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Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons™

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2010

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Articles 121 - 147 of 147

Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation

International Disparities Panel, Sean Flynn Jan 2010

International Disparities Panel, Sean Flynn

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

No abstract provided.


What Carrier Doesn't Address, Philip J. Weiser Jan 2010

What Carrier Doesn't Address, Philip J. Weiser

Publications

No abstract provided.


Intellectual Property And Antitrust Limits On Contract: Comment, Matthew J. Holian, Neil Nguyen Jan 2010

Intellectual Property And Antitrust Limits On Contract: Comment, Matthew J. Holian, Neil Nguyen

Faculty Publications

In their chapter in Dynamic Competition and Public Policy (2001, Cambridge University Press), Burtis and Kobayashi never defined their model's discount rate, making replicating their simulation results difficult. Through our own simulations, we were able to verify their results when using a discount rate of 0.10. We also identified two new types of equilibria that the authors overlooked, doubling the number of distinct equilibria in the model.


New Options For State Indirect Purchaser Legislation: Protecting The Real Victims Of Antitrust Violations, Robert H. Lande Jan 2010

New Options For State Indirect Purchaser Legislation: Protecting The Real Victims Of Antitrust Violations, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

In Illinois Brick v. Illinois Co., the Supreme Court held that, under federal antitrust law, only direct purchasers have standing to sue antitrust violators for damages. Since most products travel through one or more intermediaries before reaching consumers, this decision left most true victims of illegal cartels and other antitrust violations without a remedy to compensate them. Illinois Brick Co. also had the effect of undermining the objective of optimal deterrence of antitrust violations-because direct purchasers often have a suboptimal incentive to sue, the Court's decision often allows violators to escape paying significant damages. For this reason firms are insufficiently …


Consumer Choice As The Best Way To Recenter The Mission Of Competition Law, Robert H. Lande Jan 2010

Consumer Choice As The Best Way To Recenter The Mission Of Competition Law, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This article will (1) define the consumer choice approach to competition law or antitrust law and show how it differs from other approaches; (2) discuss the types of situations where a consumer choice focus is likely to make a difference in enforcement outcomes, producing better results than the other paradigms; (3) show that another important advantage of using the consumer choice approach would be to nudge decisions in the right direction; and (4) offer a brief overview of implementation issues.

This is a chapter of a forthcoming ASCOLA book, and is a condensation and update of Neil W. Averitt & …


Sharing The Stage: Using Title Vii To End Discrimination Against Female Playwrights On Broadway, Marisa Rothstein Jan 2010

Sharing The Stage: Using Title Vii To End Discrimination Against Female Playwrights On Broadway, Marisa Rothstein

Cardozo Journal of Equal Rights & Social Justice

No abstract provided.


Federalism And Concurrent Jurisdiction In Global Markets: Why A Combination Of National And State Antitrust Enforcement Is A Model For Effective Economic Regulation, Katherine Mason Jones Jan 2010

Federalism And Concurrent Jurisdiction In Global Markets: Why A Combination Of National And State Antitrust Enforcement Is A Model For Effective Economic Regulation, Katherine Mason Jones

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

The focus of the article is on the proper role of U.S. state governments in regulating international business. The specific issue analyzed is the desirability of having state attorneys general enforce federal antitrust laws in global markets concurrently with federal antitrust regulators. Congress granted state officials this power in 1976. In 2009, however, a large proportion of the world's commerce is now conducted in international, rather than national markets. This development has led Judge Richard A. Posner and others to advocate that the states be stripped of their statutory power to enforce federal antitrust laws on behalf of their residents …


Introduction: Expansion And Contraction In Monopolization Law, Michael S. Gal, Spencer Weber Waller, Avishalom Tor Jan 2010

Introduction: Expansion And Contraction In Monopolization Law, Michael S. Gal, Spencer Weber Waller, Avishalom Tor

