Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons^™

Precedent-Based Antitrust Law, Anca Daniela Chirita

William & Mary Business Law Review

This contribution revisits the authentic origins of antitrust law and the U.K.’s legacy of EU precedent rulings, spanning an eclectic and holistic analysis of the wider contemporary objectives of antitrust law, the versatile doctrine of vertical restraints of trade applied in the context of the online resale price maintenance, and the abuse theory of monopoly power applied in the context of excessive pricing and, more recently, of data-driven digital market competition. This contribution offers an original legal interpretation of precedent-based antitrust law: First, sustaining as principal narrative streams of evolutionary development, the rise of authentic precedent, which has had a …

Playing The Hermès Game: Quota Bags, Antitrust Law, And The Limits Of Consumer Protection In Luxury Markets, Madeleine Chou

William & Mary Business Law Review

Luxury fashion retail has become a behemoth of an industry. Through acquisitions and strong brand recognition, some brands have developed significant market power in the luxury retail space. Chief among these brands is Hermès, a luxury leather retail boutique known for its highly sought after quota bags, like the Birkin and the Kelly. Quota bags are handbags that can generally only be bought by customers who have developed a substantial purchase history and relationship with the brand. Through this sales model, Hermès has created what plaintiffs have alleged to be an antitrust tying scheme, in which the purchase of one …

From Amateurism To Open Markets: The Ncaa's Reckoning With Antitrust Lawsuits, Jesse Giffin

William & Mary Business Law Review

Throughout the 2000s the National College Athletic Association (NCAA) has been the subject of many high-profile antitrust lawsuits regarding the financial restrictions imposed on student athletes. The aftermath of some of the most recent decisions has given athletes new ways to earn compensation while competing in college athletics. In House v. NCAA, another historic antitrust lawsuit against the NCAA, the Court for the Northern District of California was tasked with deciding whether student athletes can be paid directly for their athletic performance. By comparing these NCAA antitrust lawsuits with other blockbuster antitrust cases such as the Microsoft antitrust case, …

Antiracist Antitrust: Antitrust Enforcement As A Civil Right, Synda Mark

William & Mary Journal of Race, Gender, and Social Justice

“Tryna’ make a dollar out of fifteen cents” is more than a genius hip-hop lyric, it is also a metaphor for a real-life economic problem. It is extremely difficult for Black communities to build wealth in America. While many factors contribute to the lack of economic growth, one overlooked area is the ineffective enforcement of the antitrust laws. Even though race and antitrust law have a history that has intersected since the American Civil War, antitrust enforcement has never prioritized improving the welfare of Black communities or other marginalized groups. This must change!

Instead of focusing solely on regulating tech …

How Tom Brady Saved Baseball: A New Understanding Of Union Decertification In Professional Sports Lockouts, Alec Whipple

William & Mary Business Law Review

Labor negotiations in professional sports have always been held at the crossroads of labor law and antitrust law. Players are bound by collective bargaining agreements that are governed by labor law but must negotiate these agreements with multi-owner collectives that typically engage in anti-competitive conduct: namely, locking out players during labor disputes. Furthermore, the non-statutory labor exemption has prevented players from using antitrust remedies to combat these employer actions. Players’ unions have fought back against owners in recent years by pursuing the unorthodox counter-strategy of formally decertifying as a union in order to file antitrust litigation. However, the 2011 ruling …

Against The Sliding Scale, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

Gavil and Salop claim that the Chicago School’s “conservative critique of antitrust law” has peddled numerous pro-defendant economic assumptions, misleading courts in their assessment of alleged exclusionary conduct. The resulting legal standards, they say, require plaintiffs to adduce too much evidence to establish a prima facie case, for instance, producing false negatives and thus allowing restraints that injure purchasers to avoid condemnation. Drawing on decision theory, they propose reforms to the rule of reason analysis applied to exclusionary agreements to extirpate the Chicago School’s baneful influence. In suggesting these reforms, they hope sometimes to alter the parties’ respective burdens of …

New Vision, Old Model: How The Ftc Exaggerated Harms When Rejecting Business Justifications For Noncompetes, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

The Federal Trade Commission has rejected consumer welfare and the Rule of Reason—standards that drove antitrust for 50 years—in favor of a “NeoBrandeisian” vision. This approach seeks to enhance democracy by condemning abuses of corporate power that restrict the autonomy of employees and consumers, regardless of impact on prices or wages. Pursuing this agenda, the Commission has proposed banning all employee noncompete agreements (“NCAs”) as unfair methods of competition under Section 5 of the FTC Act.

