Administrative Law Commons^™

The Diffusion Of Regulatory Oversight, Jonathan B. Wiener

Faculty Scholarship

The idea of cost-benefit analysis has been spreading internationally for centuries — at least since an American named Benjamin Franklin wrote a letter in 1772 to his British friend, Joseph Priestley, recommending that Priestley weigh the pros and cons of a difficult decision in what Franklin dubbed a “moral or prudential algebra” (Franklin 1772) (more on this letter below). Several recent studies show that the use of benefit-cost analysis (BCA), for both public projects and public regulation of private activities, is now unfolding in countries on every habitable continent around the world (Livermore and Revesz 2013; Quah and Toh 2012; …

Administrative Replacements: How Much Can They Do?, Laurie L. Levenson

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Auditor For The Auditors' Auditor: Accounting For The Unitary Executive In Free Enterprise Fund V. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, Kelsey Elizabeth Stapler

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Comparing Regulatory Oversight Bodies Across The Atlantic: The Office Of Information And Regulatory Affairs In The Us And The Impact Assessment Board In The Eu, Jonathan B. Wiener, Alberto Alemanno

Faculty Scholarship

‘Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?’ asked the Roman poet Juvenal – ‘who will watch the watchers, who will guard the guardians?’ As legislative and regulatory processes around the globe progressively put greater emphasis on impact assessment and accountability, we ask: who oversees the regulators? Although regulation can often be necessary and beneficial, it can also impose its own costs. As a result, many governments have embraced, or are considering embracing, regulatory oversight--frequently relying on economic analysis as a tool of evaluation. We are especially interested in the emergence over the last four decades of a new set of institutional actors, the …

Imperfect Principals And Lobbyist Agency Costs, Jack M. Beermann

Shorter Faculty Works

One of the secrets to scholarly success is picking interesting topics. It also helps if your analysis makes an interesting topic even more interesting. That’s exactly what Matthew Stephenson and Howell Jackson have done in their essay Lobbyists as Imperfect Agents: Implications for Public Policy in a Pluralist System, 47 Harv. J. Legis. 1 (2010). In this well-written and engaging essay, Stephenson and Jackson describe how principal-agent problems manifest themselves in the lobbying context and hypothesize on how these manifestations might affect public policy outcomes.

Wherever there are principals and agents, there are principal-agent problems, but the lobbying context …

Confession Of Error By Administrative Agencies, Alexander L. Merritt

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Ordinary Administrative Law As Constitutional Common Law, Gillian E. Metzger

Faculty Scholarship

Henry Monaghan famously argued that much of constitutional interpretation takes the form of what he termed constitutional common law, a body of doctrines and rules that are constitutionally inspired but not constitutionally required and that can be altered or reversed by Congress. This Essay argues that a fair amount of ordinary administrative law qualifies as constitutional common law: Constitutional concerns permeate core administrative law doctrines and requirements, yet Congress enjoys broad power to alter ordinary administrative law notwithstanding its constitutional aspect. Unfortunately, the constitutional common law character of much of ordinary administrative law is rarely acknowledged by courts. A striking …

Ernst Freund, Felix Frankfurter And The American Rechtsstaat: A Transatlantic Shipwreck, 1894-1932, Daniel R. Ernst

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

From the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 through the New Deal, American legislators commonly endowed administrative agencies with broad discretionary power. They did so over the objections of an intellectual founder of the American administrative state. The American-born, German-educated lawyer and political scientist Ernst Freund developed an Americanized version of the Rechtsstaat—a government bound by fixed and definite rules—in an impressive body of scholarship between 1894 and 1915. In 1920 he eagerly took up an offer from the Commonwealth Fund to finance a comprehensive study of administration in the United States. Here was his chance to show …

Removal To Federal Courts From State Administrative Agencies: Reevaluating The Functional Test, Erica B. Haggard

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Advertising Trends And Consumer Protection: Hearing Before The S. Comm. On Commerce, Science And Transportation, 111th Cong., July 22, 2009 (Statement Of David Vladeck, Geo. U. L. Center), David C. Vladeck

Testimony Before Congress

No abstract provided.

