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Articles 61 - 90 of 179

Full-Text Articles in Antitrust and Trade Regulation

Exclusionary Conduct Of Dominant Firms, R&D Competition, And Innovation, Jonathan Baker Aug 2015

Exclusionary Conduct Of Dominant Firms, R&D Competition, And Innovation, Jonathan Baker

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

This paper evaluates the innovation consequences of antitrust enforcement against the exclusionary conduct of dominant firms through a Nash equilibrium model of research and development (R&D) competition to create new products. In the two-firm model, whether one firm regards the other firm’s R&D investment as a strategic complement or strategic substitute turns on an increasing differences condition: whether the first firm’s incremental benefit of increased R&D investment is greater if its rival’s R&D effort succeeds or if its rival’s R&D effort fails. Antitrust prohibitions on pre-innovation exclusion and post-innovation exclusion are found to be effective in different strategic settings: preventing …


Putting The 'Financial Stability' In Financial Stability Oversight Council, Hilary Allen Jan 2015

Putting The 'Financial Stability' In Financial Stability Oversight Council, Hilary Allen

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

For all the ink that has been spilled on the topic of financial regulation since the financial crisis of 2007-2008, there has been little examination of the competing normative goals of financial regulation. Should the financial system be treated as an end in itself such that the efficiency of that system is the primary goal? Or should financial regulation instead treat the financial system as a means to the end of broader economic growth? This Article argues for the latter approach, and stakes out the controversial normative position that financial stability, rather than efficiency, should be the paramount focus of …


Antitrust, Competition Policy, An Inequality, Jonathan Baker, Steven Salop Jan 2015

Antitrust, Competition Policy, An Inequality, Jonathan Baker, Steven Salop

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

Economic inequality recently has entered the political discourse in a highly visible way. This political impact is not a surprise. As the U.S. economy has begun to recover from the Great Recession since mid-2009, economic growth has effectively been appropriated by those already well off, leaving the median household less well off. The serious economic, political and moral issues raised by inequality can be addressed through a panoply of public policies including competition policy, the focus of this article. The article describes the channels through which market power contributes to inequality, and sets forth a range of possible antitrust policy …


Taking The Error Out Of 'Error Cost' Analysis: What's Wrong With Antitrust's Right, Jonathan Baker Jan 2015

Taking The Error Out Of 'Error Cost' Analysis: What's Wrong With Antitrust's Right, Jonathan Baker

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

This article catalogues a series of erroneous assumptions about the current competition policy environment made by today’s antitrust conservatives. These errors inappropriately tilt the application of a neutral economic tool, decision theory, toward non-interventionist outcomes.


Where Do We Go From Here: Open Questions And Policy Considerations, Jonathan Baker, Fiona Scott Morton, Daniel Crane, Richard Steuer, Michael Whinston, C. Hemphill, Deborah Feinstein, Renata Hesse Jun 2014

Where Do We Go From Here: Open Questions And Policy Considerations, Jonathan Baker, Fiona Scott Morton, Daniel Crane, Richard Steuer, Michael Whinston, C. Hemphill, Deborah Feinstein, Renata Hesse

Presentations

The Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice held a one-day public workshop on June 23, 2014 to explore the economics and legal policy implications of certain pricing practices, such as loyalty and bundled pricing. The workshop, consisted of presentations and roundtable discussions, that focused on practices in which prices are explicitly or effectively contingent on commitments to purchase or sell a specified share or volume of a single product or a mix of multiple products. Workshop participants considered theoretical and empirical developments in the economic understanding of these practices, discussed developments in the relevant …


Channeling And Contending With Bill Kovacic, Jonathan Baker Jan 2014

Channeling And Contending With Bill Kovacic, Jonathan Baker

Contributions to Books

This essay was written for a festschrift in honor of Professor William E. Kovacic. It discusses Prof. Kovacic’s work on the design of antitrust enforcement institutions, the interplay between the Chicago and Harvard schools in the transformation of antitrust that took place a generation ago, and the extent to which antitrust norms exhibit continuity over time. It will published in "William E. Kovacic - Liber Amicorum: An Antitrust Tribute - Vol. II," which is scheduled to be released in February 2014 by the Institute of Competition Law.