The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”) articulating the Commission’s rationale found that NCAs reduce aggregate wages, harm traditionally recognized by the Rule of Reason. …

Monopolizing Digital Commerce, Herbert Hovenkamp

William & Mary Law Review

Section 2 of the Sherman Act condemns firms who “monopolize,” “attempt to monopolize,” or “combine or conspire” to monopolize—all without explanation. Section 2 is the antitrust law’s only provision that reaches entirely unilateral conduct, although it has often been used to reach collaborative conduct as well. In general, § 2 requires greater amounts of individually held market power than do the other antitrust statutes, but it is less categorical about conduct. With one exception, however, the statute reads so broadly that criticisms of the nature that it is outdated cannot be based on faithful readings of the text.

The one …

Impediments To Renewed And Reinvigorated Antitrust Enforcement, Edward D. Cavanagh

William & Mary Business Law Review

Antitrust Division head Jonathan Kanter recently proclaimed that “the era of lax enforcement is over, and the new era of vigorous and effective antitrust law enforcement has begun.” Federal enforcers have indeed been active; the DOJ has sued Google in two separate actions, and the FTC has brought an action against Facebook.

While bringing these cases is an important first step to achieving a more robust antitrust enforcement regime, a significant obstacle to an antitrust renaissance remains—overcoming the strong gravitational pull of Chicago School theory that has dominated antitrust thought for the past half-century. Chicago School principles have not kept …

Critiquing The Sec's Ongoing Efforts To Regulate Crypto Exchanges, Carol R. Goforth

William & Mary Business Law Review

Despite the so-called “Crypto Winter” in the spring of 2022, which saw a deep plunge in global crypto markets, interest in the appropriate way to develop, use, and regulate cryptoassets and crypto-based businesses continues to be high. In the United States, a Presidential Executive Order and multiple bills that seek to tackle various issues of crypto regulation are regularly highlighted in the news, suggesting the appropriate treatment of crypto is a growing national priority. Despite these discussions, which tend to focus on finding a balanced way to regulate those within the industry without stifling the technology, the Securities and Exchange …

A Chair With No Legs? Legal Constraints On The Competition Rule-Making Authority Of Lina Khan's Ftc, Jennifer Cascone Fauver

William & Mary Business Law Review

Upon her appointment to the chair position of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Lina Khan wasted little time asserting that the Agency possesses the regulatory authority to promulgate rules related to unfair methods of competition. And the President has supported the Chair’s proffered authority, requesting that the Agency use that authority to address competition concerns across the U.S. economy. Chair Khan’s interpretation of the FTC Act relies on a single case decided by the Supreme Court in 1973—National Petroleum Refiners—and judicial deference under Chevron. However, while simplistic in its logic, Chair Khan’s support for the FTC’s competition …

The Factor/Element Distinction In Antitrust Litigation, Christopher R. Leslie

William & Mary Law Review

Most price-fixing litigation turns on whether the plaintiffs can present sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the defendants did, in fact, conspire to raise prices. This generally entails the proffering of plus factors, a type of evidence that suggests parallel conduct by the defendants was the product of collusion, not independent decisions. As their name suggests, plus factors are just that—factors. Proving a collection of factors may be necessary for a plaintiff’s case, but no individual factor is ever required. If it were, it wouldn’t be a factor; it would be an element.

Several federal …

The Constitutional Moment That Wasn't: 1912-1914 And The Meaning Of The Sherman Act, Alan J. Meese

Popular Media

No abstract provided.

The Future Of College Sports After Alston: Reforming The Ncaa Via Conditional Antitrust Immunity, Nathaniel Grow

William & Mary Law Review

In June 2021, a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court issued its eagerly anticipated decision in National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Alston, ruling for the first time that NCAA rules governing student-athlete eligibility are subject to full scrutiny under federal antitrust law. Although the immediate impact of the Alston decision was rather modest—merely requiring the NCAA to allow its schools to compete by offering prospective players education-related benefits such as laptop computers and stipends for future graduate-level study—the Court hinted that it was prepared to extend the logic of this ruling much further, calling into question the legality of the NCAA’s …

Atomistic Antitrust, Robin C. Feldman, Mark A. Lemley

William & Mary Law Review

Antitrust is atomistic: deliberately focused on trees, not forests. It pays attention to the consequences of individual acts alleged to be anticompetitive.

That focus is misplaced. Companies and markets don't focus on one particular act to the exclusion of all else. Business strategy emphasizes holistic, integrated planning. And market outcomes aren't determined by a single act, but by the result of multiple acts by multiple parties in the overall context of the structure and characteristics of the market.

