Administrative Law Commons^™

Don’T “Estop” Me Now: Estoppel, Government Contract Law, And Sovereign Immunity If Congress Retroactively Repeals Public Service Loan Forgiveness, Michael J. Cole

Lewis & Clark Law Review

This Article discusses whether Direct Loan borrowers can obtain recourse against the federal government using either promissory or equitable estoppel theories if Congress retroactively repeals the Public Service Loan Forgiveness (“PSLF”) program. The Article addresses various hurdles, including sovereign immunity and the Sovereign Acts Doctrine, which the borrowers would encounter at litigation. It concludes that, despite likely overcoming these hurdles, in many cases, the plaintiff-borrowers’ government contract law claims would likely still fail to win on their merits. The Article also contends that most, if not all, equitable estoppel claims would likely fail before a court. The Article then offers …

Violence And Nondelegation, Jacob D. Charles, Darrell A. H. Miller

Faculty Scholarship

Debates over delegation are experiencing a renaissance. These debates presuppose an initial distribution of constitutional authority between actors that cannot be redistributed, or that can be redistributed only according to some clear ex ante set of rules. Nondelegation in this sense often arises in debates about separation of powers and intergovernmental delegation, although scholars have begun applying the concept to delegations to private corporations and other private actors. The public delegation doctrine restricts one branch of government from transferring its constitutional authority to another branch, while the private delegation doctrine limits transfer of government power to private entities. In this …

Subordination And Separation Of Powers, Matthew B. Lawrence

Faculty Articles

This Article calls for the incorporation of antisubordination into separation-ofpowers analysis. Scholars analyzing separation-of-powers tools—laws and norms that divide power among government actors—consider a long list of values ranging from protecting liberty to promoting efficiency. Absent from this list are questions of equity: questions of racism, sexism, and classism. This Article problematizes this omission and begins to rectify it. For the first time, this Article applies critical-race and feminist theorists’ subordination question—are marginalized groups disproportionately burdened?—to three important separation-of-powers tools: legislative appropriations, executive conditions, and constitutional entrenchment. In doing so, it reveals that each tool entails subordination by creating generalized …

Congress's Domain: Appropriations, Time, And Chevron, Matthew B. Lawrence

Faculty Articles

Annual appropriations and permanent appropriations play contradictory roles in the separation of powers. Annual appropriations preserve agencies’ need for congressionally provided funding and enforce a domain of congressional influence over agency action in which the House and the Senate each enforce written unicameral commands through the threat of reduced appropriations in the next annual cycle. Permanent appropriations permit agencies to fund their programs without ongoing congressional support, circumscribing and diluting Congress’s domain.

The unanswered question of Chevron deference for appropriations demonstrates the importance of the distinction between annual appropriations and permanent appropriations. Uncritical application of governing deference tests that emphasize …

The People's Court: On The Intellectual Origins Of American Judicial Power, Ian C. Bartrum

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

This article enters into the modern debate between “consti- tutional departmentalists”—who contend that the executive and legislative branches share constitutional interpretive authority with the courts—and what are sometimes called “judicial supremacists.” After exploring the relevant history of political ideas, I join the modern minority of voices in the latter camp.

This is an intellectual history of two evolving political ideas—popular sovereignty and the separation of powers—which merged in the making of American judicial power, and I argue we can only understand the structural function of judicial review by bringing these ideas together into an integrated whole. Or, put another way, …

Taking Appropriations Seriously, Gillian E. Metzger

Faculty Scholarship

Appropriations lie at the core of the administrative state and are be­com­ing increasingly important as deep partisan divides have stymied sub­stan­tive legislation. Both Congress and the President exploit appropria­tions to control government and advance their policy agendas, with the border wall battle being just one of several recent high-profile examples. Yet in public law doctrine, appropriations are ignored, pulled out for spe­cial legal treatment, or subjected to legal frameworks ill-suited for appro­priations realities. This Article documents how appropriations are mar­ginalized in a variety of public law contexts and assesses the reasons for this unjustified treatment. Appro­priations’ doctrinal marginalization does not …