Channeling And Contending With Bill Kovacic, Jonathan B. Baker Jan 2014

Channeling And Contending With Bill Kovacic, Jonathan B. Baker

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

No abstract provided.


What Is 'Financial Stability' -The Need For Some Common Language In International Financial Regulation, Hilary Allen Jan 2014

What Is 'Financial Stability' -The Need For Some Common Language In International Financial Regulation, Hilary Allen

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

Post-Crisis international financial regulation is animated by the buzzwords 'financial stability, " but surprisingly little attention has been paid to what these buzzwords actually mean. This Article argues that there are many-largely unexplored- disagreements regarding the meaning of 'financial stability, " and that this lack of consensus has the potential to cause a host of problems. Chief amongst these is that disagreement about the meaning of "financial stability" can thwart harmonized national implementation of international financial stability regulation. To draw attention to this largely-ignored definitional problem, and to start the process of addressing it, this Article proposes a working definition …


Congress As A Catalyst Of Patent Reform At The Federal Circuit, Jonas Anderson Jan 2014

Congress As A Catalyst Of Patent Reform At The Federal Circuit, Jonas Anderson

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is the dominant institution in patent law. The court’s control over patent law and policy has led to a host of academic proposals to shift power away from the court and towards other institutions, including the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, and federal district courts. Surprisingly, however, academics have largely dismissed Congress as a potential institutional check on the Federal Circuit. Congress, it is felt, is too slow, too divided, and too beholden to special interests to effectively monitor changes in innovation and respond with appropriate reforms. …


Patent Dialogue, Jonas Anderson Jan 2014

Patent Dialogue, Jonas Anderson

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

This Article examines the unique dialogic relationship that exists between the Supreme Court and Congress concerning patent law. In most areas of the law, Congress and the Supreme Court engage directly with each other to craft legal rules. When it comes to patent law, however, Congress and the Court often interact via an intermediary institution: the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In patent law, dialogue often begins when Congress or the Supreme Court acts as a dialogic catalyst, signaling reform priorities to which the Federal Circuit often responds.

Appreciating the unique nature of patent dialogue has important …


The Competitive Consequences Of Most-Favored-Nation Provisions, Jonathan Baker, Judith A. Chevalier Jan 2013

The Competitive Consequences Of Most-Favored-Nation Provisions, Jonathan Baker, Judith A. Chevalier

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

"Most Favored Nation" contractual provisions have come under scrutiny in recent years by antitrust authorities in both the US and EU. MFNs are a type of vertical agreement between suppliers and buyers. The literature has recognized that there may be efficiency rationales for these arrangements but the literature has also recognized that these arrangements have anticompetitive potential. In this paper, we distill the economics literature on MFNs to explore both possibilities.


Exclusion As A Core Competition Concern, Jonathan Baker Jan 2013

Exclusion As A Core Competition Concern, Jonathan Baker

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

A contemporary consensus in antitrust discourse inappropriately places exclusionary conduct at the periphery of competition policy, while putting collusion at the core. Contrary to that common view, exclusion is as important as collusion as a matter of precedent, the structure of doctrinal rules, economics, and sound competition policy. Courts treat exclusionary violations as serious competitive problems. An emerging doctrinal rule for truncated condemnation of “plain” exclusionary conduct (practices foreclosing rivals that lack a plausible efficiency justification) parallels the evolving judicial approach toward “naked” collusion. Exclusion and collusion can be understood within a common economic framework that emphasizes the close relationship …


Economics And Politics: Perspectives On The Goals And Future Of Antitrust, Jonathan Baker Jan 2013

Economics And Politics: Perspectives On The Goals And Future Of Antitrust, Jonathan Baker

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

This article examines the roles of economics and politics in U.S. antitrust from several perspectives. It explains why the modern debate over the economic welfare standard that enforcers and courts should pursue is unsatisfying. It connects economics and politics by describing antitrust’s economic goals as the product of a mid-20th century political understanding about the nature of economic regulation that has continued in force to this day. To protect that understanding, it explains, antitrust rules should now be implemented using a qualified consumer welfare standard. The article also identifies contemporary political tensions that threaten to create regulatory gridlock, or even …


Antitrust Enforcement And Sectoral Regulation: The Competition Policy Benefits Of Concurrent Enforcement In The Communications Sector, Jonathan Baker Jan 2013

