Administrative Law Commons^™

King's Domain, Mila Sohoni

Notre Dame Law Review

In King v. Burwell, the Supreme Court called the tax-credit provision of the Affordable Care Act ambiguous—but then invoked the major questions exception to Chevron deference and proceeded to resolve the provision’s meaning for itself. Litigants and commentators quickly recognized that King had the potential to destabilize Chevron. If King exempts from Chevron deference anything that is “major,” then Chevron’s significance will necessarily be diminished, as agencies will only enjoy deference on their answers to questions of “minor” import; the major questions exception may swallow Chevron’s rule.

This Essay, prepared for a symposium held by the …

Chevron Step Two's Domain, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker

Notre Dame Law Review

An increasing number of judges, policymakers, and scholars have advocated eliminating or narrowing Chevron deference—a two-step inquiry under which courts defer to federal agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes the agencies administer. Much of the debate centers on either Chevron’s domain (i.e., when Chevron should apply at all) or how courts ascertain statutory ambiguity at Chevron’s first step. Largely lost in this debate on constraining agency discretion is the role of Chevron’s second step: whether the agency’s resolution of a statutory ambiguity is reasonable. Drawing on the most comprehensive study of Chevron in the circuit courts, this …

The Ambiguous Ambiguity Inquiry: Seeking To Clarify Judicial Determinations Of Clarity Versus Ambiguity In Statutory Interpretation, Meredith A. Holland

Notre Dame Law Review

This Note will apply Judge Kavanaugh’s proposed mechanism to the interpretation of the Title IX prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex. Part I discusses recent cases decided by the Roberts Court that demonstrate the difficulties with the current jurisprudential approach to the clarity versus ambiguity determination. Part II explores Judge Kavanaugh’s recent proposal for reducing threshold findings of ambiguity. Part III considers various interpretive methods and applies Judge Kavanaugh’s proposal in the context of Title IX. Finally, this Note concludes that Judge Kavanaugh’s approach, while most dramatically transforming the purposivist approach, also has consequences for the textualist inquiry.

Chevron Step Two's Domain, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker

Scholarly Works

An increasing number of judges, policymakers, and scholars have advocated eliminating or narrowing Chevron deference—a two-step inquiry under which courts defer to federal agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes the agencies administer. Much of the debate centers on either Chevron’s domain (i.e., when Chevron should apply at all) or how courts ascertain statutory ambiguity at Chevron’s first step. Largely lost in this debate on constraining agency discretion is the role of Chevron’s second step: whether the agency’s resolution of a statutory ambiguity is reasonable. Drawing on the most comprehensive study of Chevron in the circuit courts, this Essay explores how …

Administrative Law's Political Dynamics, Kent H. Barnett, Christina L. Boyd, Christopher J. Walker

Scholarly Works

Over thirty years ago, the Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. commanded courts to uphold federal agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes as long as those interpretations are reasonable. This Chevron deference doctrine was based in part on the Court’s desire to temper administrative law’s political dynamics by vesting federal agencies, not courts, with primary authority to make policy judgments about ambiguous laws Congress charged the agencies to administer. Despite this express objective, scholars such as Frank Cross, Emerson Tiller, and Cass Sunstein have empirically documented how politics influence circuit court review of agency statutory …

Administrative Law's Political Dynamics, Christina L. Boyd, Kent Barnett, Christopher J. Walker

Scholarship@WashULaw

Over thirty years ago, the Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. commanded courts to uphold federal agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes as long as those interpretations are reasonable. This Chevron deference doctrine was based in part on the Court’s desire to temper administrative law’s political dynamics by vesting federal agencies, not courts, with primary authority to make policy judgments about ambiguous laws Congress charged the agencies to administer. Despite this express objective, scholars such as Frank Cross, Emerson Tiller, and Cass Sunstein have empirically documented how politics influence circuit court review of agency statutory …

Chevron Patterns In The Circuit Courts, Christina L. Boyd, Kent Barnett, Christopher J. Walker