An Invisible Border Wall And The Dangers Of Internal Agency Control, Jill E. Family

Lewis & Clark Law Review

Administrative law has long struggled to determine the appropriate balance between internal and external control over federal agencies. Some scholars posit that internal agency controls (those from within the executive branch) are optimal checks on agency behavior. In fact, some argue that external control (from Congress or the courts) is detrimental to agency governance. This Article presents a cautionary tale for those who discount the role of external control; it depicts a case study that poses a major challenge to those who theorize that internal agency controls are a sufficient check on agency behavior.

This case study analyzes the Trump …

Comments On Executive Ruilemaking And Democratic Legitimacy: "Reform" In The United States And The United Kingdom's Brexit Bt Susan Rose-Ackerman, Nicholas Almendares

Chicago-Kent Law Review

No abstract provided.

Administrative Law: Whose Job Is It Anyway?, Allison Mather

Pepperdine Law Review

This Note examines the current state of judicial deference to administrative agencies and suggests modifying the doctrine to better comport with the Constitution. It examines the history of administrative agencies and the rise of judicial deference. The Note explores the present-day applications of judicial deference and analyzes whether the current doctrine is consistent with both its initial underlying policies and the Constitution. Ultimately, judicial deference to administrative agencies raises serious separation of powers concerns and should be modified to remain faithful to the nation’s founding principles.

League Of Conservation Voters V. Trump, Adam W. Johnson Mr.

Public Land & Resources Law Review

A consortium of environmental groups brought suit challenging an executive order opening millions of acres of continental shelf lands to oil and gas leasing. The Court held that the President’s actions exceeded his statutory authority and intruded on Congress’s power under the Property Clause, violating the separation of powers doctrine.

Department Of Homeland Security V. Regents Of The University Of California, Et Al.: Brief For Administrative Law Scholars As Amici Curiae In Support Of Respondents, Nina A. Mendelson

Appellate Briefs

Amici are professors of administrative law and related public law subjects at institutions across the United States. In their scholarship and their teaching, they have carefully considered the legal doctrines implicated by this case. They submit this brief to address arguments and precedent that are relevant to a central question presented by this appeal: whether the Department of Homeland Security's decision to rescind the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy is judicially reviewable. Amici join this brief solely on their own behalf and not as representatives of their universities. A full list of amici appears in Appendix A.

Under …

Pepperdine University School Of Law Legal Summaries, Analise Nuxoll

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

No abstract provided.

Chevron Deference In The States: Lessons From Three States, Carrie Townsend Ingram

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

The appointment of Justice Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court of the United States has left many wondering if a change to the Chevron doctrine is impending. Justice Gorsuch’s colleague on the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas, shares similar views on Chevron. This article will compare the federal rule to three different states: Indiana, Delaware, and Arizona. Each state has taken a different path in determining that the judiciary should not give deference to an agency’s interpretation of the statutes that it is charged with enforcing. Delaware has affirmatively declared that the Chevron doctrine is not applicable in its state. A …

Executive Rulemaking And Democratic Legitimacy: "Reform" In The United States And The United Kingdom's Route To Brexit, Susan Rose-Ackerman

Chicago-Kent Law Review

Established public law principles are under strain from the prospect of Brexit in the United Kingdom and the Trump Administration in the United States. In the United Kingdom the Parliament is playing an increasingly important role in overseeing the Government, and the judiciary is beginning to support democratic accountability in executive policymaking. In the United States, possible statutory changes and the power of the president to reshape the public administration are of concern. Although in the United States the most draconian measures will likely die with the return of the House to Democratic Party control, they may remain on the …

Administrative Adjudication And Adjudicators, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