Journal Articles

This article introduces a special symposium issue of the Antitrust Law Journal based on a conference on monopolization. It argues that monopolization law has been experiencing simultaneous expansion and contraction processes that are not wholly contradictory but at least partly complementary. Specifically, the authors suggest that the contraction of monopolization law in the United States and the EU might serve to facilitate its expansion and increased importance worldwide, providing other antitrust regimes with more focused and effective tools to address the challenges involved in regulating dominant firms. Moreover, monopolization law's increased reach internationally also has made its refinement and rationalization …


Did Trinko Really Kill Antitrust Price Squeeze Claims?, Caroline C. Rudaz Jan 2010

Did Trinko Really Kill Antitrust Price Squeeze Claims?, Caroline C. Rudaz

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

This Article presents a critical analysis of the Linkline case that refuses to recognize price squeeze claims as antitrust claims under § 2 of the Sherman Act. It argues that Linkline gives a distorted reading of Trinko without giving proper attention to the application of § 2 of the Sherman Act. The Linkline decision takes a dogmatic position and thus, while refuting the Alcoa decision, appears to be a missed opportunity to more precisely define price squeezing.

This Article offers a comparison between the U.S. Supreme Court's decision and the recent European decisions delivered in broadband access cases that are …


Preserving A Political Bargain: The Political Economy Of The Non-Interventionist Challenge To Monopolization Enforcement, Jonathan Baker Jan 2010

Preserving A Political Bargain: The Political Economy Of The Non-Interventionist Challenge To Monopolization Enforcement, Jonathan Baker

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

The antitrust rules governing exclusionary conduct by dominant firms are among the most controversial in U.S. competition policy. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, they were debated in three arenas, involving legal policy, economic policy, and politics. In each arena, the dispute mainly arose as criticism of traditional standards by advocates of less intervention. Viewed through a political economy lens, the controversy can be understood as a potential challenge to an informal political bargain reached during the 1940s by which competition was adopted as national economic policy in preference to regulation or laissez-faire. From this perspective, and applying …


Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation Settlements: Implications For Competition And Innovation, John R. Thomas Jan 2010

Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation Settlements: Implications For Competition And Innovation, John R. Thomas

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Although brand-name pharmaceutical companies routinely procure patents on their innovative medications, such rights are not self-enforcing. Brand-name firms that wish to enforce their patents against generic competitors must commence litigation in the federal courts. Such litigation ordinarily terminates in either a judgment of infringement, which typically blocks generic competition until such time as the patent expires, or a judgment that the patent is invalid or not infringed, which typically opens the market to generic entry. As with other sorts of commercial litigation, however, the parties to pharmaceutical patent litigation may choose to settle their case. Certain of these settlements have …


Debunking The Purchaser Welfare Account Of Section 2 Of The Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us A Total Welfare Standard And Why We Should Keep It, Alan J. Meese Jan 2010

Debunking The Purchaser Welfare Account Of Section 2 Of The Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us A Total Welfare Standard And Why We Should Keep It, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

The last several years have seen a vigorous debate among antitrust scholars and practitionersa bout the appropriates tandardf or evaluating the conduct of monopolists under section 2 of the Sherman Act. While most of the debate over possible standards has focused on the empirical question of each standard's economic utility, this Article undertakes a somewhat different task: It examines the normative benchmark that courts have actually chosen when adjudicating section 2 cases. This Article explores three possible benchmarks-producer welfare, purchaser welfare, and total welfare-and concludes that courts have opted for a total welfare normative approach to section 2 since the …


Standardization Of Standard-Form Contracts: Competition And Contract Implications, Mark R. Patterson Jan 2010

Standardization Of Standard-Form Contracts: Competition And Contract Implications, Mark R. Patterson

Faculty Scholarship

Standard-form contracts are a common feature of commercial relationships because they offer the advantage of lower transaction costs. This advantage of standard contracts is increased when there is a second layer of standardization under which multiple firms agree on a standard contract. Trade associations and similar entities often effect standardization of this kind through collective agreement on a standard contract, sometimes under the aegis of state actors. Multifirm contract standardization can provide not only the usual transaction-cost advantages of standard-form contracts, but also increased competition among firms, because a standard contract makes comparison among firms’ offerings easier. But standardization among …


