to injure the public in …
Antitrust, Regulatory Harm, And Economic Liberty, Alan J. Meese
Antitrust, Regulatory Harm, And Economic Liberty, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Worse Than The Tower Of Babel? Remedying Antitrust’S False Dichotomy Through De Novo Appellate Review, Steven Semeraro
Worse Than The Tower Of Babel? Remedying Antitrust’S False Dichotomy Through De Novo Appellate Review, Steven Semeraro
William & Mary Business Law Review
Modern antitrust analysis rests on a strange perch. Its paradigmatic method—pretentiously entitled the Rule of Reason—appears (but only appears) to be a dichotomous analytic. At the first stage, a court supposedly defines the relevant market and determines, as a matter of fact, whether marketplace forces constrain the defendant from profitably raising price above the level that would prevail in a competitive market. Only when market forces are inadequate to protect consumers, that is, the defendant has market power, does the court proceed to stage two, at which it assesses, as a matter of law, whether the defendant used its power …
Robert Bork's Forgotten Role In The Transaction Cost Revolution, Alan J. Meese
Robert Bork's Forgotten Role In The Transaction Cost Revolution, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
The last few decades have witnessed a scientific revolution in the field of industrial organization in the form of transaction cost economics (TCE). This revolution has radically altered economists’ understanding and interpretation of both partial and complete economic integration. Not surprisingly, this sea change has substantially influenced antitrust law and policy, impelling the Supreme Court to reverse or greatly modify various precedents.
This essay supplements the received historiography of the TCE revolution. It contends that Robert Bork played a hitherto underappreciated role in that revolution. In particular, the essay contends that in 1966, before the official onset of the transaction …
Reframing The (False?) Choice Between Purchaser Welfare And Total Welfare, Alan J. Meese
Reframing The (False?) Choice Between Purchaser Welfare And Total Welfare, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
This Article critiques the role that the partial equilibrium trade-off paradigm plays in the debate over the definition of “consumer welfare” that courts should employ when developing and applying antitrust doctrine. The Article contends that common reliance on the paradigm distorts the debate between those who would equate “consumer welfare” with “total welfare” and those who equate consumer welfare with “purchaser welfare.” In particular, the model excludes, by fiat, the fact that new efficiencies free up resources that flow to other markets, increasing output and thus the welfare of purchasers in those markets. Moreover, the model also assumes that both …
Group Life And Health Ins. V. Royal Drug Co.: The Narrowing Exemption Of The Business Of Insurance From Federal Antitrust Scrutiny , Stanley K. Yamada Jr.
Group Life And Health Ins. V. Royal Drug Co.: The Narrowing Exemption Of The Business Of Insurance From Federal Antitrust Scrutiny , Stanley K. Yamada Jr.
Pepperdine Law Review
No abstract provided.
Accommodating Labor And Antitrust, Stephen F. Ross
Accommodating Labor And Antitrust, Stephen F. Ross
Utah OnLaw: The Utah Law Review Online Supplement
Short of its two critical premises—that sports labor restraints may harm players but benefit fans and the sport’s popularity, and that the Sherman Act must always step aside to protect the “entire collective bargaining process”—Professor LeRoy’s thorough research loses much of its normative force. This provocative contribution is particularly revealing in one respect that he does not explicitly mention, however, akin to Sherlock Holmes’ famous insight that the telling clue was that the sleeping dog did not bark.34 All of the lawsuits Professor LeRoy studied involved challenges by union-represented players; none involved challenges by the principal beneficiaries of the Sherman …
Competition Policy And The Great Depression: Lessons Learned And A New Way Forward, Alan J. Meese
Competition Policy And The Great Depression: Lessons Learned And A New Way Forward, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
The recent Great Recession has shaken the nation’s faith in free markets and inspired various forms of actual or proposed regulatory intervention displacing free competition. Proponents of such intervention often claim that such interference with free-market outcomes will help foster economic recovery and thus macroeconomic stability by, for instance, enhancing the “purchasing power” of workers or reducing consumer prices. Such arguments for increased economic centralization echo those made during the Great Depression, when proponents of regulatory intervention claimed that such interference with economic liberty and free competition, including suspension of the antitrust laws, was necessary to foster economic recovery. Indeed, …
Standard Oil As Lochner's Trojan Horse, Alan J. Meese
Standard Oil As Lochner's Trojan Horse, Alan J. Meese
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Antitrust, Governance, And Postseason College Football, Michael Mccann
Antitrust, Governance, And Postseason College Football, Michael Mccann
Law Faculty Scholarship
This Article examines the compatibility of the Bowl Championship Series (“BCS”) with federal antitrust law and the appropriateness of the federal government using its formal and informal powers to encourage a new format for postseason college football. The Article begins by examining the legality of the BCS under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. It then discusses the appropriateness of government actors concerning themselves with, and expending taxpayer dollars on, the scheduling of college football games. The Article concludes by offering possible changes to the scheduling structure of postseason college football, with an emphasis on voluntary, efficiency-promoting …
Antitrust Error, Alan Devlin, Michael Jacobs
Antitrust Error, Alan Devlin, Michael Jacobs
William & Mary Law Review
Fueled by economics, antitrust has evolved into a highly sophisticated body of law. Its malleable doctrine enables courts to tailor optimal standards to a wide variety of economic phenomena. Indeed, economic theory has been so revolutionary that modern U.S. competition law bears little resemblance to that which prevailed fifty years ago. Yet, for all the contributions of economics, its explanatory powers are subject to important limitations. Profound questions remain at the borders of contemporary antitrust enforcement, but answers remain elusive. It is because of the epistemological limitations of economic analysis that antitrust remains unusually vulnerable to error. The fear of …
Federal Pleading And State Presuit Discovery, Scott Dodson
Federal Pleading And State Presuit Discovery, Scott Dodson
Faculty Publications
This Article explores the role that state presuit discovery could play in rectifying the information imbalance caused by Twombly and Iqbal - when a plaintiff in federal court requires information in the hands (or minds) of defendants or third parties in order to properly plead her claim, but such information is not discoverable unless the claim can survive a motion to dismiss. First, this Article provides an account of the development of federal pleading standards from before Twombly through their current post-Iqbal state. Second, this Article describes the effects of the post-Iqbal federal pleading standards and highlights the harsh results …