Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons^™

Reverse Breakup Fees And Antitrust Approval, Albert H. Choi, Abraham L. Wickelgren

Law & Economics Working Papers

The paper examines the antitrust implications of use of reverse breakup (termination) fees in mergers. By promising to pay a reverse breakup fee to the target if the proposed merger does not get the necessary antitrust approval, the acquirer can signal to the antitrust authority that the merger is more likely to be pro-competitive. A large reverse breakup fee can also function as a commitment device by the acquirer to spend more resources in case the merger is challenged by the antitrust authority. While the first, signaling function is efficiency enhancing, the second, commitment function can lead to an efficiency …

Religious Riders And The Sherman Act, Bailey Sanders

Michigan Law Review

Can corporations engage in anticompetitive behavior on the basis of religious belief? While the answer may seem like an obvious no, in fact this question has largely been overlooked. It has hovered at the margins of the debate over religious exemptions: Proponents of religious exemptions have essentially argued that there is no harm in providing such exemptions to businesses because a competitive market will ensure consumers who might be denied services or goods by a religious firm can still obtain those goods and services elsewhere. But what if religiously minded businesses act in ways that are specifically designed to limit …

Competitive Effects Of T-Mobile/Sprint: Analysis Of A "4-To-3" Merger, Thomas W. Hazlett, Robert W. Crandall

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

Mergers in the mobile telecommunications industry are of keen interest to policymakers and scholars. This sector often experiences high concentration levels, driven by pronounced economies of scale and scope, alongside substantial regulatory barriers to entry created by radio spectrum allocations. Hence, antitrust authorities frequently struggle with the tradeoff between the benefits of enhanced synergies and the potentially adverse effects of increased market power. This tension results in varied outcomes from regulatory agencies when approving (or blocking) mergers. Between 2012 and 2016, for instance, four E.U. nations (Austria, Ireland, Germany, and Italy) allowed the consummation of “4-to-3” mobile telecommunications transactions, while …

Jerking The Rug Out From Under A Trade Secret Licensee: Is Transfer Of The Patent A Remedy?, Henry H. Perritt Jr.

Michigan Technology Law Review

Predominantly state trade secret law and exclusively federal patent law enjoy a sometimes-uneasy coexistence. Inventions almost always are secret until and unless they are patented; publicizing them for too long will negate the availability of a patent. Misappropriation of trade secrets often is accompanied by application for a patent on the same subject matter. This commonly occurs when an employee gains access to his employer’s trade secrets, quits, and then applies for a patent on them in his own name, maybe after going to work for a competitor of the original employer. It is also conceivable that the owner of …

Neo-Brandeis Goes To Washington: A Provisional Assessment Of The Biden Administration’S Antitrust Record, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

In early 2021, a new coterie of trustbusters came to Washington with the stated purpose of radically overhauling the antitrust status quo. The three central figures—Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) Chair Lina Khan, Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Antitrust Division Assistant Attorney General (“AAG”) Jonathan Kanter, and Special Assistant to the President for Technology and Competition Policy in the White House Tim Wu—were self-identified neo-Brandeisians, committed to returning antitrust policy to a contemporary version of Justice Louis Brandeis’s ideas. At the urging of Senator Elizabeth Warren, President Biden turned over his Administration’s antitrust policy to the neo-Brandeisians, who vowed to break antitrust’s …

Old, Not Odd: Running Laches Against The States And The Future Of Antitrust After New York V. Meta Platforms, Frank Schulze

Michigan Law Review

In New York v. Meta Platforms, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit applied equitable laches to an antitrust lawsuit brought by forty-six state attorneys general, holding that they had not brought their claims in their role as law enforcers. Meta Platforms is the latest in a line of cases that has characterized antitrust actions by state attorneys general as non-public and non-governmental. But this characterization is in tension with the historical role of state attorneys general in enforcing the antitrust laws and undermines the original design of the federal antitrust statutes as supplements to …

Gatekeeper Competition Policy, Herbert Hovenkamp

Michigan Technology Law Review

Antitrust policy in the United States has always had special rules for dominant firms. As Justice Scalia once observed:

Where a defendant maintains substantial market power, his activities are examined through a special lens: Behavior that might otherwise not be of concern to the antitrust laws—or that might even be viewed as procompetitive—can take on exclusionary connotations when practiced by a monopolist.