Ask The Professor: Portfolio Margining – How Will Dodd-Frank Impact Its Utilization?, Ronald Filler Jan 2010

Ask The Professor: Portfolio Margining – How Will Dodd-Frank Impact Its Utilization?, Ronald Filler

Articles & Chapters

This article analyzes the background and current status of portfolio margining, how it has evolved over the past several years, and how the recent Dodd-Frank Act will impact its utilization and effectiveness. Portfolio margining allows a broker-dealer to analyze a client's total overall portfolio from a risk-based analytical model, establishing the proper minimum initial margin requirements for the entire portfolio applying certain parameters. To be a more effective tool, changes to the U.S. Bankrupcty Code were needed. The Dodd-Frank Act made those legislative changes. It's now up to the regulators to make portfolio margining an even more effective and utilized …


The Microsoft Chronicles, Rudolph J.R. Peritz Jan 2010

The Microsoft Chronicles, Rudolph J.R. Peritz

Articles & Chapters

No abstract provided.


A Tale Of Two Theories Of Well-Known Marks, Leah C. Grinvald Jan 2010

A Tale Of Two Theories Of Well-Known Marks, Leah C. Grinvald

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

The well-known marks doctrine presents a conundrum in international trademark law. Although protecting foreign well-known trademarks has been a treaty obligation since 1925, courts around the world, and in the United States and China in particular, do not uniformly apply the doctrine. This lack of uniform protection leads to the question of whether these countries are complying with their international obligations. While brand owners and some commentators would answer this question in the negative, this Article provides a different perspective. This Article offers an alternative approach to answering the compliance question: Before considering the question, one must examine the perspective …


At The Brink Of Free Agency: Creating The Foundation For The Messersmith-Mcnally Decision - 1968-1975, Edmund P. Edmonds Jan 2010

At The Brink Of Free Agency: Creating The Foundation For The Messersmith-Mcnally Decision - 1968-1975, Edmund P. Edmonds

Journal Articles

"One of the most dramatic periods in baseball’s long history of labor relations occurred from 1968 through 1975. The Major League Baseball Players Association negotiated baseball’s first Basic Agreement in 1968 without the benefit of any leverage that could alter most of Organized Baseball’s long practices that controlled the players’ mobility and wages. In 1975, however, the union won an arbitration panel hearing that determined that pitchers Dave McNally and Andy Messersmith were free agents after playing one full season under the renewed option year of their contracts and filing a grievance under the newly adopted arbitration process. This stunning …


Short Selling And The News: A Preliminary Report On An Empirical Study, Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten, Paul C. Tetlock Jan 2010

Short Selling And The News: A Preliminary Report On An Empirical Study, Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten, Paul C. Tetlock

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.


Counterparty Regulation And Its Limits: The Evolution Of The Credit Default Swaps Market, Houman B. Shadab Jan 2010

Counterparty Regulation And Its Limits: The Evolution Of The Credit Default Swaps Market, Houman B. Shadab

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.


Keynote Address: The Conflicted Trustee Dilemma, Steven L. Schwarcz Jan 2010

Keynote Address: The Conflicted Trustee Dilemma, Steven L. Schwarcz

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.


Introduction To Global Issues In Antitrust And Competition Law, Daniel A. Crane Jan 2010

Introduction To Global Issues In Antitrust And Competition Law, Daniel A. Crane

Other Publications

This volume is a global reader. It presents materials and cases on the global issues of antitrust and competition policy. It may be used on its own or to supplement domestic antitrust casebooks.