The atomistic nature of modern antitrust law causes it to miss two important classes of potential competitive harms. First, the focus on …

Old Macdonald Had A Trust: How Market Consolidation In The Agricultural Industry, Spurred On By A Lack Of Antitrust Law Enforcement, Is Destroying Small Agricultural Producers, Cody Mccracken

William & Mary Business Law Review

The U.S. agricultural industry is controlled by a handful of large corporations. Unprecedented levels of market consolidation has created a power disparity, where controlling corporations alone shape markets, often to the disadvantage of small agricultural producers. A primary, and often overlooked, cause of this consolidationdriven bargaining disadvantage, and its resulting harm, can be found in the lacking enforcement of the nation’s antitrust laws. Faulty metrics and lax legal interpretations employed by regulatory agencies have permitted large corporations to grab control of nearly every sector of the industry. From the seeds farmers plant to the markets they sell their goods into; …

Federalism, Free Competition, And Sherman Act Preemption Of State Restraints, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

The Sherman Act establishes free competition as the rule governing interstate trade. Banning private restraints cannot ensure that competitive markets allocate the nation's resources. State laws can pose identical threats to free markets, posing an obstacle to achieving Congress's goal to protect free competition.

The Sherman Act would thus override anticompetitive state laws under ordinary preemption standards. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court rejected such preemption in Parker v. Brown, creating the "state action doctrine." Parker and its progeny hold that state-imposed restraints are immune from Sherman Act preemption, even if they impose significant harm on out-of-state consumers. Parker's progeny …

Monopolizing Sports Data, Marc Edelman, John T. Holden

William & Mary Law Review

With legal sports betting viewed as a panacea for state budget woes across the United States, the underlying data that fuels the sports betting industry has emerged as an especially valuable asset. In the hopes of capitalizing on state laws that have now legalized sports betting, United States professional sports leagues have attempted to gain exclusive ownership rights over valuable sports betting data by asking legislators to mandate that bookmakers exclusively use data sold through the league. In addition, some sports leagues have imposed policies mandating that teams bundle together their collected data for purposes of selling it exclusively through …

Will The Supreme Court Recover Its Own Fumble? How Alston Can Repair The Damage Resulting From Ncaa's Sports League Exemption, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

Horizontal restraints are unlawful per se unless a court can identify some redeeming virtue that such restraints may create. In National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma (“NCAA”), the Supreme Court rejected this standard, refusing to condemn horizontal restraints on price and output imposed by the NCAA without specifying any possible redeeming virtues. The Court emphasized that other restraints not before the Court were necessary to create and maintain athletic competition like that supervised by the NCAA. This exemption for sports leagues ensures that all restraints imposed by such entities merit Rule …

Treble, Treble Toil And Trouble: The New Per Se Rule As A Protection Against The Curse Of The "Supreme Evil", Seth Konopasek

William & Mary Business Law Review

The Supreme Court has called collusion between firms the “supreme evil” of antitrust. Despite public and private enforcement efforts, collusive firms and the cartels they form cost American consumers billions of dollars a year and undermine the virtues of our free market economy. The Chicago School theory of antitrust enforcement, which has dominated antitrust scholarship, vehemently disapproves of private antitrust actions that enable plaintiffs to recover treble damages. Recent scholarship, however, has rejected the Chicago School’s concerns of overdeterrence and embraced the treble damages remedy. This Note follows the recent scholarship and proposes the New Per Se Rule, which would …

Requiem For A Lightweight: How Ncaa Continues To Distort Antitrust Doctrine, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

The Supreme Court speaks rarely about the meaning of the Sherman Act. When the Court does speak, its pronouncements have particular resonance and staying power among jurists, scholars, and enforcers. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma was such a case. There the Court assessed agreements reducing the output and increasing the prices of televised college football games. After announcing that restraints imposed by sports leagues are exempt from per se condemnation, the Court went on to invalidate the challenged agreements under the rule of reason because they produced significant economic harm without offsetting benefits. In so …

Antitrust Regulation And The Federal-State Balance: Restoring The Original Design, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

The U.S. Constitution divides authority over commerce between states and the national government. Passed in 1890, the Sherman Act (“the Act”) reflects this allocation of power, reaching only those harmful agreements that are “in restraint of... commerce among the several States.” This Article contends that the Supreme Court erred when it radically altered the balance between state and national power over trade restraints in 1948, abruptly abandoning decades of precedent recognizing exclusive state authority over most intrastate restraints. This revised construction of the Act contravened the statute’s apparent meaning, unduly expanded the reach of federal antitrust regulation, and undermined the …

After Forty Years Of Antitrust Revision And Apple Inc. V. Pepper, What Now Illinois Brick?, Jeffrey L. Harrison