The Solicitor General As Mediator Between Court And Agency, Margaret H. Lemos

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

No Two-Stepping In The Laboratories: State Deference Standards And Their Implications For Improving Chevron Doctrine, Michael Pappas

Faculty Scholarship

This article examines the deference standards that the various states apply to agency statutory interpretation and analyzes the implications for the federal Chevron doctrine. First, the article surveys state standards for reviewing agencies' statutory interpretation, finding that none of the state standards exactly follows the federal Chevron test but that state standards fall into one of four categories ranging from "strong deference" to "de novo with deference discouraged." The article then examines four particular state standards in depth, discovering that states tend to use the same methods, tools, and processes for statutory interpretation despite the different announced degrees of deference. …

The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes And The Nondelegation Doctrine, Margaret H. Lemos

Faculty Scholarship

The nondelegation doctrine is the subject of a vast and everexpanding body of scholarship. But nondelegation literature, like nondelegation law, focuses almost exclusively on delegations of power to administrative agencies. It ignores Congress's other delegate-the federal judiciary.

This Article brings courts into the delegation picture. It demonstrates that, just as agencies exercise a lawmaking function when they fill in the gaps left by broad statutory delegations of power, so too do courts. The nondelegation doctrine purports to limit the amount of lawmaking authority Congress can cede to another institution without violating the separation of powers. Although typically considered only with …

Regulatory Preemption: Are Federal Agencies Usurping Congressional And State Authority?: Hearing Before The S. Comm. On The Judiciary,, 110th Cong., Sept. 12, 2007 (Statement Of Viet D. Dinh, Geo. U. L. Center), Viet D. Dinh

Testimony Before Congress

No abstract provided.

Regulatory Preemption: Hearing Before The S. Comm. On The Judiciary, 110th Cong., Sept. 12, 2007 (Statement Of David C. Vladeck, Geo. U. L. Center), David C. Vladeck

Testimony Before Congress

No abstract provided.

Amending Executive Order 12866: Good Governance Or Regulatory Usurpation? Part I And Part Ii: Hearing Before The H. Comm. On Science And Technology, 110th Cong., Feb. 13, 2007 (Statement Of Professor David C. Vladeck, Geo. U. L. Center), David C. Vladeck

Testimony Before Congress

No abstract provided.

Judicial Deference To Administrative Agencies And Its Limits, Graham G. Martin, David A. Super

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Policy Analysis For Natural Hazards: Some Cautionary Lessons From Environmental Policy Analysis, Matthew D. Adler

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Climate Change And The Clean Air Act, Lisa Heinzerling

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In Massachusetts v. EPA, petitioners - twelve states, three cities, an American territory, and numerous health and environmental groups - have asked the Supreme Court to hold that the Clean Air Act gives EPA the power to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles and that EPA may not decline to exercise this power based on statutorily irrelevant factors. The problem petitioners ultimately seek to address - climate change - is unique in its scope and complexity. But the legal issues before the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA are neither particularly grand nor particularly complex. They are the kinds of …

Statutory Interpretation In The Era Of Oira, Lisa Heinzerling

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In recent years, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has asserted a remarkable degree of authority over administrative agencies' rulemaking processes. One of the ways in which OIRA has exercised power over agencies has been to foist upon them its own views about the requirements of the statutes under which they operate. The most notable trend in this area has been OIRA's insistence on converting technology-based environmental laws into cost-benefit laws. In OIRA's hands, for example, the Clean Water Act ("the Act") is being transformed from a technology- based regime …

Justification, Legitimacy, And Administrative Governance, Matthew D. Adler

Faculty Scholarship

Richard Stewart, in his classic article ‘The Reformation of American Administrative Law,’ argues that the demise of the ’transmission belt’ model of administrative governance creates a crisis of agency legitimacy, and he skeptically surveys a range of possible solutions to the legitimacy crisis. I claim that Stewart’s skepticism is misguided. It may be true that no feasible administrative structure is democratically legitimate; but it is also true, given the logic of moral justification, that in every choice situation confronted by agency decisionmakers, or by those who design agencies, there is some morally permissible and justified choice (perhaps a choice that …

Applying Cost-Benefit To Past Decisions: Was Environmental Protection Ever A Good Idea?, Lisa Heinzerling, Frank Ackerman, Rachel Massey

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this Article, however, we do not mount a critique from outside the technique of cost-benefit analysis. Instead, we examine an argument that proponents of cost-benefit analysis have offered as a linchpin of the case for cost-benefit: that this technique is neither anti- nor pro-regulatory, but rather a neutral tool for evaluating public policy. In making this argument, these proponents have often invoked the use of cost-benefit analysis to support previous regulatory decisions (their favorite example involves the phase down of lead in gasoline, which we shall shortly discuss) as a sign that this technique can be used to support …