Antitrust Enforcement And Sectoral Regulation: The Competition Policy Benefits Of Concurrent Enforcement In The Communications Sector, Jonathan Baker

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

The US competition agencies – the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) – often share jurisdiction with sectoral regulators also charged with fostering competition, such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). This article highlights how this institutional structure – concurrent jurisdiction – helps protect competition through the lens of recent US experiences involving the communications industry. It argues that concurrent jurisdiction is likely most effective when the communications regulator has independent access to industry information to limit capture, when the communications regulator can take a long-term perspective, when the antitrust agency can …


Pay-To-Play: The Impact Of Group Purchasing Organizations On Drug Shortages, Christian Deroo Jan 2013

Pay-To-Play: The Impact Of Group Purchasing Organizations On Drug Shortages, Christian Deroo

American University Business Law Review

No abstract provided.


Telecommunications: Communications Law Reform, Jonathan Baker, Robert Mcdowell, Ajit Pai, Daniel Crane, Maureen Ohlhausen, Jennifer Elrod Nov 2012

Telecommunications: Communications Law Reform, Jonathan Baker, Robert Mcdowell, Ajit Pai, Daniel Crane, Maureen Ohlhausen, Jennifer Elrod

Presentations

The transcript was published on 2013 Journal of Law, Technology & Policy University of Illinois Issue 1.


Competitive Harm From Mfns: Economic Theories, Jonathan Baker Sep 2012

Competitive Harm From Mfns: Economic Theories, Jonathan Baker

Presentations

No abstract provided.


Evaluating Merger Enforcement During The Obama Administration, Jonathan Baker, Carl Shapiro Aug 2012

Evaluating Merger Enforcement During The Obama Administration, Jonathan Baker, Carl Shapiro

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

We recently concluded that government merger enforcement statistics "provide clear evidence that the Obama Administration reinvigorated merger enforcement, as it set out to do." Three weeks later, in an article published in the Stanford Law Review Online, Professor Daniel A. Crane reached the opposite conclusion, claiming that "[t]he merger statistics do not evidence 'reinvigoration' of merger enforcement under Obama."


International Investments Arbitration: Winning, Losing And Why, Susan D. Franck Jan 2012

International Investments Arbitration: Winning, Losing And Why, Susan D. Franck

Contributions to Books

In late 2008, as financial markets were crashing, the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment launched the Columbia FDI Perspectives. The first Perspective, entitled “The FDI recession has begun,” correctly forecast an FDI recession in the following year. From that first Perspective in late 2008 to the end of 2010, the series published thirty-three concise notes on topical FDI-related issues by diverse experts in the field. The purpose of these Perspectives is to inform readers about some of the important issues and trends in the contemporary debate on FDI, and to promote a wide-ranging discussion about the policy implications …


Cocos Can Drive Markets Cuckoo, Hilary Allen Jan 2012

Cocos Can Drive Markets Cuckoo, Hilary Allen

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

Bank-issued contingent-convertible capital instruments (known colloquially as "cocos ") are assumed to be a less costly substitute for common equity that will improve the stability of banks in a crisis situation. However, cocos are new and untested instruments. In a future financial crisis they are likely to incentivize behaviors and trading strategies (notably panic selling short selling, and the use of credit default swaps) that have the potential to harm confidence in banks. Without confidence, banks will have difficulty funding themselves and the likely consequences of bank difficulties (credit crunches and possible bailouts) will be felt by society at large. …


The Perils Of Armchair Analysis: Evaluating Merger Enforcement During The Obama Administration, Jonathan Baker, Carl Shapiro Jan 2012

The Perils Of Armchair Analysis: Evaluating Merger Enforcement During The Obama Administration, Jonathan Baker, Carl Shapiro

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

This brief comment responds to the analysis of Obama administration merger policy in Daniel A. Crane, Has the Obama Justice Department Reinvigorated Antitrust Enforcement? 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 13 (2012).


