Administrative Law Commons^™

The Right To Effective Self-Government, Katharina Pistor

Faculty Scholarship

Protecting individual rights is a core feature of democratic constitutionalism. The centralization of the means of coercion gave rise to the Hobbesian dilemma, the fear that this enormous power might be abused unless it be effectively controlled. In addition to dividing power among different branches of government or sharing it between the federation and its units, constitutions have fortified individual rights with judicial review and enforcement mechanisms against the executive branch to rein in state power.

Proposing a collective right to effective self-government sits oddly with a vision that pitches free individuals against an all-powerful state. Such a right can, …

A Scholarly Error And A Larger Truth, Philip A. Hamburger

Faculty Scholarship

Can Congress delegate its legislative power? The question has stimulated much recent scholarship, including Professor Nicholas Parrillo’s detailed study of the 1798 federal tax act. According to his article, the statute delegated binding rulemaking power. My recent SSRN draft Nondelegation Blues questions Parrillo’s conclusion. But now in this blog, he suggests that my article misreads his argument.

New Democracy: Finding Hope In The Past And Heavy Lifting For The Future, Kate Andrias

Faculty Scholarship

Bill Novak has written a remarkable book that debunks the myth that the American state was weak and unconcerned with providing for social welfare until it was transformed by the extraordinary leadership of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. He shows with compelling detail that the New Deal was not a magical or anomalous moment, but rather came about because of legal, institutional, socioeconomic, and democratic “heavy lifting” that occurred over the course of the preceding seventy years.

Of Presidents, Democracy, And Congress, Gillian E. Metzger

Faculty Scholarship

Put one good thing down for the Trump presidency: It inspired Peter Shane to take up the pen to detail the fallacies of unitary executive theory and other forms of aggressive presidentialism. In Democracy’s Chief Executive, Shane provides a clear and powerful account for why unitary executive theory — the claim that the president can control the entire federal bureaucracy, which Shane notes usually includes the propositions that the president can fire any subordinate executive branch officer at will and determine how any discretion delegated to the executive branch is exercised — fails. As he explains, such propositions are …

Ships Passing In The Night: The Communications Act And The Convergence On Broadband, Stuart Minor Benjamin

Faculty Scholarship

The Communications Act of 1934 and its amendments (the “Act”), and the regulations implementing them, have been enormously important to traditional telephony, broadcasting, and multichannel video. Meanwhile, the internet is barely mentioned in the Act. It thus might seem reasonable to conclude that the Act stands as a colossus and that the argument for overhauling it has grown much stronger as the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the “1996 Act”) becomes ever more outdated. In this Article I suggest otherwise. Specifically, I make three claims—one descriptive, one a bit speculative, and one normative. The descriptive claim is that significant portions of …

Nontraditional Investors, Jennifer S. Fan

Articles

In recent years, nontraditional investors have become a major player in the startup ecosystem. Under the regulatory regime of U.S. securities law, those in the public realm are heavily regulated, while those in the private realm are largely left alone. This public-private divide, which is a fundamental organizing principle of securities law, has eroded with the rise of nontraditional investors. While legal scholars have addressed the impact of some of these nontraditional investors individually, their collective impact on deal terms, deal timelines, due diligence, and board configuration has not been discussed in a holistic manner; neither has their impact on …

Removal Of Context: Blackstone, Limited Monarchy, And The Limits Of Unitary Originalism, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court's recent decisions that the President has an unconditional or indefeasible removal power rely on textual and historical assumptions and a "removal of context." This article focuses on the "executive power" part of the Vesting Clause and particularly the unitary theorists' misuse of Blackstone. Unitary executive theorists overlook the problems of relying on England's limited monarchy: the era's rise of Parliamentary supremacy over the Crown and its power to eliminate or regulate (i.e., make defeasible) royal prerogatives. Unitary theorists provide no evidence that executive removal was ever identified as a "royal prerogative" or a default royal power. The …