Scholarship@WashULaw

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC required courts to defer to federal agencies reasonable interpretation of ambiguous statutes that are administered through the agency. However, recently this “Chevron deference” has been called into question by the judiciary, the legal academy, and Congress. In this essay we briefly describe and highlight three of the most noteworthy findings from our empirical study of over 1,300 decisions of agency statutory interpretation (based on articles published in Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (2017) (Barnett and Walker); Chevron Step Two’s Domain, 93 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1441 (2018) (Barnett and Walker); …

Revisiting Seminole Rock, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski

Journal Articles

The rule that reviewing courts must defer to agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations has come under scrutiny in recent years. Critics contend that this doctrine, often associated with the 1997 Supreme Court decision Auer v. Robbins, violates the separation of powers, gives agencies perverse regulatory incentives, and undermines the judiciary’s duty to say what the law is.
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/="/">This essay offers a different argument as to why Auer is literally and prosaically bad law. Auer deference appears to be grounded on a misunderstanding of its originating case, the 1945 decision Bowles v. Seminole Rock. A closer look at …

Mind The Gap: Supreme Court Contraction Of Legal Discretion For The Executive Branch, Steven Ferrey

Suffolk University Law School Faculty Works

The Supreme Court, for the first time, elevated economic calculation to function as the fulcrum leveraging and allocating law-making power between the branches of government.

The federal agency regulation before the Supreme Court was estimated by the agency to impose approximately $9.6 billion in costs annually on the U.S. economy, to realize direct public benefits of $4-5 million annually. This is approximately a 2,000:1 negative cost/direct benefit ratio, before counting indirect ‘co-benefits.’ There is now new pressure to “change the math” by which the agency performs the now-required cost consideration. Incidental ‘co-benefits,’ if allowed to be considered, change the result. …

Chevron In The Circuit Courts: The Codebook Appendix, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker

Scholarly Works

For our empirical study on the use of Chevron deference in the federal courts of appeals, we utilized the following Codebook. This Codebook draws substantially from the codebook appended to William Eskridge and Lauren Baer's pathbreaking study of administrative law's deference doctrines at the Supreme Court. Our research assistants and we followed the instructions below when coding judicial decisions. To address questions as they arose and to ensure consistent coding, we maintained close contact with each other and our research assistants throughout the project and clarified the Codebook to address additional issues. Further details concerning our methodology (and its limitations) …

The Ambiguity Of Redesignation: What Is 'Applicable' Under The Clean Air Act?, Andrew Miller

Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology

No abstract provided.

Short-Circuiting The New Major Questions Doctrine, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker

Scholarly Works

In Minor Courts, Major Questions, Michael Coenen and Seth Davis advance perhaps the most provocative proposal to date to address the new major questions doctrine articulated in King v. Burwell. They argue that the Supreme Court alone should identify “major questions” that deprive agencies of interpretive primacy, prohibiting the doctrine’s use in the lower courts. Although we agree that the Court provided little guidance about the doctrine’s scope in King v. Burwell, we are unpersuaded that the solution to this lack of guidance is to limit its doctrinal development to one court that hears fewer than eighty cases per year. …

Chevron In The Circuit Courts, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker

Scholarly Works

This Article presents findings from the most comprehensive empirical study to date on how the federal courts of appeals have applied Chevron deference—the doctrine under which courts defer to a federal agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute that it administers. Based on 1,558 agency interpretations the circuit courts reviewed from 2003 through 2013 (where they cited Chevron), we found that the circuit courts overall upheld 71% of interpretations and applied Chevron deference 77% of the time. But there was nearly a twenty-five-percentage-point difference in agency-win rates when the circuit courts applied Chevron deference than when they did not. Among …

Administrative Dissents, Sharon B. Jacobs

Publications

Commissioners, like judges, dissent. They do so at length, with vigor, and with persistence. Yet while separate judicial decisions are the subject of a rich literature, their administrative counterparts have long languished in obscurity. A closer look is warranted, however, because studying administrative dissent can enhance our understanding of internal agency operations as well as the relationships between agencies and other actors. This Article presents the results of an original review of separate statements at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission dating back four decades. It uses these findings to move beyond two common generalizations about …

