Administrative Law Commons^™

The Oira Transparency Problem, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

This article critiques the opacity of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), arguing that its centralized review process allows former officials to exploit loopholes in post-employment ethics statutes and asserts that this dynamic undermines regulatory integrity and democratic accountability by allowing privileged access to influence high-stakes federal rulemakings.

Early Prerogative And Administrative Power: A Response To Paul Craig, Philip A. Hamburger

Faculty Scholarship

What does English experience imply about American constitutional law? My book, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?, argues that federal administrative power generally is unconstitutional. In supporting this conclusion, the book observes that eighteenth-century Americans adopted their constitutions not only with their eyes on the future, but also looking over their shoulder at the past – especially the English past. This much should not be controversial. There remain, however, all sorts of questions about how to understand the English history and its relevance for early Americans.

In opposition to my claims about American law, Paul Craig lobs three critiques from across the …

Chevron Bias, Philip A. Hamburger

Faculty Scholarship

This Article takes a fresh approach to Chevron deference. Chevron requires judges to defer to agency interpretations of statutes and justifies this on a theory of statutory authorization for agencies. This Article, however, points to a pair of constitutional questions about the role of judges – questions that have not yet been adequately asked, let alone answered.

One question concerns independent judgment. Judges have a constitutional office or duty of independent judgment, under which they must exercise their own independent judgment about what the law is. Accordingly, when they defer to agency interpretations of the law, it must be asked …

Differentiating Deference, Anya Bernstein

Faculty Scholarship

There is now some consensus that the context of a statutory term plays a crucial part in its meaning.1 The argument continues, however, over what "kinds of context ... matter."2 Building on scholarship that addresses the wide range of contexts that contribute to legal meaning,3 this Article illuminates two factors crucial to interpreting legal language: the social nature of meaning-making and the practical nature of interpretive competence. I locate my inquiry in the judicial review of agency statutory interpretation, a particularly fruitful arena for analyzing statutory interpretation more generally.

To fill the gap, Part I of this Article first illuminates …

Pepperdine University School Of Law; Legal Summaries, Nicole Banister

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

No abstract provided.

A Look Back: Developing Indiana Law; Post-Bench Reflections Of An Indiana Supreme Court Justice; Selected Developments In Indiana Administrative Law (1989-2012), Frank Sullivan Jr.

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

No abstract provided.

Striving For Efficiency In Administrative Litigation: North Carolina's Office Of Administrative Hearings, Julian Mann Iii

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

No abstract provided.

The Origins Of Legislation, Ganesh Sitaraman

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Although legislation is at the center of legal debates on statutory interpretation, administrative law, and delegation, little is known about how legislation is actually drafted. If scholars pay any attention to Congress at all, they tend to focus on what happens after legislation is introduced, ignoring how the draft came to exist in the first place. In other words, they focus on the legislative process, not the drafting process. The result is that our account of Congress, the legislative process, and the administrative state is impoverished, and debates in statutory interpretation and administrative law are incomplete. This Article seeks to …

An Administrative Jurisprudence: The Rule Of Law In The Administrative State, Kevin M. Stack

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This Essay offers a specification of the rule of law's demands of administrative law and government inspired by Professor Peter L. Strauss's scholarship. It identifies five principles'authorization, notice, justification, coherence, and procedural fairness which provide a framework for an account of the rule of law's demands of administrative governance. Together these principles have intriguing results for the evaluation of administrative law. On the one hand, they reveal rule-of-law foundations for some contested positions, such as a restrictive view of the President's power to direct subordinate officials and giving weight to an agency's determination of the scope of its own authority. …

Engines Of Environmental Innovation: Reflections On The Role Of States In The U.S. Regulatory System, Alexandra Dapolito Dunn, Chandos Culleen

Pace Environmental Law Review

This article focuses on the role that states play in environmental regulation. Specifically, this article offers examples of the central part in the evolution of United States environmental regulation states played in the past, continue to play today, and will play in the future. First, this article explores the history of state environmental regulation, demonstrating that despite a lack of resources, states were actively engaged in environmental regulation before the advent of the modern era of federal environmental regulation in the 1970s. This article relates not only the regulatory efforts of states, but also the practical benefits of state regulation. …

From Fedspeak To Forward Guidance: Regulatory Dimensions Of Central Bank Communications, Robert B. Ahdieh

Faculty Scholarship

In the face of the financial crisis that engulfed the globe beginning in 2007, the U.S. Federal Reserve quickly found itself without the key lever of monetary policy on which it had traditionally relied: short-term interest rate adjustments designed to move long-term rates, and thereby expected levels of lending, investment, and capital retention. By late 2008, short-term rates were already close to zero, yet unemployment remained strikingly high – with no sign of any likely renewal of bank lending or commercial investment.

