Administrative Law Commons^™

Fun With Administrative Law: A Game For Lawyers And Judges, Adam Babich

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

The practice of law is not a game. Administrative law in particular can implicate important issues that impact people’s health, safety, and welfare and change business’ profitability or even viability. Nonetheless, it can seem like a game. This is because courts rarely explain administrative law rulings in terms of the public purposes and policies at issue in lawsuits. Instead, the courts’ administrative law opinions tend to turn on arcane interpretive doctrines with silly names, such as the “Chevron two-step” or “Chevron step zero.” To advance doctrinal arguments, advocates and courts engage in linguistic debates that resemble a smokescreen—tending to obscure …

Longstanding Agency Interpretations, Anita S. Krishnakumar

Fordham Law Review

    How much deference—or what kind—should courts give to longstanding agency interpretations of statutes? Surprisingly, courts and scholars lack a coherent answer to this question. Legal scholars long have assumed that longstanding agency statutory interpretations are treated with heightened deference on judicial review, and federal courts sometimes have made statements suggesting that this is the case. But in practice, federal court review of longstanding agency interpretations—at both the U.S. Supreme Court and courts of appeals—turns out to be surprisingly erratic. Reviewing courts sometimes note the longevity of an agency’s statutory interpretation as a plus factor in their deference analysis but at …

A Pragmatic Approach To Interpreting The Federal Rules, Suzette M. Malveaux

Publications

No abstract provided.

Formalism And Deference In Administration Law, Kristen E. Hickman, Jide O. Nzelibe, Thomas W. Merrill, Philip A. Hamburger, Jennifer Walker Elrod

Faculty Scholarship

The topic for discussion is formalism and deference in administrative law. As we know, the landmark case of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council has changed the face of modern administrative law. The panel will address the rightness and limitations of Chevron deference, especially in the context of agency decisions on the scope of the agencies’ jurisdictional mandates. Should the federal courts defer, or should they not defer in this context? We need guidance. Justices Scalia and Thomas recently differed from Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Alito on these issues. Who is right, and why? Does the answer …

Improving Agencies’ Preemption Expertise With Chevmore Codification, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

After nearly thirty years, the judicially crafted Chevron and Skidmore judicial-review doctrines have found new life as exotic, yet familiar, legislative tools. When Chevron deference applies, courts employ two steps: they consider whether the statutory provision at issue is ambiguous, and, if so, they defer to an administering agency’s reasonable interpretation. Skidmore deference, in contrast, is a less deferential regime in which courts assume interpretative primacy over statutory ambiguities but defer to agency action based on four factors — the agency’s thoroughness, reasoning, consistency, and overall persuasiveness. In the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Congress directed courts …

What 30 Years Of Chevron Teach Us About The Rest Of Statutory Interpretation , Abbe R. Gluck

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Puzzling Presumption Of Reviewability, Nicholas Bagley

Articles

The presumption in favor of judicial review of agency action is a cornerstone of administrative law, accepted by courts and commentators alike as both legally appropriate and obviously desirable. Yet the presumption is puzzling. As with any canon of statutory construction that serves a substantive end, it should find a source in history, positive law, the Constitution, or sound policy considerations. None of these, however, offers a plausible justification for the presumption. As for history, the sort of judicial review that the presumption favors - appellate-style arbitrariness review - was not only unheard of prior to the twentieth century, but …

A Process Failure Theory Of Statutory Interpretation, Mark Seidenfeld

Scholarly Publications

Despite all that has been written about the choice between purposivist, intentionalist, and textualist approaches to statutory interpretation, to date the literature has not provided a justification for the common judicial practice of relying on intent-based inquiries in some cases and disavowing those approaches for textualism in others. This Article fills that void and, in doing so, lays out a new “legislative process failure” theory of statutory interpretation that has the potential to move the debate beyond a simple choice between textual and intent-based interpretation. This Article argues that Congress and the courts comprise different linguistic communities when they interpret …

A Framework For Judicial Review And Remand In Immigration Law, Collin D. Schueler

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

This Article breaks new ground at the intersection of administrative law and immigration law. One of the more important questions in both fields is whether a reviewing court should resolve a legal issue in the first instance or remand that issue to the agency. This Article advances the novel claim that courts should use the modem framework for judicial review of agency statutory interpretations to inform their resolution of this remand question. Then, using this framework, the Article identifies when remand is and is not appropriate in immigration cases. This critical analysis, which urges a departure from conventional academic wisdom, …

Judicial Deference To Administrative Interpretations Of Law, Antonin Scalia

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

No abstract provided.