Against Administrative Judges, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

The single largest cadre of federal adjudicators goes largely ignored by scholars, policymakers, courts, and even litigating parties. These Administrative Judges or “AJs,” often confused with well-known federal Administrative Law Judges or “ALJs,” operate by the thousands in numerous federal agencies. Yet unlike ALJs, the significantly more numerous AJs preside over less formal hearings and have no significant statutory protections to preserve their impartiality. The national press has recently called attention to the alleged unfairness of certain ALJ proceedings, and regulated parties have successfully enjoined agencies’ use of ALJs. While fixes are necessary for ALJ adjudication, any solution that ignores …

Why The Supreme Court Might Not Overrule Seminole Rock, Conor Clarke

Scholarship@WashULaw

Predictions are hard, especially about the future. It’s much safer to hide behind a broad trend: There was a time, just a couple of years ago, when it seemed like Auer and Seminole Rock were not long for this world. Auer’s author, Justice Scalia, turned his back on the doctrine. The tide of scholarly opinion—led by former Scalia clerk John Manning—seemed to rise comfortably, almost casually, in opposition to Auer. Fueled by a few encouraging concurrences, cases percolated through the federal courts that seemed to provide a ripe opportunity for review.

But no longer. The Court reaffirmed Auer last year. …

Without Deference, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski

Journal Articles

This essay explores what judicial review of agency interpretations of law would look like if the Supreme Court abandoned Chevron deference in favor de novo review. It concludes that such an alternative regime has appealing features, but may not bring as much immediate, practical change as many critiques or defenses of Chevron presume. The largest change would come from how we think about law and policy in the administrative state. The theoretical scaffolding that would uphold a regime of non-deferential review is far more classical in cast than the moderate legal realism underwriting Chevron. The more traditional character of this …

Reflections On Seminole Rock: The Past, Present, And Future Of Deference To Agency Regulatory Interpretations, Gillian E. Metzger, Aaron Nielson, Sanne H. Knudsen, Amy J. Wildermuth, Aditya Bamzai, Richard J. Pierce, Cynthia Barmore, William Yeatman, Christopher J. Walker, Kevin M. Stack, Andy Grewal, Steve R. Johnson, F. Andrew Hessick, Jonathan H. Adler, Catherine M. Sharkey, David Feder, Cass R. Sunstein, Adrian Vermeule, Ronald M. Levin, Kevin O. Leske, James Cleith Phillips, Daniel Ortner, William Funk, Kristen E. Hickman, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Adam White, Conor Clarke

Faculty Scholarship

Seminole Rock (or Auer) deference has captured the attention of scholars, policymakers, and the judiciary. That is why Notice & Comment, the blog of the Yale Journal on Regulation and the American Bar Association’s Section of Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice, hosted an online symposium from September 12 to September 23, 2016 on the subject. This symposium contains over 20 contributions addressing different aspects of Seminole Rock deference.

Topics include:

• History of Seminole Rock
• Empirical Examinations of Seminole Rock
• Understanding Seminole Rock Within Agencies
• Understanding Seminole Rock as Applied to Tax, Environmental Law, and Criminal Sentencing
• Why Seminole Rock Matters …

Means And Ends In City Of Arlington V. Fcc: Ignoring The Lawyer's Craft To Reshape The Scope Of Chevron Deference, Michael P. Healy

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

In last year's term, the United States Supreme Court considered the question of the scope of Chevron deference in City of Arlington v. FCC. This article discusses how the decision is an example of the work of an activist Court. The case should have been resolved by a straightforward determination under the analysis of United States v. Mead that Chevron deference simply did not apply to the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) legal determination. The Court ignored this restrained approach to the case and instead addressed the question the Justices desired to decide: the reach of Chevron deference. The article …

Codifying Chevmore, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

This Article considers the significance and promise of Congress’s unprecedented codification of the well-known Chevron and Skidmore judicial-deference doctrines (to which I refer collectively as “Chevmore”). Congress did so in the Dodd-Frank Act by instructing courts to apply the Skidmore deference factors when reviewing certain agency-preemption decisions and by referring to Chevron throughout.

