Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons^™

Is The Glass Half-Empty Or Half-Full?: Reflections On The Kodak Case, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Horizontal Mergers: Law, Policy, And Economics, George A. Hay, Gregory J. Werden

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The legality of a horizontal merger under section 7 of the Clayton Act turns on a reckoning of its social costs and benefits. This paper reviews what economics has to say about that reckoning and explores the relationship between economic learning and merger law and policy.

Harmonisation Of Trade Laws In The African Economic Community, Muna Ndulo

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Observations: Sylvania In Retrospect, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Market Power In Antitrust, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The concept of market power is at the core of antitrust. Philosophically, antitrust policy is aimed primarily at preventing firms from achieving, retaining, or abusing market power. Operationally, assessing whether a firm or firms have market power or any reasonable prospect for achieving it is often the first (and sometimes, the only) step in performing an antitrust analysis.

Few would dispute that market power should play a prominent role in antitrust analysis. Nevertheless, important questions remain. Some of these questions quite naturally focus on the precise degree of importance given to market power. Is it an essential ingredient in antitrust …

A History Of Gatt Unfair Trade Remedy Law--Confusion Of Purposes, John J. Barceló Iii

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This paper presents an analytical history of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy law in GATT and its member countries. In recent years this body of ‘unfair trade remedy’ law has flourished in the western trading system. Important trading countries have adopted new or expanded anti-dumping and anti-subsidy laws and imposed trade-blocking remedies under them more frequently than ever before. I try to explain in this essay how and why these laws--which I view as protectionist--have prospered and become so rooted in GATT and its member countries.

Predatory Pricing, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Geographic Market Definition In An International Context, George A. Hay, John C. Hilke, Philip B. Nelson

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Market definition is generally regarded as a key step in antitrust analysis. Market definition has two components. Product market definition seeks to include all products that are meaningful substitutes. Geographic market definition seeks to incorporate all relevant sources of the product in question. This paper is concerned with geographic market definition and, in particular, how geographic markets are defined in situations where competition may, at least to some extent, transcend national boundaries.

The subject of the paper may be of some current interest for two reasons. First, the perception is widespread that, over the past twenty or so years, competition …

Single Firm Conduct, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

My assignment is to discuss likely future developments involving single firm conduct. I will first discuss general trends and then move on to discuss some specific areas of the law. At the outset, however, I should remind the reader that what follows are predictions, not endorsements.

The Direction Of Antitrust In The Decade Ahead: Some Predictions—Panel Discussion, Donald I. Baker, Thomas E. Kauper, William F. Baxter, Gordon B. Spivack, James T. Halverson, Robert Pitofsky, George A. Hay, Alan H. Silberman

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The Free Rider Rationale And Vertical Restraints Analysis Reconsidered, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Vertical Restraints, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Vertical Restraints After Monsanto, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The decision in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. represents the Supreme Court's latest effort to articulate the standards governing vertical restraints of trade under the United States anti-trust law. It is unlikely that this will be the last time the Court addresses this topic. Notwithstanding the many Supreme Court decisions in this area, several issues remain unresolved. Indeed, Monsanto may have created (or resurrected) as many new questions as it answered, a phenomenon characteristic of most prior opinions in this area.

At least part of the reason for this unsettled state is that, from the outset, the Supreme Court …

Anti-Trust And Economic Theory: Some Observations From The Us Experience, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Recent developments in US anti-trust can be characterised as reflecting the uneasy interaction of two quite separate phenomena: first, the increased emphasis on economic analysis as the overriding organising principle of anti-trust policy and on economic efficiency as the primary (perhaps only) relevant goal for anti-trust; second, the long-standing reluctance of the federal judiciary to involve itself in any substantive economic analysis, and the preference, instead, for simple rules of thumb or ‘pigeon holes’ to sort out lawful from unlawful conduct. The result has been that while economics has played a major role, it has not influenced American anti-trust as …

Pigeonholes In Antitrust, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The Ftc And Pricing: Of Predation And Signaling, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This paper summarizes and comments on two recent FTC cases. The first case involved accusations of predatory pricing against Borden, the manufacturer of ReaLemon, the dominant brand of reconstituted lemon juice. The second involved price-signaling and other so-called facilitating practices by the four makers of lead-based antiknock compounds.

