Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons^™

All The News That's Fit To Split: Newspaper Mergers, Antitrust Laws And The First Amendment, Richard Brand

Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Pathways Across The Valley Of Death: Novel Intellectual Property Strategies For Accelerated Drug Discovery, Arti K. Rai, Jerome H. Reichman, Paul F. Uhlir, Colin Crossman

Faculty Scholarship

Drug discovery is stagnating. Government agencies, industry analysts, and industry scientists have all noted that, despite significant increases in pharmaceutical R&D funding, the production of fundamentally new drugs - particularly drugs that work on new biological pathways and proteins - remains disappointingly low. To some extent, pharmaceutical firms are already embracing the prescription of new, more collaborative R&D organizational models suggested by industry analysts. In this Article, we build on collaborative strategies that firms are already employing by proposing a novel public-private collaboration that would help move upstream academic research across the valley of death that separates upstream research from …

Evaluation Of The Dilution-Parody Paradox In The Wake Of The Trademark Dilution Revision Act Of 2006, Justin J. Gunnell

Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Antitrust Law And Regulatory Gaming, Stacey Dogan

Faculty Scholarship

Antitrust law promotes competition in the service of economic efficiency. Government regulation may or may not promote either competition or efficiency, depending on both the goals of the agency and the effects of industry "capture." Antitrust courts have long included regulated industries within their purview, working to ensure that regulated industries could not use the limits that regulation imposes on the normal competitive process to achieve anticompetitive ends. Doing so makes sense; an antitrust law that ignored anticompetitive behavior in any regulated industry would be a law full of holes.

The role of antitrust in policing regulated industries appears to …

Merger To Monopoly To Serve A Single Buyer: Comment, Jonathan Baker

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

No abstract provided.

Cartel Overcharges And Optimal Cartel Fines, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This Article examines whether the current penalties in the United States Sentencing Guidelines are set at the appropriate levels to deter illegal price fixing cartels optimally. The authors analyze two data sets to determine how high on average cartels raise prices. The first consists of every published scholarly economic study of the effects of cartels on prices in individual cases. The second consists of every final verdict in a U.S. antitrust case in which a neutral finder of fact reported collusive overcharges. They report average overcharges of 49% and 31% for the two data sets, and median overcharges of 25% …

Benefits From Private Antitrust Enforcement: Forty Individual Case Studies, Robert H. Lande, Joshua P. Davis

All Faculty Scholarship

This Paper presents information about forty of the largest recent successful private antitrust cases. To do this, the paper gathers information about each case, including, inter alia, (1) the amount of money each action recovered for the victims of each alleged antitrust violation, (2) what proportion of the money was recovered from foreign entities, (3) whether government action preceded the private litigation, (4) the attorney's fees awarded to plaintiffs' counsel, (5) on whose behalf money was recovered (direct purchasers, indirect purchasers, or a competitor), and (6) the kind of claim the plaintiffs asserted (rule of reason, per se, or a …

Policy And Methods: Choices For Legislatures, James Maxeiner

All Faculty Scholarship

The legal methods through which one adopts and implements policy decisions profoundly affect the compatibility of policy implementation with democratic legitimacy and legal certainty of the rule of law. Indeed, the choice of legal methods can be as important as the formulation of the policy itself. While a good choice of methods will not heal a bad policy, it can help assure that a less-than-perfect choice of policy can be more forcefully realized than otherwise, it can also help improve the policy choices made and help protect democratic legitimacy and the rule of law. While deficiencies in legislation or in …

The Chicago School's Foundation Is Flawed: Antitrust Protects Consumers, John B. Kirkwood, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

Chicago School antitrust policy rests on the premise that the purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote economic efficiency. That foundation is flawed. The fundamental goal of antitrust law is to protect consumers.

This essay defines the relevant economic concepts, summarizes the legislative histories, and analyzes recent case law. All these factors indicate that the ultimate goal of antitrust is not to increase the total wealth of society, but to protect consumers from behavior that deprives them of the benefits of competition and transfers their wealth to firms with market power. When conduct presents a conflict between the welfare …

Market Power Without A Large Market Share: The Role Of Imperfect Information And Other “Consumer Protection” Market Failures, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

There are two very different sources of market power in antitrust cases. The first is traditional market share-based market power. Market power in antitrust cases also can come from deception, significantly imperfect or asymmetric information, or other types of market failures that usually are associated with consumer protection violations.

When these “consumer protection” market failures are present in antitrust cases, market power can arise even if no firm has a market share large enough for a finding of traditional market share based market power. However, instead of traditional end-use consumers being harmed, the direct victims are businesses.

The “consumer protection” …

The Lawful Acquisition And Exercise Of Monopoly Power And Its Implications For The Objectives Of Antitrust, David S. Evans, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

The antitrust laws of the United States have, from their inception, allowed firms to acquire significant market power, to charge prices that reflect that market power, and to enjoy supra-competitive returns. This article shows that this policy, which was established by the U.S. Congress and affirmed repeatedly by the U.S. courts, reflects a tradeoff between the dynamic benefits that society realizes from allowing firms to secure significant rewards, including monopoly profits, from making risky investments and engaging in innovation; and the static costs that society incurs when firms with significant market power raise price and curtail output. That tradeoff results …

Reexamining The Legacy Of Dual Regulation: Reforming Dual Merger Review By The Doj And The Fcc, Philip J. Weiser

Publications

Most debates over the structure of merger review in the telecommunications industry focus on the criticism that the role of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is entirely redundant in light of the review conducted by the antitrust agencies. The FCC's lack of a consistently applied standard only reinforces such criticisms. There are, however, cases where the FCC's review of a merger - and imposition of conditions that complement the existing regulatory regime - enable the antitrust agencies to clear mergers that would otherwise pose potential objections.

The central challenge for competition policy merger review is to structure the analysis of …