This codification is meaningful because it informs the delegation theory that undergirds Chevmore (i.e., that Congress intends to delegate interpretive primacy over statutory interpretation to agencies under Chevron or courts under Skidmore). Scholars and at least three Supreme Court Justices have decried the judicial inquiry into congressional …

Chevron'S Legacy, Justice Scalia's Two Enigmatic Dissents, And His Return To The Fold In City Of Arlington, Tex. V. Fcc, Stephen J. Leacock

Catholic University Law Review

The creation by the judiciary of the doctrine of Chevron deference to administrative agencies’ determinations, followed by the judiciary’s application and supervision of the Chevron deference doctrine in Administrative Law continue. Protection by the judiciary of the evolution of the doctrine also continues as an integral component of the judiciary’s contribution to the central objective of the three coequal branches of government to achieve for the United States a more perfect union. However, synergistic cooperation between the three branches in order to achieve that central objective requires that each branch honor its own constitutional obligation under the United States Constitution …

Agency Adjudication And Judicial Nondelegation: An Article Iii Canon, Mila Sohoni

Northwestern University Law Review

The rules governing judicial review of adjudication by federal agencies are insensitive to a critical separation of powers principle. Article III jurisprudence requires different treatment of agency adjudication depending on whether the agency is adjudicating a “private right” or a “public right.” When agencies adjudicate private rights, review of the agency adjudication must be available to an Article III court on a direct appellate basis. In contrast, Article III jurisprudence does not require review to an Article III court on a direct appellate basis of agency adjudications of purely public rights. That means that federal courts reviewing agency adjudications of …

Formalism And Deference In Administration Law, Kristen E. Hickman, Jide O. Nzelibe, Thomas W. Merrill, Philip A. Hamburger, Jennifer Walker Elrod

Faculty Scholarship

The topic for discussion is formalism and deference in administrative law. As we know, the landmark case of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council has changed the face of modern administrative law. The panel will address the rightness and limitations of Chevron deference, especially in the context of agency decisions on the scope of the agencies’ jurisdictional mandates. Should the federal courts defer, or should they not defer in this context? We need guidance. Justices Scalia and Thomas recently differed from Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Alito on these issues. Who is right, and why? Does the answer …

Three Steps Forward: Shared Regulatory Space, Deference, And The Role Of The Court, Amanda Shami

Fordham Law Review

When a party files suit challenging the legitimacy of an agency’s interpretation of its governing statute, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. instructs courts to defer to the agency’s interpretation where (1) the court has found that Congress had not foreclosed the agency’s interpretation, and (2) the agency’s interpretation was a reasonable or permissible exercise of its authority. However, sometimes Congress enacts statutes delegating authority over a given regulatory space to more than one agency. When two agencies have shared authority under the same regulatory scheme, those agencies may disagree regarding the interpretation of certain provisions that …

Improving Agencies’ Preemption Expertise With Chevmore Codification, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

After nearly thirty years, the judicially crafted Chevron and Skidmore judicial-review doctrines have found new life as exotic, yet familiar, legislative tools. When Chevron deference applies, courts employ two steps: they consider whether the statutory provision at issue is ambiguous, and, if so, they defer to an administering agency’s reasonable interpretation. Skidmore deference, in contrast, is a less deferential regime in which courts assume interpretative primacy over statutory ambiguities but defer to agency action based on four factors — the agency’s thoroughness, reasoning, consistency, and overall persuasiveness. In the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Congress directed courts …

Federalism At Step Zero, Miriam Seifter

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

Chevron At The Roberts Court: Still Failing After All These Years, Jack M. Beermann

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

Step Zero After City Of Arlington, Thomas W. Merrill

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

Chevron’S Generality Principles, Emily Hammond

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

Chevron Deference, The Rule Of Law, And Presidential Influence In The Administrative State, Peter M. Shane

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.