Environmentalism And Antitrust, Albert H. Choi, Daniel A. Crane

Law & Economics Working Papers

In recent years, there has been a proliferation of interest concerning environmental issues and the application of the antitrust laws. Numerous commentators, for instance, have argued that the antitrust enforcement should adjust to reflect the environmental harm (or benefit) that is generated from a competitive condition. In this paper, we take a step back and argue that analysis of the intersection between antitrust and environmentalism should begin with more mundane questions of economics. More specifically, we argue that environmental regulations can inform antitrust analysis by considering (at least) three issues: (1) the impact of environmental regulation on the firms' production …

Antitrust After The Coming Wave, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

A coming wave of general-purpose technologies, including artificial intelligence ("AI"), robotics, quantum computing, synthetic biology, energy expansion, and nanotechnology, is likely to fundamentally reshape the economy and erode the assumptions on which the antitrust order is predicated. First, AI-driven systems will vastly improve firms' ability to detect (and even program) consumer preferences without the benefit of price signals, which will undermine the traditional information-producing benefit of competitive markets. Similarly, these systems will be able to determine comparative producer efficiency without relying on competitive signals. Second, AI systems will invert the salient characteristics of human managers, whose intentions are opaque but …

Defining Relevant Markets In Digital Ecosystems, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Traditional market definition focuses on the substitutability of two products or geographies. In digital ecosystems, competition often occurs in important ways that elide definition in conventional substitutability terms. This Article considers three kinds of economic rivalry that do not fit the conventional market definition mold: (1) Single-side competition: In two sided markets, firms may compete on just one side of the market. For example, Google and Facebook compete for the same advertisers, but their users on the other side of the market do not necessarily think of the offerings (social media and universal search) as substitutes; (2) Ecosystem competition: Technology …

Researching Antitrust Law, Keith Lacy

Law Librarian Scholarship

Antitrust is a dynamic area of law subject to rapid change. It is highly sensitive to the attitudes of regulators and market conditions, always looking forward to how decisions made today will affect businesses and the lives of individual consumers. Current events — and passionate consumers, or fans — can incur “Swift” antitrust scrutiny, as Live Nation Entertainment discovered recently.

Yet it is inextricably linked to more abstract considerations. The term “antitrust” is itself archaic, reflecting animosity to a business practice innovated by Standard Oil in 1882. Understanding the history of antitrust actions often requires understanding something of history broadly …

The Radical Challenge To The Antitrust Order, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

The U.S. antitrust order is undergoing a radical challenge along three key dimensions. First, the challengers seek to denaturalize markets and replace a commitment to competition with an anti-domination norm. Second, the challengers seek to dramatically alter institutional arrangements, with Congressional legislation and agency rulemaking replacing antitrust's longstanding commitment to judicial common law incrementalism. Finally, the challengers would replace the antitrust order's preferred juridical approach-open-ended rule of reason analysiswith a return to bright-line prohibitory rules and a related demotion of economists as decision-makers. Each of these challenges entails significant consequences, many of them unintended, counter-productive, or perverse. Contrary to the …

Tying Law For The Digital Age, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Tying arrangements, a central concern of antitrust policy since the early days of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, have come into renewed focus with re-spect to the practices of dominant technology companies. Unfortunately, tying law’s doctrinal structure is a self-contradictory and incoherent wreck. A con-ventional view holds that this mess is due to errant Supreme Court precedents, never fully corrected, that expressed hostility to tying based on faulty economic understanding. That is only part of the story. Examination of tying law’s origins and development shows that tying doctrine was built on a now-dated paradigm of what constitutes a tying arrangement. …

Valuing Social Data, Amanda Parsons, Salome Viljoen

Articles

Social data production—accumulating, processing, and using large volumes of data about people—is a unique form of value creation that characterizes the digital economy. Social data production also presents critical challenges for the legal regimes that encounter it. This Article provides scholars and policymakers with the tools to comprehend this new form of value creation through two descriptive contributions. First, it presents a theoretical account of social data, a mode of production that is cultivated and exploited for two distinct (albeit related) forms of value: prediction value and exchange value. Second, it creates and defends a taxonomy of three “scripts” that …

The American Antimonopoly Tradition: Origins, Contradictions, Transformations, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Proponents of antitrust reform argue for the rediscovery of an American antimonopoly tradition that predated the Sherman Act by centuries and suggests the reimagination of a more robust contemporary policy against concentrated economic power. But historically there have been a number of distinct and often contradictory strands of American antimonopoly. The American colanists inherited a weak, recent, and largely invented antimonopoly common law tradition focused on exclusive grants of privilege from the crown. In the nineteenth century, antimonopoly became a generative and ubiquitous concept in state legislatures and courts, but one with multiple, inconsistent meanings that evolved in the decades …

