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Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons

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2009

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Institution
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Articles 121 - 131 of 131

Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation

Contracting For Innovation: Vertical Disintegration And Interfirm Collaboration, Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel, Robert E. Scott Jan 2009

Contracting For Innovation: Vertical Disintegration And Interfirm Collaboration, Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel, Robert E. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

Rapidly innovating industries are not behaving the way theory expects. Conventional industrial organization theory predicts that, when parties in a supply chain have to make transaction-specific investments, the risk of opportunism will drive them away from contracts and toward vertical integration. Despite the conventional theory, however, contemporary practice is moving in the other direction. Instead of vertical integration, we observe vertical disintegration in a significant number of industries, as producers recognize that they cannot themselves maintain cutting-edge technology in every field required for the success of their products. In doing this, the parties are developing forms of contracting beyond the …


Detrebling Antitrust Damages In Monopolization Cases, Edward D. Cavanagh Jan 2009

Detrebling Antitrust Damages In Monopolization Cases, Edward D. Cavanagh

Faculty Publications

(Excerpt)

This article examines the question of whether the statutory rule of mandatory treble damages should continue to apply in monopolization cases brought under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The law of monopolization "has been a source of puzzlement to lawyers, judges and scholars." Compared to Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which has generated a plethora of case law and an emerging consensus on liability rules and remedies, the law of monopolization remains largely undeveloped with respect to both liability rules and remedies. In the remedies arena, the conversation has focused principally on equitable relief—conduct remedies versus structural …


Regulatory Competition, Choice Of Forum And Delaware’S Stake In Corporate Law, Faith Stevelman Jan 2009

Regulatory Competition, Choice Of Forum And Delaware’S Stake In Corporate Law, Faith Stevelman

Articles & Chapters

As Delaware corporate law confronts the twenty-first-century global economy, the state's legislators and jurists are becoming sensitive to increased threats to the law's sustained preeminence. The increased presence of federal laws and regulations in areas of corporate governance traditionally allocated to the states has been widely noted. The growth of federal corporate law standards may be undermining Delaware's confidence in the sustained prosperity of its chartering business - which has been a vital source of revenues and prestige for Delaware, its equity courts, and especially its corporate bar. The Delaware Court of Chancery appears to be concerned about the emigration …


Pangloss Responds, Daniel A. Crane Jan 2009

Pangloss Responds, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

I am afraid that William Shieber and I are speaking past each other. I agree wholeheartedly with his assertion that anyone who believes that political appointees do not exert a considerable influence over the antitrust agencies is naïve. However, Technocracy and Antitrust does not advance the Panglossian view that the antitrust agencies are apolitical, if by that we mean that robotic machines devoid of human perspective or ideological commitment churn out scientifically predetermined antitrust results.


Obama's Antitrust Agenda, Daniel A. Crane Jan 2009

Obama's Antitrust Agenda, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Antitrust law is back in vogue. After years in the wilderness, antitrust enforcement has reemerged as a hot topic in Washington and in the legal academy. In one heady week inMay of 2009, a frontpage story in the New York Times reported the dramatic decision of Christine Varney —theObama administration’s new AntitrustDivision head—to jettison the entire report onmonopolization offenses released by the Bush JusticeDepartment just eightmonths earlier. In a speech before the Center for American Progress, Varney announced that the Justice Department is “committed to aggressively pursuing enforcement of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.” As if to prove that …


The Evolution Of Chinese Merger Notification Guidelines: A Work In Progress Integrating Global Consensus And Domestic Imperatives, Susan Beth Farmer Jan 2009

The Evolution Of Chinese Merger Notification Guidelines: A Work In Progress Integrating Global Consensus And Domestic Imperatives, Susan Beth Farmer

Faculty Scholarship

China is among the most recent entrants into global competition enforcement, having adopted the first competition law of general application, the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) after more than a decade of drafting. The AML and Merger Notification Thresholds, rules issued by decree of the State Council, became effective on August 3, 2008. Both the law and the guidelines were subject to public review and comment, and went through a number of drafts before final adoption.

This article is a comprehensive comparison of merger standards across jurisdictions, with particular focus on the evolution of merger regulation in China. It comprises six parts; …


Remedies, Antitrust Law, And Microsoft: Comment On Shapiro, Keith N. Hylton Jan 2009

Remedies, Antitrust Law, And Microsoft: Comment On Shapiro, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

The subject of remedies is a relatively under-theorized area of antitrust law, and Professor Shapiro has done the antitrust community a great favor by offering some innovative and useful theoretical insights on the design of antitrust remedies. He applies his theoretical insights to the Microsoft III case to reach the conclusion that the remedies adopted were inadequate to restore competition in the market for software platforms. In this review, I will offer additional theoretical insights on remedies and explain my reasons for rejecting his conclusions on Microsoft III.


Regulating Interoperability: Lessons From At&T, Microsoft, And Beyond, Philip J. Weiser Jan 2009

Regulating Interoperability: Lessons From At&T, Microsoft, And Beyond, Philip J. Weiser

Publications

Antitrust law confronted the challenges of regulating interoperability between platforms and applications in both the AT&T and Microsoft cases, but it has yet to mine the series of lessons that can inform how to address this challenge going forward. With the Microsoft consent decree still in place, it may too soon to render a final judgment on the remedy adopted in that case as well as to evaluate more generally whether antitrust law is up to the task of developing the institutional strategies - be it the use of technical committees or reliance on standard setting bodies - for addressing …


The Empagran Exception: Between Illinois Brick And A Hard Place, Victor P. Goldberg Jan 2009

The Empagran Exception: Between Illinois Brick And A Hard Place, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

Before it was uncovered and prosecuted, the international vitamin cartel, known as "Vitamins, Inc." by its perpetrators, was extraordinarily successful. Estimates of cartel profits run as high as $18 billion (in 2003 dollars). In addition to substantial criminal sanctions, cartel members paid over $2 billion to American plaintiffs. When foreign plaintiffs tried to sue the foreign defendants in American courts, however, they encountered resistance. A trial court read the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act ("FTAIA") to restrict the reach of the Sherman Act and preclude foreign purchasers from suing the foreign defendants. The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that the facts …


A Careful Examination Of The Live Nation-Ticketmaster Merger, Barak D. Richman, Alan J. Meese Jan 2009

A Careful Examination Of The Live Nation-Ticketmaster Merger, Barak D. Richman, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Scholarship

As great admirers of The Boss and as fans of live entertainment, we share in the popular dismay over rising ticket prices for live performances. But we have been asked as antitrust scholars to examine the proposed merger of Live Nation and Ticketmaster, and we do so with the objectivity and honesty called for by The Boss’s quotes above. The proposed merger has been the target of aggressive attacks from several industry commentators and popular figures, but the legal and policy question is whether the transaction is at odds with the nation’s antitrust laws.

One primary source of concern to …


The Antitrust Of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics And Concerted Refusals To Deal, Barak D. Richman Jan 2009

The Antitrust Of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics And Concerted Refusals To Deal, Barak D. Richman

Faculty Scholarship

An agreement among competitors to refuse to deal with another party is traditionally per se illegal under the antitrust laws. But coordinated refusals to deal are often necessary to punish wrongdoers, and thus to deter undesirable behavior that state-sponsored courts cannot reach. When viewed as a mechanism to govern transactions and induce socially desirable cooperative behavior, coordinated refusals to deal can sustain valuable reputation mechanisms. This paper employs institutional economics to understand the role of coordinated refusals to deal in merchant circles and to evaluate the economic desirability of permitting such coordinated actions among competitors. It concludes that if the …