The 'No Surplusage' Canon In State-Local Tax Litigation, Steve R. Johnson

Scholarly Publications

Previous installments of this column have examined numerous canons or conventions of statutory interpretation in their application to state and local tax controversies. This installment considers another canon: the precept that courts should prefer interpretations that render no part of a statute superfluous. A recent treatise phrased the principle thus:

If possible, every word and every provision [of an enactment] is to be given effect. . . . None should be ignored. None should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to duplicate another provision or to have no consequence.

The first part below describes the canon generally. The …

Inside Agency Preemption, Catherine M. Sharkey

Michigan Law Review

A subtle shift has taken place in the mechanics of preemption, the doctrine that determines when federal law displaces state law. In the past, Congress was the leading actor, and courts and commentators focused almost exclusively on the precise wording of its statutory directives as a clue to its intent to displace state law. Federal agencies were, if not ignored, certainly no more than supporting players. But the twenty-first century has witnessed a role reversal. Federal agencies now play the dominant role in statutory interpretation. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the ascendancy of federal agencies in preemption disputes-an ascendancy …

End The Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed And Why It Can And Should Be Overruled, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, decided in 1984, the Supreme Court announced a startling new approach to judicial review of statutory interpretation by administrative agencies, which requires courts to defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Although it was perhaps hoped that Chevron would simplify judicial review and increase deference to agency interpretation, the opposite has occurred. Chevron has complicated judicial review and at best it is uncertain whether it has resulted in increased deference to agency interpretation. In fact, for numerous reasons, Chevron has been a failure on any reasonable measure and should be overruled. Further, overruling Chevron …

Sparks Nugget. State Tax Exemption Of Food Used By Casinos For Comped Meals, Steve Johnson

UNLV Gaming Law Journal

In their search for new sources of revenue, states have legalized and sought to tax many kinds of gaming. Forty-eight of the fifty states of the United States permit one or more types of legal gaming. An important technique in casino and some other types of gaming is giving “comps” – complimentary goods or services – to player-customers. A frequent type of comp is free meals on the casino premises or elsewhere. Gaming establishments also often give free meals to their employees.

Comps have been controversial for federal income tax purposes. A recent Nevada case, Sparks Nugget, and related cases …

May Legislative History Be Considered At Chevron Step One: The Third Circuit Dances The Chevron Two-Step In United States V. Geiser, Melina Forte

Villanova Law Review (1956 - )

No abstract provided.

Chevron'S Two Steps, Kenneth A. Bamberger, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

The framework for judicial review of administrative interpretations of regulatory statutes set forth in the landmark Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council decision prescribes two analytic inquiries, and for good reason. The familiar two-step analysis is best understood as a framework for allocating interpretive authority in the administrative state; it separates questions of statutory implementation assigned to independent judicial judgment (Step One) from questions regarding which the courts role is limited to oversight of agency decisionmaking (Step Two).

The boundary between a reviewing court's decision and oversight roles rests squarely on the question of statutory ambiguity. For while courts, …

No Two-Stepping In The Laboratories: State Deference Standards And Their Implications For Improving Chevron Doctrine, Michael Pappas

Faculty Scholarship

This article examines the deference standards that the various states apply to agency statutory interpretation and analyzes the implications for the federal Chevron doctrine. First, the article surveys state standards for reviewing agencies' statutory interpretation, finding that none of the state standards exactly follows the federal Chevron test but that state standards fall into one of four categories ranging from "strong deference" to "de novo with deference discouraged." The article then examines four particular state standards in depth, discovering that states tend to use the same methods, tools, and processes for statutory interpretation despite the different announced degrees of deference. …

Slides: The Future Of Oil And Gas Development On Federal Lands, Mike Chiropolos

The Future of Natural Resources Law and Policy (Summer Conference, June 6-8)

Presenter: Mike Chiropolos, Lands Program Director, Western Resource Advocates

44 slides

Running On Empty: Will Exxon Mobil Cause A Breakdown For Chevron And The Administrative State?, Meredith Abernathy

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Judicial Deference To Administrative Agencies And Its Limits, Graham G. Martin, David A. Super

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Bringing Deference Back (But For How Long?), Stephen M. Johnson