Credit Default Swaps And Clearing, Nazanin Baseri Jan 2011

Credit Default Swaps And Clearing, Nazanin Baseri

Legislation and Policy Brief

In an article from 2000, an investigative journalist from The Banker warned against the hidden dangers of credit default swaps (CDS). Although CDSs can be a useful financial instrument for the banking industry, the article warned of the anonymity of credit derivatives, lack of transparency, and the potential for disaster. In an unfortunately accurate conclusion, the journalist opined that a crisis might occur because banks may not put in place the proper risk control systems in time to avert a disaster. Fast forward eight years and the financial meltdown of 2008 developed into one of the largest economic disasters in …


Equity, Antitrust, And The Reemergence Of The Patent Unenforceability Remedy, Jorge Contreras Jan 2011

Equity, Antitrust, And The Reemergence Of The Patent Unenforceability Remedy, Jorge Contreras

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

The conventional legal analysis of technical standard setting derives primarily from antitrust law. But antitrust remedies, taken alone, may not be broad enough to address recent abuses of the standardization process. The principal example of this shortcoming is the well-known case of Rambus, Inc., which, over the course of several years, was alleged to have concealed relevant patent applications from a standards organization in which it participated and then successfully sued the entire DRAM industry for royalties after the standard was “locked-in.” Remarkably, Rambus prevailed in its litigation campaign despite aggressive enforcement efforts by the Federal Trade Commission. Rambus’s success …


Merger Simulation In An Administrative Context, Jonathan Baker Jan 2011

Merger Simulation In An Administrative Context, Jonathan Baker

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

This article addresses the application of the economic literature on merger simulation to the practical context of antitrust enforcement. It highlights the value of simple simulations as a basis for creating screens and presumptions – particularly the gross upward pricing pressure index for the preliminary review of unilateral effects among sellers of branded consumer products and a presumption based on identifying mavericks for the analysis of coordinated effects – in order to provide guidance to merging firms and judges, who may not have specialized competition policy expertise. The article explains why antitrust agencies should rely on these approaches to identify …


Sector-Specific Competition Enforcement At The Fcc, Jonathan Baker Jan 2011

Sector-Specific Competition Enforcement At The Fcc, Jonathan Baker

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

This comment explains how and why sector-specific enforcement by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) complements generalist competition enforcement by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), to the benefit of competition in the communications industry. It illustrates ways in which a sector-specific agency such as the FCC can foster competition by comparing merger reviews by the FCC and DOJ in the wake of the 1996 Telecommunications Act.


Comcast/Nbcu: The Fcc Provides A Roadmap For Vertical Merger Analysis, Jonathan Baker Jan 2011

Comcast/Nbcu: The Fcc Provides A Roadmap For Vertical Merger Analysis, Jonathan Baker

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

The FCC’s analysis of the Comcast-NBCU transaction fills a gap in the contemporary treatment of vertical mergers by providing a roadmap for courts and litigants addressing the possibility of anticompetitive exclusion. The FCC identified the factors any judicial or administrative tribunal would likely consider today in analyzing whether a vertical merger would lead to anticompetitive input or customer foreclosure, and a range of economic methods potentially relevant to applying that template to the facts of a transaction. Notwithstanding the difference between administrative adjudication under a public interest standard and judicial decision-making under the Clayton Act, the legal framework and economic …


2009 International Trade Law Decisions Of The Federal Circuit, Patrick A. Fitch Apr 2010

2009 International Trade Law Decisions Of The Federal Circuit, Patrick A. Fitch

American University Law Review

No abstract provided.


Commentary: Environmental Justice And The Bp Oil Spill: Does Anyone Care About The "Small People" Of Color?, Perry Wallace Jan 2010

Commentary: Environmental Justice And The Bp Oil Spill: Does Anyone Care About The "Small People" Of Color?, Perry Wallace

The Modern American

No abstract provided.


Using Competition Law To Promote Access To Knowledge, Sean Flynn Jan 2010

Using Competition Law To Promote Access To Knowledge, Sean Flynn

Contributions to Books

One of the points of convergence among the many strands of the A2K movement is resistance to the one-size-fits-all ratcheting up of intellectual property provisions around the world. The resistance is grounded in analysis showing that intellectual property rules often create social costs that far outweigh their intended benefits. Much of the A2K movement’s advocacy for limitations of intellectual property rights is located within the field of intellectual property law – promoting the inclusion and use of balancing mechanisms within the laws granting intellectual property rights. But intellectual property rights are also shaped and limited by their interaction with other …


International Disparities Panel, Sean Flynn Jan 2010

International Disparities Panel, Sean Flynn

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

No abstract provided.