Famously, the Fed embraced so-called quantitative easing – the purchase of massive volumes of public and private debt …

Benson V. State Engineer, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 409 (Sep. 24, 2015), Cassandra Ramey

Nevada Supreme Court Summaries

The Court held that NRS § 533.395 requires a party seeking relief from the cancellation of a water permit to exhaust all available administrative remedies before seeking judicial review, even if the State Engineer is not authorized to provide the particular remedy that the party seeks. If the State Engineer is authorized by NRS § 533.395 to provide a party with a remedy, then the doctrine of futility does not apply to excuse the NRS § 533.394(4) exhaustion requirement. Therefore, the party must first show that the administrative process would afford him or her “no relief at all” before seeking …

Tate V. State, Bd. Of Med. Exam’Rs, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 67 (Sep. 10, 2015), Nancy Snow

Nevada Supreme Court Summaries

The Court considers an appeal from a district court order denying an injunction challenging the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting stay of Board of Medical Examiners decision. The Court revered and remanded the district court’s order because the statute prohibiting district courts from entering a stay of a decision of the Board of Medical Examiners pending judicial review violates the separation of powers doctrine as a matter of first impression.

The Brazilian Clean Company Act: Using Institutional Multiplicity For Effective Punishment, Mariana Mota Prado, Lindsey Carson, Izabela Correa

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

In Brazil’s battle against corruption over the past two decades, there has been significant progress associated with the systems of oversight and investigation but very little progress in holding corrupt actors legally accountable for their transgressions. We suggest that until very recently this could be partially explained by the fact that there was institutional multiplicity (i.e., duplication of functions) in oversight and investigative institutions, while at the punishment stage, a single and underperforming institution—the judiciary—exercised monopolistic authority. To circumvent the limits associated with Brazilian courts, the government is increasingly relying on administrative sanctions for corruption. It is in this context …

Changing The Rules Of The Game: Beyond Disclosure Framework For Securities Regulation, Jena Martin

West Virginia Law Review

No abstract provided.

Occupational Safety And Health Act, Industrial Union V. American Petroleum Institute, Patrick M. Vitone

Akron Law Review

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration [hereinafter cited as OSHA] was created pursuant to Title 29 of the United States Code, to define the terms of this battle. In Industrial Union v. American Petroleum Institute, the federal judiciary has taken a hand at making these terms somewhat more clear. It is the object of this casenote to analyze the impact of the Industrial Union decision on the regulatory processes of OSHA, a task which involves a synthesis of the plurality, concurring and dissenting opinions.

Judicial Review Of An Administrative Agency Rescission: Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association V. State Farm Mutal Automobile Insurance Company, Margot F. Reagan

Akron Law Review

This casenote will summarize the legislative and political history of Standard 208. The casenote will then analyze the Supreme Court's recent decision in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual. It will conclude by considering the judicial review of administrative rulemaking and how the Court's decision will affect such review in the area of rescission of an agency action.

The Bayh–Dole Act & Public Rights In Federally Funded Inventions: Will The Agencies Ever Go Marching In?, Ryan Whalen

Northwestern University Law Review

For over thirty years, the Bayh–Dole Act has granted federal agencies the power to force the recipients of federal research funding to license the resulting inventions to third parties. Despite having this expansive power, no federal agency has ever seen fit to utilize it. This Note explores why Bayh–Dole march-in rights have never been used, and proposes reforms that would help ensure that, in the instances when they are most required, the public is able to access the inventions it bankrolled.

There have been five documented march-in petitions since the Bayh–Dole Act was passed into law. Each petition was dismissed …

Purposivism In The Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes, Kevin M. Stack

Northwestern University Law Review

After decades of debate, the lines of distinction between textualism and purposivism have been carefully drawn with respect to the judicial task of statutory interpretation. Far less attention has been devoted to the question of how executive branch officials approach statutory interpretation. While scholars have contrasted agencies’ interpretive practices from those of courts, they have not yet developed a theory of agency statutory interpretation.

This Article develops a purposivist theory of agency statutory interpretation on the ground that regulatory statutes oblige agencies to implement the statutes they administer in that manner. Regulatory statutes not only grant powers but also impose …

A Triptych Of Regulators: A New Perspective On The Administrative State, Yair Sagy

Akron Law Review

In combining past and present perspectives, this Article makes an important contribution to the literature: by isolating the three general prototypes pervading the literature, it introduces a greater degree of theoretical precision to the understanding of public regulation, and goes on to demonstrate how current regulatory schemes can be better understood using the triad of prototypes. This Article also suggests why we can expect these types to persist in future public regulation. At the same time, this Article joins and contributes to the study of the intellectual history of U.S. regulation by identifying deep undercurrents running throughout that history.

Pepperdine University School Of Law Legal Summaries, Nicole Banister

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

No abstract provided.