Demonstration: Economic Analysis And Expert Testimony—Plaintiff's Conference, Eleanor M. Fox, Jay Topkis, George A. Hay, Charles B. Renfrew

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This article is a demonstration on the use of economic experts. The demonstration is based loosely on Mobil’s attempted take-over of Marathon Oil Company. However, the oil companies involved here are named Major, which is the second largest oil company in the United States, and Olympic, which is the largest supplier to independents. Any resemblance of Major and Olympic to any other firm, entity or person, living or not, is purely coincidental.

The demonstration is divided into two parts. The first part is the conference. A conference of plaintiff’s team will be followed by a conference of defendant’s team.

Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly, And Antitrust Law, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

The Economics Of Predatory Pricing, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The revival of interest among economists in predatory pricing, spawned by Areeda and Turner's 1975 article, and the tidal wave of literature which has followed, creates a serious problem for the lawyer interested in keeping up with what economists are saying on the subject. Articles appearing in the standard economics journals are often inaccessible, due to the advanced level of mathematics normally employed, and seem of little apparent relevance, due to the detailed but often artificially sounding assumptions used to generate conclusions. The materials appearing in law reviews, while perhaps less technical, is voluminous and not always original, Worst of …

Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories And The Evolution Of Legal Standards, Joseph F. Brodley, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Recent years have witnessed a virtual explosion in the legal and economic literature dealing with predatory pricing. Equally dramatic has been the swift adoption by several courts of policy conclusions derived from this literature—a development that is startling, given the complexity and volume of the literature and the lack of consensus among legal and economic scholars. The result has been to raise an acute problem for lawyers and judges who must assess the validity and applicability of competing economic models, mold stubborn and unruly facts to fit abstract economic theories, translate economic theories into legal doctrines, and resolve puzzling cost …

The Antidumping Law: Repeal It Or Revise It, John J. Barceló Iii

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Subsidies And Countervailing Duties--Analysis And A Proposal, John J. Barceló Iii

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The author recommends a new scheme for regulating the use of government subsidies and countervailing duties in international trade, an area presently regulated by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. He contends that these rules should be based to a large extent on principles of free trade and economic efficiency. In addition to setting out proposed regulations, the author analyzes the strength and weaknesses of free trade theory and of the present GATT rules regarding subsidies and countervailing duties.

The Antibiotics Class Actions, Charles W. Wolfram

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

An Empirical Survey Of Price Fixing Conspiracies, George A. Hay, Daniel Kelley

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This paper reports on a study of recent Antitrust Division horizontal price fixing cases. The objective of the study was to determine if there has been a specific set of characteristics associated with the product or product markets that have been the subjects of price fixing. If such a pattern exists, it might provide empirical insight into some aspects of oligopoly behavior. From a policy point of view, any pattern that is found could be used in a positive enforcement program designed to investigate the "most likely" areas of price fixing. Section I reviews the academic literature which has dealt …

Import Controls On Foreign Oil: Reply, George A. Hay

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The position of Ryan Amacher, Robert Tollison, and Thomas Willett (ATW) can be summarized as follows: Assuming that the domestic industry behaves like a profit-maximizing monopoly, if the quota on imported crude oil is replaced by a tariff that is by assumption set so as to achieve the same domestic price of crude oil, the market power of the dominant domestic firms is "severely constrained."

In response I would contend that 1) their assumption about the level of the tariff differs from what I had assumed; 2) their conclusion about the market power of the dominant firms is subject to …

Antidumping Laws As Barriers To Trade--The United States And The International Antidumping Code, John J. Barceló Iii

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Proposals For Change In The Structure Of Antitrust Enforcement: The Department Of Justice, The Ftc And The Courts, Roger C. Cramton

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Diversification Of Ownership In The Regulated Industries – The Folklore Of Regulation, Roger C. Cramton

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.