Antitrust And The Corporate Tax, 1909–1928, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah

Book Chapters

In “Antitrust and the Corporate Tax, 1909–1928,” Reuven Avi-Yonah examines a twentieth-century antitrust measure that lay outside the Sherman Act per se—the corporate tax act of 1909. After the enactment of the Clayton Act and the creation of the FTC in 1914, the corporate tax’s antimonopoly reputation faded somewhat. Between 1919 and 1928 most of its antitrust features were eliminated, and they would not be revived during the New Deal. Nevertheless, Avi-Yonah argues that the corporate tax still retains some potential to contribute to limiting the power of monopolies, especially if the progressive corporate tax rate structure adopted in the …

Valuing Social Data, Amanda Parsons, Salomé Viljoen

Law & Economics Working Papers

Social data production is a unique form of value creation that characterizes informational capitalism. Social data production also presents critical challenges for the various legal regimes that are encountering it. This Article provides legal scholars and policymakers with the tools to comprehend this new form of value creation through two descriptive contributions. First, it presents a theoretical account of social data, a mode of production which is cultivated and exploited for two distinct (albeit related) forms of value: prediction value and exchange value. Second, it creates and defends a taxonomy of three “scripts” that companies follow to build up and …

Gotta Get Those Ill-Gotten Gains: Improving The Ftc's Authority To Seek Disgorgement In Antitrust Cases, Kathryn Buggs

Michigan Law Review

Disgorgement is an equitable monetary remedy that requires a defendant to give up all ill-gotten gains from their illegal conduct. Unlike damages, which can be compensatory, deterrent, or even punitive in nature, disgorgement focuses primarily on deterring future illegal conduct. It relies on the simple moral premise that wrongdoers should not be allowed to retain the profits of their wrongdoing. Especially in antitrust litigation involving complex, multilayered supply chains, damages can underestimate the true harm suffered as a result of anticompetitive conduct. Disgorgement, if calculated properly and litigated thoughtfully, has the potential to provide redress for the full amount of …

Race-Ing Antitrust, Bennett Capers, Gregory Day

Michigan Law Review

Antitrust law has a race problem. To spot an antitrust violation, courts inquire into whether an act has degraded consumer welfare. Since anticompetitive practices are often assumed to enhance consumer welfare, antitrust offenses are rarely found. Key to this framework is that antitrust treats all consumers monolithically; that consumers are differently situated, especially along lines of race, simply is ignored.

We argue that antitrust law must disaggregate the term “consumer” to include those who disproportionately suffer from anticompetitive practices via a community welfare standard. As a starting point, we demonstrate that anticompetitive conduct has specifically been used as a tool …

Why Do Corporations Merge And Why Should Law Care?, Chris Sagers

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Mergers and acquisitions are extraordinarily prevalent in the United States, generating massive expenditures every year. However, a serious empirical puzzle lies at the heart of all that activity. That empirical phenomenon’s most remarkable feature by far is that even though it is well established in an extensive literature and implies far-reaching policy consequences, American law ignores it entirely.

Generations of researchers have failed to find evidence that merger and acquisition activity generates any lasting benefits for the combining firms’ owners or anyone else. No one seriously doubts that efficiencies of scale or technological integration are real or that acquisitions sometimes …

The Death Of Amateurism In The Ncaa: How The Ncaa Can Survive The New Economic Reality Of College Sports, Claire Haws

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

In October 2019, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) announced it would be making a major change to its rules: student-athletes would soon be permitted to receive compensation for the use of their name, image and likeness (NIL). The announcement came in response to an increasing volume of state legislation allowing for student-athlete NIL compensation. On July 1, 2021, student-athletes finally had the opportunity to receive NIL benefits as the NCAA’s interim NIL policy went into effect. This change represents a nail in the coffin for traditional notions of amateurism.

For decades, the NCAA defended its rules from antitrust challenges …

Fenceposts Without A Fence, Katherine E. Dr Lucido, Nicholas K. Tabor, Jeffery Y. Zhang

Articles

Banking organizations in the United States have long been subject to two broad categories of regulatory requirements. The first is permissive: a “positive” grant of rights and privileges, typically via a charter for a corporate entity, to engage in the business of banking. The second is restrictive: a “negative” set of conditions on those rights and privileges, limiting conduct and imposing a program of oversight and enforcement, by which the holder of that charter must abide. Together, these requirements form a legal cordon, or “regulatory perimeter,” around the U.S. banking sector.