The appointment, removal, supervision and allocation of cases to Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) and other non-Article III adjudicators in the United States federal government continues to create vexing legal issues for courts and commentators. This article is an effort to address all of these issues together, to facilitate a holistic understanding of the place of non-Article III adjudicators in the federal government. The appointment question revolves around whether non-Article III adjudicators are Officers of the United States, which most are. There are two issues surrounding the removal of non-Article III adjudicators. First, for reasons sounding in due process concerns, adjudicators …

Blank Checks: An Analysis Of Emergency Actions Warranting Unilateral Executive Action, Megan E. Ball

Notre Dame Law Review

This Note discusses the separation of powers issues raised in the D.C. Circuit by then-Judge, now Justice Kavanaugh in Mexichem Fluor’s suit. Specifically, this Note analyzes the federal government’s approach to climate change, overreach of the EPA to act beyond its statutorily granted authority, and the EPA’s reliance upon President Obama’s executive directives as the justification for its overreach. Part I of this Note provides a broad introduction of the CAA and the importance of the policy motivations for the later addition of Title VI to the Act. Part II discusses in more depth the decision in Mexichem Fluor v. …

Separation Of Powers In Comparative Perspective: How Much Protection For The Rule Of Law?, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter discusses the separation of powers. The point about traditions, or shared social norms, is a central one for this chapter. At a time of growing pessimism about the fate of democracy worldwide, adherence to norms of political behaviour may have an importance transcending formal provisions for the allocation of governmental power. As such, this chapter first presents a brief account of ‘separation of powers’ under American presidentialism; then the contrasting system of Westminster parliamentarianism; third, the increasingly prevalent mixed regimes, often semi-presidential, that can be described as ‘constrained parliamentarism’; and, finally, international institutions. As the chapter shows, in …

Neither Fish Nor Fowl: The Separation Of Powers And The Office Of Administrative Hearings, Ann E. Cohen, Elise Larson

Mitchell Hamline Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Self-Delegation False Alarm: Analyzing Auer Deference’S Effect On Agency Rules, Daniel E. Walters

Faculty Scholarship

Auer deference holds that reviewing courts should defer to agen­cies when the latter interpret their own preexisting regulations. This doc­trine relieves pressure on agencies to undergo costly notice-and-com­ment rulemaking each time interpretation of existing regulations is neces­sary. But according to some leading scholars and jurists, the doc­trine actually encourages agencies to promulgate vague rules in the first instance, augmenting agency power and violating core separation of pow­ers norms in the process. The claim that Auer perversely encourages agencies to “self-delegate”—that is, to create vague rules that can later be informally interpreted by agencies with latitude due to judicial defer­ence—has helped …

Kisor, Gundy, Mead, Chevron, Skidmore, Hearst, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

Kisor v. Wilkie, in which the Court narrowly declined to overrule Auer deference while distinctly constraining its reach, shares with United States v. Mead Corp. and Skidmore v. Swift & Co. — so prominently mentioned in its opinions—the characteristic of being about an administrative action that, at root, is soft law, guidance. Quite appropriately, it did not address Chevron deference, although readers of the opinions, with Justices’ prior opinions in mind, will have no problem foreseeing a similar confrontation in the coming Term of Court, or perhaps the one to follow.

The Statutory Separation Of Powers, Sharon B. Jacobs

Publications

Separation of powers forms the backbone of our constitutional democracy. But it also operates as an underappreciated structural principle in subconstitutional domains. This Article argues that Congress constructs statutory schemes of separation, checks, and balances through its delegations to administrative agencies. Like its constitutional counterpart, the “statutory separation of powers” seeks to prevent the dominance of factions and ensure policy stability. But separating and balancing statutory authority is a delicate business: the optimal balance is difficult to calibrate ex ante, the balance is unstable, and there are risks that executive agencies in particular might seek expansion of their authority vis-à-vis …

Due Process For Article Iii—Rethinking Murray's Lessee, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