Optimal Abuse Of Power, Adrian Vermeule

Northwestern University Law Review

I will argue that in the administrative state, in contrast to classical constitutional theory, the abuse of government power is not something to be strictly minimized, but rather optimized. An administrative regime will tolerate a predictable level of misrule, even abuse of power, as the inevitable byproduct of attaining other ends that are desirable overall.

There are three principal grounds for this claim. First, the architects of the modern administrative state were not only worried about misrule by governmental officials. They were equally worried about “private” misrule—misrule effected through the self-interested or self-serving behavior of economic actors wielding and abusing …

Means And Ends In City Of Arlington V. Fcc: Ignoring The Lawyer's Craft To Reshape The Scope Of Chevron Deference, Michael P. Healy

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

In last year's term, the United States Supreme Court considered the question of the scope of Chevron deference in City of Arlington v. FCC. This article discusses how the decision is an example of the work of an activist Court. The case should have been resolved by a straightforward determination under the analysis of United States v. Mead that Chevron deference simply did not apply to the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) legal determination. The Court ignored this restrained approach to the case and instead addressed the question the Justices desired to decide: the reach of Chevron deference. The article …

Self-Represented Litigants, Active Adjudication And The Perception Of Bias: Issues In Administrative Law, Michelle Flaherty

Dalhousie Law Journal

This paper advocates for a more active role for adjudicators, one in which they provide direction to parties and actively shape the hearing process. Active adjudication can be an important access to justice tool. Without some direction and assistance from the adjudicator, growing numbers of self-represented litigants cannot meaningfully access administrative justice. Importantly, however, as the role of the adjudicator shifts, so too must our understanding of the notion of impartiality If it is unfair to expect self-represented litigants to navigate the hearing process without adjudicative assistance and direction, it is also unfair to insist on a vision of impartiality …

Codifying Chevmore, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

This Article considers the significance and promise of Congress’s unprecedented codification of the well-known Chevron and Skidmore judicial-deference doctrines (to which I refer collectively as “Chevmore”). Congress did so in the Dodd-Frank Act by instructing courts to apply the Skidmore deference factors when reviewing certain agency-preemption decisions and by referring to Chevron throughout.

This codification is meaningful because it informs the delegation theory that undergirds Chevmore (i.e., that Congress intends to delegate interpretive primacy over statutory interpretation to agencies under Chevron or courts under Skidmore). Scholars and at least three Supreme Court Justices have decried the judicial inquiry into congressional …

Chevron'S Legacy, Justice Scalia's Two Enigmatic Dissents, And His Return To The Fold In City Of Arlington, Tex. V. Fcc, Stephen J. Leacock

Catholic University Law Review

The creation by the judiciary of the doctrine of Chevron deference to administrative agencies’ determinations, followed by the judiciary’s application and supervision of the Chevron deference doctrine in Administrative Law continue. Protection by the judiciary of the evolution of the doctrine also continues as an integral component of the judiciary’s contribution to the central objective of the three coequal branches of government to achieve for the United States a more perfect union. However, synergistic cooperation between the three branches in order to achieve that central objective requires that each branch honor its own constitutional obligation under the United States Constitution …

The Enigma Of Engineering's Industrial Exemption To Licensure: The Exception That Swallowed A Profession, Paul M. Spinden

Faculty Publications and Presentations

No abstract provided.

Agency Publicity In The Internet Era, Nathan Cortez

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

This Report, prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), details how federal agencies use modern forms of publicity - including press releases, agency web sites, searchable online databases, and social media - to achieve regulatory ends. It evaluates the benefits and burdens of modern agency publicity practices, using three agencies as case studies: the Food and Drug Administration (FDA); the Federal Trade Commission (FTC); and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). Part V recommends a series of largely procedural reforms that balance the need for public disclosure with the need to protect those potentially injured by adverse …

Regulatory Exit, J.B. Ruhl, James Salzman

Faculty Scholarship

Exit is a ubiquitous feature of life, whether breaking up in a marriage, dropping a college course, or pulling out of a venture capital investment. In fact, our exit options often determine whether and how we enter in the first place. While legal scholarship is replete with studies of exit strategies for businesses and individuals, the topic of exit has barely been touched in administrative law scholarship. Yet exit plays just as central a role in the regulatory state as elsewhere – welfare support ends; government steps out of rate-setting. In this article, we argue that exit is a fundamental …

Democratic Rulemaking, John M. De Figueiredo, Edward H. Stiglitz

Faculty Scholarship

This paper examines to what extent agency rulemaking is democratic. It reviews theories of administrative rulemaking in light of two normative benchmarks: a “democratic” benchmark based on voter preferences, and a “republican” benchmark based on the preferences of elected representatives. It then evaluates how the empirical evidence lines up in light of these two approaches. The paper concludes with a discussion of avenues for future research.