Articles

For most of the past decade, the Supreme Court seemed to be gradually eroding the deference accorded to administrative agencies. In Christensen v. Harris County and United States v. Mead Corp. the Court refused to accord Chevron deference to agencies' interpretations of statutes when the agencies adopted those interpretations through informal procedures. The trend appeared to continue when the Court refused to accord Chevron deference to tobacco regulations adopted by the Food and Drug Administration in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. or to controlled substance regulations adopted by the Attorney General in Gonzales v. Oregon. In addition, …

Knox V. United States Department Of Labor: The Potentially Risky Business Of Interpreting Asbestos Statutes, Jessica J. Suh

Villanova Environmental Law Journal (1991 - )

No abstract provided.

Only A Sith Thinks Like That: Llewellyn's Dueling Canons, Eight To Twelve, Michael B.W. Sinclair

Articles & Chapters

In this, the second installment in a series of articles planned to examine each of the twenty eight pairs of "dueling canons" having opposite effect left to us in 1950 by Karl N. Llewellyn (Karl N. Llewellyn, "Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed", 3 VANDERBILT L.REV. 395 (1950)), I examine pairs 8 through 12. I start with Pair 12, Llewellyn's formulation of the Plain Meaning Rule; it is not so much a canon of construction as a condition on construction: unless one or both of its conditions …

Rag Cumberland V. Dep: An Agency's Volte-Face Statutory Interpretation - When Do Courts Stop Deferring And Start Judicial Interpretation, Dennis C. Lumia

Villanova Environmental Law Journal (1991 - )

No abstract provided.

Florida East Coast Railway And The Structure Of Administrative Law, Michael P. Healy

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

A typical Administrative Law course presents the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co. as establishing the rule that statutory text quite close to the magic words, "on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing," is needed to trigger the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) formal hearing requirements for a rulemaking. Florida East Coast Railway is a prime example of an underrated case because, even though the case is well known, its renown is a consequence only of its black letter rule about rulemaking procedures. Many scholars and practitioners do not appreciate the case for …

Sherman's March (In)To The Sea, Andrew S. Oldham

ExpressO

This Article argues that the Sherman Act is unconstitutional. At the very least, scholars and jurists must not take for granted Congress's ability to statutorily deputize the federal courts with common-lawmaking powers. The federal antitrust statute—which has been described as the Magna Carta of free enterprise—raises serious constitutional questions that have heretofore gone unexplored and unanswered. Specifically, it is difficult (if not impossible) to reconcile the Sherman Act with the separation of powers, the nondelegation doctrine, and the Supremacy Clause.

Waters Of The United States: Theory, Practice And Integrity At The Supreme Court, Jamison E. Colburn

ExpressO

In the Supreme Court's two wetlands cases this Term, a question of statutory interpretation divided the justices sharply, in part because so much rides on the particular statutory provision at issue. The provision, a cryptic definition within the Clean Water Act (CWA), has now provided three separate occasions at the Court where the justices have confronted (1) the Chevron doctrine and the Court’s own ambivalence toward it, and (2) the CWA's enormous project of restoring the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters. In this essay, I argue that the way the Court went about resolving its differences …

Review Essay: Using All Available Information, Max Huffman

ExpressO

This is a review essay entitled “Using All Available Information,” in which I review and comment on Justice Stephen Breyer’s new book, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution, published in September 2005. Justice Breyer’s book, adapted from the Tanner Lectures given in 2005 at Harvard Law School, serves partly as a response to Justice Scalia’s 1997 volume A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law. I review Justice Breyer’s book in part by comparison to and contrast with Justice Scalia’s. I propose that much about Justice Breyer’s interpretive philosophy, which centers on determining the “purposes” of texts and interpreting …

National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n V. Brand X Internet Services: A War Of Words, The Effect Of Classifying Cable Modem Service As An Information Service, David P. Manni

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal (1994 - )

No abstract provided.

Review Of Agency Interpretations: The Difference Discovers Itself, Marla E. Mansfield

ExpressO

The Supreme Court regularly reviews agency interpretations of statutes. For many years, the official dogma of the Court was one of deference to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes – the so-called “Chevron doctrine.” After Mead and Christensen, the Court was open to other levels of respect for agency interpretations. Recently, cases have so emphasized the particular statutory construction methods of the individual justices that the agency interpretation of a statute is now on the level of legislative history or other aids to interpretation, such as canons, which may or may not be used at a justice’s option. The array …