Administrative Adjudication In Kentucky: Ethics And Unauthorized Practice Considerations, Richard H. Underwood

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

This article is an extended version of a presentation I made at a training course for hearing officers sponsored by the Office of the Attorney General, Division of Administrative Hearings. In my original presentation, I was asked to focus on the ethics of the administrative adjudicator. I was asked to answer some specific questions, which I will include here for the reader's benefit. In this more complete treatment, I would also like to discuss the ethics of lawyers and other representatives appearing before administrative agencies.

The Kentucky Courts had begun to "judicialize" the administrative hearing process in the early 1970's, …

The Humbugs Of The Anti-Regulatory Movement, Lisa Heinzerling, Frank Ackerman

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

It is so hard to get beyond cynicism these days. Even a symposium devoted to this goal has, as reflected in the articles by Professors Cynthia Farina, Jeffrey Rachlinski, and Mark Seidenfeld, succeeded primarily in suggesting that regulators are not so much selfish as they are obtuse, stubborn, and sometimes downright dumb. Undoubtedly this is true some of the time. But Farina, Rachlinski, and Seidenfeld want to convince us that it is true enough of the time to warrant quite large-scale solutions. In this Comment, we take issue with this pessimistic assessment of regulatory behavior by discrediting the most prominent …

Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari, Minority Media And Telecommunications Council V. Md/Dc/De Broadcasters Ass'n, No. 01-639 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2001), Angela J. Campbell, Amy S. Wolverton

U.S. Supreme Court Briefs

No abstract provided.

Defending Courts: A Brief Rejoinder To Professors Fried And Rosenberg, David C. Vladeck

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Harvard Professors David Rosenberg and Charles Fried have presented a provocative, sweeping critique of the theoretical foundations of tort liability that leaves virtually no aspect of our current tort system untouched, or perhaps more accurately, unscathed. Their article throws down the gauntlet to defenders of traditional tort law. For instance, Rosenberg and Fried take aim at the jury system, arguing that ex post liability rules created by juries are inefficient and should be replaced, whenever possible, by ex ante liability rules set by legislative bodies. And they attack the idea that compensation plays a legitimate role in structuring our tort …

Schechter Poultry At The Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine For The Administrative State, Lisa Schultz Bressman

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The new delegation doctrine might seem perplexing to both sides of the current delegation debate. Either it is too intrusive on administrative prerogatives or it is not nearly intrusive enough. The new delegation doctrine is difficult to comprehend only because it evinces a different focus. While the debate concentrates primarily on the legitimacy of lawmaking by administrative agencies, the new doctrine speaks more to the goal of promoting the legitimacy of law made by administrative agencies. It might even be fair to say that, in this regard, the new doctrine moves beyond the academic debate. Moreover, the new doctrine neither …

Battle On The Benches: The Wagner Act And The Federal Circuit Courts Of Appeals, 1935-1942, Douglas J. Feeney-Gallagher

Seattle University Law Review

This paper examines the efforts of some circuit court judges to preserve the integrity of the judicial branch against the encroaching power of the New Deal administrative agencies, especially as represented by the National Labord Relations Board (NLRB). This paper offers a historical overview of the relationship between two circuits and the NLRB; one circuit welcomed the Board's aggressive enforcement of the Act, while the other expressed hostility towards the labor agency's powers and interpretation of the Wagner Act. An examination of the NLRB opinions in these two circuits illustrates the opposing judicial attitudes toward the new turn in labor …

Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, Matthew D. Adler, Eric A. Posner

Faculty Scholarship

Cost-benefit analysis is routinely used by government agencies in order to evaluate projects, but it remains controversial among academics. This paper argues that cost-benefit analysis is best understood as a welfarist decision procedure and that use of cost-benefit analysis is more likely to maximize overall well-being than is use of alternative decision-procedures. The paper focuses on the problem of distorted preference. A person's preferences are distorted when his or her satisfaction does not enhance that person's well-being. Preferences typically thought to be distorted in this sense include disinterested preferences, uninformed preferences, adaptive preferences, and objectively bad preferences; further, preferences may …

Introduction, To Cost-Benefit Analysis, Matthew D. Adler, Eric A. Posner

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.