On Firms, Sanjukta Paul

Law & Economics Working Papers

This paper is about firms as an instance of economic coordination, and about how we think about them in relation to other forms of coordination as well as in relation to competition and markets. The dominant frame for thinking about firms--which has strongly influenced contemporary competition law as well as serving as a vital adjunct to the fundamental concepts of neoclassical price theory that guide many areas of law and policy--implicitly or explicitly explains and justifies the centralization of both decision-making rights and flows of income from economic activity on productive efficiency grounds. We have very good reasons to doubt …

Criminal Enforcement Of Section 2 Of The Sherman Act: An Empirical Assessment, Daniel A. Crane

Law & Economics Working Papers

The Biden Justice Department has announced that it may begin to bring criminal monopolization cases under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, a practice that the Department has not employed in almost half a century. The Department's leadership has justified this idea by asserting that it used to be common practice for the Antitrust Division to bring such cases. This Article presents the findings of an empirical study of all of the Justice Department's antitrust case filings. It finds that the Justice Depart brought 175 criminal monopolization cases between 1903 and 1977, but that only 20 of these involved unilateral …

Charting The Reform Path, Sanjukta Paul

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Inequality and the Labor Market: The Case for Greater Competition. Edited by Sharon Block and Benjamin H. Harris.

The Impact Of Amex And Its Progeny On Technology Platforms, Kacyn H. Fujii

Michigan Law Review

Big Tech today faces unprecedented levels of antitrust scrutiny. Yet antitrust enforcement against Big Tech still faces a major obstacle: the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Ohio v. American Express. Popularly called Amex, the case imposed a higher initial burden on antitrust plaintiffs in cases involving two-sided markets. Two-sided markets connect two distinct, noncompeting groups of customers on a shared platform. These platforms have indirect network effects, meaning that one group of customers benefits when more of the second group of customers joins the platform. Two-sided markets are ubiquitous in the technology sector, encompassing social media, search engines, …

Fenceposts Without A Fence, Katherine Di Lucido, Nicholas Kean Tabor, Jeffery Zhang

Law & Economics Working Papers

Banking organizations in the United States have long been subject to two broad categories of regulatory requirements. The first is permissive: a “positive” grant of rights and privileges, typically via a charter for a corporate entity, to engage in the business of banking. The second is restrictive: a “negative” set of conditions on those rights and privileges, limiting conduct and imposing a program of oversight and enforcement, by which the holder of that charter must abide. Together, these requirements form a legal cordon, or “regulatory perimeter,” around the U.S. banking sector.

The regulatory perimeter figures prominently in several ongoing policy …

Reviving Antitrust Enforcement In The Airline Industry, Jonathan Edelman

Michigan Law Review

The Department of Transportation (DOT) has broad but oft overlooked power to address antitrust issues among airlines through section 411 of the Federal Aviation Act. However, the DOT’s unwillingness to enforce antitrust more aggressively may be translating into higher fares and fees for airline travelers.

More aggressive antitrust enforcement is urgently needed. Recent research has revealed a widespread practice of common ownership in the airline industry, whereby investment firms own large portions of rival airline companies. Although this practice leads to higher prices and reduced competition, antitrust regulators, from the DOT to the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade …

Alston And The Dejudicialization Of Antitrust, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

A curious feature of NCAA v. Alston is the shoe that didn’t drop, at least not immediately. “Put simply,” Justice Gorsuch wrote for a unanimous Court, “this suit involves admitted horizontal price fixing in a market where the defendants exercise monopoly control.” Given that this pronouncement occurred on page fourteen of the Court’s opinion, one might have expected that the opinion would end on, say, page fifteen, for if there has been one fixed point in American antitrust law it has been that horizontal price-fixing, especially but not only by those with monopoly power, is per se illegal. Instead, the …

Taking It With You: Platform Barriers To Entry And The Limits Of Data Portability, Gabriel Nicholas

Michigan Technology Law Review

Policymakers are faced with a vexing problem: how to increase competition in a tech sector dominated by a few giants. One answer proposed and adopted by regulators in the United States and abroad is to require large platforms to allow consumers to move their data from one platform to another, an approach known as data portability. Facebook, Google, Apple, and other major tech companies have enthusiastically supported data portability through their own technical and political initiatives. Today, data portability has taken hold as one of the go-to solutions to address the tech industry’s competition concerns.

This Article argues that despite …