William & Mary Business Law Review

Nineteen seventy-seven was a paradigm-shifting year in antitrust law. Decisions by the Supreme Court greatly limited the type of parties who could successfully bring antitrust actions and what types of activities would violate the antitrust laws. First, in January of that year, the Court, in Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, ruled that to mount a case the plaintiff had to have suffered an antitrust injury. In other words, even if the antitrust laws were violated, the party raising the issue had to have suffered the type of harm the laws were designed to avoid. Then in a fourteen day span …

Artificial Stupidity, Clark D. Asay

William & Mary Law Review

Artificial intelligence is everywhere. And yet, the experts tell us, it is not yet actually anywhere. This is because we are yet to achieve artificial general intelligence, or artificially intelligent systems that are capable of thinking for themselves and adapting to their circumstances. Instead, all the AI hype—and it is constant—concerns narrower, weaker forms of artificial intelligence, which are confined to performing specific, narrow tasks. The promise of true artificial general intelligence thus remains elusive. Artificial stupidity reigns supreme.

What is the best set of policies to achieve more general, stronger forms of artificial intelligence? Surprisingly, scholars have paid little …

No-Fault Digital Platform Monopolization, Marina Lao

William & Mary Law Review

The power of today’s tech giants has prompted calls for changes in antitrust law and policy which, for decades, has been exceedingly permissive in merger enforcement and in constraining dominant firm conduct. Economically, the fear is that the largest digital platforms are so dominant and its data advantage so substantial that competition is foreclosed, resulting in long-term harm to consumers and to the economy. But the concerns extend beyond economics. Critics worry, too, that the large platforms’ tremendous economic power poses risks of social and political harm and threatens our democracy. These concerns have prompted discussions of ways to reinvigorate …

The (Limited) Constitutional Right To Compete In An Occupation, Rebecca Haw Allensworth

William & Mary Law Review

Is there a constitutional right to compete in an occupation? The “right to earn a living” movement, gaining steam in policy circles and winning some battles in the lower courts, says so. Advocates for this right say that the right to compete in an occupation stands on equal footing with our most sacred constitutional rights such as the right to be free from racial discrimination. This Article takes a different view, arguing that while there is a limited constitutional right to compete in an occupation, it is—and should be—weaker than these advocates claim. Some state licensing laws run afoul of …

Scrutinizing Anticompetitive State Regulations Through Constitutional And Antitrust Lenses, Daniel A. Crane

William & Mary Law Review

State and local regulations that anticompetitively favor certain producers to the detriment of consumers are a pervasive problem in our economy. Their existence is explicable by a variety of structural features—including asymmetry between consumer and producer interests, cost externalization, and institutional and political factors entrenching incumbent technologies. Formulating legal tools to combat such economic parochialism is challenging in the post-Lochner world, where any move toward heightened judicial review of economic regulation poses the perceived threat of a return to economic substantive due process. This Article considers and compares two potential tools for reviewing such regulations—a constitutional principle against anticompetitive parochialism …

Religious Freedom Through Market Freedom: The Sherman Act And The Marketplace For Religion, Barak D. Richman

William & Mary Law Review

In prior work, I examined certain restraints by private religious organizations and concluded that the First Amendment did not immunize these organizations from antitrust liability. In short, the First Amendment did not preempt enforcing the Sherman Act against certain religious monopolies or cartels.

This Article offers a stronger argument: First Amendment values demand antitrust enforcement. Because American religious freedoms, enshrined in the Constitution and reflected in American history, are quintessentially exercised when decentralized communities create their own religious expression, the First Amendment’s religion clauses are best exemplified by a proverbial marketplace for religions. Any effort to stifle a market organization …

The Present New Antitrust Era, Barak Orbach

William & Mary Law Review

Antitrust scholars frequently refer to an “ideological pendulum” to describe the rise and fall of trends in the evolution of antitrust law. This pendulum arguably swings between fairness and laissez-faire visions, while a technocracy vision moderates its motion. Mapping key phases in the evolution of antitrust law, I argue that a new antitrust era with distinctive characteristics has been forming in recent years.

The present new antitrust era is a product of growing tensions and contradictions among policy prescriptions. After several decades in which antitrust was a specialized field that drew little public attention, in the aftermath of the Great …

Antitrust And The Politics Of State Action, Thomas B. Nachbar

William & Mary Law Review

In North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners, the Court refused to exempt the board from the second element of Parker immunity—active supervision by the state—because the Board was made up largely of “active market participants.” This Article argues that the “active market participant” rule laid out in North Carolina State Board, while intuitively appealing, ignores important political values represented by antitrust law, values most evident in the context of state action immunity. By focusing on the potential market harm from self-interested regulators, the Court ignored a series of political harms inherent in the structure of the North …