The Founders sought to protect federal judges’ impartiality primarily because those judges would review the political branches’ actions. To that end, Article III judges retain their offices during “good behaviour,” and Congress cannot reduce their compensation while they are in office. But Article III has taken a curious turn. Article III generally does not prohibit Article I courts or agencies from deciding “public rights” cases, i.e., when the government is a party and seeking to vindicate its own actions and interpretations under federal law against a private party. In contrast, Article III courts generally must resolve cases that concern “private …

Endangered Deference: Separation Of Powers And Judicial Review Of Agency Interpretation, Kathryn M. Baldwin

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

This Note proceeds in four parts: Part I consists of a brief history of the development of agency deference doctrine. Part II examines the decline of deference from the perspective of all three branches of government: the overuse by the executive agency that catalyzed deference’s denouement, the underuse by the United States Supreme Court and renewed separation of powers challenges, and the parallel assault from Congress under the pending SOPRA. Part III addresses the proposed de novo review standard and highlights the deficiencies in that solution, emphasizing instead the tools that Congress already employs to meaningfully check agency interpretations. …

The Role Of The Courts In Guarding Against Privatization Of Important Public Environmental Resources, Melissa K. Scanlan

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

Drinking water, beaches, a livable climate, clean air, forests, fisheries, and parks are all commons, shared by many users with diffuse and overlapping interests. These public natural resources are susceptible to depletion, overuse, erosion, and extinction; and they are under increasing pressures to become privatized. The Public Trust Doctrine provides a legal basis to guard against privatizing important public resources or commons. As such, it is a critical doctrine to counter the ever-increasing enclosure and privatization of the commons as well as ensure government trustees protect current and future generations. This Article considers separation of powers and statutory interpretation in …

Characterizing Power For Separation-Of-Powers Purposes, Tuan N. Samahon

University of Richmond Law Review

The U.S. Constitution parcels "legislative," "executive," and "judicial" powers among the separate branches of the federal government, but leaves those powers undefined. Accordingly, characterizing exercises of power becomes an important threshold inquiry in separation-of-powers disputes. This symposium Essay canvasses four competing judicial approaches to the characterization of power: functional inquiry; identity-of-the-officer formalism; historical induction; and skepticism. In this area, Justice Scalia's formalism has been particularly influential but created considerable tension with original public meaning originalism. This Essay explains how Scalia's formalism led to his embrace of delegation and concludes by cautioning against judicial oversimplification in the characterization inquiry.

Reconstructing An Administrative Republic, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski

Michigan Law Review

Review of Jon D. Michaels, Constitutional Coup: Privatization's Threat to the American Republic.

Restoring Congress's Role In The Modern Administrative State, Christopher J. Walker

Michigan Law Review

A review of Josh Chafetzm Congress's Constitution: Legislative Authority and Separation of Powers.

Accountability For Nonenforcement, Urska Velikonja

Notre Dame Law Review

Changes in enforcement can move in more than one direction: enforcement can increase significantly as the Securities and Exchange Commission saw in the aftermath of the accounting scandals or the Madoff Ponzi scheme, and decrease precipitously, as evidenced at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau under Acting Director Mick Mulvaney. There is no reason in constitutional or administrative law to treat changes in enforcement policy differently depending on whether enforcement increases or decreases. Policy choices raise similar questions about reviewability and accountability, regardless of whether they increase or decrease enforcement. They also raise symmetrical questions about fair notice and due process …

Past, Present, And Precedent In Lucia, Gillian E. Metzger

Faculty Scholarship

Much of the debate in Lucia has focused on history, and more particularly on the original understanding of who counted as an officer at the founding. As Neil Kinkopf notes, this reflects in part the paucity of Supreme Court precedent on the meaning of inferior officer; it also reflects the originalist focus of many contemporary attacks on current administrative arrangements, as well as of recent leading scholarship on the Appointments Clause.

Analyzing Justice Cardozo’S Opinions On The Constitutionality Of The New Deal, Robert J. Pushaw Jr

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.