It might seem strange to consider the treatment of global issues as a supplement to antitrust casebooks, for, in one important sense, antitrust is global. Markets commonly cross national boundaries. Mergers are as likely as not to combine firms from different nations and in any event to affect markets in many nations. Acts and conspiracies in New York, Washington, Tokyo, Zurich, Frankfurt, Johannesburg, Beijing, Delhi, or Sao …


When The Wto Works, And How It Fails, Anu Bradford Jan 2010

When The Wto Works, And How It Fails, Anu Bradford

Faculty Scholarship

This Article seeks to explain when an international legal framework like the WTO can facilitate international cooperation and when it fails to do so. Using an empirical inquiry into different agreements that the WTO has attempted to facilitate — specifically, intellectual property and antitrust regulation — it reveals more general principles about why the WTO can facilitate agreement in some situations and not in others. Comparing the successful conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement and the failed attempts to negotiate a WTO antitrust agreement indicates that international cooperation is likely to emerge when the interests of powerful states align and when …


Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, Daniel A. Crane Jan 2010

Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Private litigation is the predominant means of antitrust enforcement in the United States. Other jurisdictions around the world are increasingly implementing private enforcement models. Private enforcement is usually justified on either compensation or deterrence grounds. While the choice between these two goals matters, private litigation is not very effective at advancing either one. Compensation fails because the true economic victims of most antitrust violations are usually downstream consumers who are too numerous and remote to locate and compensate. Deterrence is ineffective because the time lag between the planning of the violation and the legal judgment day is usually so long …


Does Monopoly Broth Make Bad Soup?, Daniel A. Crane Jan 2010

Does Monopoly Broth Make Bad Soup?, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

There is an oft-repeated maxim in U.S. antitrust law that a monopolist's conduct must be examined in its totality in order to determine its legality. Judges admonish that plaintiffs "should be given the full benefit of their proof without tightly compartmentalizating the various factual components and wiping the slate clean after scrutiny of each." As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated in much-quoted language, "It is the mix of various ingredients ... in a monopoly broth that produces the unsavory flavor."' In this article, I examine the use and misuse of monopoly broth theories. Reflecting a …


Did We Avoid Historical Failures Of Antitrust Enforcement During The 2008-2009 Financial Crisis?, Daniel A. Crane Jan 2010

Did We Avoid Historical Failures Of Antitrust Enforcement During The 2008-2009 Financial Crisis?, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

During both economic crises and wars, times of severe national anxiety, antitrust has taken a back seat to other political and regulatory objectives. Antitrust enforcement has often been a political luxury good, consumed only during periods of relative peace and prosperity. In 1890, the Sherman Act's adoption kicked off the era of national antitrust enforcement. Barely three years later, the panic of 1893 provided the first major test to the national appetite for antitrust enforcement. Perhaps 1893 should not be included in the story: antitrust was still young, and it was not even clear that the Sherman Act applied to …


Unilateral, Anticompetitive Acquisitions Of Dominance Or Monopoly Power, Avishalom Tor Jan 2010

Unilateral, Anticompetitive Acquisitions Of Dominance Or Monopoly Power, Avishalom Tor

Journal Articles

The prohibition of certain types of anticompetitive unilateral conduct by firms possessing a substantial degree of market power is a cornerstone of competition law regimes worldwide. Yet notwithstanding the social costs of monopoly modern legal regimes refrain from prohibiting it outright. Instead, competition laws prohibit monopolies or dominant firms from engaging in those types of anticompetitive conduct that amount to monopolizing or an abuse of dominant position. Importantly, anticompetitive conduct can take place both on the road to monopoly and, later on, once substantial market power has been achieved. Legal regimes nevertheless tend either to ignore or pay only limited …


Back To The Future: Rediscovering Equitable Discretion In Trademark Cases, Mark P. Mckenna Jan 2010

Back To The Future: Rediscovering Equitable Discretion In Trademark Cases, Mark P. Mckenna

Journal Articles

Courts in recent years have increasingly made blunt use of their equitable powers in trademark cases. Rather than limiting the scope of injunctive relief so as to protect the interests of a mark owner while respecting the legitimate interests of third parties and of consumers, courts in most cases have viewed injunctive relief in binary terms. This is unfortunate, because greater willingness to tailor injunctive relief could go a long way to mitigating some of the most pernicious effects of trademark law’s modern expansion. This Essay urges courts to reverse this trend towards crude injunctive relief, and to re-embrace their …